OpenSSL 1.0.0f: merge

61 files changed, 782 insertions, 316 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bf_buff.c
index c1fd75aaad..4b5a132d8a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bf_buff.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
         /* add to buffer and return */
         if (i >= inl)
                 {
-                memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+                memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
                 ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
                 return(num+inl);
                 }
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
                 {
                 if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
                         {
-                        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+                        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
                         in+=i;
                         inl-=i;
                         num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
         case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
                 ret=0;
                 p1=ctx->ibuf;
-                for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+                for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
                         {
-                        if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+                        if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
                         }
                 break;
         case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
                 for (;;)
                         {
                         BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-                        if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+                        if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
                                 {
                                 r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
                                         &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-                                        ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+                                        ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
                                 BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
                                 if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
                                 ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+                                ctx->obuf_len-=r;
                                 }
                         else
                                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bio.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bio.h
index 152802fbdf..ab47abcf14 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
         {
+        /* Buffers are setup like this:
+         *
+         * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+         * +---------------------------------------------------+
+         * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+         * +---------------------------------------------------+
+         * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+         */
+
         /* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
         int ibuf_size;  /* how big is the input buffer */
         int obuf_size;  /* how big is the output buffer */
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index e060592fdc..9ed8bc2b40 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
                                   * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
 #endif
         CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
-        unsigned int  counter;
+        int counter;
         unsigned long flags;
         BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
         int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
         if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
                 BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-        ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+        /* Set the counter to the special value -1
+         * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+         * that does not need updating before first use. */
+        ret->counter = -1;
         CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid);
         return(ret);
 err:
@@ -190,7 +193,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 goto err;
                 }
 
-        if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+        if (b->counter == -1)
+                b->counter = 0;
+
+        if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
                 !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
                 {
                 /* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -205,8 +211,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
         ret=1;
 err:
-        if (b->counter == 0)
-                b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+        if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+                b->counter = 0;
         return(ret);
         }
 
@@ -227,6 +233,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 return(0);
                 }
 
+        if (b->counter == -1)
+                /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+                b->counter = 0;
+        else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+                return(0);
+
         if (r != NULL)
                 {
                 if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -247,22 +259,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
         int ret;
 
         bn_check_top(n);
-        if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-                {
-                BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-                return(0);
-                }
 
         if (r != NULL)
                 ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
         else
-                ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-        if (ret >= 0)
                 {
-                if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+                if (b->Ai == NULL)
+                        {
+                        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
                         return(0);
+                        }
+                ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
                 }
+
         bn_check_top(n);
         return(ret);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index af94458ca7..03deae6674 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
         field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;     
 
         /* only support affine coordinates */
-        if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+        if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
 
         if (ctx == NULL)
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/opensslv.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/opensslv.h
index 310a3387be..d6d61a0c7d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000005fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000006fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0f-fips 4 Jan 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0f 4 Jan 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 4bb9666e49..3316388443 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -133,47 +133,87 @@
 # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef __VOS__
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock
+   (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm
+   relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors
+   such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and
+   upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the
+   clock and the rate at which it can be read.
+
+   If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is
+   more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+   clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the
+   results would be far more predictable.
+
+   As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of
+   seed data.  */
+
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-        unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+        short int code;
+        gid_t curr_gid;
         pid_t curr_pid;
         uid_t curr_uid;
-        static int first=1;
-        int i;
-        long rnd = 0;
+        int i, k;
         struct timespec ts;
-        unsigned seed;
-
-/* The VOS random() function starts from a static seed so its
-   initial value is predictable.  If random() returns the
-   initial value, reseed it with dynamic data.  The VOS
-   real-time clock has a granularity of 1 nsec so it should be
-   reasonably difficult to predict its exact value.  Do not
-   gratuitously reseed the PRNG because other code in this
-   process or thread may be using it.  */
-
-        if (first) {
-                first = 0;
-                rnd = random ();
-                if (rnd == 1804289383) {
-                        clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-                        curr_pid = getpid();
-                        curr_uid = getuid();
-                        seed = ts.tv_sec ^ ts.tv_nsec ^ curr_pid ^ curr_uid;
-                        srandom (seed);
-                }
-        }
+        unsigned char v;
 
