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-Bundle of old SSLeay documentation files [OBSOLETE!]
-*** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! ***
-OBSOLETE means that nothing in this document should be trusted.  This
-document is provided mostly for historical purposes (it wasn't even up
-to date at the time SSLeay 0.8.1 was released) and as inspiration.  If
-you copy some snippet of code from this document, please _check_ that
-it really is correct from all points of view.  For example, you can
-check with the other documents in this directory tree, or by comparing
-with relevant parts of the include files.
-People have done the mistake of trusting what's written here.  Please
-don't do that.
-*** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! ***
-==== readme ========================================================
-This is the old 0.6.6 docuementation.  Most of the cipher stuff is still
-relevent but I'm working (very slowly) on new documentation.
-The current version can be found online at
-http://www.cryptsoft.com/ssleay/doc
-==== API.doc ========================================================
-SSL - SSLv2/v3/v23 etc.
-BIO - methods and how they plug together
-MEM - memory allocation callback
-CRYPTO - locking for threads
-EVP - Ciphers/Digests/signatures
-RSA - methods
-X509 - certificate retrieval
-X509 - validation
-X509 - X509v3 extensions
-Objects - adding object identifiers
-ASN.1 - parsing
-PEM - parsing
-==== ssl/readme =====================================================
-22 Jun 1996
-This file belongs in ../apps, but I'll leave it here because it deals
-with SSL :-)  It is rather dated but it gives you an idea of how
-things work.
-===
-17 Jul 1995
-I have been changing things quite a bit and have not fully updated
-this file, so take what you read with a grain of salt
-eric
-===
-The s_client and s_server programs can be used to test SSL capable
-IP/port addresses and the verification of the X509 certificates in use
-by these services.  I strongly advise having a look at the code to get
-an idea of how to use the authentication under SSLeay.  Any feedback
-on changes and improvements would be greatly accepted.
-This file will probably be gibberish unless you have read
-rfc1421, rfc1422, rfc1423 and rfc1424 which describe PEM
-authentication.
-A Brief outline (and examples) how to use them to do so.
-NOTE:
-The environment variable SSL_CIPER is used to specify the prefered
-cipher to use, play around with setting it's value to combinations of
-RC4-MD5, EXP-RC4-MD5, CBC-DES-MD5, CBC3-DES-MD5, CFB-DES-NULL
-in a : separated list.
-This directory contains 3 X509 certificates which can be used by these programs.
-client.pem: a file containing a certificate and private key to be used
-        by s_client.
-server.pem :a file containing a certificate and private key to be used
-        by s_server.
-eay1024.pem:the certificate used to sign client.pem and server.pem.
-        This would be your CA's certificate.  There is also a link
-        from the file a8556381.0 to eay1024.PEM.  The value a8556381
-        is returned by 'x509 -hash -noout <eay1024.pem' and is the
-        value used by X509 verification routines to 'find' this
-        certificte when search a directory for it.
-        [the above is not true any more, the CA cert is 
-         ../certs/testca.pem which is signed by ../certs/mincomca.pem]
-When testing the s_server, you may get
-bind: Address already in use
-errors.  These indicate the port is still being held by the unix
-kernel and you are going to have to wait for it to let go of it.  If
-this is the case, remember to use the port commands on the s_server and
-s_client to talk on an alternative port.
-=====
-s_client.
-This program can be used to connect to any IP/hostname:port that is
-talking SSL.  Once connected, it will attempt to authenticate the
-certificate it was passed and if everything works as expected, a 2
-directional channel will be open.  Any text typed will be sent to the
-other end.  type Q<cr> to exit.  Flags are as follows.
-host arg       : Arg is the host or IP address to connect to.
-port arg       : Arg is the port to connect to (https is 443).
-verify arg     : Turn on authentication of the server certificate.
-                : Arg specifies the 'depth', this will covered below.
-cert arg       : The optional certificate to use.  This certificate
-                : will be returned to the server if the server
-                : requests it for client authentication.
-key arg        : The private key that matches the certificate
-                : specified by the -cert option.  If this is not
-                : specified (but -cert is), the -cert file will be
-                : searched for the Private key.  Both files are
-                : assumed to be in PEM format.
-CApath arg     : When to look for certificates when 'verifying' the
-                : certificate from the server.
-CAfile arg     : A file containing certificates to be used for
-                : 'verifying' the server certificate.
-reconnect      : Once a connection has been made, drop it and
-                : reconnect with same session-id.  This is for testing :-).
-The '-verify n' parameter specifies not only to verify the servers
-certificate but to also only take notice of 'n' levels.  The best way
-to explain is to show via examples.
-Given
-s_server -cert server.PEM is running.
-s_client
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-What has happened is that the 'SSLeay demo server' certificate's
-issuer ('CA') could not be found but because verify is not on, we
-don't care and the connection has been made anyway.  It is now 'up'
-using CBC-DES-MD5 mode.  This is an unauthenticate secure channel.
-You may not be talking to the right person but the data going to them
-is encrypted.
-s_client -verify 0
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-We are 'verifying' but only to depth 0, so since the 'SSLeay demo server'
-certificate passed the date and checksum, we are happy to proceed.
-s_client -verify 1
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate
-        verify return:0
-        ERROR
-        verify error:unable to get issuer certificate
-In this case we failed to make the connection because we could not
-authenticate the certificate because we could not find the
-'CA' certificate.
-s_client -verify 1 -CAfile eay1024.PEM
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-We loaded the certificates from the file eay1024.PEM.  Everything
-checked out and so we made the connection.
-s_client -verify 1 -CApath .
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-We looked in out local directory for issuer certificates and 'found'
-a8556381.0 and so everything is ok.
-It is worth noting that 'CA' is a self certified certificate.  If you
-are passed one of these, it will fail to 'verify' at depth 0 because
-we need to lookup the certifier of a certificate from some information
-that we trust and keep locally.
-SSL_CIPHER=CBC3-DES-MD5:RC4-MD5
-export SSL_CIPHER
-s_client -verify 10 -CApath . -reconnect
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        drop the connection and reconnect with the same session id
-        CIPHER is CBC3-DES-MD5
-This has done a full connection and then re-estabished it with the
-same session id but a new socket.  No RSA stuff occures on the second
-connection.  Note that we said we would prefer to use CBC3-DES-MD5
-encryption and so, since the server supports it, we are.
-=====
-s_server
-This program accepts SSL connections on a specified port
-Once connected, it will estabish an SSL connection and optionaly
-attempt to authenticate the client.  A 2 directional channel will be
-open.  Any text typed will be sent to the other end.  Type Q<cr> to exit.
-Flags are as follows.
-port arg       : Arg is the port to listen on.
-verify arg     : Turn on authentication of the client if they have a
-                : certificate.  Arg specifies the 'depth'.
-Verify arg     : Turn on authentication of the client. If they don't
-                : have a valid certificate, drop the connection.
-cert arg       : The certificate to use.  This certificate
-                : will be passed to the client.  If it is not
-                : specified, it will default to server.PEM
-key arg        : The private key that matches the certificate
-                : specified by the -cert option.  If this is not
-                : specified (but -cert is), the -cert file will be
-                : searched for the Private key.  Both files are
-                : assumed to be in PEM format.  Default is server.PEM
-CApath arg     : When to look for certificates when 'verifying' the
-                : certificate from the client.
-CAfile arg     : A file containing certificates to be used for
-                : 'verifying' the client certificate.
-For the following 'demo'  I will specify the s_server command and
-the s_client command and then list the output from the s_server.
-s_server
-s_client
-        CONNECTED
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-Everything up and running
-s_server -verify 0
-s_client  
-        CONNECTED
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-Ok since no certificate was returned and we don't care.
-s_server -verify 0
-./s_client -cert client.PEM
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client
-        issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-Ok since we were only verifying to level 0
-s_server -verify 4
-s_client -cert client.PEM
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client
-        issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate
-        verify return:0
-        ERROR
-        verify error:unable to get issuer certificate
-Bad because we could not authenticate the returned certificate.
-s_server -verify 4 -CApath .
-s_client -cert client.PEM
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-Ok because we could authenticate the returned certificate :-).
-s_server -Verify 0 -CApath .
-s_client
-        CONNECTED
-        ERROR
-        SSL error:function is:REQUEST_CERTIFICATE
-                 :error is   :client end did not return a certificate
-Error because no certificate returned.
-s_server -Verify 4 -CApath .
-s_client -cert client.PEM
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-Full authentication of the client.
-So in summary to do full authentication of both ends
-s_server -Verify 9 -CApath .
-s_client -cert client.PEM -CApath . -verify 9
-From the server side
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-From the client side
-        CONNECTED
-        depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server
-        verify return:1
-        depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA
-        verify return:1
-        CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5
-For general probing of the 'internet https' servers for the
-distribution area, run
-s_client -host www.netscape.com -port 443 -verify 4 -CApath ../rsa/hash
-Then enter
-GET /
-and you should be talking to the https server on that host.
-www.rsa.com was refusing to respond to connections on 443 when I was
-testing.
-have fun :-).
-eric
-==== a_verify.doc ========================================================
-From eay@mincom.com Fri Oct  4 18:29:06 1996
-Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA29080
-  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Fri, 4 Oct 1996 08:29:07 +1000
-Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 08:29:06 +1000 (EST)
-From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>
-X-Sender: eay@orb
-To: wplatzer <wplatzer@iaik.tu-graz.ac.at>
-Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>, SSL Mailing List <ssl-users@mincom.com>
-Subject: Re: Netscape's Public Key
-In-Reply-To: <19961003134837.NTM0049@iaik.tu-graz.ac.at>
-Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.961004081346.8018K-100000@orb>
-Mime-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
-Status: RO
-X-Status: 
-On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, wplatzer wrote:
-> I get Public Key from Netscape (Gold 3.0b4), but cannot do anything
-> with it... It looks like (asn1parse):
-> 
-> 0:d=0 hl=3 l=180 cons: SEQUENCE
-> 3:d=1 hl=2 l= 96 cons: SEQUENCE
-> 5:d=2 hl=2 l= 92 cons: SEQUENCE
-> 7:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
-> 9:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsaEncryption
-> 20:d=4 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
-> 22:d=3 hl=2 l= 75 prim: BIT STRING
-> 99:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: IA5STRING :
-> 101:d=1 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
-> 103:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5withRSAEncryption
-> 114:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
-> 116:d=1 hl=2 l= 65 prim: BIT STRING
-> 
-> The first BIT STRING is the public key and the second BIT STRING is 
-> the signature.
-> But a public key consists of the public exponent and the modulus. Are 
-> both numbers in the first BIT STRING?
-> Is there a document simply describing this coding stuff (checking 
-> signature, get the public key, etc.)?
-Minimal in SSLeay.  If you want to see what the modulus and exponent are,
-try asn1parse -offset 25 -length 75 <key.pem
-asn1parse will currently stuff up on the 'length 75' part (fixed in next 
-release) but it will print the stuff.  If you are after more 
-documentation on ASN.1, have a look at www.rsa.com and get their PKCS 
-documents, most of my initial work on SSLeay was done using them.
-As for SSLeay,
-util/crypto.num and util/ssl.num are lists of all exported functions in 
-the library (but not macros :-(.
-The ones for extracting public keys from certificates and certificate 
-requests are EVP_PKEY *      X509_REQ_extract_key(X509_REQ *req);
-EVP_PKEY *      X509_extract_key(X509 *x509);
-To verify a signature on a signed ASN.1 object
-int X509_verify(X509 *a,EVP_PKEY *key);
-int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a,EVP_PKEY *key);
-int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a,EVP_PKEY *key);
-int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a,EVP_PKEY *key);
-I should mention that EVP_PKEY can be used to hold a public or a private key,
-since for  things like RSA and DSS, a public key is just a subset of what 
-is stored for the private key.
-To sign any of the above structures
-int X509_sign(X509 *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md);
-int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md);
-int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md);
-int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md);
-where md is the message digest to sign with.
-There are all defined in x509.h and all the _sign and _verify functions are
-actually macros to the ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify() functions.
-These functions will put the correct algorithm identifiers in the correct 
-places in the structures.
-eric
--
-Eric Young                  | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates.
-AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au    | RTFM Win32 GetMessage().
-==== x509 =======================================================
-X509_verify()
-X509_sign()
-X509_get_version()
-X509_get_serialNumber()
-X509_get_issuer()
-X509_get_subject()
-X509_get_notBefore()
-X509_get_notAfter()
-X509_get_pubkey()
-X509_set_version()
-X509_set_serialNumber()
-X509_set_issuer()
-X509_set_subject()
-X509_set_notBefore()
-X509_set_notAfter()
-X509_set_pubkey()
-X509_get_extensions()
-X509_set_extensions()
-X509_EXTENSIONS_clear()
-X509_EXTENSIONS_retrieve()
-X509_EXTENSIONS_add()
-X509_EXTENSIONS_delete()
-==== x509 attribute ================================================
-PKCS7
-        STACK of X509_ATTRIBUTES
-                ASN1_OBJECT
-                STACK of ASN1_TYPE
-So it is
-p7.xa[].obj
-p7.xa[].data[]
-get_obj_by_nid(STACK , nid)
-get_num_by_nid(STACK , nid)
-get_data_by_nid(STACK , nid, index)
-X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_new(void );
-void            X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(X509_ATTRIBUTE *a);
-X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **ex,
-                        int nid, STACK *value);
-X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **ex,
-                        int nid, STACK *value);
-int             X509_ATTRIBUTE_set_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex,ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
-int             X509_ATTRIBUTE_add_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex, int index,
-                        ASN1_TYPE *value);
-ASN1_OBJECT *   X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex);
-int             X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_num(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne);
-ASN1_TYPE *     X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne,int index);
-ASN1_TYPE *     X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_data_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne,
-                        ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
-X509_ATTRIBUTE *PKCS7_get_s_att_by_NID(PKCS7 *p7,int nid);
-X509_ATTRIBUTE *PKCS7_get_u_att_by_NID(PKCS7 *p7,int nid);
-==== x509 v3 ========================================================
-The 'new' system.
-The X509_EXTENSION_METHOD includes extensions and attributes and/or names. 
-Basically everthing that can be added to an X509 with an OID identifying it.
-It operates via 2 methods per object id.
-int a2i_XXX(X509 *x,char *str,int len);
-int i2a_XXX(BIO *bp,X509 *x);
-The a2i_XXX function will add the object with a value converted from the
-string into the X509.  Len can be -1 in which case the length is calculated
-via strlen(str).   Applications can always use direct knowledge to load and
-unload the relevent objects themselves.
-i2a_XXX will print to the passed BIO, a text representation of the
-relevet object.  Use a memory BIO if you want it printed to a buffer :-).
-X509_add_by_NID(X509 *x,int nid,char *str,int len);
-X509_add_by_OBJ(X509 *x,ASN1_OBJECT *obj,char *str,int len);
-X509_print_by_name(BIO *bp,X509 *x);
-X509_print_by_NID(BIO *bp,X509 *x);
-X509_print_by_OBJ(BIO *bp,X509 *x);
-==== verify ========================================================
-X509_verify_cert_chain(
-        CERT_STORE *cert_store,
-        STACK /* X509 */ *certs,
-        int *verify_result,
-        int (*verify_error_callback)()
-        char *argument_to_callback, /* SSL */
-app_verify_callback(
-        char *app_verify_arg, /* from SSL_CTX */
-        STACK /* X509 */ *certs,
-        int *verify_result,
-        int (*verify_error_callback)()
-        SSL *s,
-int X509_verify_cert(
-        CERT_STORE *cert_store,
-        X509 *x509,
-        int *verify_result,
-        int (*verify_error_callback)(),
-        char *arg,
-==== apps.doc ========================================================
-The applications
-Ok, where to begin....
-In the begining, when SSLeay was small (April 1995), there
-were but few applications, they did happily cohabit in
-the one bin directory.  Then over time, they did multiply and grow,
-and they started to look like microsoft software; 500k to print 'hello world'.
-A new approach was needed.  They were coalessed into one 'Monolithic'
-application, ssleay.  This one program is composed of many programs that
-can all be compiled independantly.
-ssleay has 3 modes of operation.
-1) If the ssleay binary has the name of one of its component programs, it
-executes that program and then exits.  This can be achieved by using hard or
-symbolic links, or failing that, just renaming the binary.
-2) If the first argument to ssleay is the name of one of the component
-programs, that program runs that program and then exits.
-3) If there are no arguments, ssleay enters a 'command' mode.  Each line is
-interpreted as a program name plus arguments.  After each 'program' is run,
-ssleay returns to the comand line.
-dgst    - message digests
-enc     - encryption and base64 encoding
-ans1parse - 'pulls' appart ASN.1 encoded objects like certificates.
-dh      - Diffle-Hellman parameter manipulation.
-rsa     - RSA manipulations.
-crl     - Certificate revokion list manipulations
-x509    - X509 cert fiddles, including signing.
-pkcs7   - pkcs7 manipulation, only DER versions right now.
-genrsa  - generate an RSA private key.
-gendh   - Generate a set of Diffle-Hellman parameters.
-req     - Generate a PKCS#10 object, a certificate request.
-s_client - SSL client program
-s_server - SSL server program
-s_time   - A SSL protocol timing program
-s_mult   - Another SSL server, but it multiplexes
-           connections.
-s_filter - under development
-errstr  - Convert SSLeay error numbers to strings.
-ca      - Sign certificate requests, and generate
-          certificate revokion lists
-crl2pkcs7 - put a crl and certifcates into a pkcs7 object.
-speed   - Benchmark the ciphers.
-verify  - Check certificates
-hashdir - under development
-[ there a now a few more options, play with the program to see what they
-  are ]
-==== asn1.doc ========================================================
-The ASN.1 Routines.
-ASN.1 is a specification for how to encode structured 'data' in binary form.
-The approach I have take to the manipulation of structures and their encoding
-into ASN.1 is as follows.
