ash: do not use "safe applets" in non-standalone shell

author: Denis Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> 2007-03-03 23:12:17 +0000
committer: Denis Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> 2007-03-03 23:12:17 +0000
commit: 29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b (patch)
tree: 526a300a71482a1230f9a23232ef524dadaddfbc /shell/ash.c
parent: dcbd51dd2874164b693fc7133a07714c8ea14234 (diff)
download: busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.tar.gz
busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.tar.bz2
busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.zip
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/shell/ash.c b/shell/ash.c
index 371b5d9c3..335dcbab1 100644
--- a/shell/ash.c
+++ b/shell/ash.c
@@ -6455,7 +6455,9 @@ casematch(union node *pattern, char *val)
 /* ============ find_command */
-static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
+static int
+is_safe_applet(char *name)
 {
        /* It isn't a bug to have non-existent applet here... */
        /* ...just a waste of space... */
@@ -6488,6 +6490,7 @@ static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
        return 0;
 }
+#endif
 struct builtincmd {
        const char *name;
@@ -6551,27 +6554,26 @@ static void
 tryexec(char *cmd, char **argv, char **envp)
 {
        int repeated = 0;
-        struct BB_applet *a;
-        int argc = 0;
-        char **c;
-        if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL
-         && (a = find_applet_by_name(cmd)) != NULL
-         && is_safe_applet(cmd)
-        ) {
-                c = argv;
-                while (*c != NULL) {
-                        c++; argc++;
-                }
-                applet_name = cmd;
-                exit(a->main(argc, argv));
-        }
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
-        if (find_applet_by_name(cmd) != NULL) {
+        if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL) {
-                /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
+                struct BB_applet *a;
-                execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
+                char **c;
-                /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
-                 * executable, fall through */
+                a = find_applet_by_name(cmd);
+                if (a) {
+                        if (is_safe_applet(cmd)) {
+                                c = argv;
+                                while (*c)
+                                        c++;
+                                applet_name = cmd;
+                                exit(a->main(c - argv, argv));
+                        }
+                        /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
+                        execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
+                        /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
+                         * executable, fall through */
+                }
        }
 #endif
@@ -6619,7 +6621,7 @@ shellexec(char **argv, const char *path, int idx)
        clearredir(1);
        envp = environment();
-        if (strchr(argv[0], '/') || is_safe_applet(argv[0])
+        if (strchr(argv[0], '/')
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
         || find_applet_by_name(argv[0])
 #endif
@@ -11141,13 +11143,13 @@ find_command(char *name, struct cmdentry *entry, int act, const char *path)
                entry->u.index = -1;
                return;
        }
-#endif
+        /* Already caught above
        if (is_safe_applet(name)) {
                entry->cmdtype = CMDNORMAL;
                entry->u.index = -1;
                return;
-        }
+        }*/
+#endif
        updatetbl = (path == pathval());
        if (!updatetbl) {
author	Denis Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>	2007-03-03 23:12:17 +0000
committer	Denis Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>	2007-03-03 23:12:17 +0000
commit	29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b (patch)
tree	526a300a71482a1230f9a23232ef524dadaddfbc /shell/ash.c
parent	dcbd51dd2874164b693fc7133a07714c8ea14234 (diff)
download	busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.tar.gz busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.tar.bz2 busybox-w32-29e31ddd81d797af6aad5d119f645ab2fc217a5b.zip

diff --git a/shell/ash.c b/shell/ash.c index 371b5d9c3..335dcbab1 100644 --- a/shell/ash.c +++ b/shell/ash.c
@@ -6455,7 +6455,9 @@ casematch(union node pattern, char val)
6455		6455
6456	/* ============ find_command */	6456	/* ============ find_command */
6457		6457
6458	static int is_safe_applet(char *name)	6458	#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
		6459	static int
		6460	is_safe_applet(char *name)
6459	{	6461	{
6460	/* It isn't a bug to have non-existent applet here... */	6462	/* It isn't a bug to have non-existent applet here... */
6461	/* ...just a waste of space... */	6463	/* ...just a waste of space... */
@@ -6488,6 +6490,7 @@ static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
6488		6490
6489	return 0;	6491	return 0;
6490	}	6492	}
		6493	#endif
6491		6494
6492	struct builtincmd {	6495	struct builtincmd {
6493	const char *name;	6496	const char *name;
@@ -6551,27 +6554,26 @@ static void
6551	tryexec(char cmd, char argv, char *envp)	6554	tryexec(char cmd, char argv, char *envp)
6552	{	6555	{
6553	int repeated = 0;	6556	int repeated = 0;
6554	struct BB_applet *a;
6555	int argc = 0;
6556	char **c;
6557		6557
6558	if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL
6559	&& (a = find_applet_by_name(cmd)) != NULL
6560	&& is_safe_applet(cmd)
6561	) {
6562	c = argv;
6563	while (*c != NULL) {
6564	c++; argc++;
6565	}
6566	applet_name = cmd;
6567	exit(a->main(argc, argv));
6568	}
6569	#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL	6558	#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
6570	if (find_applet_by_name(cmd) != NULL) {	6559	if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL) {
6571	/* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */	6560	struct BB_applet *a;
6572	execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);	6561	char **c;
6573	/* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer	6562
6574	* executable, fall through */	6563	a = find_applet_by_name(cmd);
		6564	if (a) {
		6565	if (is_safe_applet(cmd)) {
		6566	c = argv;
		6567	while (*c)
		6568	c++;
		6569	applet_name = cmd;
		6570	exit(a->main(c - argv, argv));
		6571	}
		6572	/* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
		6573	execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
		6574	/* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
		6575	* executable, fall through */
		6576	}
6575	}	6577	}
6576	#endif	6578	#endif
6577		6579
@@ -6619,7 +6621,7 @@ shellexec(char *argv, const char path, int idx)
6619		6621
6620	clearredir(1);	6622	clearredir(1);
6621	envp = environment();	6623	envp = environment();
6622	if (strchr(argv[0], '/') \|\| is_safe_applet(argv[0])	6624	if (strchr(argv[0], '/')
6623	#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL	6625	#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
6624	\|\| find_applet_by_name(argv[0])	6626	\|\| find_applet_by_name(argv[0])
6625	#endif	6627	#endif
@@ -11141,13 +11143,13 @@ find_command(char name, struct cmdentry entry, int act, const char *path)
11141	entry->u.index = -1;	11143	entry->u.index = -1;
11142	return;	11144	return;
11143	}	11145	}
11144	#endif	11146	/* Already caught above
11145
11146	if (is_safe_applet(name)) {	11147	if (is_safe_applet(name)) {
11147	entry->cmdtype = CMDNORMAL;	11148	entry->cmdtype = CMDNORMAL;
11148	entry->u.index = -1;	11149	entry->u.index = -1;
11149	return;	11150	return;
11150	}	11151	}*/
		11152	#endif
11151		11153
11152	updatetbl = (path == pathval());	11154	updatetbl = (path == pathval());
11153	if (!updatetbl) {	11155	if (!updatetbl) {