-        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
-                if (i % 4 == 0)
-                        rnd = random();
-                buf[i] = rnd;
-                rnd >>= 8;
-        }
-        RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-        memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+        long duration;
+        extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+        long long duration;
+        extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#error "Unsupported Platform."
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
 
+        /* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some*
+           variation between different processes.  */
+
+        curr_gid = getgid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+        curr_gid = 0;
+
+        curr_pid = getpid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+        curr_pid = 0;
+
+        curr_uid = getuid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+        curr_uid = 0;
+
+        for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++)
+        {
+                /* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache
+                   collisions, bus interference, etc.  */
+                for (k=0; k<99; k++)
+                        ts.tv_nsec = random ();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+                /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
+                duration = 1;
+                s$sleep (&duration, &code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+                /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
+                duration = 1;
+                s$sleep2 (&duration, &code);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+                /* get wall clock time.  */
+                clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+                /* take 8 bits */
+                v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+                RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1);
+                v = 0;
+        }
         return 1;
 }
 #elif defined __OpenBSD__
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7c941885f0..2e1ddd48d3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
         return ret;
 }
 
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-        BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-        if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+        BN_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        if (unblind == NULL)
+                /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+                 * in BN_BLINDING. */
                 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
         else
                 {
-                int ret;
-                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
-                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                return ret;
-                }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-        BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-        if (local)
-                return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-        else
-                {
+                /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+                 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
                 int ret;
                 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+                ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
                 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
                 return ret;
                 }
-}
+        }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+        BN_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+         * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+         * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+         * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+         * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+         * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+         */
+        return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+        }
 
 /* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
              unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
         int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
         int local_blinding = 0;
+        /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+         * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+        BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
         BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
         if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
         BN_CTX_start(ctx);
         f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-        br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
         buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
         
         if (blinding != NULL)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+                {
+                if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+                        {
+                        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
+                }
 
         if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
                 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
 
         if (blinding)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
 
         if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
              unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+        BIGNUM *f, *ret;
         int j,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
         int local_blinding = 0;
+        /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+         * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+        BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
         BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
         if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
         BN_CTX_start(ctx);
         f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-        br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
         buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
         
         if (blinding != NULL)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+                {
+                if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+                        {
+                        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                         goto err;
+                        }
+                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+                        goto err;
+                }
 
         /* do the decrypt */
         if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
 
         if (blinding)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
 
         p=buf;
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkerr.pl b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkerr.pl
index 2c99467d34..aec401c773 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkerr.pl
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ EOF
         undef %err_reason_strings;
 }
 
-if($debug && defined(%notrans)) {
+if($debug && %notrans) {
         print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n";
         foreach(sort keys %notrans)
         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5a0b0249b4..701ec565e9 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-        if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+        if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 0d70e8696d..df46a4983b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
  * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
  * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
  */
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
                         const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
                         const int length,
                         const unsigned char fill)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+  if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+    return 0;
   if (bs->length > 0) {
     memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
     if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
     }
   }
   memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+  return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
     return 0;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    if (bs->length > 4)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
     BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    if (bs->length > 16)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
     for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
       ;
     for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 /*
  * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
  * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
  */
 static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
                                 const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 
   switch (a->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = length * 8;
     break;
   }
 
   switch (b->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = length * 8;
     break;
   }
@@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
   unsigned char mask;
   int i, j;
 
+  OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
   for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
     ;
   for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -601,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
     return NULL;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   }
   f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
@@ -656,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
 /*
  * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
  */
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
                             unsigned char *min,
                             unsigned char *max,
                             int length)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+    return 0;
   switch (aor->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+            addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+            addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
   }
+  return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -687,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
   if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
       afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
       (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
-       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+      !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
     return 0;
-  extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
   return afi_length;
 }
 
@@ -771,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
       IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
 
-      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-      extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+          !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+        return 0;
 
       /*
        * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -800,14 +813,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
     }
 
     /*
-     * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+     * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+     * prefix.
      */
     j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
     {
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
-      if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
-        extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-        if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+      if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+        if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+          return 0;
+        if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+            range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
           return 0;
       }
     }
@@ -841,8 +857,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
     unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
 
