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author | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2017-07-24 17:20:13 +0200 |
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committer | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2017-07-24 17:20:13 +0200 |
commit | b920a38dc0a87f5884444d4731a8b887b5e16018 (patch) | |
tree | 5d845976a9471e705183db9afbbe7885e9070b52 /archival | |
parent | c810978552bc0133ba723ababaa178c8d53256e1 (diff) | |
download | busybox-w32-b920a38dc0a87f5884444d4731a8b887b5e16018.tar.gz busybox-w32-b920a38dc0a87f5884444d4731a8b887b5e16018.tar.bz2 busybox-w32-b920a38dc0a87f5884444d4731a8b887b5e16018.zip |
tar: postpone creation of symlinks with "suspicious" targets. Closes 8411
function old new delta
data_extract_all 968 1038 +70
tar_main 952 986 +34
scan_tree 258 262 +4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 3/0 up/down: 108/0) Total: 108 bytes
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'archival')
-rw-r--r-- | archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | archival/tar.c | 37 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | archival/tar_symlink_attack | 16 |
3 files changed, 71 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c index 1830ffb8d..1ce927c2f 100644 --- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c +++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c | |||
@@ -128,10 +128,11 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) | |||
128 | res = link(hard_link, dst_name); | 128 | res = link(hard_link, dst_name); |
129 | if (res != 0 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)) { | 129 | if (res != 0 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)) { |
130 | /* shared message */ | 130 | /* shared message */ |
131 | bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink " | 131 | bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'", |
132 | "%s to %s", "hard", | 132 | "hard", |
133 | dst_name, | 133 | dst_name, |
134 | hard_link); | 134 | hard_link |
135 | ); | ||
135 | } | 136 | } |
136 | /* Hardlinks have no separate mode/ownership, skip chown/chmod */ | 137 | /* Hardlinks have no separate mode/ownership, skip chown/chmod */ |
137 | goto ret; | 138 | goto ret; |
@@ -178,15 +179,44 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) | |||
178 | case S_IFLNK: | 179 | case S_IFLNK: |
179 | /* Symlink */ | 180 | /* Symlink */ |
180 | //TODO: what if file_header->link_target == NULL (say, corrupted tarball?) | 181 | //TODO: what if file_header->link_target == NULL (say, corrupted tarball?) |
182 | |||
183 | /* To avoid a directory traversal attack via symlinks, | ||
184 | * for certain link targets postpone creation of symlinks. | ||
185 | * | ||
186 | * For example, consider a .tar created via: | ||
187 | * $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt | ||
188 | * $ ln -s /tmp symlink | ||
189 | * $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink | ||
190 | * $ rm symlink | ||
191 | * $ mkdir symlink | ||
192 | * $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink/evil.py | ||
193 | * | ||
194 | * This will result in an archive that contains: | ||
195 | * $ tar --list -f bug.tar | ||
196 | * anything.txt | ||
197 | * symlink [-> /tmp] | ||
198 | * symlink/evil.py | ||
199 | * | ||
200 | * Untarring bug.tar would otherwise place evil.py in '/tmp'. | ||
201 | */ | ||
202 | if (file_header->link_target[0] == '/' | ||
203 | || strstr(file_header->link_target, "..") | ||
204 | ) { | ||
205 | llist_add_to(&archive_handle->symlink_placeholders, | ||
206 | xasprintf("%s%c%s", file_header->name, '\0', file_header->link_target) | ||
207 | ); | ||
208 | break; | ||
209 | } | ||
181 | res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name); | 210 | res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name); |
182 | if (res != 0 | 211 | if (res != 0 |
183 | && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET) | 212 | && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET) |
184 | ) { | 213 | ) { |
185 | /* shared message */ | 214 | /* shared message */ |
186 | bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink " | 215 | bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'", |