-For each distinct structure there are 4 function of the following form
-TYPE *TYPE_new(void);
-void TYPE_free(TYPE *);
-TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a,unsigned char **pp,long length);
-long i2d_TYPE(TYPE *a,unsigned char **pp);      /* CHECK RETURN VALUE */
-where TYPE is the type of the 'object'.  The TYPE that have these functions
-can be in one of 2 forms, either the internal C malloc()ed data structure
-or in the DER (a variant of ASN.1 encoding) binary encoding which is just
-an array of unsigned bytes.  The 'i2d' functions converts from the internal
-form to the DER form and the 'd2i' functions convert from the DER form to
-the internal form.
-The 'new' function returns a malloc()ed version of the structure with all
-substructures either created or left as NULL pointers.  For 'optional'
-fields, they are normally left as NULL to indicate no value.  For variable
-size sub structures (often 'SET OF' or 'SEQUENCE OF' in ASN.1 syntax) the
-STACK data type is used to hold the values.  Have a read of stack.doc
-and have a look at the relevant header files to see what I mean.  If there
-is an error while malloc()ing the structure, NULL is returned.
-The 'free' function will free() all the sub components of a particular
-structure.  If any of those sub components have been 'removed', replace
-them with NULL pointers, the 'free' functions are tolerant of NULL fields.
-The 'd2i' function copies a binary representation into a C structure.  It
-operates as follows.  'a' is a pointer to a pointer to
-the structure to populate, 'pp' is a pointer to a pointer to where the DER
-byte string is located and 'length' is the length of the '*pp' data.
-If there are no errors, a pointer to the populated structure is returned.
-If there is an error, NULL is returned.  Errors can occur because of
-malloc() failures but normally they will be due to syntax errors in the DER
-encoded data being parsed. It is also an error if there was an
-attempt to read more that 'length' bytes from '*p'.  If
-everything works correctly, the value in '*p' is updated
-to point at the location just beyond where the DER
-structure was read from.  In this way, chained calls to 'd2i' type
-functions can be made, with the pointer into the 'data' array being
-'walked' along the input byte array.
-Depending on the value passed for 'a', different things will be done.  If
-'a' is NULL, a new structure will be malloc()ed and returned.  If '*a' is
-NULL, a new structure will be malloc()ed and put into '*a' and returned.
-If '*a' is not NULL, the structure in '*a' will be populated, or in the
-case of an error, free()ed and then returned.
-Having these semantics means that a structure
-can call a 'd2i' function to populate a field and if the field is currently
-NULL, the structure will be created.
-The 'i2d' function type is used to copy a C structure to a byte array.
-The parameter 'a' is the structure to convert and '*p' is where to put it.
-As for the 'd2i' type structure, 'p' is updated to point after the last
-byte written.  If p is NULL, no data is written.  The function also returns
-the number of bytes written.  Where this becomes useful is that if the
-function is called with a NULL 'p' value, the length is returned.  This can
-then be used to malloc() an array of bytes and then the same function can
-be recalled passing the malloced array to be written to. e.g.
-int len;
-unsigned char *bytes,*p;
-len=i2d_X509(x,NULL);   /* get the size of the ASN1 encoding of 'x' */
-if ((bytes=(unsigned char *)malloc(len)) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-p=bytes;
-i2d_X509(x,&p);
-Please note that a new variable, 'p' was passed to i2d_X509.  After the
-call to i2d_X509 p has been incremented by len bytes.
-Now the reason for this functional organisation is that it allows nested
-structures to be built up by calling these functions as required.  There
-are various macros used to help write the general 'i2d', 'd2i', 'new' and
-'free' functions.  They are discussed in another file and would only be
-used by some-one wanting to add new structures to the library.  As you
-might be able to guess, the process of writing ASN.1 files can be a bit CPU
-expensive for complex structures.  I'm willing to live with this since the
-simpler library code make my life easier and hopefully most programs using
-these routines will have their execution profiles dominated by cipher or
-message digest routines.
-What follows is a list of 'TYPE' values and the corresponding ASN.1
-structure and where it is used.
-TYPE                    ASN.1
-ASN1_INTEGER            INTEGER
-ASN1_BIT_STRING         BIT STRING
-ASN1_OCTET_STRING       OCTET STRING
-ASN1_OBJECT             OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING    PrintableString
-ASN1_T61STRING          T61String
-ASN1_IA5STRING          IA5String
-ASN1_UTCTIME            UTCTime
-ASN1_TYPE               Any of the above mentioned types plus SEQUENCE and SET
-Most of the above mentioned types are actualled stored in the
-ASN1_BIT_STRING type and macros are used to differentiate between them.
-The 3 types used are
-typedef struct asn1_object_st
-        {
-        /* both null if a dynamic ASN1_OBJECT, one is
-         * defined if a 'static' ASN1_OBJECT */
-        char *sn,*ln;
-        int nid;
-        int length;
-        unsigned char *data;
-        } ASN1_OBJECT;
-This is used to store ASN1 OBJECTS.  Read 'objects.doc' for details ono
-routines to manipulate this structure.  'sn' and 'ln' are used to hold text
-strings that represent the object (short name and long or lower case name).
-These are used by the 'OBJ' library.  'nid' is a number used by the OBJ
-library to uniquely identify objects.  The ASN1 routines will populate the
-'length' and 'data' fields which will contain the bit string representing
-the object.
-typedef struct asn1_bit_string_st
-        {
-        int length;
-        int type;
-        unsigned char *data;
-        } ASN1_BIT_STRING;
-This structure is used to hold all the other base ASN1 types except for
-ASN1_UTCTIME (which is really just a 'char *').  Length is the number of
-bytes held in data and type is the ASN1 type of the object (there is a list
-in asn1.h).
-typedef struct asn1_type_st
-        {
-        int type;
-        union   {
-                char *ptr;
-                ASN1_INTEGER *          integer;
-                ASN1_BIT_STRING *       bit_string;
-                ASN1_OCTET_STRING *     octet_string;
-                ASN1_OBJECT *           object;
-                ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *  printablestring;
-                ASN1_T61STRING *        t61string;
-                ASN1_IA5STRING *        ia5string;
-                ASN1_UTCTIME *          utctime;
-                ASN1_BIT_STRING *       set;
-                ASN1_BIT_STRING *       sequence;
-                } value;
-        } ASN1_TYPE;
-This structure is used in a few places when 'any' type of object can be
-expected.
-X509                    Certificate
-X509_CINF               CertificateInfo
-X509_ALGOR              AlgorithmIdentifier
-X509_NAME               Name                    
-X509_NAME_ENTRY         A single sub component of the name.
-X509_VAL                Validity
-X509_PUBKEY             SubjectPublicKeyInfo
-The above mentioned types are declared in x509.h. They are all quite
-straight forward except for the X509_NAME/X509_NAME_ENTRY pair.
-A X509_NAME is a STACK (see stack.doc) of X509_NAME_ENTRY's.
-typedef struct X509_name_entry_st
-        {
-        ASN1_OBJECT *object;
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING *value;
-        int set;
-        int size;       /* temp variable */
-        } X509_NAME_ENTRY;
-The size is a temporary variable used by i2d_NAME and set is the set number
-for the particular NAME_ENTRY.  A X509_NAME is encoded as a sequence of
-sequence of sets.  Normally each set contains only a single item.
-Sometimes it contains more.  Normally throughout this library there will be
-only one item per set.  The set field contains the 'set' that this entry is
-a member of.  So if you have just created a X509_NAME structure and
-populated it with X509_NAME_ENTRYs, you should then traverse the X509_NAME
-(which is just a STACK) and set the 'set/' field to incrementing numbers.
-For more details on why this is done, read the ASN.1 spec for Distinguished
-Names.
-X509_REQ                CertificateRequest
-X509_REQ_INFO           CertificateRequestInfo
-These are used to hold certificate requests.
-X509_CRL                CertificateRevocationList
-These are used to hold a certificate revocation list
-RSAPrivateKey           PrivateKeyInfo
-RSAPublicKey            PublicKeyInfo
-Both these 'function groups' operate on 'RSA' structures (see rsa.doc).
-The difference is that the RSAPublicKey operations only manipulate the m
-and e fields in the RSA structure.
-DSAPrivateKey           DSS private key
-DSAPublicKey            DSS public key
-Both these 'function groups' operate on 'DSS' structures (see dsa.doc).
-The difference is that the RSAPublicKey operations only manipulate the 
-XXX fields in the DSA structure.
-DHparams                DHParameter
-This is used to hold the p and g value for The Diffie-Hellman operation.
-The function deal with the 'DH' strucure (see dh.doc).
-Now all of these function types can be used with several other functions to give
-quite useful set of general manipulation routines.  Normally one would
-not uses these functions directly but use them via macros. 
-char *ASN1_dup(int (*i2d)(),char *(*d2i)(),char *x);
-'x' is the input structure case to a 'char *', 'i2d' is the 'i2d_TYPE'
-function for the type that 'x' is and d2i is the 'd2i_TYPE' function for the
-type that 'x' is.  As is obvious from the parameters, this function
-duplicates the strucutre by transforming it into the DER form and then
-re-loading it into a new strucutre and returning the new strucutre.  This
-is obviously a bit cpu intensive but when faced with a complex dynamic
-structure this is the simplest programming approach.  There are macros for
-duplicating the major data types but is simple to add extras.
-char *ASN1_d2i_fp(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),FILE *fp,unsigned char **x);
-'x' is a pointer to a pointer of the 'desired type'.  new and d2i are the
-corresponding 'TYPE_new' and 'd2i_TYPE' functions for the type and 'fp' is
-an open file pointer to read from.  This function reads from 'fp' as much
-data as it can and then uses 'd2i' to parse the bytes to load and return
-the parsed strucutre in 'x' (if it was non-NULL) and to actually return the
-strucutre.  The behavior of 'x' is as per all the other d2i functions.
-char *ASN1_d2i_bio(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),BIO *fp,unsigned char **x);
-The 'BIO' is the new IO type being used in SSLeay (see bio.doc).  This
-function is the same as ASN1_d2i_fp() except for the BIO argument.
-ASN1_d2i_fp() actually calls this function.
-int ASN1_i2d_fp(int (*i2d)(),FILE *out,unsigned char *x);
-'x' is converted to bytes by 'i2d' and then written to 'out'.  ASN1_i2d_fp
-and ASN1_d2i_fp are not really symetric since ASN1_i2d_fp will read all
-available data from the file pointer before parsing a single item while
-ASN1_i2d_fp can be used to write a sequence of data objects.  To read a
-series of objects from a file I would sugest loading the file into a buffer
-and calling the relevent 'd2i' functions.
-char *ASN1_d2i_bio(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),BIO *fp,unsigned char **x);
-This function is the same as ASN1_i2d_fp() except for the BIO argument.
-ASN1_i2d_fp() actually calls this function.
-char *  PEM_ASN1_read(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char **x,int (*cb)());
-This function will read the next PEM encoded (base64) object of the same
-type as 'x' (loaded by the d2i function).  'name' is the name that is in
-the '-----BEGIN name-----' that designates the start of that object type.
-If the data is encrypted, 'cb' will be called to prompt for a password.  If
-it is NULL a default function will be used to prompt from the password.
-'x' is delt with as per the standard 'd2i' function interface.  This
-function can be used to read a series of objects from a file.  While any
-data type can be encrypted (see PEM_ASN1_write) only RSA private keys tend
-to be encrypted.
-char *  PEM_ASN1_read_bio(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,BIO *fp,
-        char **x,int (*cb)());
-Same as PEM_ASN1_read() except using a BIO.  This is called by
-PEM_ASN1_read().
-int     PEM_ASN1_write(int (*i2d)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char *x,EVP_CIPHER *enc,
-                unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)());
-int     PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(),char *name,BIO *fp,
-                char *x,EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen,
-                int (*callback)());
-int ASN1_sign(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, RSA *rsa, EVP_MD *type);
-int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *algor1,
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,char *data, RSA *rsa);
-int ASN1_BIT_STRING_cmp(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *b);
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *ASN1_BIT_STRING_type_new(int type );
-int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
-void ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
-ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_dup(ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *d2i_asn1_print_type(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,unsigned char **pp,
-                long length,int type);
-int             i2d_ASN1_SET(STACK *a, unsigned char **pp,
-                        int (*func)(), int ex_tag, int ex_class);
-STACK *         d2i_ASN1_SET(STACK **a, unsigned char **pp, long length,
-                        char *(*func)(), int ex_tag, int ex_class);
-int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp,ASN1_OBJECT *object);
-int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a);
-int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp,ASN1_INTEGER *bs,char *buf,int size);
-int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v);
-long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a);
-ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai);
-BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai,BIGNUM *bn);
-/* given a string, return the correct type.  Max is the maximum number
- * of bytes to parse.  It stops parsing when 'max' bytes have been
- * processed or a '\0' is hit */
-int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(unsigned char *s,int max);
-void ASN1_parse(BIO *fp,unsigned char *pp,long len);
-int i2d_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp, int tag, int class);
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **a, unsigned char **pp,
-        long length, int Ptag, int Pclass);
-/* PARSING */
-int asn1_Finish(ASN1_CTX *c);
-/* SPECIALS */
-int ASN1_get_object(unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
-        int *pclass, long omax);
-int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p,long len);
-void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length,
-        int tag, int class);
-int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag);
-X509 *  X509_get_cert(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509_NAME * name,X509 *tmp_x509);
-int     X509_add_cert(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *);
-char *  X509_cert_verify_error_string(int n);
-int     X509_add_cert_file(CERTIFICATE_CTX *c,char *file, int type);
-char *  X509_gmtime (char *s, long adj);
-int     X509_add_cert_dir (CERTIFICATE_CTX *c,char *dir, int type);
-int     X509_load_verify_locations (CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,
-                char *file_env, char *dir_env);
-int     X509_set_default_verify_paths(CERTIFICATE_CTX *cts);
-X509 *  X509_new_D2i_X509(int len, unsigned char *p);
-char *  X509_get_default_cert_area(void );
-char *  X509_get_default_cert_dir(void );
-char *  X509_get_default_cert_file(void );
-char *  X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void );
-char *  X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void );
-char *  X509_get_default_private_dir(void );
-X509_REQ *X509_X509_TO_req(X509 *x, RSA *rsa);
-int     X509_cert_verify(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *xs, int (*cb)()); 
-CERTIFICATE_CTX *CERTIFICATE_CTX_new();
-void CERTIFICATE_CTX_free(CERTIFICATE_CTX *c);
-void X509_NAME_print(BIO *fp, X509_NAME *name, int obase);
-int             X509_print_fp(FILE *fp,X509 *x);
-int             X509_print(BIO *fp,X509 *x);
-X509_INFO *     X509_INFO_new(void);
-void            X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *a);
-char *          X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a);
-#define X509_verify(x,rsa)
-#define X509_REQ_verify(x,rsa)
-#define X509_CRL_verify(x,rsa)
-#define X509_sign(x,rsa,md)
-#define X509_REQ_sign(x,rsa,md)
-#define X509_CRL_sign(x,rsa,md)
-#define X509_dup(x509)
-#define d2i_X509_fp(fp,x509)
-#define i2d_X509_fp(fp,x509)
-#define d2i_X509_bio(bp,x509)
-#define i2d_X509_bio(bp,x509)
-#define X509_CRL_dup(crl)
-#define d2i_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl)
-#define i2d_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl)
-#define d2i_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl)
-#define i2d_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl)
-#define X509_REQ_dup(req)
-#define d2i_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req)
-#define i2d_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req)
-#define d2i_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req)
-#define i2d_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req)
-#define RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)
-#define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa)
-#define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa)
-#define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa)
-#define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa)
-#define X509_NAME_dup(xn)
-#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(ne)
-void X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp,X509_REQ *req);
-void X509_REQ_print(BIO *fp,X509_REQ *req);
-RSA *X509_REQ_extract_key(X509_REQ *req);
-RSA *X509_extract_key(X509 *x509);
-int             X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b);
-unsigned long   X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a);
-X509_NAME *     X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a);
-int             X509_issuer_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b);
-unsigned long   X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *a);
-X509_NAME *     X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a);
-int             X509_subject_name_cmp(X509 *a,X509 *b);
-unsigned long   X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x);
-int             X509_NAME_cmp (X509_NAME *a, X509_NAME *b);
-unsigned long   X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x);
-==== bio.doc ========================================================
-BIO Routines
-This documentation is rather sparse, you are probably best 
-off looking at the code for specific details.
-The BIO library is a IO abstraction that was originally 
-inspired by the need to have callbacks to perform IO to FILE 
-pointers when using Windows 3.1 DLLs.  There are two types 
-of BIO; a source/sink type and a filter type.
-The source/sink methods are as follows:
-       BIO_s_mem()  memory buffer - a read/write byte array that
-        grows until memory runs out :-).
-       BIO_s_file()  FILE pointer - A wrapper around the normal 
-        'FILE *' commands, good for use with stdin/stdout.
-       BIO_s_fd()  File descriptor - A wrapper around file 
-        descriptors, often used with pipes.
-       BIO_s_socket()  Socket - Used around sockets.  It is 
-        mostly in the Microsoft world that sockets are different 
-        from file descriptors and there are all those ugly winsock 
-        commands.
-       BIO_s_null()  Null - read nothing and write nothing.; a 
-        useful endpoint for filter type BIO's specifically things 
-        like the message digest BIO.
-The filter types are
-       BIO_f_buffer()  IO buffering - does output buffering into 
-        larger chunks and performs input buffering to allow gets() 
-        type functions.
-       BIO_f_md()  Message digest - a transparent filter that can 
-        be asked to return a message digest for the data that has 
-        passed through it.
-       BIO_f_cipher()  Encrypt or decrypt all data passing 
-        through the filter.
-       BIO_f_base64()  Base64 decode on read and encode on write.
-       BIO_f_ssl()  A filter that performs SSL encryption on the 
-        data sent through it.
-Base BIO functions.
-The BIO library has a set of base functions that are 
-implemented for each particular type.  Filter BIOs will 
-normally call the equivalent function on the source/sink BIO 
-that they are layered on top of after they have performed 
-some modification to the data stream.  Multiple filter BIOs 
-can be 'push' into a stack of modifers, so to read from a 
-file, unbase64 it, then decrypt it, a BIO_f_cipher, 
-BIO_f_base64 and a BIO_s_file would probably be used.  If a 
-sha-1 and md5 message digest needed to be generated, a stack 
-two BIO_f_md() BIOs and a BIO_s_null() BIO could be used.