-    extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-    extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+        !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+      return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+        memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+      return 0;
 
     /*
      * Punt overlaps.
@@ -860,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
       IPAddressOrRange *merged;
       if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
         return 0;
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
       --i;
@@ -869,6 +893,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted final range.
+   */
+  j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+  {
+    IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+      unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+      if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -885,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
                                     v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
       return 0;
   }
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
   OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
   return 1;
@@ -1017,6 +1055,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
         X509V3_conf_err(val);
         goto err;
       }
+      if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+        X509V3_conf_err(val);
+        goto err;
+      }
       if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
         X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
@@ -1102,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
 
   p = 0;
   for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
-    extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
-                    c_min, c_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+                         c_min, c_max, length))
+      return -1;
     for (;; p++) {
       if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
         return 0;
-      extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
-                      p_min, p_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+                           p_min, p_max, length))
+        return 0;
       if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
         continue;
       if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -1130,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
     return 1;
   if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b))
     return 0;
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
     IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
     int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
@@ -1195,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   }
   if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
     validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
     X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     ret = 0;
@@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
       }
       continue;
     }
-    sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
     for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
       IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
       int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
index 39aac73e10..e0c0f0cc9a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
         unsigned int mac_size;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
 
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -409,13 +410,10 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
         if (enc_err <= 0)
                 {
-                /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-                if (enc_err < 0)
-                        {
-                        rr->length = 0;
-                        s->packet_length = 0;
-                        }
-                goto err;
+                /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
+                 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
+                 */
+                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -445,7 +443,7 @@ printf("\n");
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                         goto f_err;
 #else
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif                  
                         }
                 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
@@ -456,17 +454,25 @@ printf("\n");
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
 #else
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif
                         }
                 rr->length-=mac_size;
                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
                 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
                         {
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                         }
                 }
 
+        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+                {
+                /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                s->packet_length = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+
         /* r->length is now just compressed */
         if (s->expand != NULL)
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
index a6a4c87ea6..149983be30 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
                                 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
                                 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
                                         (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
                                         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/doc/openssl.cnf b/src/lib/libssl/doc/openssl.cnf
index 9d2cd5bfa5..18760c6e67 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/doc/openssl.cnf
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/doc/openssl.cnf
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName          = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default =
 
-commonName                      = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName                      = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max                  = 64
 
 emailAddress                    = Email Address
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
index 50bd415b56..53223bd38d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                 /* wrong packet length */
                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-                goto err;
+                goto f_err;
                 }
 
         return(1);
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         if (n < 6)
                 {
                 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-                al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                 goto f_err;
                 }
@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
         if (ticklen + 6 != n)
                 {
-                al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                 goto f_err;
                 }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c
index 62c791cb72..1130244aeb 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2177,6 +2177,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         {
         unsigned char *rp,*wp;
         size_t rlen, wlen;
+        int init_extra;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
         if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
@@ -2215,6 +2216,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
         rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
         wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+        init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
         if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
                 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
                 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
@@ -2227,6 +2229,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
         s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
         s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+        s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
 
         ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
index c3b5ff33ff..d734c359fb 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                 }
 
                         s->init_num=0;
+                        s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
                         if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                                 {
@@ -755,6 +756,14 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
         int ok;
         long n;
 
+        /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+         * negotiation. */
+        if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
          * so permit appropriate message length */
         n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -783,6 +792,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
                         s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
                         }
 #endif
+                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
                 return 2;
                 }
         return 1;
@@ -2130,6 +2140,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 if (i <= 0)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                        BN_clear_free(pub);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/CHANGES b/src/lib/libssl/src/CHANGES
index a0de5abb60..03e744a049 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/CHANGES
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,63 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+     [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+     [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+     [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
 
   *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
@@ -909,6 +966,26 @@
   
  Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
   *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
      for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/Configure b/src/lib/libssl/src/Configure
index 429ab2e5eb..7941c93f64 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/Configure
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/Configure
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ my %table=(
 "cc",           "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
 
 ####VOS Configurations
-"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
-"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
 
