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<title>openbsd/src, branch libressl-v3.6.1</title>
<subtitle>A mirror of https://github.com/libressl/openbsd.git
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.lua4.win/openbsd/atom?h=libressl-v3.6.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.lua4.win/openbsd/atom?h=libressl-v3.6.1'/>
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<updated>2022-10-20T09:47:01+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Unbreak ASN.1 indefinite length encoding.</title>
<updated>2022-10-20T09:47:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>tb</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-20T09:47:01+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:83249055024eb55369c80ad88645d5d52b8eeae6</id>
<content type='text'>
In r1.25 of tasn_enc.c a check was added to ensure that asn1_ex_i2c()
returned the same value on both calls, however in the ndef case the len
variable gets changed between calls. Keep a copy of the original value to
test against.

Issue reported by niklas, who encountered a test failure in rust-openssl.

ok miod@ tb@; from jsing

This is errata/7.2/002_asn1.patch.sig
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Store errors that result from leaf certificate verification.</title>
<updated>2022-10-20T09:45:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>tb</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-20T09:45:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e08bcb01b2d496908faf5968f289cda7e088285</id>
<content type='text'>
In the case that a verification callback is installed that tells the
verifier to continue when a certificate is invalid (e.g. expired),
any error resulting from the leaf certificate verification is not stored
and made available post verification, resulting in an incorrect error being
returned.

Also perform leaf certificate verification prior to adding the chain, which
avoids a potential memory leak (as noted by tb@).

Issue reported by Ilya Shipitsin, who encountered haproxy regress failures.

ok tb@; from jsing

This is errata/7.2/001_x509.patch.sig
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Tweak symbols test in such a way that it would have caught the recent</title>
<updated>2022-09-21T15:24:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>tb</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-21T15:24:45+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a1ab11b512a48638b18c6decdb5824adc3a3a139</id>
<content type='text'>
Symbols.list mistake: undefine aliases (except _cfb block ciphers which
are aliases for historical reasons). Use -Wl,--no-allow-shlib-undefined.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove PKCS12_MAKE_{,SH}KEYBAG from Symbols.list</title>
<updated>2022-09-19T12:25:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>tb</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-19T12:25:52+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8c6b171d46b1c38f2d049466913944f62bc162e2</id>
<content type='text'>
These functions were renamed in the last bump

#define PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG      PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf                                        #define PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG    PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt

They don't appear in the compiled library itself, so no further bump
required.

Fixes libressl-portable/portable#791

Found the hard way by vollkommenheit
ok deraadt jsing
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Allow TLSv1.3 clients to send CCS without middlebox compatibility mode.</title>
<updated>2022-09-17T17:14:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jsing</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-17T17:14:06+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:74f7c264c9c7cf9fa2bbccfe73e2d98bf2e07476</id>
<content type='text'>
While RFC 8446 is clear about what legacy session identifiers can be sent
by a TLSv1.3 client and how middlebox compatibility mode is requested, it
is delightfully vague about the circumstances under which a client is
permitted to send CCS messages. While it does not make sense for a client
to send CCS messages when they are not requesting middlebox compatibility
mode, it is not strictly forbidden by the RFC and at least one (unknown)
TLSv1.3 stack has been observed to do this in the wild.

Revert part of the previous change and allow clients to send CCS messages,
even if they are not requesting middlebox compatibility mode.

Found the hard way by florian@

ok tb@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Link to SSL_read_early_data(3)</title>
<updated>2022-09-17T16:03:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>kn</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-17T16:03:21+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:70f7b2faa17684b3944dd57095e0993328b1b4a3</id>
<content type='text'>
OK tb
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add OID for RPKI signedTAL objects</title>
<updated>2022-09-15T08:20:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>job</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T08:20:34+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5e986ba9f9b316020df4d510e27b6b7d1a19effe</id>
<content type='text'>
IANA made a permanent registration in the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS
Content Type registry at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#security-smime-1
for signed objects conforming to draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal.

OK tb@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use LONG_MAX as the limit for ciphers with long based APIs.</title>
<updated>2022-09-15T07:04:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jsing</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T07:04:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.lua4.win/openbsd/commit/?id=69a6645367fe0e98f414f8ce038c6a4c2e3fb102'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69a6645367fe0e98f414f8ce038c6a4c2e3fb102</id>
<content type='text'>
These ciphers have long based APIs, while EVP has a size_t based API. The
intent of these loops is to handle sizes that are bigger than LONG_MAX.
Rather than using the rather crazy EVP_MAXCHUNK construct, use LONG_MAX
rounded down to a large block size, ensuring that it is a block size
multiple. Revert the recently added overflow checks now that this is
handled more appropriately.

ok tb@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>remove an extraneous empty line</title>
<updated>2022-09-14T16:31:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>tb</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-14T16:31:36+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b90fb1a563a5bd5fbe53dc5355f9de11f4dd687e</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Stop pretending that EVP_CIPHER cleanup can fail.</title>
<updated>2022-09-13T04:59:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jsing</name>
<email></email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-13T04:59:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2ec5e8a2e012afe68c1a580604d754b7e8cc73ee</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that EVP_CIPHER is opaque, stop pretending that EVP_CIPHER cleanup can
fail.

ok tb@
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
