openbsd/src/lib/libcrypto/evp, branch OPENBSD_7_6A mirror of https://github.com/libressl/openbsd.git
https://git.lua4.win/openbsd/atom?h=OPENBSD_7_62024-09-06T09:57:32+00:00Reenable AES-NI in libcrypto2024-09-06T09:57:32+00:00tb2024-09-06T09:57:32+00:00urn:sha1:de922e906737ea318d3a84723ec68b62581dd51c
The OPENSSL_cpu_caps() change after the last bump missed a crucial bit:
there is more MD mess in the MI code than anticipated, with the result
that AES is now used without AES-NI on amd64 and i386, hurting machines
that previously greatly benefitted from it.
Temporarily add an internal crypto_cpu_caps_ia32() API that returns the
OPENSSL_ia32cap_P or 0 like OPENSSL_cpu_caps() previously did. This can
be improved after the release.
Regression reported and fix tested by Mark Patruck.
No impact on public ABI or API.
with/ok jsing
PS: Next time my pkg_add feels very slow, I should perhaps not mechanically
blame IEEE 802.11...
Nuke the whrlpool (named after the galaxy) from orbit2024-08-31T10:38:49+00:00tb2024-08-31T10:38:49+00:00urn:sha1:74a335fca70cbc1c69a8939c41ad12d0a6414a99
It's just gross. Only used by a popular disk encryption utility on an
all-too-popular OS one or two decades back.
ok beck jsing
Remove EVP_PKEY.*attr* API2024-08-31T10:25:38+00:00tb2024-08-31T10:25:38+00:00urn:sha1:1879b1c335b79500e4608d064e6a67c172898224
I ranted enough about this recently. PKCS#12. Microsoft. 'nuff said.
ok beck jsing
Remove EVP_PKEY_*check again2024-08-31T09:14:21+00:00tb2024-08-31T09:14:21+00:00urn:sha1:4d0ecb9ca6915541794e3cc736907b89e9a1dd6c
This API turned out to be a really bad idea. OpenSSL 3 extended it, with
the result that basically every key type had its own DoS issues fixed in
a recent security release. We eschewed these by having some upper bounds
that kick in when keys get insanely large.
Initially added on tobhe's request who fortunately never used it in iked,
this was picked up only by ruby/openssl (one of the rare projects doing
proper configure checks rather than branching on VERSION defines) and of
course xca, since it uses everything it can. So it was easy to get rid of
this again.
ok beck jsing
Remove the pkey_{,public_,param_}check() handlers2024-08-29T16:58:19+00:00tb2024-08-29T16:58:19+00:00urn:sha1:c8099c070f0c547b73edced83591dbd871254307
This disables the EVP_PKEY_*check() API and makes it fail (more precisely
indicate lack of support) on all key types.
This is an intermediate step to full removal.
Removal is ok beck jsing
Implement X509_get_signature_info()2024-08-28T07:15:04+00:00tb2024-08-28T07:15:04+00:00urn:sha1:f822543d6a7043acc1d14a3e0b44eddc1051b097
This is a slightly strange combination of OBJ_find_sigid_algs() and the
security level API necessary because OBJ_find_sigid_algs() on its own
isn't smart enough for the special needs of RSA-PSS and EdDSA.
The API extracts the hash's NID and the pubkey's NID from the certificate's
signatureAlgorithm and invokes special handlers for RSA-PSS and EdDSA
for retrieving the corresponding information. This isn't entirely free
for RSA-PSS, but for now we don't cache this information.
The security bits calculation is a bit hand-wavy, but that's something
that comes along with this sort of numerology.
ok jsing
Garbage collect unused attributes member from EVP_PKEY2024-08-22T12:24:24+00:00tb2024-08-22T12:24:24+00:00urn:sha1:fc0702d8720a97dcf11b0e1241a3245bf18fcb95
ok miod
Neuter EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID()2024-08-22T12:21:07+00:00tb2024-08-22T12:21:07+00:00urn:sha1:4780007f3a348d3b3c372f85f91ba4c3507d328e
The last consumer in openssl(1) pkcs12 has been removed, so we no longer
need this function.
ok miod
typo: regresss -> regress2024-07-29T06:05:31+00:00tb2024-07-29T06:05:31+00:00urn:sha1:4093af273f353872a840e608604eba30249fc024Rewrite EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID()2024-07-14T16:06:31+00:00tb2024-07-14T16:06:31+00:00urn:sha1:54533d8955167d29d29a2a23d2e997aa8be42feb
Instead of jumping through many layers that cause headache, we can achieve
the same in an entirely straightforward way without losing clarity.
ok jsing