 #### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups
 # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ my %table=(
 "darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 
 ##### A/UX
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/FAQ b/src/lib/libssl/src/FAQ
index fe54856a62..3b07cd363d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/FAQ
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/FAQ
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0e was released on Sep 6th, 2011.
+OpenSSL 1.0.0f was released on Jan 4th, 2012.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/Makefile b/src/lib/libssl/src/Makefile
index 445e15d671..8fe888587e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/Makefile
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.0e
+VERSION=1.0.0f
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.0
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/NEWS b/src/lib/libssl/src/NEWS
index 672810dcc7..1fb25c626c 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/NEWS
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
 
       o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/README b/src/lib/libssl/src/README
index 898437989a..50d54d5706 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/README
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0f 4 Jan 2012
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/VMS/mkshared.com b/src/lib/libssl/src/VMS/mkshared.com
index 794e1de62a..b0d1fdaac3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/VMS/mkshared.com
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/VMS/mkshared.com
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ $! P2: Zlib object library path (optional).
 $!
 $! Input:       [.UTIL]LIBEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO[32].OLB
 $!              [.UTIL]SSLEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL[32].OLB
+$!              [.CRYPTO.xxx]OPENSSLCONF.H
 $! Output:      [.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO_SHR[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE
 $!              [.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL_SRH[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE
 $!
@@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ $     endif
 $   endif
 $ endif
 $!
+$! ----- Prepare info for processing: disabled algorithms info
+$ gosub read_disabled_algorithms_info
+$!
 $ ZLIB = p2
 $ zlib_lib = ""
 $ if (ZLIB .nes. "")
@@ -384,8 +388,7 @@ $	alg_i = alg_i + 1
 $       if alg_entry .eqs. "" then goto loop2
 $       if alg_entry .nes. ","
 $       then
-$         if alg_entry .eqs. "KRB5" then goto loop ! Special for now
-$         if alg_entry .eqs. "STATIC_ENGINE" then goto loop ! Special for now
+$         if disabled_algorithms - ("," + alg_entry + ",") .nes disabled_algorithms then goto loop
 $         if f$trnlnm("OPENSSL_NO_"+alg_entry) .nes. "" then goto loop
 $         goto loop2
 $       endif
@@ -452,3 +455,22 @@ $     endif
 $   endloop_rvi:
 $   close vf
 $   return
+$
+$! The disabled algorithms reader
+$ read_disabled_algorithms_info:
+$   disabled_algorithms = ","
+$   open /read cf [.CRYPTO.'ARCH']OPENSSLCONF.H
+$   loop_rci:
+$     read/err=endloop_rci/end=endloop_rci cf rci_line
+$     rci_line = f$edit(rci_line,"TRIM,COMPRESS")
+$     rci_ei = 0
+$     if f$extract(0,9,rci_line) .eqs. "# define " then rci_ei = 2
+$     if f$extract(0,8,rci_line) .eqs. "#define " then rci_ei = 1
+$     if rci_ei .eq. 0 then goto loop_rci
+$     rci_e = f$element(rci_ei," ",rci_line)
+$     if f$extract(0,11,rci_e) .nes. "OPENSSL_NO_" then goto loop_rci
+$     disabled_algorithms = disabled_algorithms + f$extract(11,999,rci_e) + ","
+$     goto loop_rci
+$   endloop_rci:
+$   close cf
+$   return
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl-vms.cnf b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
index 20ed61bc3e..45e46a0fb4 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName          = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default =
 
-commonName                      = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName                      = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max                  = 64
 
 emailAddress                    = Email Address
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl.cnf b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl.cnf
index 9d2cd5bfa5..18760c6e67 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName          = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default =
 
