openbsd/src/lib/libcrypto/cms, branch OPENBSD_7_2

Plug memory leak in CMS_add_simple_smimecap() in the unlikely event that

2022-08-28T18:27:47+00:00

ASN1_INTEGER_set() fails. ok jsing

Remove mkerr.pl remnants from LibreSSL

2022-07-12T14:42:50+00:00

This script is not used at all and files are edited by hand instead. Thus remove misleading comments incl. the obsolete script/config. Feedback OK jsing tb

Add check for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length return value

2022-01-20T10:58:35+00:00

It returns 1 on success and 0 for failure, never negative value. ok jsing@ millert@ tb@

Check return value from EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new in cms_pwri.c

2022-01-19T13:47:44+00:00

CID 345137 ok jsing@ tb@

Garbage collect the app_items field of ASN1_ADB

2022-01-14T08:16:13+00:00

This is unused and was removed in OpenSSL 5b70372d when it was replaced with an ASN.1 ADB callback (which we don't support). ok inoguchi jsing

Move the now internal X.509-related structs into x509_lcl.h.

2021-11-01T20:53:08+00:00

Garbage collect the now unused LIBRESSL_CRYPTO_INTERNAL and LIBRESSL_OPAQUE_X509. Include "x509_lcl.h" where needed and fix a couple of unnecessary reacharounds. ok jsing

Fix leak in cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt()

2021-09-08T14:33:02+00:00

Free ec->key before reassigning it. From OpenSSL 1.1.1, 58e1e397 ok inoguchi

Remove remaining error *_str_functs[]

2020-06-05T16:51:12+00:00

A number of years ago we dropped the concept of having function names in errors, since it is not that useful and very quickly gets out of sync when refactoring. It would seem that some new ones got imported and some missed the last clean up. ok tb@ beck@ "kill it with fire"

Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.

2019-10-04T18:03:56+00:00

(Note that the CMS code is currently disabled.) Port of Edlinger's Fix for CVE-2019-1563 from OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests from bluhm@ ok jsing commit e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Author: Bernd Edlinger Date: Sun Sep 1 00:16:28 2019 +0200 Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)

Provide a local version of X509_get0_subject_key_id()

2019-08-12T18:13:13+00:00

It seems that the CMS code is currently the only code in existence that uses this function.