-The base functions are
-       BIO *BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type); Create  a new BIO of  type 'type'.
-       int BIO_free(BIO *a); Free a BIO structure.  Depending on 
-        the configuration, this will free the underlying data 
-        object for a source/sink BIO.
-       int BIO_read(BIO *b, char *data, int len); Read upto 'len' 
-        bytes into 'data'. 
-       int BIO_gets(BIO *bp,char *buf, int size); Depending on 
-        the BIO, this can either be a 'get special' or a get one 
-        line of data, as per fgets();
-       int BIO_write(BIO *b, char *data, int len); Write 'len' 
-        bytes from 'data' to the 'b' BIO.
-       int BIO_puts(BIO *bp,char *buf); Either a 'put special' or 
-        a write null terminated string as per fputs().
-       long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,char *parg);  A 
-        control function which is used to manipulate the BIO 
-        structure and modify it's state and or report on it.  This 
-        function is just about never used directly, rather it 
-        should be used in conjunction with BIO_METHOD specific 
-        macros.
-       BIO *BIO_push(BIO *new_top, BIO *old); new_top is apped to the
-        top of the 'old' BIO list.  new_top should be a filter BIO.
-        All writes will go through 'new_top' first and last on read.
-        'old' is returned.
-       BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *bio); the new topmost BIO is returned, NULL if
-        there are no more.
-If a particular low level BIO method is not supported 
-(normally BIO_gets()), -2 will be returned if that method is 
-called.  Otherwise the IO methods (read, write, gets, puts) 
-will return the number of bytes read or written, and 0 or -1 
-for error (or end of input).  For the -1 case, 
-BIO_should_retry(bio) can be called to determine if it was a 
-genuine error or a temporary problem.  -2 will also be 
-returned if the BIO has not been initalised yet, in all 
-cases, the correct error codes are set (accessible via the 
-ERR library).
-The following functions are convenience functions:
-       int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, char * format, ..);  printf but 
-        to a BIO handle.
-       long BIO_ctrl_int(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,int iarg); a 
-        convenience function to allow a different argument types 
-        to be passed to BIO_ctrl().
-       int BIO_dump(BIO *b,char *bytes,int len); output 'len' 
-        bytes from 'bytes' in a hex dump debug format.
-       long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, char *argp, int 
-        argi, long argl, long ret) - a default debug BIO callback, 
-        this is mentioned below.  To use this one normally has to 
-        use the BIO_set_callback_arg() function to assign an 
-        output BIO for the callback to use.
-       BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *bio,int type); when there is a 'stack'
-        of BIOs, this function scan the list and returns the first
-        that is of type 'type', as listed in buffer.h under BIO_TYPE_XXX.
-       void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio); Free the bio and all other BIOs
-        in the list.  It walks the bio->next_bio list.
-Extra commands are normally implemented as macros calling BIO_ctrl().
-       BIO_number_read(BIO *bio) - the number of bytes processed 
-        by BIO_read(bio,.).
-       BIO_number_written(BIO *bio) - the number of bytes written 
-        by BIO_write(bio,.).
-       BIO_reset(BIO *bio) - 'reset' the BIO.
-       BIO_eof(BIO *bio) - non zero if we are at the current end 
-        of input.
-       BIO_set_close(BIO *bio, int close_flag) - set the close flag.
-       BIO_get_close(BIO *bio) - return the close flag.
-        BIO_pending(BIO *bio) - return the number of bytes waiting 
-        to be read (normally buffered internally).
-       BIO_flush(BIO *bio) - output any data waiting to be output.
-       BIO_should_retry(BIO *io) - after a BIO_read/BIO_write 
-        operation returns 0 or -1, a call to this function will 
-        return non zero if you should retry the call later (this 
-        is for non-blocking IO).
-       BIO_should_read(BIO *io) - we should retry when data can 
-        be read.
-       BIO_should_write(BIO *io) - we should retry when data can 
-        be written.
-       BIO_method_name(BIO *io) - return a string for the method name.
-       BIO_method_type(BIO *io) - return the unique ID of the BIO method.
-       BIO_set_callback(BIO *io,  long (*callback)(BIO *io, int 
-        cmd, char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); - sets 
-        the debug callback.
-       BIO_get_callback(BIO *io) - return the assigned function 
-        as mentioned above.
-       BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *io, char *arg)  - assign some 
-        data against the BIO.  This is normally used by the debug 
-        callback but could in reality be used for anything.  To 
-        get an idea of how all this works, have a look at the code 
-        in the default debug callback mentioned above.  The 
-        callback can modify the return values.
-Details of the BIO_METHOD structure.
-typedef struct bio_method_st
-        {
-        int type;
-        char *name;
-        int (*bwrite)();
-        int (*bread)();
-        int (*bputs)();
-        int (*bgets)();
-        long (*ctrl)();
-        int (*create)();
-        int (*destroy)();
-        } BIO_METHOD;
-The 'type' is the numeric type of the BIO, these are listed in buffer.h;
-'Name' is a textual representation of the BIO 'type'.
-The 7 function pointers point to the respective function 
-methods, some of which can be NULL if not implemented.
-The BIO structure
-typedef struct bio_st
-        {
-        BIO_METHOD *method;
-        long (*callback)(BIO * bio, int mode, char *argp, int 
-                argi, long argl, long ret);
-        char *cb_arg; /* first argument for the callback */
-        int init;
-        int shutdown;
-        int flags;      /* extra storage */
-        int num;
-        char *ptr;
-        struct bio_st *next_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */
-        int references;
-        unsigned long num_read;
-        unsigned long num_write;
-        } BIO;
-       'Method' is the BIO method.
-       'callback', when configured, is called before and after 
-        each BIO method is called for that particular BIO.  This 
-        is intended primarily for debugging and of informational feedback.
-       'init' is 0 when the BIO can be used for operation.  
-        Often, after a BIO is created, a number of operations may 
-        need to be performed before it is available for use.  An 
-        example is for BIO_s_sock().  A socket needs to be 
-        assigned to the BIO before it can be used.
-       'shutdown', this flag indicates if the underlying 
-        communication primitive being used should be closed/freed 
-        when the BIO is closed.
-       'flags' is used to hold extra state.  It is primarily used 
-        to hold information about why a non-blocking operation 
-        failed and to record startup protocol information for the 
-        SSL BIO.
-       'num' and 'ptr' are used to hold instance specific state 
-        like file descriptors or local data structures.
-       'next_bio' is used by filter BIOs to hold the pointer of the
-        next BIO in the chain. written data is sent to this BIO and
-        data read is taken from it.
-       'references' is used to indicate the number of pointers to 
-        this structure.  This needs to be '1' before a call to 
-        BIO_free() is made if the BIO_free() function is to 
-        actually free() the structure, otherwise the reference 
-        count is just decreased.  The actual BIO subsystem does 
-        not really use this functionality but it is useful when 
-        used in more advanced applicaion.
-       num_read and num_write are the total number of bytes 
-        read/written via the 'read()' and 'write()' methods.
-BIO_ctrl operations.
-The following is the list of standard commands passed as the 
-second parameter to BIO_ctrl() and should be supported by 
-all BIO as best as possible.  Some are optional, some are 
-manditory, in any case, where is makes sense, a filter BIO 
-should pass such requests to underlying BIO's.
-       BIO_CTRL_RESET  - Reset the BIO back to an initial state.
-       BIO_CTRL_EOF    - return 0 if we are not at the end of input, 
-        non 0 if we are.
-       BIO_CTRL_INFO   - BIO specific special command, normal
-        information return.
-       BIO_CTRL_SET    - set IO specific parameter.
-       BIO_CTRL_GET    - get IO specific parameter.
-       BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE - Get the close on BIO_free() flag, one 
-        of BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE.
-       BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE - Set the close on BIO_free() flag.
-       BIO_CTRL_PENDING - Return the number of bytes available 
-        for instant reading
-       BIO_CTRL_FLUSH  - Output pending data, return number of bytes output.
-       BIO_CTRL_SHOULD_RETRY - After an IO error (-1 returned) 
-        should we 'retry' when IO is possible on the underlying IO object.
-       BIO_CTRL_RETRY_TYPE - What kind of IO are we waiting on.
-The following command is a special BIO_s_file() specific option.
-       BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME - specify a file to open for IO.
-The BIO_CTRL_RETRY_TYPE needs a little more explanation.  
-When performing non-blocking IO, or say reading on a memory 
-BIO, when no data is present (or cannot be written), 
-BIO_read() and/or BIO_write() will return -1.  
-BIO_should_retry(bio) will return true if this is due to an 
-IO condition rather than an actual error.  In the case of 
-BIO_s_mem(), a read when there is no data will return -1 and 
-a should retry when there is more 'read' data.
-The retry type is deduced from 2 macros
-BIO_should_read(bio) and BIO_should_write(bio).
-Now while it may appear obvious that a BIO_read() failure 
-should indicate that a retry should be performed when more 
-read data is available, this is often not true when using 
-things like an SSL BIO.  During the SSL protocol startup 
-multiple reads and writes are performed, triggered by any 
-SSL_read or SSL_write.
-So to write code that will transparently handle either a 
-socket or SSL BIO,
-        i=BIO_read(bio,..)
-        if (I == -1)
-                {
-                if (BIO_should_retry(bio))
-                        {
-                        if (BIO_should_read(bio))
-                                {
-                                /* call us again when BIO can be read */
-                                }
-                        if (BIO_should_write(bio))
-                                {
-                                /* call us again when BIO can be written */
-                                }
-                        }
-                }
-At this point in time only read and write conditions can be 
-used but in the future I can see the situation for other 
-conditions, specifically with SSL there could be a condition 
-of a X509 certificate lookup taking place and so the non-
-blocking BIO_read would require a retry when the certificate 
-lookup subsystem has finished it's lookup.  This is all 
-makes more sense and is easy to use in a event loop type 
-setup.
-When using the SSL BIO, either SSL_read() or SSL_write()s 
-can be called during the protocol startup and things will 
-still work correctly.
-The nice aspect of the use of the BIO_should_retry() macro 
-is that all the errno codes that indicate a non-fatal error 
-are encapsulated in one place.  The Windows specific error 
-codes and WSAGetLastError() calls are also hidden from the 
-application.
-Notes on each BIO method.
-Normally buffer.h is just required but depending on the 
-BIO_METHOD, ssl.h or evp.h will also be required.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
-       BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *bio, BUF_MEM *bm, int close_flag) - 
-        set the underlying BUF_MEM structure for the BIO to use.
-       BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *bio, char **pp) - if pp is not NULL, 
-        set it to point to the memory array and return the number 
-        of bytes available.
-A read/write BIO.  Any data written is appended to the 
-memory array and any read is read from the front.  This BIO 
-can be used for read/write at the same time. BIO_gets() is 
-supported in the fgets() sense.
-BIO_CTRL_INFO can be used to retrieve pointers to the memory 
-buffer and it's length.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void);
-       BIO_set_fp(BIO *bio, FILE *fp, int close_flag) - set 'FILE *' to use.
-       BIO_get_fp(BIO *bio, FILE **fp) - get the 'FILE *' in use.
-       BIO_read_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - read from file.
-       BIO_write_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - write to file.
-       BIO_append_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - append to file.
-This BIO sits over the normal system fread()/fgets() type 
-functions. Gets() is supported.  This BIO in theory could be 
-used for read and write but it is best to think of each BIO 
-of this type as either a read or a write BIO, not both.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void);
-       BIO_sock_should_retry(int i) - the underlying function 
-        used to determine if a call should be retried; the 
-        argument is the '0' or '-1' returned by the previous BIO 
-        operation.
-       BIO_fd_should_retry(int i) - same as the 
-       BIO_sock_should_retry() except that it is different internally.
-       BIO_set_fd(BIO *bio, int fd, int close_flag) - set the 
-        file descriptor to use
-       BIO_get_fd(BIO *bio, int *fd) - get the file descriptor.
-These two methods are very similar.  Gets() is not 
-supported, if you want this functionality, put a 
-BIO_f_buffer() onto it.  This BIO is bi-directional if the 
-underlying file descriptor is.  This is normally the case 
-for sockets but not the case for stdio descriptors.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void);
-Read and write as much data as you like, it all disappears 
-into this BIO.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void);
-       BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(BIO *bio) - return the number of 
-        complete lines in the buffer.
-       BIO_set_buffer_size(BIO *bio, long size) - set the size of 
-        the buffers.
-This type performs input and output buffering.  It performs 
-both at the same time.  The size of the buffer can be set 
-via the set buffer size option.  Data buffered for output is 
-only written when the buffer fills.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
-       BIO_set_ssl(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int close_flag) - the SSL 
-        structure to use.
-       BIO_get_ssl(BIO *bio, SSL **ssl) - get the SSL structure 
-        in use.
-The SSL bio is a little different from normal BIOs because 
-the underlying SSL structure is a little different.  A SSL 
-structure performs IO via a read and write BIO.  These can 
-be different and are normally set via the
-SSL_set_rbio()/SSL_set_wbio() calls.  The SSL_set_fd() calls 
-are just wrappers that create socket BIOs and then call 
-SSL_set_bio() where the read and write BIOs are the same.  
-The BIO_push() operation makes the SSLs IO BIOs the same, so 
-make sure the BIO pushed is capable of two directional 
-traffic.  If it is not, you will have to install the BIOs 
-via the more conventional SSL_set_bio() call.  BIO_pop() will retrieve
-the 'SSL read' BIO.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void);
-       BIO_set_md(BIO *bio, EVP_MD *md) - set the message digest 
-        to use.
-       BIO_get_md(BIO *bio, EVP_MD **mdp) - return the digest 
-        method in use in mdp, return 0 if not set yet.
-       BIO_reset() reinitializes the digest (EVP_DigestInit()) 
-        and passes the reset to the underlying BIOs.
-All data read or written via BIO_read() or BIO_write() to 
-this BIO will be added to the calculated digest.  This 
-implies that this BIO is only one directional.  If read and 
-write operations are performed, two separate BIO_f_md() BIOs 
-are reuqired to generate digests on both the input and the 
-output.  BIO_gets(BIO *bio, char *md, int size) will place the 
-generated digest into 'md' and return the number of bytes.  
-The EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE should probably be used to size the 'md' 
-array.  Reading the digest will also reset it.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void);
-       BIO_reset() reinitializes the cipher.
-       BIO_flush() should be called when the last bytes have been 
-        output to flush the final block of block ciphers.
-       BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b), when called after the last 
-        read from a cipher BIO, returns non-zero if the data 
-        decrypted correctly, otherwise, 0.
-       BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *key, 
-        unsigned char *iv, int encrypt)   This function is used to 
-        setup a cipher BIO.  The length of key and iv are 
-        specified by the choice of EVP_CIPHER.  Encrypt is 1 to 
-        encrypt and 0 to decrypt.
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void);
-       BIO_flush() should be called when the last bytes have been output.
-This BIO base64 encodes when writing and base64 decodes when 
-reading.  It will scan the input until a suitable begin line 
-is found.  After reading data, BIO_reset() will reset the 
-BIO to start scanning again.  Do not mix reading and writing 
-on the same base64 BIO.  It is meant as a single stream BIO.
-Directions      type
-both            BIO_s_mem()
-one/both        BIO_s_file()
-both            BIO_s_fd()
-both            BIO_s_socket() 
-both            BIO_s_null()
-both            BIO_f_buffer()
-one             BIO_f_md()  
-one             BIO_f_cipher()  
-one             BIO_f_base64()  
-both            BIO_f_ssl()
-It is easy to mix one and two directional BIOs, all one has 
-to do is to keep two separate BIO pointers for reading and 
-writing and be careful about usage of underlying BIOs.  The 
-SSL bio by it's very nature has to be two directional but 
-the BIO_push() command will push the one BIO into the SSL 
-BIO for both reading and writing.
-The best example program to look at is apps/enc.c and/or perhaps apps/dgst.c.
-==== blowfish.doc ========================================================
-The Blowfish library.
-Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities.  It
-uses variable size key, but 128bit (16 byte) key would normally be considered
-good.  It can be used in all the modes that DES can be used.  This
-library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64, ofb64 modes.
-Blowfish is quite a bit faster that DES, and much faster than IDEA or
-RC2.  It is one of the faster block ciphers.
-For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the
-same.
-This library requires the inclusion of 'blowfish.h'.
-All of the encryption functions take what is called an BF_KEY as an 
-argument.  An BF_KEY is an expanded form of the Blowfish key.
-For all modes of the Blowfish algorithm, the BF_KEY used for
-decryption is the same one that was used for encryption.
-The define BF_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions
-that require an encryption/decryption flag. BF_DECRYPT is passed to
-specify decryption.
-Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library
-could be used with Blowfish.  I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and
-ofb64 for the following reasons.
- ecb is the basic Blowfish encryption.
- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers.
- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output
-  do not need to be a multiple of 8.
- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as
-  secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode.
- If you want triple Blowfish, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally
-  obsessed with security.  Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to
-  copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to
-  BF_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-).
-The functions are as follows:
-void BF_set_key(
-BF_KEY *ks;
-int len;
-unsigned char *key;
-        BF_set_key converts an 'len' byte key into a BF_KEY.
-        A 'ks' is an expanded form of the 'key' which is used to
-        perform actual encryption.  It can be regenerated from the Blowfish key
-        so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about
-        to occur.  Don't save or pass around BF_KEY's since they
-        are CPU architecture dependent, 'key's are not.  Blowfish is an
-        interesting cipher in that it can be used with a variable length
-        key.  'len' is the length of 'key' to be used as the key.
-        A 'len' of 16 is recomended by me, but blowfish can use upto
-        72 bytes.  As a warning, blowfish has a very very slow set_key
-        function, it actually runs BF_encrypt 521 times.
-        
-void BF_encrypt(unsigned long *data, BF_KEY *key);
-void BF_decrypt(unsigned long *data, BF_KEY *key);
-        These are the Blowfish encryption function that gets called by just
-        about every other Blowfish routine in the library.  You should not
-        use this function except to implement 'modes' of Blowfish.
-        I say this because the
-        functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to
-        long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory
-        access do not occur.