-commonName                      = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName                      = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max                  = 64
 
 emailAddress                    = Email Address
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/x509.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/x509.c
index ed1e8c69ad..9f5eaeb6be 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/x509.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/apps/x509.c
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ bad:
                                 else
                                         {
                                         pk=load_key(bio_err,
-                                                keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0,
+                                                keyfile, keyformat, 0,
                                                 passin, e, "request key");
                                         if (pk == NULL) goto end;
                                         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
index c1fd75aaad..4b5a132d8a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
         /* add to buffer and return */
         if (i >= inl)
                 {
-                memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+                memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
                 ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
                 return(num+inl);
                 }
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
                 {
                 if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
                         {
-                        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+                        memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
                         in+=i;
                         inl-=i;
                         num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
         case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
                 ret=0;
                 p1=ctx->ibuf;
-                for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+                for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
                         {
-                        if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+                        if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
                         }
                 break;
         case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
                 for (;;)
                         {
                         BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-                        if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+                        if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
                                 {
                                 r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
                                         &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-                                        ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+                                        ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
                                 BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
                                 if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
                                 ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+                                ctx->obuf_len-=r;
                                 }
                         else
                                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bio.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 152802fbdf..ab47abcf14 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
         {
+        /* Buffers are setup like this:
+         *
+         * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+         * +---------------------------------------------------+
+         * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+         * +---------------------------------------------------+
+         * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+         */
+
         /* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
         int ibuf_size;  /* how big is the input buffer */
         int obuf_size;  /* how big is the output buffer */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index e060592fdc..9ed8bc2b40 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
                                   * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
 #endif
         CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
-        unsigned int  counter;
+        int counter;
         unsigned long flags;
         BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
         int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
         if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
                 BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-        ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+        /* Set the counter to the special value -1
+         * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+         * that does not need updating before first use. */
+        ret->counter = -1;
         CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid);
         return(ret);
 err:
@@ -190,7 +193,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 goto err;
                 }
 
-        if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+        if (b->counter == -1)
+                b->counter = 0;
+
+        if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
                 !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
                 {
                 /* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -205,8 +211,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
         ret=1;
 err:
-        if (b->counter == 0)
-                b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+        if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+                b->counter = 0;
         return(ret);
         }
 
@@ -227,6 +233,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 return(0);
                 }
 
+        if (b->counter == -1)
+                /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+                b->counter = 0;
+        else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+                return(0);
+
         if (r != NULL)
                 {
                 if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -247,22 +259,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
         int ret;
 
         bn_check_top(n);
-        if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-                {
-                BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-                return(0);
-                }
 
         if (r != NULL)
                 ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
         else
-                ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-        if (ret >= 0)
                 {
-                if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+                if (b->Ai == NULL)
+                        {
+                        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
                         return(0);
+                        }
+                ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
                 }
+
         bn_check_top(n);
         return(ret);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index af94458ca7..03deae6674 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
         field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;     
 
         /* only support affine coordinates */
-        if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+        if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
 
         if (ctx == NULL)
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/opensslv.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/opensslv.h
index 310a3387be..d6d61a0c7d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000005fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000006fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0f-fips 4 Jan 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0f 4 Jan 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 4bb9666e49..3316388443 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -133,47 +133,87 @@
 # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef __VOS__
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock
+   (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm
+   relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors
+   such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and
+   upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the
+   clock and the rate at which it can be read.
+
+   If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is
+   more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+   clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the
+   results would be far more predictable.
+
+   As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of
+   seed data.  */
+
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-        unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+        short int code;
+        gid_t curr_gid;
         pid_t curr_pid;
         uid_t curr_uid;
-        static int first=1;
-        int i;
-        long rnd = 0;
+        int i, k;
         struct timespec ts;
-        unsigned seed;
-
-/* The VOS random() function starts from a static seed so its
-   initial value is predictable.  If random() returns the
-   initial value, reseed it with dynamic data.  The VOS
-   real-time clock has a granularity of 1 nsec so it should be
-   reasonably difficult to predict its exact value.  Do not
-   gratuitously reseed the PRNG because other code in this
-   process or thread may be using it.  */
-
-        if (first) {
-                first = 0;
-                rnd = random ();
-                if (rnd == 1804289383) {
-                        clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-                        curr_pid = getpid();
-                        curr_uid = getuid();
-                        seed = ts.tv_sec ^ ts.tv_nsec ^ curr_pid ^ curr_uid;
-                        srandom (seed);
-                }
-        }
+        unsigned char v;
 
-        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
-                if (i % 4 == 0)
-                        rnd = random();
-                buf[i] = rnd;
-                rnd >>= 8;
-        }
-        RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-        memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+        long duration;
+        extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+        long long duration;
+        extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#error "Unsupported Platform."
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
 
