openbsd/src/lib, branch OPENBSD_6_6_BASE

bump internal version to 3.0.2

2019-10-10T14:29:20+00:00

bump to 3.0.2

2019-10-10T14:28:48+00:00

Use EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE instead of SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH and remove OPENSSL_NO_SHA*

2019-10-09T16:17:59+00:00

conditionals, now that this code handles arbitrary message digests. ok inoguchi@ tb@

Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.

2019-10-04T18:03:56+00:00

(Note that the CMS code is currently disabled.) Port of Edlinger's Fix for CVE-2019-1563 from OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests from bluhm@ ok jsing commit e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Author: Bernd Edlinger Date: Sun Sep 1 00:16:28 2019 +0200 Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)

Use a valid curve when constructing an EC_KEY that looks like X25519.

2019-10-04T17:21:24+00:00

The recent EC group cofactor change results in stricter validation, which causes the EC_GROUP_set_generator() call to fail. Issue reported and fix tested by rsadowski@ ok tb@

Provide internal RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() functions.

2019-10-04T16:51:31+00:00

These are internal only for now and will be made public at a later date. The RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP() functions become wrappers around the *_mgf1() variant. ok tb@ inoguchi@ (as part of a larger diff)

Move towards making RSA OAEP functions handle arbitrary message digests.

2019-10-03T17:45:27+00:00

Based on OpenSSL 1.1.1. ok tb@, inoguchi@ (on an earlier/larger diff)

bump for LibreSSL 3.0.1

2019-09-30T07:56:14+00:00

zap trailing whitespace;

2019-09-29T16:30:35+00:00

If a NULL or zero cofactor is passed to EC_GROUP_set_generator(),

2019-09-29T10:09:09+00:00

try to compute it using Hasse's bound. This works as long as the cofactor is small enough. Port of Brumley's fix for CVE-2019-1547 in OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests & ok inoguchi input & ok jsing commit 30c22fa8b1d840036b8e203585738df62a03cec8 Author: Billy Brumley Date: Thu Sep 5 21:25:37 2019 +0300 [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present. This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code. This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent. It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero). The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks. CVE-2019-1547 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)