-        Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and key is the
-        BF_KEY to use. 
-void BF_ecb_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-BF_KEY *key,
-int encrypt);
-        This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of Blowfish (in DES this
-        mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term
-        for blowfish as well.
-        Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by
-        key.  Depending on the encrypt, encryption or
-        decryption occurs.  Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes.
-        
-void BF_cbc_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-BF_KEY *ks,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int encrypt);
-        This routine implements Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
-        Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted
-        (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes.
-        The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above,
-        should be a multiple of 8).  If length is not a multiple of 8, bad 
-        things will probably happen.  ivec is the initialisation vector.
-        This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to
-        the next call to BF_cbc_encrypt().
-        
-void BF_cfb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-BF_KEY *schedule,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int *num,
-int encrypt);
-        This is one of the more useful functions in this Blowfish library, it
-        implements CFB mode of Blowfish with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        'Encrypt' is used to indicate encryption or decryption.
-        CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to generate a stream
-        of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text.
-        The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to
-        be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain
-        text.  As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt,
-        the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next
-        block of data is gathered for encryption is different for
-        encryption and decryption.
-        
-void BF_ofb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-BF_KEY *schedule,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int *num);
-        This functions implements OFB mode of Blowfish with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or
-        decryption mode.
-        
-For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library.
-To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to
-produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to
-BF_set_key().
-=====
-For more information about the specific Blowfish modes in this library
-(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the
-documentation on my DES library.  What is said about DES is directly
-applicable for Blowfish.
-==== bn.doc ========================================================
-The Big Number library.
-#include "bn.h" when using this library.
-This big number library was written for use in implementing the RSA and DH
-public key encryption algorithms.  As such, features such as negative
-numbers have not been extensively tested but they should work as expected.
-This library uses dynamic memory allocation for storing its data structures
-and so there are no limit on the size of the numbers manipulated by these
-routines but there is always the requirement to check return codes from
-functions just in case a memory allocation error has occurred.
-The basic object in this library is a BIGNUM.  It is used to hold a single
-large integer.  This type should be considered opaque and fields should not
-be modified or accessed directly.
-typedef struct bignum_st
-        {
-        int top;        /* Index of last used d. */
-        BN_ULONG *d;    /* Pointer to an array of 'BITS2' bit chunks. */
-        int max;        /* Size of the d array. */
-        int neg;
-        } BIGNUM;
-The big number is stored in a malloced array of BN_ULONG's.  A BN_ULONG can
-be either 16, 32 or 64 bits in size, depending on the 'number of  bits'
-specified in bn.h. 
-The 'd' field is this array.  'max' is the size of the 'd' array that has
-been allocated.  'top' is the 'last' entry being used, so for a value of 4,
-bn.d[0]=4 and bn.top=1.  'neg' is 1 if the number is negative.
-When a BIGNUM is '0', the 'd' field can be NULL and top == 0.
-Various routines in this library require the use of 'temporary' BIGNUM
-variables during their execution.  Due to the use of dynamic memory
-allocation to create BIGNUMs being rather expensive when used in
-conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the BN_CTX structure is
-used.  This structure contains BN_CTX BIGNUMs.  BN_CTX
-is the maximum number of temporary BIGNUMs any publicly exported 
-function will use.
-#define BN_CTX  12
-typedef struct bignum_ctx
-        {
-        int tos;                        /* top of stack */
-        BIGNUM *bn[BN_CTX];     /* The variables */
-        } BN_CTX;
-The functions that follow have been grouped according to function.  Most
-arithmetic functions return a result in the first argument, sometimes this
-first argument can also be an input parameter, sometimes it cannot.  These
-restrictions are documented.
-extern BIGNUM *BN_value_one;
-There is one variable defined by this library, a BIGNUM which contains the
-number 1.  This variable is useful for use in comparisons and assignment.
-Get Size functions.
-int BN_num_bits(BIGNUM *a);
-        This function returns the size of 'a' in bits.
-        
-int BN_num_bytes(BIGNUM *a);
-        This function (macro) returns the size of 'a' in bytes.
-        For conversion of BIGNUMs to byte streams, this is the number of
-        bytes the output string will occupy.  If the output byte
-        format specifies that the 'top' bit indicates if the number is
-        signed, so an extra '0' byte is required if the top bit on a
-        positive number is being written, it is upto the application to
-        make this adjustment.  Like I said at the start, I don't
-        really support negative numbers :-).
-Creation/Destruction routines.
-BIGNUM *BN_new();
-        Return a new BIGNUM object.  The number initially has a value of 0.  If
-        there is an error, NULL is returned.
-        
-void    BN_free(BIGNUM *a);
-        Free()s a BIGNUM.
-        
-void    BN_clear(BIGNUM *a);
-        Sets 'a' to a value of 0 and also zeros all unused allocated
-        memory.  This function is used to clear a variable of 'sensitive'
-        data that was held in it.
-        
-void    BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a);
-        This function zeros the memory used by 'a' and then free()'s it.
-        This function should be used to BN_free() BIGNUMS that have held
-        sensitive numeric values like RSA private key values.  Both this
-        function and BN_clear tend to only be used by RSA and DH routines.
-BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void);
-        Returns a new BN_CTX.  NULL on error.
-        
-void    BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c);
-        Free a BN_CTX structure.  The BIGNUMs in 'c' are BN_clear_free()ed.
-        
-BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *b, int bits);
-        This is an internal function that should not normally be used.  It
-        ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'bits' bit number.  It is
-        mostly used by the various BIGNUM routines.  If there is an error,
-        NULL is returned. if not, 'b' is returned.
-        
-BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, BIGNUM *from);
-        The 'from' is copied into 'to'.  NULL is returned if there is an
-        error, otherwise 'to' is returned.
-BIGNUM *BN_dup(BIGNUM *a);
-        A new BIGNUM is created and returned containing the value of 'a'.
-        NULL is returned on error.
-Comparison and Test Functions.
-int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a)
-        Return 1 if 'a' is zero, else 0.
-int BN_is_one(a)
-        Return 1 is 'a' is one, else 0.
-int BN_is_word(a,w)
-        Return 1 if 'a' == w, else 0.  'w' is a BN_ULONG.
-int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-        Return -1 if 'a' is less than 'b', 0 if 'a' and 'b' are the same
-        and 1 is 'a' is greater than 'b'.  This is a signed comparison.
-        
-int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-        This function is the same as BN_cmp except that the comparison
-        ignores the sign of the numbers.
-        
-Arithmetic Functions
-For all of these functions, 0 is returned if there is an error and 1 is
-returned for success.  The return value should always be checked.  eg.
-if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;
-Unless explicitly mentioned, the 'return' value can be one of the
-'parameters' to the function.
-int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-        Add 'a' and 'b' and return the result in 'r'.  This is r=a+b.
-        
-int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-        Subtract 'a' from 'b' and put the result in 'r'. This is r=a-b.
-        
-int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        Shift 'a' left by 'n' bits.  This is r=a*(2^n).
-        
-int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
-        Shift 'a' left by 1 bit.  This form is more efficient than
-        BN_lshift(r,a,1).  This is r=a*2.
-        
-int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        Shift 'a' right by 'n' bits.  This is r=int(a/(2^n)).
-        
-int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
-        Shift 'a' right by 1 bit.  This form is more efficient than
-        BN_rshift(r,a,1).  This is r=int(a/2).
-        
-int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-        Multiply a by b and return the result in 'r'. 'r' must not be
-        either 'a' or 'b'.  It has to be a different BIGNUM.
-        This is r=a*b.
-int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Multiply a by a and return the result in 'r'. 'r' must not be
-        'a'.  This function is alot faster than BN_mul(r,a,a).  This is r=a*a.
-int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *m, BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Divide 'm' by 'd' and return the result in 'dv' and the remainder
-        in 'rem'.  Either of 'dv' or 'rem' can be NULL in which case that
-        value is not returned.  'ctx' needs to be passed as a source of
-        temporary BIGNUM variables.
-        This is dv=int(m/d), rem=m%d.
-        
-int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *m, BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Find the remainder of 'm' divided by 'd' and return it in 'rem'.
-        'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function.
-        This function is more efficient than BN_div(NULL,rem,m,d,ctx);
-        This is rem=m%d.
-int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BIGNUM *m,BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Multiply 'a' by 'b' and return the remainder when divided by 'm'.
-        'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function.
-        This is r=(a*b)%m.
-int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *m,BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Raise 'a' to the 'p' power and return the remainder when divided by
-        'm'.  'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function.
-        This is r=(a^p)%m.
-int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
-        Return the reciprocal of 'm'.  'ctx' holds the temporary variables
-        required.  This function returns -1 on error, otherwise it returns
-        the number of bits 'r' is shifted left to make 'r' into an integer.
-        This number of bits shifted is required in BN_mod_mul_reciprocal().
-        This is r=(1/m)<<(BN_num_bits(m)+1).
-        
-int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *m, 
-        BIGNUM *i, int nb, BN_CTX *ctx);
-        This function is used to perform an efficient BN_mod_mul()
-        operation.  If one is going to repeatedly perform BN_mod_mul() with
-        the same modulus is worth calculating the reciprocal of the modulus
-        and then using this function.  This operation uses the fact that
-        a/b == a*r where r is the reciprocal of b.  On modern computers
-        multiplication is very fast and big number division is very slow.
-        'x' is multiplied by 'y' and then divided by 'm' and the remainder
-        is returned.  'i' is the reciprocal of 'm' and 'nb' is the number
-        of bits as returned from BN_reciprocal().  Normal usage is as follows.
-        bn=BN_reciprocal(i,m);
-        for (...)
-                { BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r,x,y,m,i,bn,ctx); }
-        This is r=(x*y)%m.  Internally it is approximately
-        r=(x*y)-m*(x*y/m) or r=(x*y)-m*((x*y*i) >> bn)
-        This function is used in BN_mod_exp() and BN_is_prime().
-Assignment Operations
-int BN_one(BIGNUM *a)
-        Set 'a' to hold the value one.
-        This is a=1.
-        
-int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a)
-        Set 'a' to hold the value zero.
-        This is a=0.
-        
-int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
-        Set 'a' to hold the value of 'w'.  'w' is an unsigned long.
-        This is a=w.
-unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
-        Returns 'a' in an unsigned long.  Not remarkably, often 'a' will
-        be bigger than a word, in which case 0xffffffffL is returned.
-Word Operations
-These functions are much more efficient that the normal bignum arithmetic
-operations.
-BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
-        Return the remainder of 'a' divided by 'w'.
-        This is return(a%w).
-        
-int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
-        Add 'w' to 'a'.  This function does not take the sign of 'a' into
-        account.  This is a+=w;
-        
-Bit operations.
-int BN_is_bit_set(BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        This function return 1 if bit 'n' is set in 'a' else 0.
-int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        This function sets bit 'n' to 1 in 'a'. 
-        This is a&= ~(1<<n);
-int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        This function sets bit 'n' to zero in 'a'.  Return 0 if less
-        than 'n' bits in 'a' else 1.  This is a&= ~(1<<n);
-int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n);
-        Truncate 'a' to n bits long.  This is a&= ~((~0)<<n)
-Format conversion routines.
-BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(unsigned char *s, int len,BIGNUM *ret);
-        This function converts 'len' bytes in 's' into a BIGNUM which
-        is put in 'ret'.  If ret is NULL, a new BIGNUM is created.
-        Either this new BIGNUM or ret is returned.  The number is
-        assumed to be in bigendian form in 's'.  By this I mean that
-        to 'ret' is created as follows for 'len' == 5.
-        ret = s[0]*2^32 + s[1]*2^24 + s[2]*2^16 + s[3]*2^8 + s[4];
-        This function cannot be used to convert negative numbers.  It
-        is always assumed the number is positive.  The application
-        needs to diddle the 'neg' field of th BIGNUM its self.
-        The better solution would be to save the numbers in ASN.1 format
-        since this is a defined standard for storing big numbers.
-        Look at the functions
-        ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai);
-        BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai,BIGNUM *bn);
-        int i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a,unsigned char **pp);
-        ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a,unsigned char **pp,
-                long length;
-int BN_bn2bin(BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
-        This function converts 'a' to a byte string which is put into
-        'to'.  The representation is big-endian in that the most
-        significant byte of 'a' is put into to[0].  This function
-        returns the number of bytes used to hold 'a'.  BN_num_bytes(a)
-        would return the same value and can be used to determine how
-        large 'to' needs to be.  If the number is negative, this
-        information is lost.  Since this library was written to
-        manipulate large positive integers, the inability to save and
-        restore them is not considered to be a problem by me :-).
-        As for BN_bin2bn(), look at the ASN.1 integer encoding funtions
-        for SSLeay.  They use BN_bin2bn() and BN_bn2bin() internally.
-        
-char *BN_bn2ascii(BIGNUM *a);
-        This function returns a malloc()ed string that contains the
-        ascii hexadecimal encoding of 'a'.  The number is in bigendian
-        format with a '-' in front if the number is negative.
-int BN_ascii2bn(BIGNUM **bn, char *a);
-        The inverse of BN_bn2ascii.  The function returns the number of
-        characters from 'a' were processed in generating a the bignum.
-        error is inticated by 0 being returned.  The number is a
-        hex digit string, optionally with a leading '-'.  If *bn
-        is null, a BIGNUM is created and returned via that variable.
-        
-int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, BIGNUM *a);
-        'a' is printed to file pointer 'fp'.  It is in the same format
-        that is output from BN_bn2ascii().  0 is returned on error,
-        1 if things are ok.
-int BN_print(BIO *bp, BIGNUM *a);
-        Same as BN_print except that the output is done to the SSLeay libraries
-        BIO routines.  BN_print_fp() actually calls this function.
-Miscellaneous Routines.
-int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
-        This function returns in 'rnd' a random BIGNUM that is bits
-        long.  If bottom is 1, the number returned is odd.  If top is set,
-        the top 2 bits of the number are set.  This is useful because if
-        this is set, 2 'n; bit numbers multiplied together will return a 2n
-        bit number.  If top was not set, they could produce a 2n-1 bit
-        number.
-BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
-        This function create a new BIGNUM and returns it.  This number
-        is the inverse mod 'n' of 'a'.  By this it is meant that the
-        returned value 'r' satisfies (a*r)%n == 1.  This function is
-        used in the generation of RSA keys.  'ctx', as per usual,
-        is used to hold temporary variables that are required by the
-        function.  NULL is returned on error.
-int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r,BIGNUM *a,BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx);
-        'r' has the greatest common divisor of 'a' and 'b'.  'ctx' is
-        used for temporary variables and 0 is returned on error.
-int BN_is_prime(BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,void (*callback)(),BN_CTX *ctx,
-        char *cb_arg);
-        This function is used to check if a BIGNUM ('p') is prime.
-        It performs this test by using the Miller-Rabin randomised
-        primality test.  This is a probalistic test that requires a
-        number of rounds to ensure the number is prime to a high
-        degree of probability.  Since this can take quite some time, a
-        callback function can be passed and it will be called each
-        time 'p' passes a round of the prime testing.  'callback' will
-        be called as follows, callback(1,n,cb_arg) where n is the number of
-        the round, just passed.  As per usual 'ctx' contains temporary
-        variables used.  If ctx is NULL, it does not matter, a local version
-        will be malloced.  This parameter is present to save some mallocing
-        inside the function but probably could be removed.
-        0 is returned on error.
-        'ncheck' is the number of Miller-Rabin tests to run.  It is
-        suggested to use the value 'BN_prime_checks' by default.
-BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(
-int bits,
-int strong,
-BIGNUM *a,
-BIGNUM *rems,
-void (*callback)());
-char *cb_arg
-        This function is used to generate prime numbers.  It returns a
-        new BIGNUM that has a high probability of being a prime.
-        'bits' is the number of bits that
-        are to be in the prime.  If 'strong' is true, the returned prime
-        will also be a strong prime ((p-1)/2 is also prime).
-        While searching for the prime ('p'), we
-        can add the requirement that the prime fill the following
-        condition p%a == rem.  This can be used to help search for
-        primes with specific features, which is required when looking
-        for primes suitable for use with certain 'g' values in the
-        Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm.  If 'a' is NULL,
-        this condition is not checked.  If rem is NULL, rem is assumed
-        to be 1.  Since this search for a prime
-        can take quite some time, if callback is not NULL, it is called
-        in the following situations.
-        We have a suspected prime (from a quick sieve),
-        callback(0,sus_prime++,cb_arg). Each item to be passed to BN_is_prime().
-        callback(1,round++,cb_arg).  Each successful 'round' in BN_is_prime().
-        callback(2,round,cb_arg). For each successful BN_is_prime() test.
-Hints
-----
-DSA wants 64*32 to use word mont mul, but RSA wants to use full.
-==== callback.doc ========================================================
-Callback functions used in SSLeay.
--------------------------
-The BIO library.  
-Each BIO structure can have a callback defined against it.  This callback is
-called 2 times for each BIO 'function'.  It is passed 6 parameters.
-BIO_debug_callback() is an example callback which is defined in
-crypto/buffer/bio_cb.c and is used in apps/dgst.c  This is intended mostly
-for debuging or to notify the application of IO.
-long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio,int cmd,char *argp,int argi,long argl,
-        long ret);
-bio is the BIO being called, cmd is the type of BIO function being called.
-Look at the BIO_CB_* defines in buffer.h.  Argp and argi are the arguments
-passed to BIO_read(), BIO_write, BIO_gets(), BIO_puts().  In the case of
-BIO_ctrl(), argl is also defined.  The first time the callback is called,
-before the underlying function has been executed, 0 is passed as 'ret', and
-if the return code from the callback is not > 0, the call is aborted
-and the returned <= 0 value is returned.
-The second time the callback is called, the 'cmd' value also has
-BIO_CB_RETURN logically 'or'ed with it.  The 'ret' value is the value returned
-from the actuall function call and whatever the callback returns is returned
-from the BIO function.
-BIO_set_callback(b,cb) can be used to set the callback function
-(b is a BIO), and BIO_set_callback_arg(b,arg) can be used to
-set the cb_arg argument in the BIO strucutre.  This field is only intended
-to be used by application, primarily in the callback function since it is
-accessable since the BIO is passed.
--------------------------
-The PEM library.