+        /* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some*
+           variation between different processes.  */
+
+        curr_gid = getgid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+        curr_gid = 0;
+
+        curr_pid = getpid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+        curr_pid = 0;
+
+        curr_uid = getuid();
+        RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+        curr_uid = 0;
+
+        for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++)
+        {
+                /* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache
+                   collisions, bus interference, etc.  */
+                for (k=0; k<99; k++)
+                        ts.tv_nsec = random ();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+                /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
+                duration = 1;
+                s$sleep (&duration, &code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+                /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
+                duration = 1;
+                s$sleep2 (&duration, &code);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+                /* get wall clock time.  */
+                clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+                /* take 8 bits */
+                v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+                RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1);
+                v = 0;
+        }
         return 1;
 }
 #elif defined __OpenBSD__
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7c941885f0..2e1ddd48d3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
         return ret;
 }
 
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-        BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-        if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+        BN_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        if (unblind == NULL)
+                /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+                 * in BN_BLINDING. */
                 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
         else
                 {
-                int ret;
-                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
-                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                return ret;
-                }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-        BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-        if (local)
-                return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-        else
-                {
+                /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+                 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
                 int ret;
                 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-                ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+                ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
                 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
                 return ret;
                 }
-}
+        }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+        BN_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+         * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+         * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+         * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+         * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+         * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+         */
+        return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+        }
 
 /* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
              unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
         int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
         int local_blinding = 0;
+        /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+         * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+        BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
         BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
         if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
         BN_CTX_start(ctx);
         f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-        br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
         buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
         
         if (blinding != NULL)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+                {
+                if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+                        {
+                        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
+                }
 
         if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
                 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
 
         if (blinding)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
 
         if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
              unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+        BIGNUM *f, *ret;
         int j,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
         int local_blinding = 0;
+        /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+         * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+        BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
         BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
         if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
         BN_CTX_start(ctx);
         f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-        br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
         buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
         
         if (blinding != NULL)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+                {
+                if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+                        {
+                        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                         goto err;
+                        }
+                if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+                        goto err;
+                }
 
         /* do the decrypt */
         if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 }
 
         if (blinding)
-                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+                if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
                         goto err;
 
         p=buf;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5a0b0249b4..701ec565e9 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-        if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+        if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 0d70e8696d..df46a4983b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
  * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
  * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
  */
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
                         const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
                         const int length,
                         const unsigned char fill)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+  if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+    return 0;
   if (bs->length > 0) {
     memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
     if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
     }
   }
   memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+  return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
     return 0;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    if (bs->length > 4)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
     BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    if (bs->length > 16)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
     for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
       ;
     for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 /*
  * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
  * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
  */
 static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
                                 const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 
   switch (a->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = length * 8;
     break;
   }
 
   switch (b->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = length * 8;
     break;
   }
@@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
   unsigned char mask;
   int i, j;
 
+  OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
   for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
     ;
   for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -601,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
     return NULL;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   }
   f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
@@ -656,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
 /*
  * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
  */
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
                             unsigned char *min,
                             unsigned char *max,
                             int length)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+    return 0;
   switch (aor->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+            addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+            addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
   }
+  return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -687,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
   if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
       afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
       (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
-       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+      !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
     return 0;
-  extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
   return afi_length;
 }
 
@@ -771,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
       IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
 
-      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-      extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+          !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+        return 0;
 
       /*
        * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -800,14 +813,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
     }
 
     /*
-     * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+     * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+     * prefix.
      */
     j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
     {
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
-      if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
-        extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-        if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+      if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+        if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+          return 0;
+        if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+            range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
           return 0;
       }
     }
@@ -841,8 +857,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
     unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
 
-    extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-    extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+        !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+      return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+        memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+      return 0;
 
