openbsd/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_smime.c, branch OPENBSD_7_9_BASE

Clean up confusing logic in CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt()

2025-11-28T06:07:09+00:00

This makes it easier to read and more in line with other code in libcrypto. Also add a missing error check for the CMS_set_detached() call. ok jsing kenjiro

Plug memeory leak in CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt()

2025-11-03T14:29:50+00:00

If CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key() fails, cms is leaked. From Niels Dossche

Use err_local.h rather than err.h in most places

2025-05-10T05:54:39+00:00

ok jsing

Clean up includes in cms_smime.c

2023-12-22T10:23:11+00:00

Hide symbols in cms, comp, conf, and buffer

2023-07-08T08:26:26+00:00

ok jsing@

Unifdef ZLIB

2023-06-11T05:35:43+00:00

This has long been unused code and compilation with -DZLIB was broken for a long time after BIO was made opaque. ok jsing

Make internal header file names consistent

2022-11-26T16:08:57+00:00

Libcrypto currently has a mess of *_lcl.h, *_locl.h, and *_local.h names used for internal headers. Move all these headers we inherited from OpenSSL to *_local.h, reserving the name *_internal.h for our own code. Similarly, move dtls_locl.h and ssl_locl.h to dtls_local and ssl_local.h. constant_time_locl.h is moved to constant_time.h since it's special. Adjust all .c files in libcrypto, libssl and regress. The diff is mechanical with the exception of tls13_quic.c, where #include was fixed manually. discussed with jsing, no objection bcook

Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.

2019-10-04T18:03:56+00:00

(Note that the CMS code is currently disabled.) Port of Edlinger's Fix for CVE-2019-1563 from OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests from bluhm@ ok jsing commit e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Author: Bernd Edlinger Date: Sun Sep 1 00:16:28 2019 +0200 Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)

Use ERR_asprintf_error_data() instead of ERR_add_error_data().

2019-08-11T14:51:15+00:00

Convert CMSerr() to CMSerror().

2019-08-11T10:38:27+00:00