-The pem library only really uses one type of callback,
-static int def_callback(char *buf, int num, int verify);
-which is used to return a password string if required.
-'buf' is the buffer to put the string in.  'num' is the size of 'buf'
-and 'verify' is used to indicate that the password should be checked.
-This last flag is mostly used when reading a password for encryption.
-For all of these functions, a NULL callback will call the above mentioned
-default callback.  This default function does not work under Windows 3.1.
-For other machines, it will use an application defined prompt string
-(EVP_set_pw_prompt(), which defines a library wide prompt string)
-if defined, otherwise it will use it's own PEM password prompt.
-It will then call EVP_read_pw_string() to get a password from the console.
-If your application wishes to use nice fancy windows to retrieve passwords,
-replace this function.  The callback should return the number of bytes read
-into 'buf'.  If the number of bytes <= 0, it is considered an error.
-Functions that take this callback are listed below.  For the 'read' type
-functions, the callback will only be required if the PEM data is encrypted.
-For the Write functions, normally a password can be passed in 'kstr', of
-'klen' bytes which will be used if the 'enc' cipher is not NULL.  If
-'kstr' is NULL, the callback will be used to retrieve a password.
-int PEM_do_header (EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data,long *len,
-        int (*callback)());
-char *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,BIO *bp,char **x,int (*cb)());
-char *PEM_ASN1_read(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char **x,int (*cb)());
-int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(),char *name,BIO *bp,char *x,
-        EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)());
-int PEM_ASN1_write(int (*i2d)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char *x,
-        EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)());
-STACK *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK *sk, int (*cb)());
-STACK *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *fp, STACK *sk, int (*cb)());
-#define PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb)
-#define PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb)
-#define PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb)
-#define PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb)
-#define PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_X509(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_X509_REQ(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_X509_CRL(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_PKCS7(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_DHparams(fp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_X509(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(bp,x,cb)
-#define PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bp,x,cb)
-int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)());
-RSA *d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)());
-Now you will notice that macros like
-#define PEM_write_X509(fp,x) \
-                PEM_ASN1_write((int (*)())i2d_X509,PEM_STRING_X509,fp, \
-                                        (char *)x, NULL,NULL,0,NULL)
-Don't do encryption normally.  If you want to PEM encrypt your X509 structure,
-either just call PEM_ASN1_write directly or just define your own
-macro variant.  As you can see, this macro just sets all encryption related
-parameters to NULL.
--------------------------
-The SSL library.
-#define SSL_set_info_callback(ssl,cb)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,cb)
-void callback(SSL *ssl,int location,int ret)
-This callback is called each time around the SSL_connect()/SSL_accept() 
-state machine.  So it will be called each time the SSL protocol progresses.
-It is mostly present for use when debugging.  When SSL_connect() or
-SSL_accept() return, the location flag is SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT or
-SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT and 'ret' is the value about to be returned.
-Have a look at the SSL_CB_* defines in ssl.h.  If an info callback is defined
-against the SSL_CTX, it is called unless there is one set against the SSL.
-Have a look at
-void client_info_callback() in apps/s_client() for an example.
-Certificate verification.
-void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) ());
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*callback)());
-This callback is used to help verify client and server X509 certificates.
-It is actually passed to X509_cert_verify(), along with the SSL structure
-so you have to read about X509_cert_verify() :-).  The SSL_CTX version is used
-if the SSL version is not defined.  X509_cert_verify() is the function used
-by the SSL part of the library to verify certificates.  This function is
-nearly always defined by the application.
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(),char *arg);
-int callback(char *arg,SSL *s,X509 *xs,STACK *cert_chain);
-This call is used to replace the SSLeay certificate verification code.
-The 'arg' is kept in the SSL_CTX and is passed to the callback.
-If the callback returns 0, the certificate is rejected, otherwise it
-is accepted.  The callback is replacing the X509_cert_verify() call.
-This feature is not often used, but if you wished to implement
-some totally different certificate authentication system, this 'hook' is
-vital.
-SSLeay keeps a cache of session-ids against each SSL_CTX.  These callbacks can
-be used to notify the application when a SSL_SESSION is added to the cache
-or to retrieve a SSL_SESSION that is not in the cache from the application.
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx,cb)
-SSL_SESSION *callback(SSL *s,char *session_id,int session_id_len,int *copy);
-If defined, this callback is called to return the SESSION_ID for the
-session-id in 'session_id', of 'session_id_len' bytes.  'copy' is set to 1
-if the server is to 'take a copy' of the SSL_SESSION structure.  It is 0
-if the SSL_SESSION is being 'passed in' so the SSLeay library is now
-responsible for 'free()ing' the structure.  Basically it is used to indicate
-if the reference count on the SSL_SESSION structure needs to be incremented.
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx,cb)
-int callback(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess);
-When a new connection is established, if the SSL_SESSION is going to be added
-to the cache, this callback is called.  Return 1 if a 'copy' is required,
-otherwise, return 0.  This return value just causes the reference count
-to be incremented (on return of a 1), this means the application does
-not need to worry about incrementing the refernece count (and the
-locking that implies in a multi-threaded application).
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)());
-This sets the SSL password reading function.
-It is mostly used for windowing applications
-and used by PEM_read_bio_X509() and PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey()
-calls inside the SSL library.   The only reason this is present is because the
-calls to PEM_* functions is hidden in the SSLeay library so you have to
-pass in the callback some how.
-#define SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(ctx,cb)
-int callback(SSL *s,X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-Called when a client certificate is requested but there is not one set
-against the SSL_CTX or the SSL.  If the callback returns 1, x509 and
-pkey need to point to valid data.  The library will free these when
-required so if the application wants to keep these around, increment
-their reference counts.  If 0 is returned, no client cert is
-available.  If -1 is returned, it is assumed that the callback needs
-to be called again at a later point in time.  SSL_connect will return
-1 and SSL_want_x509_lookup(ssl) returns true.  Remember that
-application data can be attached to an SSL structure via the
-SSL_set_app_data(SSL *ssl,char *data) call.
--------------------------
-The X509 library.
-int X509_cert_verify(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *xs, int (*cb)(),
-        int *error,char *arg,STACK *cert_chain);
-int verify_callback(int ok,X509 *xs,X509 *xi,int depth,int error,char *arg,
-        STACK *cert_chain);
-X509_cert_verify() is used to authenticate X509 certificates.  The 'ctx' holds
-the details of the various caches and files used to locate certificates.
-'xs' is the certificate to verify and 'cb' is the application callback (more
-detail later).  'error' will be set to the error code and 'arg' is passed
-to the 'cb' callback.  Look at the VERIFY_* defines in crypto/x509/x509.h
-When ever X509_cert_verify() makes a 'negative' decision about a
-certitificate, the callback is called.  If everything checks out, the
-callback is called with 'VERIFY_OK' or 'VERIFY_ROOT_OK' (for a self
-signed cert that is not the passed certificate).
-The callback is passed the X509_cert_verify opinion of the certificate 
-in 'ok', the certificate in 'xs', the issuer certificate in 'xi',
-the 'depth' of the certificate in the verification 'chain', the
-VERIFY_* code in 'error' and the argument passed to X509_cert_verify()
-in 'arg'. cert_chain is a list of extra certs to use if they are not
-in the cache.
-The callback can be used to look at the error reason, and then return 0
-for an 'error' or '1' for ok.  This will override the X509_cert_verify()
-opinion of the certificates validity.  Processing will continue depending on
-the return value.  If one just wishes to use the callback for informational
-reason, just return the 'ok' parameter.
--------------------------
-The BN and DH library.
-BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(int bits,int strong,BIGNUM *add,
-        BIGNUM *rem,void (*callback)(int,int));
-int BN_is_prime(BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,void (*callback)(int,int),
-Read doc/bn.doc for the description of these 2.
-DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len,int generator,
-        void (*callback)(int,int));
-Read doc/bn.doc for the description of the callback, since it is just passed
-to BN_generate_prime(), except that it is also called as
-callback(3,0) by this function.
--------------------------
-The CRYPTO library.
-void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*func)(int mode,int type,char *file,
-        int line));
-void CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(int (*func)(int *num,int mount,
-        int type,char *file, int line));
-void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func)(void));
-Read threads.doc for info on these ones.
-==== cipher.doc ========================================================
-The Cipher subroutines.
-These routines require "evp.h" to be included.
-These functions are a higher level interface to the various cipher
-routines found in this library.  As such, they allow the same code to be
-used to encrypt and decrypt via different ciphers with only a change
-in an initial parameter.  These routines also provide buffering for block
-ciphers.
-These routines all take a pointer to the following structure to specify
-which cipher to use.  If you wish to use a new cipher with these routines,
-you would probably be best off looking an how an existing cipher is
-implemented and copying it.  At this point in time, I'm not going to go
-into many details.  This structure should be considered opaque
-typedef struct pem_cipher_st
-        {
-        int type;
-        int block_size;
-        int key_len;
-        int iv_len;
-        void (*enc_init)();     /* init for encryption */
-        void (*dec_init)();     /* init for decryption */
-        void (*do_cipher)();    /* encrypt data */
-        } EVP_CIPHER;
-        
-The type field is the object NID of the cipher type
-(read the section on Objects for an explanation of what a NID is).
-The cipher block_size is how many bytes need to be passed
-to the cipher at a time.  Key_len is the
-length of the key the cipher requires and iv_len is the length of the
-initialisation vector required.  enc_init is the function
-called to initialise the ciphers context for encryption and dec_init is the
-function to initialise for decryption (they need to be different, especially
-for the IDEA cipher).
-One reason for specifying the Cipher via a pointer to a structure
-is that if you only use des-cbc, only the des-cbc routines will
-be included when you link the program.  If you passed an integer
-that specified which cipher to use, the routine that mapped that
-integer to a set of cipher functions would cause all the ciphers
-to be link into the code.  This setup also allows new ciphers
-to be added by the application (with some restrictions).
-The thirteen ciphers currently defined in this library are
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb();     /* DES in ecb mode,     iv=0, block=8, key= 8 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede();     /* DES in ecb ede mode, iv=0, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3();    /* DES in ecb ede mode, iv=0, block=8, key=24 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb();     /* DES in cfb mode,     iv=8, block=1, key= 8 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(); /* DES in ede cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb();/* DES in ede cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=24 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ofb();     /* DES in ofb mode,     iv=8, block=1, key= 8 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ofb(); /* DES in ede ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ofb();/* DES in ede ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=24 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc();     /* DES in cbc mode,     iv=8, block=8, key= 8 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(); /* DES in cbc ede mode, iv=8, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc();/* DES in cbc ede mode, iv=8, block=8, key=24 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc();    /* DES in desx cbc mode,iv=8, block=8, key=24 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4();         /* RC4,                 iv=0, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ecb();    /* IDEA in ecb mode,    iv=0, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb();    /* IDEA in cfb mode,    iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ofb();    /* IDEA in ofb mode,    iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cbc();    /* IDEA in cbc mode,    iv=8, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ecb();     /* RC2 in ecb mode,     iv=0, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb();     /* RC2 in cfb mode,     iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ofb();     /* RC2 in ofb mode,     iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc();     /* RC2 in cbc mode,     iv=8, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ecb();      /* Blowfish in ecb mode,iv=0, block=8, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb();      /* Blowfish in cfb mode,iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ofb();      /* Blowfish in ofb mode,iv=8, block=1, key=16 */
-EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cbc();      /* Blowfish in cbc mode,iv=8, block=8, key=16 */
-The meaning of the compound names is as follows.
-des     The base cipher is DES.
-idea    The base cipher is IDEA
-rc4     The base cipher is RC4-128
-rc2     The base cipher is RC2-128
-ecb     Electronic Code Book form of the cipher.
-cbc     Cipher Block Chaining form of the cipher.
-cfb     64 bit Cipher Feedback form of the cipher.
-ofb     64 bit Output Feedback form of the cipher.
-ede     The cipher is used in Encrypt, Decrypt, Encrypt mode.  The first
-        and last keys are the same.
-ede3    The cipher is used in Encrypt, Decrypt, Encrypt mode.
-All the Cipher routines take a EVP_CIPHER_CTX pointer as an argument.
-The state of the cipher is kept in this structure.
-typedef struct EVP_CIPHER_Ctx_st
-        {
-        EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-        int encrypt;            /* encrypt or decrypt */
-        int buf_len;            /* number we have left */
-        unsigned char buf[8];
-        union   {
-                .... /* cipher specific stuff */
-                } c;
-        } EVP_CIPHER_CTX;
-Cipher is a pointer the the EVP_CIPHER for the current context.  The encrypt
-flag indicates encryption or decryption.  buf_len is the number of bytes
-currently being held in buf.
-The 'c' union holds the cipher specify context.
-The following functions are to be used.
-int EVP_read_pw_string(
-char *buf,
-int len,
-char *prompt,
-int verify,
-        This function is the same as des_read_pw_string() (des.doc).
-void EVP_set_pw_prompt(char *prompt);
-        This function sets the 'default' prompt to use to use in
-        EVP_read_pw_string when the prompt parameter is NULL.  If the
-        prompt parameter is NULL, this 'default prompt' feature is turned
-        off.  Be warned, this is a global variable so weird things
-        will happen if it is used under Win16 and care must be taken
-        with a multi-threaded version of the library.
-char *EVP_get_pw_prompt();
-        This returns a pointer to the default prompt string.  NULL
-        if it is not set.
-int EVP_BytesToKey(
-EVP_CIPHER *type,
-EVP_MD *md,
-unsigned char *salt,
-unsigned char *data,
-int datal,
-int count,
-unsigned char *key,
-unsigned char *iv);
-        This function is used to generate a key and an initialisation vector
-        for a specified cipher from a key string and a salt.  Type
-        specifies the cipher the 'key' is being generated for.  Md is the
-        message digest algorithm to use to generate the key and iv.  The salt
-        is an optional 8 byte object that is used to help seed the key
-        generator.
-        If the salt value is NULL, it is just not used.  Datal is the
-        number of bytes to use from 'data' in the key generation.  
-        This function returns the key size for the specified cipher, if
-        data is NULL, this value is returns and no other
-        computation is performed.  Count is
-        the number of times to loop around the key generator.  I would
-        suggest leaving it's value as 1.  Key and iv are the structures to
-        place the returning iv and key in.  If they are NULL, no value is
-        generated for that particular value.
-        The algorithm used is as follows
-        
-        /* M[] is an array of message digests
-         * MD() is the message digest function */
-        M[0]=MD(data . salt);
-        for (i=1; i<count; i++) M[0]=MD(M[0]);
-        i=1
-        while (data still needed for key and iv)
-                {
-                M[i]=MD(M[i-1] . data . salt);
-                for (i=1; i<count; i++) M[i]=MD(M[i]);
-                i++;
-                }
-        If the salt is NULL, it is not used.
-        The digests are concatenated together.
-        M = M[0] . M[1] . M[2] .......
-        For key= 8, iv=8 => key=M[0.. 8], iv=M[ 9 .. 16].
-        For key=16, iv=0 => key=M[0..16].
-        For key=16, iv=8 => key=M[0..16], iv=M[17 .. 24].
-        For key=24, iv=8 => key=M[0..24], iv=M[25 .. 32].
-        This routine will produce DES-CBC keys and iv that are compatible
-        with the PKCS-5 standard when md2 or md5 are used.  If md5 is
-        used, the salt is NULL and count is 1, this routine will produce
-        the password to key mapping normally used with RC4.
-        I have attempted to logically extend the PKCS-5 standard to
-        generate keys and iv for ciphers that require more than 16 bytes,
-        if anyone knows what the correct standard is, please inform me.
-        When using sha or sha1, things are a bit different under this scheme,
-        since sha produces a 20 byte digest.  So for ciphers requiring
-        24 bits of data, 20 will come from the first MD and 4 will
-        come from the second.
-        I have considered having a separate function so this 'routine'
-        can be used without the requirement of passing a EVP_CIPHER *,
-        but I have decided to not bother.  If you wish to use the
-        function without official EVP_CIPHER structures, just declare
-        a local one and set the key_len and iv_len fields to the
-        length you desire.
-The following routines perform encryption and decryption 'by parts'.  By
-this I mean that there are groups of 3 routines.  An Init function that is
-used to specify a cipher and initialise data structures.  An Update routine
-that does encryption/decryption, one 'chunk' at a time.  And finally a
-'Final' function that finishes the encryption/decryption process.
-All these functions take a EVP_CIPHER pointer to specify which cipher to
-encrypt/decrypt with.  They also take a EVP_CIPHER_CTX object as an
-argument.  This structure is used to hold the state information associated
-with the operation in progress.
-void EVP_EncryptInit(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-EVP_CIPHER *type,
-unsigned char *key,
-unsigned char *iv);
-        This function initialise a EVP_CIPHER_CTX for encryption using the
-        cipher passed in the 'type' field.  The cipher is initialised to use
-        'key' as the key and 'iv' for the initialisation vector (if one is
-        required).  If the type, key or iv is NULL, the value currently in the
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX is reused.  So to perform several decrypt
-        using the same cipher, key and iv, initialise with the cipher,
-        key and iv the first time and then for subsequent calls,
-        reuse 'ctx' but pass NULL for type, key and iv.  You must make sure
-        to pass a key that is large enough for a particular cipher.  I
-        would suggest using the EVP_BytesToKey() function.
-void EVP_EncryptUpdate(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *out,
-int *outl,
-unsigned char *in,
-int inl);
-        This function takes 'inl' bytes from 'in' and outputs bytes
-        encrypted by the cipher 'ctx' was initialised with into 'out'.  The
-        number of bytes written to 'out' is put into outl.  If a particular
-        cipher encrypts in blocks, less or more bytes than input may be
-        output.  Currently the largest block size used by supported ciphers
-        is 8 bytes, so 'out' should have room for 'inl+7' bytes.  Normally
-        EVP_EncryptInit() is called once, followed by lots and lots of
-        calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate, followed by a single EVP_EncryptFinal
-        call.
