openbsd/src/lib, branch OPENBSD_6_6

OpenBSD 6.6 errata 032, June 11, 2020 (6.6/032_x509.patch.sig)

2020-06-10T03:56:28+00:00

original commit: CVSROOT: /cvs Module name: src Changes by: jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2020/05/31 11:23:39 Modified files: lib/libcrypto/x509: x509_vfy.c Log message: When building a chain look for non-expired certificates first. Currently, when building a certificate chain we look up an issuer and if it is the only issuer certificate available we still use it even if it has expired. When X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST is not in use, untrusted certificates are processed first and if one of these happens to be expired it will be used to build the chain, even if there is another non-expired option in the trusted store. Rework this code so that we first look for a non-expired untrusted certificate. If one does not exist then we take a look in the trusted store to see if we would be able to build the chain and only if there is not, do we then look for an expired untrusted certificate. This makes certificate validation possible for various sites that are serving expired AddTrust certificates. Issue reported by Christian Heimes via GitHub. ok beck@ tb@

bump internal version to 3.0.2

2019-10-10T14:29:20+00:00

bump to 3.0.2

2019-10-10T14:28:48+00:00

Use EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE instead of SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH and remove OPENSSL_NO_SHA*

2019-10-09T16:17:59+00:00

conditionals, now that this code handles arbitrary message digests. ok inoguchi@ tb@

Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.

2019-10-04T18:03:56+00:00

(Note that the CMS code is currently disabled.) Port of Edlinger's Fix for CVE-2019-1563 from OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests from bluhm@ ok jsing commit e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Author: Bernd Edlinger Date: Sun Sep 1 00:16:28 2019 +0200 Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)

Use a valid curve when constructing an EC_KEY that looks like X25519.

2019-10-04T17:21:24+00:00

The recent EC group cofactor change results in stricter validation, which causes the EC_GROUP_set_generator() call to fail. Issue reported and fix tested by rsadowski@ ok tb@

Provide internal RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() functions.

2019-10-04T16:51:31+00:00

These are internal only for now and will be made public at a later date. The RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP() functions become wrappers around the *_mgf1() variant. ok tb@ inoguchi@ (as part of a larger diff)

Move towards making RSA OAEP functions handle arbitrary message digests.

2019-10-03T17:45:27+00:00

Based on OpenSSL 1.1.1. ok tb@, inoguchi@ (on an earlier/larger diff)

bump for LibreSSL 3.0.1

2019-09-30T07:56:14+00:00

zap trailing whitespace;

2019-09-29T16:30:35+00:00