import openssl-0.9.7-beta1

1 files changed, 445 insertions, 110 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 42a77f11cd..0eda816081 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -1,13 +1,3 @@
-
-/* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July
- * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the
- * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an
- * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be
- * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once
- * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric
- * Young's original copyright is below. 
- */
-
 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -68,207 +58,552 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "rand.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
 
-#ifndef NOPROTO
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+#ifndef RSA_NULL
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-#else
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp();
-static int RSA_eay_init();
-static int RSA_eay_finish();
-#endif
-
 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
         "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
         RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
-        RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
-        RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+        RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+        RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
         RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
         RSA_eay_mod_exp,
-        BN_mod_exp_mont,
+        BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if  e == 3 */
         RSA_eay_init,
         RSA_eay_finish,
-        0,
+        0, /* flags */
         NULL,
+        0, /* rsa_sign */
+        0  /* rsa_verify */
         };
 
-RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay()
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
         {
         return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+        BIGNUM f,ret;
         int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+        if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+        if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
 
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+        case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
+                break;
+#endif
+        case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+        
+        if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+                {       
+                /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+                {
+                BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+                if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+                        {
+                        BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+                        {
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                        if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+                                {
+                                rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+                                bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+                                }
+                        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                        }
+                if (bn_mont_ctx)
+                        BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                }
+                
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+        /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+         * length of the modulus */
+        j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+        i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+        for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+                to[k]=0;
+
+        r=num;
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
-        if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+        BN_clear_free(&f);
+        BN_clear_free(&ret);
         if (buf != NULL) 
                 {
                 memset(buf,0,num);
-                Free(buf);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
                 }
         return(r);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+/* signing */
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+        BIGNUM f,ret;
         int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
 
+        if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+        if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+        
+        if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+                {       
+                /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+                RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+                ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+                { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+        else
+                {
+                if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+         * length of the modulus */
+        j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+        i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+        for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+                to[k]=0;
+
+        r=num;
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
-        if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
+        BN_clear_free(&ret);
+        BN_clear_free(&f);
         if (buf != NULL)
                 {
                 memset(buf,0,num);
-                Free(buf);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
                 }
         return(r);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(flen, from, to, rsa,padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+        BIGNUM f,ret;
         int j,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+        ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+        if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+         * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+        if (flen > num)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* make data into a big number */
+        if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+        if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+                RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        /* do the decrypt */
+        if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+                ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+                { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+        else
+                {
+                if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        p=buf;
+        j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+        case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+                break;
+#endif
+        case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (r < 0)
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
-        if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+        BN_clear_free(&f);
+        BN_clear_free(&ret);
         if (buf != NULL)
                 {
                 memset(buf,0,num);
-                Free(buf);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
                 }
         return(r);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+/* signature verification */
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+             unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
         {
-        BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+        BIGNUM f,ret;
         int i,num=0,r= -1;
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+        ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+        buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+        if (buf == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+         * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+        if (flen > num)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+                goto err;
+                }
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+        if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* do the decrypt */
+        if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+                {
+                BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+                if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+                        {
+                        BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+                        {
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                        if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+                                {
+                                rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+                                bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+                                }
+                        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                        }
+                if (bn_mont_ctx)
+                        BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                }
+                
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+        p=buf;
+        i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
+                break;
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (r < 0)
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
-        if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+        BN_clear_free(&f);
+        BN_clear_free(&ret);
         if (buf != NULL)
                 {
                 memset(buf,0,num);
-                Free(buf);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
                 }
         return(r);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa)
-BIGNUM *r0;
-BIGNUM *I;
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
         {
-        BIGNUM *r1=NULL,*m1=NULL;
+        BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
         int ret=0;
         BN_CTX *ctx;
 
+        BN_init(&m1);
+        BN_init(&r1);
+        BN_init(&vrfy);
         if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
-        m1=BN_new();
-        r1=BN_new();
-        if ((m1 == NULL) || (r1 == NULL)) goto err;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+                {
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+                        {
+                        BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+                        if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+                                goto err;
+                        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
+                                {
+                                BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+                                {
+                                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                                if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+                                        {
+                                        rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
+                                        bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+                                        }
+                                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                                }
+                        if (bn_mont_ctx)
+                                BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                        }
+
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+                        {
+                        BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+                        if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+                                goto err;
+                        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
+                                {
+                                BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+                                {
+                                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                                if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+                                        {
+                                        rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
+                                        bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+                                        }
+                                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+                                }
+                        if (bn_mont_ctx)
+                                BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+                        }
+                }
+                
+        if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+        /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+         * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+        if (r0->neg)
+                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+        /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+         * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+         * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+         * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+         * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+         * they ensure p > q [steve]
+         */
+        if (r0->neg)
+                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+
+        if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+                {
+                if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+                /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+                 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+                 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+                 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+                if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+                if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+                if (vrfy.neg)
+                        if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+                if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+                        /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+                         * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+                         * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+                        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+                }
+        ret=1;
 err:
-        if (m1 != NULL) BN_free(m1);
-        if (r1 != NULL) BN_free(r1);
+        BN_clear_free(&m1);
+        BN_clear_free(&r1);
+        BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
         return(ret);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_init(rsa)
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
         {
         rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
         return(1);
         }
 
-static int RSA_eay_finish(rsa)
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
         {
-        if (rsa->method_mod_n != NULL)
-                BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_n);
-        if (rsa->method_mod_p != NULL)
-                BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_p);
-        if (rsa->method_mod_q != NULL)
-                BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_q);
+        if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+        if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+        if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
         return(1);
         }
 
-
+#endif