-void EVP_EncryptFinal(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *out,
-int *outl);
-        Because quite a large number of ciphers are block ciphers, there is
-        often an incomplete block to write out at the end of the
-        encryption.  EVP_EncryptFinal() performs processing on this last
-        block.  The last block in encoded in such a way that it is possible
-        to determine how many bytes in the last block are valid.  For 8 byte
-        block size ciphers, if only 5 bytes in the last block are valid, the
-        last three bytes will be filled with the value 3.  If only 2 were
-        valid, the other 6 would be filled with sixes.  If all 8 bytes are
-        valid, a extra 8 bytes are appended to the cipher stream containing
-        nothing but 8 eights.  These last bytes are output into 'out' and
-        the number of bytes written is put into 'outl'  These last bytes
-        are output into 'out' and the number of bytes written is put into
-        'outl'.  This form of block cipher finalisation is compatible with
-        PKCS-5.  Please remember that even if you are using ciphers like
-        RC4 that has no blocking and so the function will not write
-        anything into 'out', it would still be a good idea to pass a
-        variable for 'out' that can hold 8 bytes just in case the cipher is
-        changed some time in the future.  It should also be remembered
-        that the EVP_CIPHER_CTX contains the password and so when one has
-        finished encryption with a particular EVP_CIPHER_CTX, it is good
-        practice to zero the structure 
-        (ie. memset(ctx,0,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)).
-        
-void EVP_DecryptInit(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-EVP_CIPHER *type,
-unsigned char *key,
-unsigned char *iv);
-        This function is basically the same as EVP_EncryptInit() accept that
-        is prepares the EVP_CIPHER_CTX for decryption.
-void EVP_DecryptUpdate(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *out,
-int *outl,
-unsigned char *in,
-int inl);
-        This function is basically the same as EVP_EncryptUpdate()
-        except that it performs decryption.  There is one
-        fundamental difference though.  'out' can not be the same as
-        'in' for any ciphers with a block size greater than 1 if more
-        than one call to EVP_DecryptUpdate() will be made.  This
-        is because this routine can hold a 'partial' block between
-        calls.  When a partial block is decrypted (due to more bytes
-        being passed via this function, they will be written to 'out'
-        overwriting the input bytes in 'in' that have not been read
-        yet.  From this it should also be noted that 'out' should
-        be at least one 'block size' larger than 'inl'.  This problem
-        only occurs on the second and subsequent call to
-        EVP_DecryptUpdate() when using a block cipher.
-int EVP_DecryptFinal(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *out,
-int *outl);
-        This function is different to EVP_EncryptFinal in that it 'removes'
-        any padding bytes appended when the data was encrypted.  Due to the
-        way in which 1 to 8 bytes may have been appended when encryption
-        using a block cipher, 'out' can end up with 0 to 7 bytes being put
-        into it.  When decoding the padding bytes, it is possible to detect
-        an incorrect decryption.  If the decryption appears to be wrong, 0
-        is returned.  If everything seems ok, 1 is returned.  For ciphers
-        with a block size of 1 (RC4), this function would normally not
-        return any bytes and would always return 1.  Just because this
-        function returns 1 does not mean the decryption was correct. It
-        would normally be wrong due to either the wrong key/iv or
-        corruption of the cipher data fed to EVP_DecryptUpdate().
-        As for EVP_EncryptFinal, it is a good idea to zero the
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX after use since the structure contains the key used
-        to decrypt the data.
-        
-The following Cipher routines are convenience routines that call either
-EVP_EncryptXxx or EVP_DecryptXxx depending on weather the EVP_CIPHER_CTX
-was setup to encrypt or decrypt.  
-void EVP_CipherInit(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-EVP_CIPHER *type,
-unsigned char *key,
-unsigned char *iv,
-int enc);
-        This function take arguments that are the same as EVP_EncryptInit()
-        and EVP_DecryptInit() except for the extra 'enc' flag.  If 1, the
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX is setup for encryption, if 0, decryption.
-void EVP_CipherUpdate(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *out,
-int *outl,
-unsigned char *in,
-int inl);
-        Again this function calls either EVP_EncryptUpdate() or
-        EVP_DecryptUpdate() depending on state in the 'ctx' structure.
-        As noted for EVP_DecryptUpdate(), when this routine is used
-        for decryption with block ciphers, 'out' should not be the
-        same as 'in'.
-int EVP_CipherFinal(
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *outm,
-int *outl);
-        This routine call EVP_EncryptFinal() or EVP_DecryptFinal()
-        depending on the state information in 'ctx'.  1 is always returned
-        if the mode is encryption, otherwise the return value is the return
-        value of EVP_DecryptFinal().
-==== cipher.m ========================================================
-Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 08:16:14 +1000 (EST)
-From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.com>
-X-Sender: eay@orb
-To: Roland Haring <rharing@tandem.cl>
-Cc: ssl-users@mincom.com
-Subject: Re: Symmetric encryption with ssleay
-In-Reply-To: <m0vBpyq-00001aC@tandemnet.tandem.cl>
-Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.961015075623.11394A-100000@orb>
-Mime-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
-Sender: ssl-lists-owner@mincom.com
-Precedence: bulk
-Status: RO
-X-Status: 
-On Fri, 11 Oct 1996, Roland Haring wrote:
-> THE_POINT:
->       Would somebody be so kind to give me the minimum basic 
->       calls I need to do to libcrypto.a to get some text encrypted
->       and decrypted again? ...hopefully with code included to do
->       base64 encryption and decryption ... e.g. that sign-it.c code
->       posted some while ago was a big help :-) (please, do not point
->       me to apps/enc.c where I suspect my Heissenbug to be hidden :-)
-Ok, the base64 encoding stuff in 'enc.c' does the wrong thing sometimes 
-when the data is less than a line long (this is for decoding).  I'll dig 
-up the exact fix today and post it.  I am taking longer on 0.6.5 than I 
-intended so I'll just post this patch.
-The documentation to read is in
-doc/cipher.doc,
-doc/encode.doc (very sparse :-).
-and perhaps
-doc/digest.doc,
-The basic calls to encrypt with say triple DES are
-Given
-char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-unsigned char out[512+8];
-int outl;
-/* optional generation of key/iv data from text password using md5
- * via an upward compatable verson of PKCS#5. */
-EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_des_ede3_cbc,EVP_md5,NULL,passwd,strlen(passwd),
-        key,iv);
-/* Initalise the EVP_CIPHER_CTX */
-EVP_EncryptInit(ctx,EVP_des_ede3_cbc,key,iv);
-while (....)
-        {
-        /* This is processing 512 bytes at a time, the bytes are being
-         * copied into 'out', outl bytes are output.  'out' should not be the
-         * same as 'in' for reasons mentioned in the documentation. */
-        EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,&outl,in,512);
-        }
-/* Output the last 'block'.  If the cipher is a block cipher, the last
- * block is encoded in such a way so that a wrong decryption will normally be
- * detected - again, one of the PKCS standards. */
-EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx,out,&outl);
-To decrypt, use the EVP_DecryptXXXXX functions except that EVP_DecryptFinal()
-will return 0 if the decryption fails (only detectable on block ciphers).
-You can also use
-EVP_CipherInit()
-EVP_CipherUpdate()
-EVP_CipherFinal()
-which does either encryption or decryption depending on an extra 
-parameter to EVP_CipherInit().
-To do the base64 encoding,
-EVP_EncodeInit()
-EVP_EncodeUpdate()
-EVP_EncodeFinal()
-EVP_DecodeInit()
-EVP_DecodeUpdate()
-EVP_DecodeFinal()
-where the encoding is quite simple, but the decoding can be a bit more 
-fun (due to dud input).
-EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 for an error on an input line, 0 if the 
-'last line' was just processed, and 1 if more lines should be submitted.
-EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 for an error or 1 if things are ok.
-So the loop becomes
-EVP_DecodeInit(....)
-for (;;)
-        {
-        i=EVP_DecodeUpdate(....);
-        if (i < 0) goto err;
-        /* process the data */
-        if (i == 0) break;
-        }
-EVP_DecodeFinal(....);
-/* process the data */
-The problem in 'enc.c' is that I was stuff the processing up after the 
-EVP_DecodeFinal(...) when the for(..) loop was not being run (one line of 
-base64 data) and this was because 'enc.c' tries to scan over a file until
-it hits the first valid base64 encoded line.
-hope this helps a bit.
-eric
--
-Eric Young                  | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates.
-AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au    | RTFM Win32 GetMessage().
-==== conf.doc ========================================================
-The CONF library.
-The CONF library is a simple set of routines that can be used to configure
-programs.  It is a superset of the genenv() function with some extra
-structure.
-The library consists of 5 functions.
-LHASH *CONF_load(LHASH *config,char *file);
-This function is called to load in a configuration file.  Multiple
-configuration files can be loaded, with each subsequent 'load' overwriting
-any already defined 'variables'.  If there is an error, NULL is returned.
-If config is NULL, a new LHASH structure is created and returned, otherwise
-the new data in the 'file' is loaded into the 'config' structure.
-void CONF_free(LHASH *config);
-This function free()s the data in config.
-char *CONF_get_string(LHASH *config,char *section,char *name);
-This function returns the string found in 'config' that corresponds to the
-'section' and 'name' specified.  Classes and the naming system used will be
-discussed later in this document.  If the variable is not defined, an NULL
-is returned.
-long CONF_get_long(LHASH *config,char *section, char *name);
-This function is the same as CONF_get_string() except that it converts the
-string to an long and returns it.  If variable is not a number or the
-variable does not exist, 0 is returned.  This is a little problematic but I
-don't know of a simple way around it.
-STACK *CONF_get_section(LHASH *config, char *section);
-This function returns a 'stack' of CONF_VALUE items that are all the
-items defined in a particular section.  DO NOT free() any of the
-variable returned.  They will disappear when CONF_free() is called.
-The 'lookup' model.
-The configuration file is divided into 'sections'.  Each section is started by
-a line of the form '[ section ]'.  All subsequent variable definitions are
-of this section.  A variable definition is a simple alpha-numeric name
-followed by an '=' and then the data.  A section or variable name can be
-described by a regular expression of the following form '[A-Za-z0-9_]+'.
-The value of the variable is the text after the '=' until the end of the
-line, stripped of leading and trailing white space.
-At this point I should mention that a '#' is a comment character, \ is the
-escape character, and all three types of quote can be used to stop any
-special interpretation of the data.
-Now when the data is being loaded, variable expansion can occur.  This is
-done by expanding any $NAME sequences into the value represented by the
-variable NAME.  If the variable is not in the current section, the different
-section can be specified by using the $SECTION::NAME form.  The ${NAME} form
-also works and is very useful for expanding variables inside strings.
-When a variable is looked up, there are 2 special section. 'default', which
-is the initial section, and 'ENV' which is the processes environment
-variables (accessed via getenv()).  When a variable is looked up, it is
-first 'matched' with it's section (if one was specified), if this fails, the
-'default' section is matched.
-If the 'lhash' variable passed was NULL, the environment is searched.
-Now why do we bother with sections?  So we can have multiple programs using
-the same configuration file, or multiple instances of the same program
-using different variables.  It also provides a nice mechanism to override
-the processes environment variables (eg ENV::HOME=/tmp).  If there is a
-program specific variable missing, we can have default values.
-Multiple configuration files can be loaded, with each new value clearing
-any predefined values.  A system config file can provide 'default' values,
-and application/usr specific files can provide overriding values.
-Examples
-# This is a simple example
-SSLEAY_HOME     = /usr/local/ssl
-ENV::PATH       = $SSLEAY_HOME/bin:$PATH        # override my path
-[X509]
-cert_dir        = $SSLEAY_HOME/certs    # /usr/local/ssl/certs
-[SSL]
-CIPHER          = DES-EDE-MD5:RC4-MD5
-USER_CERT       = $HOME/${USER}di'r 5'  # /home/eay/eaydir 5
-USER_CERT       = $HOME/\${USER}di\'r   # /home/eay/${USER}di'r
-USER_CERT       = "$HOME/${US"ER}di\'r  # $HOME/${USER}di'r
-TEST            = 1234\
-5678\
-9ab                                     # TEST=123456789ab
-TTT             = 1234\n\n              # TTT=1234<nl><nl>
-==== des.doc ========================================================
-The DES library.
-Please note that this library was originally written to operate with
-eBones, a version of Kerberos that had had encryption removed when it left
-the USA and then put back in.  As such there are some routines that I will
-advise not using but they are still in the library for historical reasons.
-For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the
-same.
-This library requires the inclusion of 'des.h'.
-All of the encryption functions take what is called a des_key_schedule as an 
-argument.  A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the des key.
-A des_key is 8 bytes of odd parity, the type used to hold the key is a
-des_cblock.  A des_cblock is an array of 8 bytes, often in this library
-description I will refer to input bytes when the function specifies
-des_cblock's as input or output, this just means that the variable should
-be a multiple of 8 bytes.
-The define DES_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption, DES_DECRYPT to
-specify decryption.  The functions and global variable are as follows:
-int des_check_key;
-        DES keys are supposed to be odd parity.  If this variable is set to
-        a non-zero value, des_set_key() will check that the key has odd
-        parity and is not one of the known weak DES keys.  By default this
-        variable is turned off;
-        
-void des_set_odd_parity(
-des_cblock *key );
-        This function takes a DES key (8 bytes) and sets the parity to odd.
-        
-int des_is_weak_key(
-des_cblock *key );
-        This function returns a non-zero value if the DES key passed is a
-        weak, DES key.  If it is a weak key, don't use it, try a different
-        one.  If you are using 'random' keys, the chances of hitting a weak
-        key are 1/2^52 so it is probably not worth checking for them.
-        
-int des_set_key(
-des_cblock *key,
-des_key_schedule schedule);
-        Des_set_key converts an 8 byte DES key into a des_key_schedule.
-        A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the key which is used to
-        perform actual encryption.  It can be regenerated from the DES key
-        so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about
-        to occur.  Don't save or pass around des_key_schedule's since they
-        are CPU architecture dependent, DES keys are not.  If des_check_key
-        is non zero, zero is returned if the key has the wrong parity or
-        the key is a weak key, else 1 is returned.
-        
-int des_key_sched(
-des_cblock *key,
-des_key_schedule schedule);
-        An alternative name for des_set_key().
-int des_rw_mode;                /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */
-        This flag holds either DES_CBC_MODE or DES_PCBC_MODE (default).
-        This specifies the function to use in the enc_read() and enc_write()
-        functions.
-void des_encrypt(
-unsigned long *data,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-int enc);
-        This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about
-        every other DES routine in the library.  You should not use this
-        function except to implement 'modes' of DES.  I say this because the
-        functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to
-        long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory
-        access do not occur.  The characters are loaded 'little endian',
-        have a look at my source code for more details on how I use this
-        function.
-        Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the
-        des_key_schedule to use.  enc, is non zero specifies encryption,
-        zero if decryption.
-void des_encrypt2(
-unsigned long *data,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-int enc);
-        This functions is the same as des_encrypt() except that the DES
-        initial permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left
-        out.  As for des_encrypt(), you should not use this function.
-        It is used by the routines in my library that implement triple DES.
-        IP() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() FP() is the same
-        as des_encrypt() des_encrypt() des_encrypt() except faster :-).
-void des_ecb_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-int enc);
-        This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of DES, the most basic
-        form.  Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by
-        ks.  If enc is non zero (DES_ENCRYPT), encryption occurs, otherwise
-        decryption occurs.  Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes.
-        (the des_cblock structure is 8 chars).
-        
-void des_ecb3_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-des_key_schedule ks1,
-des_key_schedule ks2,
-des_key_schedule ks3,
-int enc);
-        This is the 3 key EDE mode of ECB DES.  What this means is that 
-        the 8 bytes of input is encrypted with ks1, decrypted with ks2 and
-        then encrypted again with ks3, before being put into output;
-        C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))).  There is a macro, des_ecb2_encrypt()
-        that only takes 2 des_key_schedules that implements,
-        C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))) in that the final encrypt is done with ks1.
-        
-void des_cbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int enc);
-        This routine implements DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
-        Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted
-        (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes.
-        The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above,
-        should be a multiple of 8).  If length is not a multiple of 8, I'm
-        not being held responsible :-).  ivec is the initialisation vector.
-        This function does not modify this variable.  To correctly implement
-        cbc mode, you need to do one of 2 things; copy the last 8 bytes of
-        cipher text for use as the next ivec in your application,
-        or use des_ncbc_encrypt(). 
-        Only this routine has this problem with updating the ivec, all
-        other routines that are implementing cbc mode update ivec.
-        
-void des_ncbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule sk,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int enc);
-        For historical reasons, des_cbc_encrypt() did not update the
-        ivec with the value requires so that subsequent calls to
-        des_cbc_encrypt() would 'chain'.  This was needed so that the same
-        'length' values would not need to be used when decrypting.
-        des_ncbc_encrypt() does the right thing.  It is the same as
-        des_cbc_encrypt accept that ivec is updates with the correct value
-        to pass in subsequent calls to des_ncbc_encrypt().  I advise using
-        des_ncbc_encrypt() instead of des_cbc_encrypt();
-void des_xcbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule sk,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-des_cblock *inw,
-des_cblock *outw,
-int enc);
-        This is RSA's DESX mode of DES.  It uses inw and outw to
-        'whiten' the encryption.  inw and outw are secret (unlike the iv)
-        and are as such, part of the key.  So the key is sort of 24 bytes.
-        This is much better than cbc des.
-        
-void des_3cbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule sk1,
-des_key_schedule sk2,
-des_cblock *ivec1,
-des_cblock *ivec2,
-int enc);
-        This function is flawed, do not use it.  I have left it in the
-        library because it is used in my des(1) program and will function
-        correctly when used by des(1).  If I removed the function, people
-        could end up unable to decrypt files.
-        This routine implements outer triple cbc encryption using 2 ks and
-        2 ivec's.  Use des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() instead.
-        
-void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output, 
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks1,
-des_key_schedule ks2, 
-des_key_schedule ks3, 
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int enc);
-        This function implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with 3
-        keys.  What this means is that each 'DES' operation
-        inside the cbc mode is really an C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))).
-        Again, this is cbc mode so an ivec is requires.
-        This mode is used by SSL.
-        There is also a des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() that only uses 2
-        des_key_schedule's, the first being reused for the final
-        encryption.  C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))).  This form of triple DES
-        is used by the RSAref library.