     /*
      * Punt overlaps.
@@ -860,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
       IPAddressOrRange *merged;
       if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
         return 0;
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
       --i;
@@ -869,6 +893,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted final range.
+   */
+  j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+  {
+    IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+      unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+      if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -885,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
                                     v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
       return 0;
   }
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
   OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
   return 1;
@@ -1017,6 +1055,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
         X509V3_conf_err(val);
         goto err;
       }
+      if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+        X509V3_conf_err(val);
+        goto err;
+      }
       if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
         X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
@@ -1102,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
 
   p = 0;
   for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
-    extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
-                    c_min, c_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+                         c_min, c_max, length))
+      return -1;
     for (;; p++) {
       if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
         return 0;
-      extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
-                      p_min, p_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+                           p_min, p_max, length))
+        return 0;
       if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
         continue;
       if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -1130,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
     return 1;
   if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b))
     return 0;
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
     IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
     int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
@@ -1195,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   }
   if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
     validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
     X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     ret = 0;
@@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
       }
       continue;
     }
-    sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
     for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
       IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
       int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
index 8e077e31c9..d4df1bfac3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
@@ -39,10 +39,16 @@ for a description of the method's properties.
 SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The
 reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions
 (some of these settings were made automatically during the last
-handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing
-an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings.
-SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence
-L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; .
+handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact
+same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer
+changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence
+L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>;
+L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>
+instead to avoid such failures
+(or simply L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>
+if session reuse is not desired).
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/e_os2.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/e_os2.h
index 4c785c62cf..d30724d304 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/e_os2.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/e_os2.h
@@ -193,8 +193,14 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 /* --------------------------------- VOS ----------------------------------- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS
+#if defined(__VOS__) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS)
 # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS
+#ifdef __HPPA__
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+#endif
+#ifdef __IA32__
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /* ------------------------------- VxWorks --------------------------------- */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/openssl.spec b/src/lib/libssl/src/openssl.spec
index e4db875539..703cea2a5f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/openssl.spec
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/openssl.spec
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 %define libmaj 1
 %define libmin 0
 %define librel 0
-%define librev e
+%define librev f
 Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 39aac73e10..e0c0f0cc9a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
         unsigned int mac_size;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
 
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -409,13 +410,10 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
         if (enc_err <= 0)
                 {
-                /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-                if (enc_err < 0)
-                        {
-                        rr->length = 0;
-                        s->packet_length = 0;
-                        }
-                goto err;
+                /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
+                 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
+                 */
+                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -445,7 +443,7 @@ printf("\n");
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                         goto f_err;
 #else
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif                  
                         }
                 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
@@ -456,17 +454,25 @@ printf("\n");
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
 #else
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif
                         }
                 rr->length-=mac_size;
                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
                 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
                         {
-                        goto err;
+                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                         }
                 }
 
+        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+                {
+                /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                s->packet_length = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+
         /* r->length is now just compressed */
         if (s->expand != NULL)
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index a6a4c87ea6..149983be30 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
                                 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
                                 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
                                         (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
                                         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 50bd415b56..53223bd38d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                 /* wrong packet length */
                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-                goto err;
+                goto f_err;
                 }
 
         return(1);
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         if (n < 6)
                 {
                 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-                al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                 goto f_err;
                 }
@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
         /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
         if (ticklen + 6 != n)
                 {
-                al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                 goto f_err;
                 }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 58386e1ba0..b14597076d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
                         /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
                         l+=i;
+                        /* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
+                         * with the padding length. */
+                        memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
                         rec->length+=i;
                         rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
                         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 62c791cb72..1130244aeb 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2177,6 +2177,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         {
         unsigned char *rp,*wp;
         size_t rlen, wlen;
+        int init_extra;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
         if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
@@ -2215,6 +2216,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
         rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
         wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+        init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
         if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
                 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
                 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
@@ -2227,6 +2229,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
         s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
         s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
         s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+        s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
 
         ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c3b5ff33ff..d734c359fb 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                 }
 
                         s->init_num=0;
+                        s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
                         if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                                 {
@@ -755,6 +756,14 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
         int ok;
         long n;
 