187 | "%s to %s", "sym", | 216 | "sym", |
188 | dst_name, | 217 | dst_name, |
189 | file_header->link_target); | 218 | file_header->link_target |
219 | ); | ||
190 | } | 220 | } |
191 | break; | 221 | break; |
192 | case S_IFSOCK: | 222 | case S_IFSOCK: |
diff --git a/archival/tar.c b/archival/tar.c index 0fc574dfd..280ded4e1 100644 --- a/archival/tar.c +++ b/archival/tar.c | |||
@@ -22,24 +22,6 @@ | |||
22 | * | 22 | * |
23 | * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree. | 23 | * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree. |
24 | */ | 24 | */ |
25 | /* TODO: security with -C DESTDIR option can be enhanced. | ||
26 | * Consider tar file created via: | ||
27 | * $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt | ||
28 | * $ ln -s /tmp symlink | ||
29 | * $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink | ||
30 | * $ rm symlink | ||
31 | * $ mkdir symlink | ||
32 | * $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink/evil.py | ||
33 | * | ||
34 | * This will result in an archive which contains: | ||
35 | * $ tar --list -f bug.tar | ||
36 | * anything.txt | ||
37 | * symlink | ||
38 | * symlink/evil.py | ||
39 | * | ||
40 | * Untarring it puts evil.py in '/tmp' even if the -C DESTDIR is given. | ||
41 | * This doesn't feel right, and IIRC GNU tar doesn't do that. | ||
42 | */ | ||
43 | 25 | ||
44 | //config:config TAR | 26 | //config:config TAR |
45 | //config: bool "tar (40 kb)" | 27 | //config: bool "tar (40 kb)" |
@@ -296,6 +278,23 @@ static void chksum_and_xwrite(int fd, struct tar_header_t* hp) | |||
296 | xwrite(fd, hp, sizeof(*hp)); | 278 | xwrite(fd, hp, sizeof(*hp)); |
297 | } | 279 | } |
298 | 280 | ||
281 | static void replace_symlink_placeholders(llist_t *list) | ||
282 | { | ||
283 | while (list) { | ||
284 | char *target; | ||
285 | |||
286 | target = list->data + strlen(list->data) + 1; | ||
287 | if (symlink(target, list->data)) { | ||
288 | /* shared message */ | ||
289 | bb_error_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'", | ||
290 | "sym", | ||
291 | list->data, target | ||
292 | ); | ||
293 | } | ||
294 | list = list->link; | ||
295 | } | ||
296 | } | ||
297 | |||
299 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_TAR_GNU_EXTENSIONS | 298 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_TAR_GNU_EXTENSIONS |
300 | static void writeLongname(int fd, int type, const char *name, int dir) | 299 | static void writeLongname(int fd, int type, const char *name, int dir) |
301 | { | 300 | { |
@@ -1252,6 +1251,8 @@ int tar_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) | |||
1252 | while (get_header_tar(tar_handle) == EXIT_SUCCESS) | 1251 | while (get_header_tar(tar_handle) == EXIT_SUCCESS) |
1253 | bb_got_signal = EXIT_SUCCESS; /* saw at least one header, good */ | 1252 | bb_got_signal = EXIT_SUCCESS; /* saw at least one header, good */ |
1254 | 1253 | ||
1254 | replace_symlink_placeholders(tar_handle->symlink_placeholders); | ||
1255 | |||
1255 | /* Check that every file that should have been extracted was */ | 1256 | /* Check that every file that should have been extracted was */ |
1256 | while (tar_handle->accept) { | 1257 | while (tar_handle->accept) { |
1257 | if (!find_list_entry(tar_handle->reject, tar_handle->accept->data) | 1258 | if (!find_list_entry(tar_handle->reject, tar_handle->accept->data) |
diff --git a/archival/tar_symlink_attack b/archival/tar_symlink_attack new file mode 100755 index 000000000..35455f200 --- /dev/null +++ b/archival/tar_symlink_attack | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ | |||
1 | #!/bin/sh | ||
2 | # Makes "symlink attack" tarball (needs GNU tar for --append) | ||
3 | |||
4 | true >anything.txt | ||
5 | tar cvf tar_symlink_attack.tar anything.txt | ||
6 | rm anything.txt | ||
7 | |||
8 | ln -s /tmp symlink | ||
9 | tar --append -f tar_symlink_attack.tar symlink | ||
10 | rm symlink | ||
11 | |||
12 | mkdir symlink | ||
13 | echo BUG >symlink/bb_test_evilfile | ||
14 | tar --append -f tar_symlink_attack.tar symlink/bb_test_evilfile | ||
15 | rm symlink/bb_test_evilfile | ||
16 | rmdir symlink | ||