cherry pick bugfixes for http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20130205.txt

from the openssl git (changes between openssl 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d).
ok djm@

5 files changed, 216 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 432722e409..fc84cd3d19 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 
         int mdnid, pknid;
 
+        if (!pkey)
+                {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
         /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
index ee7b87c45c..de83a15b99 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
                         a->neg=!(a->neg);
                 return(i);
                 }
-        /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-        if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-                        (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-                return(0);
-        i=0;
-        for (;;)
+        for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
                 {
-                if (i >= a->top)
-                        l=w;
-                else
-                        l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-                a->d[i]=l;
-                if (w > l)
-                        w=1;
-                else
-                        break;
-                i++;
+                a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+                w = (w>l)?1:0;
                 }
-        if (i >= a->top)
+        if (w && i==a->top)
+                {
+                if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
                 a->top++;
+                a->d[i]=w;
+                }
         bn_check_top(a);
         return(1);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 710fb79baf..483e04b605 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ typedef struct
         defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      || \
         defined(__INTEL__)      )
 
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# define BSWAP(x) ({ unsigned int r=(x); asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; })
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
 #define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
 
@@ -167,6 +171,9 @@ static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c,const void *data,size_t len)
                 SHA1_Update(c,ptr,res);
 }
 
+#ifdef SHA1_Update
+#undef SHA1_Update
+#endif
 #define SHA1_Update sha1_update
 
 static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
@@ -184,6 +191,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
 #endif
 
+        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
         if (len%AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0;
 
         if (ctx->encrypt) {
@@ -234,47 +243,210 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                                         &key->ks,ctx->iv,1);
                 }
         } else {
-                unsigned char mac[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+                union { unsigned int  u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+                        unsigned char c[32+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac;
+
+                /* arrange cache line alignment */
+                pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c+31)&((size_t)0-32));
 
                 /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
                 aesni_cbc_encrypt(in,out,len,
                                 &key->ks,ctx->iv,0);
 
                 if (plen) {     /* "TLS" mode of operation */
-                        /* figure out payload length */
-                        if (len<(size_t)(out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
-
-                        len -= (out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+                        unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+                        int ret = 1;
+                        union { unsigned int  u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+                                unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK]; }
+                                *data = (void *)key->md.data;
 
                         if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen-4]<<8|key->aux.tls_aad[plen-3])
-                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
-                                len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
                                 iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-                        }
 
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = len>>8;
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = len;
+                        if (len<(iv+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1))
+                                return 0;
+
+                        /* omit explicit iv */
+                        out += iv;
+                        len -= iv;
+
+                        /* figure out payload length */
+                        pad = out[len-1];
+                        maxpad = len-(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1);
+                        maxpad |= (255-maxpad)>>(sizeof(maxpad)*8-8);
+                        maxpad &= 255;
+
+                        inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+pad+1);
+                        mask = (0-((inp_len-len)>>(sizeof(inp_len)*8-1)));
+                        inp_len &= mask;
+                        ret &= (int)mask;
+
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = inp_len>>8;
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = inp_len;
 
-                        /* calculate HMAC and verify it */
+                        /* calculate HMAC */
                         key->md = key->head;
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,key->aux.tls_aad,plen);
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out+iv,len);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
 
+#if 1
+                        len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;               /* amend mac */
+                        if (len>=(256+SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+                                j = (len-(256+SHA_CBLOCK))&(0-SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j += SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
+                                SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,j);
+                                out += j;
+                                len -= j;
+                                inp_len -= j;
+                        }
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        bitlen = key->md.Nl+(inp_len<<3);       /* at most 18 bits */
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        bitlen = BSWAP(bitlen);
+#else
+                        mac.c[0] = 0;
+                        mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>16);
+                        mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>8);
+                        mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+                        bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#endif
+
+                        pmac->u[0]=0;
+                        pmac->u[1]=0;
+                        pmac->u[2]=0;
+                        pmac->u[3]=0;
+                        pmac->u[4]=0;
+
+                        for (res=key->md.num, j=0;j<len;j++) {
+                                size_t c = out[j];
+                                mask = (j-inp_len)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8);
+                                c &= mask;
+                                c |= 0x80&~mask&~((inp_len-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8));
+                                data->c[res++]=(unsigned char)c;
+
+                                if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
+
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+                                res=0;
+                        }
+
+                        for(i=res;i<SHA_CBLOCK;i++,j++) data->c[i]=0;
+
+                        if (res>SHA_CBLOCK-8) {
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+                                memset(data,0,SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j+=64;
+                        }
+                        data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] = bitlen;
+                        sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        mask = 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                        pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        pmac->u[0] = BSWAP(pmac->u[0]);
+                        pmac->u[1] = BSWAP(pmac->u[1]);
+                        pmac->u[2] = BSWAP(pmac->u[2]);
+                        pmac->u[3] = BSWAP(pmac->u[3]);
+                        pmac->u[4] = BSWAP(pmac->u[4]);
+#else
+                        for (i=0;i<5;i++) {
+                                res = pmac->u[i];
+                                pmac->c[4*i+0]=(unsigned char)(res>>24);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+1]=(unsigned char)(res>>16);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+2]=(unsigned char)(res>>8);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+3]=(unsigned char)res;
+                        }
+#endif
+                        len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#else
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,inp_len);
+                        res = key->md.num;
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
+
+                        {
+                        unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        inp_blocks = 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        res += (unsigned int)(len-inp_len);
+                        pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        res %= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        pad_blocks += 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        for (;inp_blocks<pad_blocks;inp_blocks++)
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        }
+#endif
                         key->md = key->tail;
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,pmac->c,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
 
-                        if (memcmp(out+iv+len,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
+                        /* verify HMAC */
+                        out += inp_len;
+                        len -= inp_len;
+#if 1
+                        {
+                        unsigned char *p = out+len-1-maxpad-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        size_t off = out-p;
+                        unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+                        maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        for (res=0,i=0,j=0;j<maxpad;j++) {
+                                c = p[j];
+                                cmask = ((int)(j-off-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pad)&~cmask;  /* ... and padding */
+                                cmask &= ((int)(off-1-j))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pmac->c[i])&cmask;
+                                i += 1&cmask;
+                        }
+                        maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+                        }
+#else
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pmac->c[i];
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+
+                        /* verify padding */
+                        pad = (pad&~res) | (maxpad&res);
+                        out = out+len-1-pad;
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<pad;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pad;
+
+                        res = (0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1);
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+#endif
+                        return ret;
                 } else {
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,len);
                 }
         }
 
-        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
-
         return 1;
         }
 
@@ -309,6 +481,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void
                 SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
                 SHA1_Update(&key->tail,hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
 
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
+
                 return 1;
                 }
         case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 415d67e61c..91a45c9133 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                 {
                 EVP_PKEY *skey;
                 skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-                ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-                if(ret <= 0)
+                if (skey)
+                        {
+                        ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                        }
+                if(!skey || ret <= 0)
                         {
                         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
                         goto end;
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 553d212ebe..e08ac151ff 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
                 return -1;
 
-        if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
                 goto decoding_err;
         else
                 {