+        /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+         * negotiation. */
+        if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
          * so permit appropriate message length */
         n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -783,6 +792,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
                         s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
                         }
 #endif
+                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
                 return 2;
                 }
         return 1;
@@ -2130,6 +2140,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 if (i <= 0)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                        BN_clear_free(pub);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h
index e4c3f65010..8f922eea72 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1882,6 +1882,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL                         233
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE                   129
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM              130
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO                    304
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO                          131
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT                               132
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL                                  213
@@ -2139,6 +2140,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY                        172
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY                       173
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE                     174
+#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS                      346
 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET                   175
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED                   176
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED                    177
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl3.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl3.h
index baaa89e717..9c2c41287a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -379,6 +379,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER                   0x0004
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG              0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY             0x0010
+ 
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE             0x0040
 
 typedef struct ssl3_state_st
         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index a8ce186b78..54ba7ef5b4 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
                                                 sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
                                                 }
                                         }
+                                        sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
                                 }
                         MemCheck_on();
                         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_err.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 0eed464749..e9be77109f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL),    "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),      "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO),       "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO),     "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT),  "SSL3_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL),     "SSL3_CTRL"},
@@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY)   ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY)  ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index a3c9309488..7755476de3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1054,6 +1054,9 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
                 s->max_cert_list=larg;
                 return(l);
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+                if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+                        return 0;
+
                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
                     SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 4c78393f3f..cea622a2a6 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 85371c87b8..26cbae449e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -971,6 +971,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                 sdata = data;
                                 if (dsize > 0)
                                         {
+                                        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+                                                {
+                                                sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+                                                                           X509_EXTENSION_free);
+                                                }
+
                                         s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
                                                 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
                                                         &sdata, dsize);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/test/testssl b/src/lib/libssl/src/test/testssl
index f9d7c5d65f..b55364ae88 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/test/testssl
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/test/testssl
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
 $ssltest $extra || exit 1
 
 if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
-  echo test sslv2/sslv3 w/o DHE via BIO pair
-  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
+  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
 fi
 
 echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ fi
 if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then
   echo skipping RSA tests
 else
-  echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no DHE, multiple handshakes
-  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'
+  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
 
   if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
     echo skipping RSA+DHE tests
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkerr.pl b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkerr.pl
index 2c99467d34..aec401c773 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkerr.pl
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ EOF
         undef %err_reason_strings;
 }
 
-if($debug && defined(%notrans)) {
+if($debug && %notrans) {
         print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n";
         foreach(sort keys %notrans)
         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl.h
index e4c3f65010..8f922eea72 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl.h
@@ -1882,6 +1882,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL                         233
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE                   129
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM              130
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO                    304
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO                          131
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT                               132
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL                                  213
@@ -2139,6 +2140,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY                        172
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY                       173
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE                     174
+#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS                      346
 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET                   175
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED                   176
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED                    177
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl3.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl3.h
index baaa89e717..9c2c41287a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl3.h
@@ -379,6 +379,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER                   0x0004
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG              0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY             0x0010
+ 
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE             0x0040
 
 typedef struct ssl3_state_st
         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
index a8ce186b78..54ba7ef5b4 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
                                                 sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
                                                 }
                                         }
+                                        sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
                                 }
                         MemCheck_on();
                         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_err.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_err.c
index 0eed464749..e9be77109f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL),    "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),      "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO),       "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO),     "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT),  "SSL3_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL),     "SSL3_CTRL"},
@@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY)   ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY)  ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
index a3c9309488..7755476de3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1054,6 +1054,9 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
                 s->max_cert_list=larg;
                 return(l);
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+                if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+                        return 0;
+
                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
                     SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                         {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
index 4c78393f3f..cea622a2a6 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
index 85371c87b8..26cbae449e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -971,6 +971,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                 sdata = data;
                                 if (dsize > 0)
                                         {
+                                        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+                                                {
+                                                sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+                                                                           X509_EXTENSION_free);
+                                                }
+
                                         s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
                                                 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
                                                         &sdata, dsize);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/test/testssl b/src/lib/libssl/test/testssl
index f9d7c5d65f..b55364ae88 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/test/testssl
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/test/testssl
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
 $ssltest $extra || exit 1
 
 if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
-  echo test sslv2/sslv3 w/o DHE via BIO pair
-  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
+  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
 fi
 
 echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ fi
 if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then
   echo skipping RSA tests
 else
-  echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no DHE, multiple handshakes
-  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'
+  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
 
   if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
     echo skipping RSA+DHE tests