http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162ec30718b5e7480add42598158

Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random
perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and
replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set".  New flags
(SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME)
were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t
for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".

Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]

Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them.  The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned.  No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
index 24f0a2e86e..a118e8e82f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -909,7 +909,8 @@ dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
                 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                 p = s->s3->server_random;
-                ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+                RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
                 /* Do the message type and length last */
                 d = p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);