http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162ec30718b5e7480add42598158

Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random
perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and
replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set".  New flags
(SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME)
were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t
for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".

Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]

Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them.  The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned.  No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
index 8ff4d8e369..976b753a87 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -791,8 +791,7 @@ dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
                 for (i = 0; p[i]=='\0' && i < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); i++)
                         ;
                 if (i == sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
-                        ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
-                            sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+                        RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 
                 /* Do the message type and length last */
                 d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);