-        
-void des_pcbc_encrypt(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int enc);
-        This is Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode of DES.  It is used
-        by Kerberos v4.  It's parameters are the same as des_ncbc_encrypt().
-        
-void des_cfb_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-int numbits,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int enc);
-        Cipher Feedback Back mode of DES.  This implementation 'feeds back'
-        in numbit blocks.  The input (and output) is in multiples of numbits
-        bits.  numbits should to be a multiple of 8 bits.  Length is the
-        number of bytes input.  If numbits is not a multiple of 8 bits,
-        the extra bits in the bytes will be considered padding.  So if
-        numbits is 12, for each 2 input bytes, the 4 high bits of the
-        second byte will be ignored.  So to encode 72 bits when using
-        a numbits of 12 take 12 bytes.  To encode 72 bits when using
-        numbits of 9 will take 16 bytes.  To encode 80 bits when using
-        numbits of 16 will take 10 bytes. etc, etc.  This padding will
-        apply to both input and output.
-        
-void des_cfb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num,
-int enc);
-        This is one of the more useful functions in this DES library, it
-        implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback.  Why is this
-        useful you ask?  Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an
-        arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.  If this does
-        not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-).
-        
-void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks1,
-des_key_schedule ks2,
-des_key_schedule ks3,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num,
-int enc);
-        Same as des_cfb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is
-        triple DES.  As usual, there is a macro for
-        des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1.
-void des_ofb_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-int numbits,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec);
-        This is a implementation of Output Feed Back mode of DES.  It is
-        the same as des_cfb_encrypt() in that numbits is the size of the
-        units dealt with during input and output (in bits).
-        
-void des_ofb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num);
-        The same as des_cfb64_encrypt() except that it is Output Feed Back
-        mode.
-void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks1,
-des_key_schedule ks2,
-des_key_schedule ks3,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num);
-        Same as des_ofb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is
-        triple DES.  As usual, there is a macro for
-        des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1.
-int des_read_pw_string(
-char *buf,
-int length,
-char *prompt,
-int verify);
-        This routine is used to get a password from the terminal with echo
-        turned off.  Buf is where the string will end up and length is the
-        size of buf.  Prompt is a string presented to the 'user' and if
-        verify is set, the key is asked for twice and unless the 2 copies
-        match, an error is returned.  A return code of -1 indicates a
-        system error, 1 failure due to use interaction, and 0 is success.
-unsigned long des_cbc_cksum(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec);
-        This function produces an 8 byte checksum from input that it puts in
-        output and returns the last 4 bytes as a long.  The checksum is
-        generated via cbc mode of DES in which only the last 8 byes are
-        kept.  I would recommend not using this function but instead using
-        the EVP_Digest routines, or at least using MD5 or SHA.  This
-        function is used by Kerberos v4 so that is why it stays in the
-        library.
-        
-char *des_fcrypt(
-const char *buf,
-const char *salt
-char *ret);
-        This is my fast version of the unix crypt(3) function.  This version
-        takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast
-        crypt() implementations.  This is different to the normal crypt
-        in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value
-        is written into.  It needs to be at least 14 bytes long.  This
-        function is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt.
-char *crypt(
-const char *buf,
-const char *salt);
-        This function calls des_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the
-        third parameter.  This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics
-        of crypt(3).
-void des_string_to_key(
-char *str,
-des_cblock *key);
-        This function takes str and converts it into a DES key.  I would
-        recommend using MD5 instead and use the first 8 bytes of output.
-        When I wrote the first version of these routines back in 1990, MD5
-        did not exist but I feel these routines are still sound.  This
-        routines is compatible with the one in MIT's libdes.
-        
-void des_string_to_2keys(
-char *str,
-des_cblock *key1,
-des_cblock *key2);
-        This function takes str and converts it into 2 DES keys.
-        I would recommend using MD5 and using the 16 bytes as the 2 keys.
-        I have nothing against these 2 'string_to_key' routines, it's just
-        that if you say that your encryption key is generated by using the
-        16 bytes of an MD5 hash, every-one knows how you generated your
-        keys.
-int des_read_password(
-des_cblock *key,
-char *prompt,
-int verify);
-        This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_key().
-int des_read_2passwords(
-des_cblock *key1,
-des_cblock *key2,
-char *prompt,
-int verify);
-        This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_2key().
-void des_random_seed(
-des_cblock key);
-        This routine sets a starting point for des_random_key().
-        
-void des_random_key(
-des_cblock ret);
-        This function return a random key.  Make sure to 'seed' the random
-        number generator (with des_random_seed()) before using this function.
-        I personally now use a MD5 based random number system.
-int des_enc_read(
-int fd,
-char *buf,
-int len,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *iv);
-        This function will write to a file descriptor the encrypted data
-        from buf.  This data will be preceded by a 4 byte 'byte count' and
-        will be padded out to 8 bytes.  The encryption is either CBC of
-        PCBC depending on the value of des_rw_mode.  If it is DES_PCBC_MODE,
-        pcbc is used, if DES_CBC_MODE, cbc is used.  The default is to use
-        DES_PCBC_MODE.
-int des_enc_write(
-int fd,
-char *buf,
-int len,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *iv);
-        This routines read stuff written by des_enc_read() and decrypts it.
-        I have used these routines quite a lot but I don't believe they are
-        suitable for non-blocking io.  If you are after a full
-        authentication/encryption over networks, have a look at SSL instead.
-unsigned long des_quad_cksum(
-des_cblock *input,
-des_cblock *output,
-long length,
-int out_count,
-des_cblock *seed);
-        This is a function from Kerberos v4 that is not anything to do with
-        DES but was needed.  It is a cksum that is quicker to generate than
-        des_cbc_cksum();  I personally would use MD5 routines now.
-=====
-Modes of DES
-Quite a bit of the following information has been taken from
-        AS 2805.5.2
-        Australian Standard
-        Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces,
-        Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm
-        Appendix A
-There are several different modes in which DES can be used, they are
-as follows.
-Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) (des_ecb_encrypt())
- 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection.
- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block
-  (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'.
- An error will only affect one ciphertext block.
-Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) (des_cbc_encrypt())
- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
-  plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the
-  current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not
-  be rearranged.
- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
-  enciphering to the same ciphertext.
- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks.
-Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (des_cfb_encrypt())
- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
-  plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the
-  current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are
-  chained together and can not be rearranged.
- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext
-  enciphering to the same ciphertext.
- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if
-  j == k).  In my implementation this is always the case.
- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
-  the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
-  greater processing overheads.
- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables.
-Output Feedback Mode (OFB) (des_ofb_encrypt())
- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time.
- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same
-  plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable.  More
-  over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same
-  key and start variable are used.  Consequently, for security reasons
-  a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key.
- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks.
- The use of different start variables values prevents the same
-  plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different
-  key streams.
- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through
-  the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause
-  greater processing overheads.
- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered.
- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the
-  resultant plaintext output.  Every bit error in the ciphertext causes
-  only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext.
- OFB mode is not self-synchronising.  If the two operation of
-  encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs
-  to be re-initialised.
- Each re-initialisation should use a value of the start variable
- different from the start variable values used before with the same
- key.  The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be
- produced each time from the same parameters.  This would be
- susceptible to a ' known plaintext' attack.
-Triple ECB Mode (des_ecb3_encrypt())
- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again.
- As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits.
-  There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective
-  key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of
-  memory, not very likely, even for the NSA.
- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with
-  just one key.
- If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits.
-  There are attacks that could reduce the key space to 55 bit's but it
-  requires 2^56 blocks of memory.
- If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal
-  ecb mode.
-Triple CBC Mode (des_ede3_cbc_encrypt())
- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3.
- As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with
-  the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode.
-==== digest.doc ========================================================
-The Message Digest subroutines.
-These routines require "evp.h" to be included.
-These functions are a higher level interface to the various message digest
-routines found in this library.  As such, they allow the same code to be
-used to digest via different algorithms with only a change in an initial
-parameter.  They are basically just a front-end to the MD2, MD5, SHA
-and SHA1
-routines.
-These routines all take a pointer to the following structure to specify
-which message digest algorithm to use.
-typedef struct evp_md_st
-        {
-        int type;
-        int pkey_type;
-        int md_size;
-        void (*init)();
-        void (*update)();
-        void (*final)();
-        int required_pkey_type; /*EVP_PKEY_xxx */
-        int (*sign)();
-        int (*verify)();
-        } EVP_MD;
-If additional message digest algorithms are to be supported, a structure of
-this type needs to be declared and populated and then the Digest routines
-can be used with that algorithm.  The type field is the object NID of the
-digest type (read the section on Objects for an explanation).  The pkey_type
-is the Object type to use when the a message digest is generated by there
-routines and then is to be signed with the pkey algorithm.  Md_size is
-the size of the message digest returned.  Init, update
-and final are the relevant functions to perform the message digest function
-by parts.  One reason for specifying the message digest to use via this
-mechanism is that if you only use md5, only the md5 routines will
-be included in you linked program.  If you passed an integer
-that specified which message digest to use, the routine that mapped that
-integer to a set of message digest functions would cause all the message
-digests functions to be link into the code.  This setup also allows new
-message digest functions to be added by the application.
-The six message digests defined in this library are
-EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void);  /* RSA sign/verify */
-EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void);  /* RSA sign/verify */
-EVP_MD *EVP_sha(void);  /* RSA sign/verify */
-EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void); /* RSA sign/verify */
-EVP_MD *EVP_dss(void);  /* DSA sign/verify */
-EVP_MD *EVP_dss1(void); /* DSA sign/verify */
-All the message digest routines take a EVP_MD_CTX pointer as an argument.
-The state of the message digest is kept in this structure.
-typedef struct pem_md_ctx_st
-        {
-        EVP_MD *digest;
-        union   {
-                unsigned char base[4]; /* this is used in my library as a
-                                        * 'pointer' to all union elements
-                                        * structures. */
-                MD2_CTX md2;
-                MD5_CTX md5;
-                SHA_CTX sha;
-                } md;
-        } EVP_MD_CTX;
-The Digest functions are as follows.
-void EVP_DigestInit(
-EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-EVP_MD *type);
-        This function is used to initialise the EVP_MD_CTX.  The message
-        digest that will associated with 'ctx' is specified by 'type'.
-void EVP_DigestUpdate(
-EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *data,
-unsigned int cnt);
-        This function is used to pass more data to the message digest
-        function.  'cnt' bytes are digested from 'data'.
-void EVP_DigestFinal(
-EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *md,
-unsigned int *len);
-        This function finishes the digestion and puts the message digest
-        into 'md'.  The length of the message digest is put into len;
-        EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE is the size of the largest message digest that
-        can be returned from this function.  Len can be NULL if the
-        size of the digest is not required.
-        
-==== encode.doc ========================================================
-void    EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
-void    EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,
-                int *outl,unsigned char *in,int inl);
-void    EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl);
-int     EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *f, int n);
-void    EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
-int     EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl,
-                unsigned char *in, int inl);
-int     EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
-                char *out, int *outl);
-int     EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, unsigned
-                char *f, int n);
-==== envelope.doc ========================================================
-The following routines are use to create 'digital' envelopes.
-By this I mean that they perform various 'higher' level cryptographic
-functions.  Have a read of 'cipher.doc' and 'digest.doc' since those
-routines are used by these functions.
-cipher.doc contains documentation about the cipher part of the
-envelope library and digest.doc contatins the description of the
-message digests supported.
-To 'sign' a document involves generating a message digest and then encrypting
-the digest with an private key.
-#define EVP_SignInit(a,b)               EVP_DigestInit(a,b)
-#define EVP_SignUpdate(a,b,c)           EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
-Due to the fact this operation is basically just an extended message
-digest, the first 2 functions are macro calls to Digest generating
-functions.
-int     EVP_SignFinal(
-EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *md,
-unsigned int *s,
-EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-        This finalisation function finishes the generation of the message
-digest and then encrypts the digest (with the correct message digest 
-object identifier) with the EVP_PKEY private key.  'ctx' is the message digest
-context.  'md' will end up containing the encrypted message digest.  This
-array needs to be EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes long.  's' will actually
-contain the exact length.  'pkey' of course is the private key.  It is
-one of EVP_PKEY_RSA or EVP_PKEY_DSA type.
-If there is an error, 0 is returned, otherwise 1.
-                
-Verify is used to check an signed message digest.
-#define EVP_VerifyInit(a,b)             EVP_DigestInit(a,b)
-#define EVP_VerifyUpdate(a,b,c)         EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
-Since the first step is to generate a message digest, the first 2 functions
-are macros.
-int EVP_VerifyFinal(
-EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-unsigned char *md,
-unsigned int s,
-EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-        This function finishes the generation of the message digest and then
-compares it with the supplied encrypted message digest.  'md' contains the
-'s' bytes of encrypted message digest.  'pkey' is used to public key decrypt
-the digest.  It is then compared with the message digest just generated.
-If they match, 1 is returned else 0.
-int     EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek,
-                int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk);
-Must have at least one public key, error is 0.  I should also mention that
-the buffers pointed to by 'ek' need to be EVP_PKEY_size(pubk[n]) is size.
-#define EVP_SealUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)       EVP_EncryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)    
-void    EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl);
-int     EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,EVP_CIPHER *type,unsigned char *ek,
-                int ekl,unsigned char *iv,EVP_PKEY *priv);
-0 on failure
-#define EVP_OpenUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)       EVP_DecryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e)
-int     EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
-Decrypt final return code
-==== error.doc ========================================================
-The error routines.
-The 'error' system I've implemented is intended to server 2 purpose, to
-record the reason why a command failed and to record where in the libraries
-the failure occurred.  It is more or less setup to record a 'trace' of which
-library components were being traversed when the error occurred.
-When an error is recorded, it is done so a as single unsigned long which is
-composed of three parts.  The top byte is the 'library' number, the middle
-12 bytes is the function code, and the bottom 12 bits is the 'reason' code.
-Each 'library', or should a say, 'section' of the SSLeay library has a
-different unique 'library' error number.  Each function in the library has
-a number that is unique for that library.  Each 'library' also has a number
-for each 'error reason' that is only unique for that 'library'.
-Due to the way these error routines record a 'error trace', there is an
-array per thread that is used to store the error codes.
-The various functions in this library are used to access
-and manipulate this array.
-void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func,int reason);
-        This routine records an error in library 'lib', function 'func'
-and reason 'reason'.  As errors get 'put' into the buffer, they wrap
-around and overwrite old errors if too many are written.  It is assumed
-that the last errors are the most important.
-unsigned long ERR_get_error(void );
-        This function returns the last error added to the error buffer.
-In effect it is popping the value off the buffer so repeated calls will
-continue to return values until there are no more errors to return in which
-case 0 is returned.
-unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void );
-        This function returns the value of the last error added to the
-error buffer but does not 'pop' it from the buffer.
-void ERR_clear_error(void );
-        This function clears the error buffer, discarding all unread
-errors.
-While the above described error system obviously produces lots of different
-error number, a method for 'reporting' these errors in a human readable
-form is required.  To achieve this, each library has the option of
-'registering' error strings.
-typedef struct ERR_string_data_st
-        {
-        unsigned long error;
-        char *string;
-        } ERR_STRING_DATA;
-The 'ERR_STRING_DATA' contains an error code and the corresponding text
-string.  To add new function error strings for a library, the
-ERR_STRING_DATA needs to be 'registered' with the library.
-void ERR_load_strings(unsigned long lib,ERR_STRING_DATA *err);
-        This function 'registers' the array of ERR_STRING_DATA pointed to by
-'err' as error text strings for the error library 'lib'.
-void ERR_free_strings(void);
-        This function free()s all the loaded error strings.
-char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long error,char *buf);
-        This function returns a text string that is a human readable
-version of the error represented by 'error'.  Buff should be at least 120
-bytes long and if it is NULL, the return value is a pointer to a static
-variable that will contain the error string, otherwise 'buf' is returned.
-If there is not a text string registered for a particular error, a text
-string containing the error number is returned instead.
-void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp);
-void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp);
-        This function is a convenience routine that prints the error string
-for each error until all errors have been accounted for.
-char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e);
-char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e);
-char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e);
-The above three functions return the 3 different components strings for the
-error 'e'.  ERR_error_string() uses these functions.
-void ERR_load_ERR_strings(void );
-        This function 'registers' the error strings for the 'ERR' module.
-void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void );
-        This function 'register' the error strings for just about every
-library in the SSLeay package except for the SSL routines.  There is no
-need to ever register any error text strings and you will probably save in
-program size.  If on the other hand you do 'register' all errors, it is
-quite easy to determine why a particular routine failed.
-As a final footnote as to why the error system is designed as it is.
-1) I did not want a single 'global' error code.
-2) I wanted to know which subroutine a failure occurred in.
-3) For Windows NT etc, it should be simple to replace the 'key' routines
-   with code to pass error codes back to the application.
-4) I wanted the option of meaningful error text strings.
-Late breaking news - the changes to support threads.
-Each 'thread' has an 'ERR_STATE' state associated with it.
-ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void ) will return the 'state' for the calling
-thread/process.
-ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid); will 'free()' this state.  If pid == 0
-the current 'thread/process' will have it's error state removed.
-If you do not remove the error state of a thread, this could be considered a
-form of memory leak, so just after 'reaping' a thread that has died,
-call ERR_remove_state(pid).
-Have a read of thread.doc for more details for what is required for
-multi-threading support.  All the other error routines will
-work correctly when using threads.
-==== idea.doc ========================================================
-The IDEA library.
-IDEA is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities.  It
-uses a 128bit (16 byte) key.  It can be used in all the modes that DES can
-be used.  This library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64 and ofb64 modes.
-For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the
-same.
-This library requires the inclusion of 'idea.h'.
-All of the encryption functions take what is called an IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE as an 
-argument.  An IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of the idea key.
-For all modes of the IDEA algorithm, the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE used for
-decryption is different to the one used for encryption.
-The define IDEA_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions
-that require an encryption/decryption flag. IDEA_DECRYPT is passed to
-specify decryption.  For some mode there is no encryption/decryption
-flag since this is determined by the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE.
