Remove now unused code for EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER and EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE.

ok inoguchi@ tb@

4 files changed, 28 insertions, 77 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
index 8c910c5f86..a1c0ce6b90 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.16 2017/01/23 08:08:06 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.17 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -135,12 +135,6 @@ tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size,
 
         padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
 
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-                /* padding is already verified */
-                rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
-                return 1;
-        }
-
         good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
         /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
          * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 59c3ad5a0b..e54fbacdd8 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_ciph.c,v 1.104 2018/09/08 14:29:52 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_ciph.c,v 1.105 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -598,12 +598,20 @@ ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
                         *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
         }
 
-        if (*enc != NULL &&
-            (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) &&
-            (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
-                return 1;
+        if (*enc == NULL || *md == NULL ||
+            (mac_pkey_type != NULL && *mac_pkey_type == NID_undef))
+                return 0;
 
-        return 0;
+        /*
+         * EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER and EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE ciphers are not
+         * supported via EVP_CIPHER (they should be using EVP_AEAD instead).
+         */
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+                return 0;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(*enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+                return 0;
+
+        return 1;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
index 163b0292af..4e3ac7722a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.12 2017/05/07 04:22:24 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.13 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
         p += 2;
 
         /* Explicit IV length. */
+        eivlen = 0;
         if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
                 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_write_ctx);
                 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
@@ -746,16 +747,10 @@ do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
                         if (eivlen <= 1)
                                 eivlen = 0;
                 }
-                /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
-                else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-                        eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                else
-                        eivlen = 0;
         } else if (s->internal->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
             s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) {
                 eivlen = s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
-        } else
-                eivlen = 0;
+        }
 
         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
         wr->data = p + eivlen;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
index 77ac5899ac..b8ebf52417 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.113 2018/09/06 16:40:45 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.114 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read,
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
         EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+        EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
         const EVP_MD *mac;
         int mac_type;
 
@@ -503,26 +504,13 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read,
                 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx;
         }
 
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-                EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL,
-                    !is_read);
-                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-                    iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv);
-        } else
-                EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read);
-
-        if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
-                EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-                    mac_secret, mac_secret_size);
-                if (mac_key == NULL)
-                        goto err;
-                EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key);
-                EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-        } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) {
-                /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-                    mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret);
-        }
+        EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read);
+
+        if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+            mac_secret_size)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
 
         if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) {
                 int nid;
@@ -589,10 +577,6 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         } else {
                 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
                 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
-                /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-                        iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
         }
 
         mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
@@ -676,10 +660,6 @@ tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
                 }
                 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
                 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
-                /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-                        iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
         }
 
         S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead;
@@ -951,28 +931,7 @@ tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 l = rec->length;
                 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-                        unsigned char buf[13];
-
-                        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-                                dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq,
-                                    send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch);
-                        } else {
-                                memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
-                                tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq);
-                        }
-
-                        buf[8] = rec->type;
-                        buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
-                        buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-                        buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
-                        buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
-                        pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
-                        if (send) {
-                                l += pad;
-                                rec->length += pad;
-                        }
-                } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+                if (bs != 1 && send) {
                         i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
 
                         /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
@@ -994,11 +953,6 @@ tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) &
                     EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0))
                         return -1;      /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
-                        rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                        rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                        rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                }
 
                 ret = 1;
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)