openbsd/src/lib/libssl, branch OPENBSD_3_3_BASE A mirror of https://github.com/libressl/openbsd.git https://git.lua4.win/openbsd/atom?h=OPENBSD_3_3_BASE 2003-03-22T08:02:04+00:00 This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_3_3_BASE'. 2003-03-22T08:02:04+00:00 cvs2svn admin@example.com 2003-03-22T08:02:04+00:00 urn:sha1:df32a1286ae06981a79e30b678165a784696be4b Fix for Klima-Pokorny-Rosa attack on RSA in SSL/TLS, see 2003-03-19T23:03:01+00:00 markus 2003-03-19T23:03:01+00:00 urn:sha1:121e69a3174716503bfd88f7116dc9853b35d1e2 http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=104811162730834&w=2 update to official patch from openssl.org; ok deraadt@, millert@ 2003-03-17T19:57:16+00:00 markus 2003-03-17T19:57:16+00:00 urn:sha1:f70fbcbe107b93fd24d31f9afa4e99bf2464a2b7 Less strcpy/strcat/sprintf. tdeval@ ok. 2003-03-16T12:18:21+00:00 ho 2003-03-16T12:18:21+00:00 urn:sha1:a4c0f9de9c618e0271a7e122136bdfe50301a6d7 Enforce blinding on RSA operations involving private keys. 2003-03-15T16:35:53+00:00 ho 2003-03-15T16:35:53+00:00 urn:sha1:68d910a736124944b061ef4eb6d3e07b4682389a From http://www.openssl.org/~geoff, modified to be enabled at all times. jmc wrote a combination man page that covers all openssl(1) functionality, 2003-03-05T20:59:17+00:00 deraadt 2003-03-05T20:59:17+00:00 urn:sha1:608076f3980f669b320ef391c35132bd474541e3 based on the pod files from openssl. This may need by-hand updating once in a while, but at least now people can read a real man page instead of the mess that the openssl team provides us with. DSAparams_print_pf() -> DSAparams_print_fp() 2003-02-28T13:12:40+00:00 cedric 2003-02-28T13:12:40+00:00 urn:sha1:6739bef0b892a063bee07460073d25748d39c95c ok deraadt@ check for size < 0 when allocating memory, from openssl (-r1.34) 2003-02-21T12:39:17+00:00 markus 2003-02-21T12:39:17+00:00 urn:sha1:449a81d8ab21ae7082ab3e22e14f32e3dcb513b0 security fix from openssl 0.9.7a: 2003-02-19T20:37:46+00:00 markus 2003-02-19T20:37:46+00:00 urn:sha1:3f2b7ab6e4cf7b95dc7eb4cb48824c06fb9d8757 In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078) delete duplicate line; jason@ackley.net, 3090 2003-02-12T04:13:26+00:00 deraadt 2003-02-12T04:13:26+00:00 urn:sha1:240aed806834cc514ea7fc38b7d2bc36e60f9b78