backport patch from openssl for multiple issues:

missing padding check in aesni functions
overflow in evp encode functions
use of invalid negative asn.1 types
ok beck

8 files changed, 58 insertions, 31 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
index c0fb0a3802..26338732b6 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: a_d2i_fp.c,v 1.11 2014/07/13 11:10:20 miod Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: a_d2i_fp.c,v 1.11.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
 }
 
 #define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
 static int
 asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 {
@@ -167,18 +168,22 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                 if (want >= (len - off)) {
                         want -= (len - off);
 
-                        if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        if (len + want < len ||
+                            !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
                         if ((i < 0) && ((len - off) == 0)) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         if (i > 0) {
                                 if (len + i < len) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
                                 len += i;
@@ -206,7 +211,8 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                         /* no data body so go round again */
                         eos++;
                         if (eos < 0) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         want = HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -221,28 +227,45 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                         /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
                         want = c.slen;
                         if (want > (len - off)) {
+                                size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
                                 want -= (len - off);
                                 if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
                                     len+want < len) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
-                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                /*
+                                 * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+                                 * so we can return an error for EOF without
+                                 * having to allocate the entire content length
+                                 * in one go.
+                                 */
+                                size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
-                                while (want > 0) {
-                                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
+                                want -= chunk;
+                                while (chunk > 0) {
+                                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
                                         if (i <= 0) {
                                                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
                                                     ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                                                 goto err;
                                         }
-                                        /* This can't overflow because
-                                         * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
+                                        /*
+                                         * This can't overflow because |len+want|
+                                         * didn't overflow.
+                                         */
                                         len += i;
-                                        want -= i;
+                                        chunk -= i;
                                 }
+                                if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+                                        chunk_max *= 2;
                         }
                         if (off + c.slen < off) {
                                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
index 38b3c65beb..9501f1cebb 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: a_type.c,v 1.16 2015/03/19 14:00:22 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: a_type.c,v 1.16.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -127,9 +127,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
         case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
         case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
         case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 23a6740115..aac3c08820 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tasn_dec.c,v 1.29 2015/12/12 21:05:11 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tasn_dec.c,v 1.29.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2000.
  */
@@ -861,9 +861,7 @@ asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype,
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
                 tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
                 if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
                         goto err;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index 0a6426a95e..dbc22b5fc6 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tasn_enc.c,v 1.17 2015/12/22 08:44:44 mmcc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tasn_enc.c,v 1.17.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2000.
  */
@@ -603,9 +603,7 @@ asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
                 /* These are all have the same content format
                  * as ASN1_INTEGER
                  */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index c76c2b1c52..948706342a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c,v 1.9 2015/09/10 15:56:25 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c,v 1.9.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include <openssl/aes.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include "evp_locl.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
 #define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER       0x200000
@@ -282,6 +283,8 @@ aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                         maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
                         maxpad &= 255;
 
+                        ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+
                         inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
                         mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >>
                             (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c
index 725667bfff..c060d2d5e5 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: encode.c,v 1.20 2015/02/07 13:19:15 doug Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: encode.c,v 1.20.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
+#include <sys/limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -124,13 +125,13 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 {
         int i, j;
-        unsigned int total = 0;
+        size_t total = 0;
 
         *outl = 0;
         if (inl == 0)
                 return;
         OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
-        if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
+        if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
                 memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
                 ctx->num += inl;
                 return;
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                 *out = '\0';
                 total = j + 1;
         }
-        while (inl >= ctx->length) {
+        while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) {
                 j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
                 in += ctx->length;
                 inl -= ctx->length;
@@ -156,6 +157,11 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                 *out = '\0';
                 total += j + 1;
         }
+        if (total > INT_MAX) {
+                /* Too much output data! */
+                *outl = 0;
+                return;
+        }
         if (inl != 0)
                 memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
         ctx->num = inl;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index 99bf59e05f..e91dab9b8b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: evp_enc.c,v 1.27 2015/09/10 15:56:25 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: evp_enc.c,v 1.27.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                 return 0;
         }
         if (i != 0) {
-                if (i + inl < bl) {
+                if (bl - i > inl) {
                         memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
                         ctx->buf_len += inl;
                         *outl = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 153b37612f..4dd09eeba5 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.57 2015/09/12 16:10:07 doug Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.57.2.1 2016/05/03 12:39:48 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -956,6 +956,7 @@ start:
 
                 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
                 if (!peek) {
+                        memset(&(rr->data[rr->off]), 0, n);
                         rr->length -= n;
                         rr->off += n;
                         if (rr->length == 0) {