-So to encrypt you would do the following
-idea_set_encrypt_key(key,encrypt_ks);
-idea_ecb_encrypt(...,encrypt_ks);
-idea_cbc_encrypt(....,encrypt_ks,...,IDEA_ENCRYPT);
-To Decrypt
-idea_set_encrypt_key(key,encrypt_ks);
-idea_set_decrypt_key(encrypt_ks,decrypt_ks);
-idea_ecb_encrypt(...,decrypt_ks);
-idea_cbc_encrypt(....,decrypt_ks,...,IDEA_DECRYPT);
-Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library
-could be used with IDEA.  I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and
-ofb64 for the following reasons.
- ecb is the basic IDEA encryption.
- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers.
- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output
-  do not need to be a multiple of 8.
- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as
-  secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode.
- If you want triple IDEA, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally
-  obsessed with security.  Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to
-  copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to
-  idea_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-).
-The functions are as follows:
-void idea_set_encrypt_key(
-unsigned char *key;
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
-        idea_set_encrypt_key converts a 16 byte IDEA key into an
-        IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE.  The IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of
-        the key which can be used to perform IDEA encryption.
-        An IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of the key which is used to
-        perform actual encryption.  It can be regenerated from the IDEA key
-        so it only needs to be kept when encryption is about
-        to occur.  Don't save or pass around IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE's since they
-        are CPU architecture dependent, IDEA keys are not.
-        
-void idea_set_decrypt_key(
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *encrypt_ks,
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *decrypt_ks);
-        This functions converts an encryption IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE into a
-        decryption IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE.  For all decryption, this conversion
-        of the key must be done.  In some modes of IDEA, an
-        encryption/decryption flag is also required, this is because these
-        functions involve block chaining and the way this is done changes
-        depending on which of encryption of decryption is being done.
-        Please note that there is no quick way to generate the decryption
-        key schedule other than generating the encryption key schedule and
-        then converting it.
-void idea_encrypt(
-unsigned long *data,
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
-        This is the IDEA encryption function that gets called by just about
-        every other IDEA routine in the library.  You should not use this
-        function except to implement 'modes' of IDEA.  I say this because the
-        functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to
-        long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory
-        access do not occur.
-        Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the
-        IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE to use.  Encryption or decryption depends on the
-        IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE.
-void idea_ecb_encrypt(
-unsigned char *input,
-unsigned char *output,
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks);
-        This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of IDEA (in DES this
-        mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term
-        for idea as well :-).
-        Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by
-        ks.  Depending on the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE, encryption or
-        decryption occurs.  Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes.
-        
-void idea_cbc_encrypt(
-unsigned char *input,
-unsigned char *output,
-long length,
-IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int enc);
-        This routine implements IDEA in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
-        Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted
-        (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes.
-        The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above,
-        should be a multiple of 8).  If length is not a multiple of 8, bad 
-        things will probably happen.  ivec is the initialisation vector.
-        This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to
-        the next call to idea_cbc_encrypt().
-        
-void idea_cfb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num,
-int enc);
-        This is one of the more useful functions in this IDEA library, it
-        implements CFB mode of IDEA with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        Enc is used to indicate encryption or decryption.
-        One very important thing to remember is that when decrypting, use
-        the encryption form of the key.
-        CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to
-        generate a stream of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text.
-        The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to
-        be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain
-        text.  As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt,
-        the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next
-        block of data is gathered for encryption is different for
-        encryption and decryption.  What this means is that to encrypt
-        idea_set_encrypt_key(key,ks);
-        idea_cfb64_encrypt(...,ks,..,IDEA_ENCRYPT)
-        do decrypt
-        idea_set_encrypt_key(key,ks)
-        idea_cfb64_encrypt(...,ks,...,IDEA_DECRYPT)
-        Note: The same IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE but different encryption flags.
-        For idea_cbc or idea_ecb, idea_set_decrypt_key() would need to be
-        used to generate the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE for decryption.
-        The reason I'm stressing this point is that I just wasted 3 hours
-        today trying to decrypt using this mode and the decryption form of
-        the key :-(.
-        
-void idea_ofb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-des_key_schedule ks,
-des_cblock *ivec,
-int *num);
-        This functions implements OFB mode of IDEA with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or
-        decryption mode.  The same key and iv should be used to
-        encrypt and decrypt.
-        
-For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library.
-To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to
-produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to
-idea_set_encrypt_key().
-=====
-For more information about the specific IDEA modes in this library
-(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the
-documentation on my DES library.  What is said about DES is directly
-applicable for IDEA.
-==== legal.doc ========================================================
-From eay@mincom.com Thu Jun 27 00:25:45 1996
-Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA15821
-  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Wed, 26 Jun 1996 14:25:45 +1000
-Date: Wed, 26 Jun 1996 14:25:45 +1000 (EST)
-From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>
-X-Sender: eay@orb
-To: Ken Toll <ktoll@ren.digitalage.com>
-Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>, ssl-talk@netscape.com
-Subject: Re: Unidentified subject!
-In-Reply-To: <9606261950.ZM28943@ren.digitalage.com>
-Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.960626131156.28573K-100000@orb>
-Mime-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
-Status: O
-X-Status: 
-This is a little off topic but since SSLeay is a free implementation of
-the SSLv2 protocol, I feel it is worth responding on the topic of if it 
-is actually legal for Americans to use free cryptographic software.
-On Wed, 26 Jun 1996, Ken Toll wrote:
-> Is the U.S the only country that SSLeay cannot be used commercially 
-> (because of RSAref) or is that going to be an issue with every country 
-> that a client/server application (non-web browser/server) is deployed 
-> and sold?
->From what I understand, the software patents that apply to algorithms 
-like RSA and DH only apply in the USA.  The IDEA algorithm I believe is 
-patened in europe (USA?), but considing how little it is used by other SSL 
-implementations, it quite easily be left out of the SSLeay build
-(this can be done with a compile flag).
-Actually if the RSA patent did apply outside the USA, it could be rather
-interesting since RSA is not alowed to let RSA toolkits outside of the USA
-[1], and since these are the only forms that they will alow the algorithm
-to be used in, it would mean that non-one outside of the USA could produce
-public key software which would be a very strong statment for
-international patent law to make :-).  This logic is a little flawed but
-it still points out some of the more interesting permutations of USA
-patent law and ITAR restrictions. 
-Inside the USA there is also the unresolved issue of RC4/RC2 which were
-made public on sci.crypt in Sep 1994 (RC4) and Feb 1996 (RC2).  I have
-copies of the origional postings if people are interested.  RSA I believe 
-claim that they were 'trade-secrets' and that some-one broke an NDA in 
-revealing them.  Other claim they reverse engineered the algorithms from 
-compiled binaries.  If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I believe 
-RSA had no legal leg to stand on.  If an NDA was broken, I don't know.
-Regardless, RSA, I believe, is willing to go to court over the issue so 
-licencing is probably the best idea, or at least talk to them.
-If there are people who actually know more about this, pease let me know, I 
-don't want to vilify or spread miss-information if I can help it.
-If you are not producing a web browser, it is easy to build SSLeay with
-RC2/RC4 removed. Since RC4 is the defacto standard cipher in 
-all web software (and it is damn fast) it is more or less required for 
-www use. For non www use of SSL, especially for an application where 
-interoperability with other vendors is not critical just leave it out.
-Removing IDEA, RC2 and RC4 would only leave DES and Triple DES but 
-they should be ok.  Considing that Triple DES can encrypt at rates of
-410k/sec on a pentium 100, and 940k/sec on a P6/200, this is quite 
-reasonable performance.  Single DES clocks in at 1160k/s and 2467k/s
-respectivly is actually quite fast for those not so paranoid (56 bit key).[1]
-> Is it possible to get a certificate for commercial use outside of the U.S.?
-yes.
-Thawte Consulting issues certificates (they are the people who sell the
-        Sioux httpd server and are based in South Africa)
-Verisign will issue certificates for Sioux (sold from South Africa), so this
-        proves that they will issue certificate for OS use if they are
-        happy with the quality of the software.
-(The above mentioned companies just the ones that I know for sure are issuing
- certificates outside the USA).
-There is always the point that if you are using SSL for an intra net, 
-SSLeay provides programs that can be used so you can issue your own 
-certificates.  They need polishing but at least it is a good starting point.
-I am not doing anything outside Australian law by implementing these
-algorithms (to the best of my knowedge).  It is another example of how 
-the world legal system does not cope with the internet very well.
-I may start making shared libraries available (I have now got DLL's for 
-Windows).  This will mean that distributions into the usa could be 
-shipped with a version with a reduced cipher set and the versions outside 
-could use the DLL/shared library with all the ciphers (and without RSAref).
-This could be completly hidden from the application, so this would not 
-even require a re-linking.
-This is the reverse of what people were talking about doing to get around 
-USA export regulations :-)
-eric
-[1]:    The RSAref2.0 tookit is available on at least 3 ftp sites in Europe
-        and one in South Africa.
-[2]:    Since I always get questions when I post benchmark numbers :-),
-        DES performace figures are in 1000's of bytes per second in cbc 
-        mode using an 8192 byte buffer.  The pentium 100 was running Windows NT 
-        3.51 DLLs and the 686/200 was running NextStep.
-        I quote pentium 100 benchmarks because it is basically the
-        'entry level' computer that most people buy for personal use.
-        Windows 95 is the OS shipping on those boxes, so I'll give
-        NT numbers (the same Win32 runtime environment).  The 686
-        numbers are present as an indication of where we will be in a
-        few years.
--
-Eric Young                  | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates.
-AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au    | RTFM Win32 GetMessage().
-==== lhash.doc ========================================================
-The LHASH library.
-I wrote this library in 1991 and have since forgotten why I called it lhash.
-It implements a hash table from an article I read at the
-time from 'Communications of the ACM'.  What makes this hash
-table different is that as the table fills, the hash table is
-increased (or decreased) in size via realloc().
-When a 'resize' is done, instead of all hashes being redistributed over
-twice as many 'buckets', one bucket is split.  So when an 'expand' is done,
-there is only a minimal cost to redistribute some values.  Subsequent
-inserts will cause more single 'bucket' redistributions but there will
-never be a sudden large cost due to redistributing all the 'buckets'.
-The state for a particular hash table is kept in the LHASH structure.
-The LHASH structure also records statistics about most aspects of accessing
-the hash table.  This is mostly a legacy of my writing this library for
-the reasons of implementing what looked like a nice algorithm rather than
-for a particular software product.
-Internal stuff you probably don't want to know about.
-The decision to increase or decrease the hash table size is made depending
-on the 'load' of the hash table.  The load is the number of items in the
-hash table divided by the size of the hash table.  The default values are
-as follows.  If (hash->up_load < load) => expand.
-if (hash->down_load > load) =>  contract.  The 'up_load' has a default value of
-1 and 'down_load' has a default value of 2.  These numbers can be modified
-by the application by just playing with the 'up_load' and 'down_load'
-variables.  The 'load' is kept in a form which is multiplied by 256.  So
-hash->up_load=8*256; will cause a load of 8 to be set.
-If you are interested in performance the field to watch is
-num_comp_calls.  The hash library keeps track of the 'hash' value for
-each item so when a lookup is done, the 'hashes' are compared, if
-there is a match, then a full compare is done, and
-hash->num_comp_calls is incremented.  If num_comp_calls is not equal
-to num_delete plus num_retrieve it means that your hash function is
-generating hashes that are the same for different values.  It is
-probably worth changing your hash function if this is the case because
-even if your hash table has 10 items in a 'bucked', it can be searched
-with 10 'unsigned long' compares and 10 linked list traverses.  This
-will be much less expensive that 10 calls to you compare function.
-LHASH *lh_new(
-unsigned long (*hash)(),
-int (*cmp)());
-        This function is used to create a new LHASH structure.  It is passed
-        function pointers that are used to store and retrieve values passed
-        into the hash table.  The 'hash'
-        function is a hashing function that will return a hashed value of
-        it's passed structure.  'cmp' is passed 2 parameters, it returns 0
-        is they are equal, otherwise, non zero.
-        If there are any problems (usually malloc failures), NULL is
-        returned, otherwise a new LHASH structure is returned.  The
-        hash value is normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure
-        that your hash function returns well mixed low order bits.
-        
-void lh_free(
-LHASH *lh);
-        This function free()s a LHASH structure.  If there is malloced
-        data in the hash table, it will not be freed.  Consider using the
-        lh_doall function to deallocate any remaining entries in the hash
-        table.
-        
-char *lh_insert(
-LHASH *lh,
-char *data);
-        This function inserts the data pointed to by data into the lh hash
-        table.  If there is already and entry in the hash table entry, the
-        value being replaced is returned.  A NULL is returned if the new
-        entry does not clash with an entry already in the table (the normal
-        case) or on a malloc() failure (perhaps I should change this....).
-        The 'char *data' is exactly what is passed to the hash and
-        comparison functions specified in lh_new().
-        
-char *lh_delete(
-LHASH *lh,
-char *data);
-        This routine deletes an entry from the hash table.  The value being
-        deleted is returned.  NULL is returned if there is no such value in
-        the hash table.
-char *lh_retrieve(
-LHASH *lh,
-char *data);
-        If 'data' is in the hash table it is returned, else NULL is
-        returned.  The way these routines would normally be uses is that a
-        dummy structure would have key fields populated and then
-        ret=lh_retrieve(hash,&dummy);.  Ret would now be a pointer to a fully
-        populated structure.
-void lh_doall(
-LHASH *lh,
-void (*func)(char *a));
-        This function will, for every entry in the hash table, call function
-        'func' with the data item as parameters.
-        This function can be quite useful when used as follows.
-        void cleanup(STUFF *a)
-                { STUFF_free(a); }
-        lh_doall(hash,cleanup);
-        lh_free(hash);
-        This can be used to free all the entries, lh_free() then
-        cleans up the 'buckets' that point to nothing.  Be careful
-        when doing this.  If you delete entries from the hash table,
-        in the call back function, the table may decrease in size,
-        moving item that you are
-        currently on down lower in the hash table.  This could cause
-        some entries to be skipped.  The best solution to this problem
-        is to set lh->down_load=0 before you start.  This will stop
-        the hash table ever being decreased in size.
-void lh_doall_arg(
-LHASH *lh;
-void(*func)(char *a,char *arg));
-char *arg;
-        This function is the same as lh_doall except that the function
-        called will be passed 'arg' as the second argument.
-        
-unsigned long lh_strhash(
-char *c);
-        This function is a demo string hashing function.  Since the LHASH
-        routines would normally be passed structures, this routine would
-        not normally be passed to lh_new(), rather it would be used in the
-        function passed to lh_new().
-The next three routines print out various statistics about the state of the
-passed hash table.  These numbers are all kept in the lhash structure.
-void lh_stats(
-LHASH *lh,
-FILE *out);
-        This function prints out statistics on the size of the hash table,
-        how many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to
-        the routines in this library.
-void lh_node_stats(
-LHASH *lh,
-FILE *out);
-        For each 'bucket' in the hash table, the number of entries is
-        printed.
-        
-void lh_node_usage_stats(
-LHASH *lh,
-FILE *out);
-        This function prints out a short summary of the state of the hash
-        table.  It prints what I call the 'load' and the 'actual load'.
-        The load is the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the
-        hash table.  The 'actual load' is the average number of items per
-        'bucket', but only for buckets which contain entries.  So the
-        'actual load' is the average number of searches that will need to
-        find an item in the hash table, while the 'load' is the average number
-        that will be done to record a miss.
-==== md2.doc ========================================================
-The MD2 library.
-MD2 is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary
-length message down to a 16 byte hash.  The functions all need to be passed
-a MD2_CTX which is used to hold the MD2 context during multiple MD2_Update()
-function calls.  The normal method of use for this library is as follows
-MD2_Init(...);
-MD2_Update(...);
-...
-MD2_Update(...);
-MD2_Final(...);
-This library requires the inclusion of 'md2.h'.
-The main negative about MD2 is that it is slow, especially when compared
-to MD5.
-The functions are as follows:
-void MD2_Init(
-MD2_CTX *c);
-        This function needs to be called to initiate a MD2_CTX structure for
-        use.
-        
-void MD2_Update(
-MD2_CTX *c;
-unsigned char *data;
-unsigned long len);
-        This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len'
-        bytes from the 'data' pointer.  The number of bytes can be any
-        length.
-void MD2_Final(
-unsigned char *md;
-MD2_CTX *c;
-        This function is called when a message digest of the data digested
-        with MD2_Update() is wanted.  The message digest is put in the 'md'
-        array and is MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH (16) bytes long.
-unsigned char *MD2(
-unsigned long n;
-unsigned char *d;
-unsigned char *md;
-        This function performs a MD2_Init(), followed by a MD2_Update()
-        followed by a MD2_Final() (using a local MD2_CTX).
-        The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL.
-        Regardless of the value of 'md', the message
-        digest is returned from the function.  If 'md' was NULL, the message
-        digest returned is being stored in a static structure.
-==== md5.doc ========================================================
-The MD5 library.
-MD5 is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary
-length message down to a 16 byte hash.  The functions all need to be passed
-a MD5_CTX which is used to hold the MD5 context during multiple MD5_Update()
-function calls.  This library also contains random number routines that are
-based on MD5
-The normal method of use for this library is as follows
-MD5_Init(...);
-MD5_Update(...);
-...
-MD5_Update(...);
-MD5_Final(...);
-This library requires the inclusion of 'md5.h'.
-The functions are as follows:
-void MD5_Init(
-MD5_CTX *c);
-        This function needs to be called to initiate a MD5_CTX structure for
-        use.
-        
-void MD5_Update(
-MD5_CTX *c;
-unsigned char *data;
-unsigned long len);
-        This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len'
-        bytes from the 'data' pointer.  The number of bytes can be any
-        length.
-void MD5_Final(
-unsigned char *md;
-MD5_CTX *c;
-        This function is called when a message digest of the data digested
-        with MD5_Update() is wanted.  The message digest is put in the 'md'
-        array and is MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH (16) bytes long.
-unsigned char *MD5(
-unsigned char *d;
-unsigned long n;
-unsigned char *md;
-        This function performs a MD5_Init(), followed by a MD5_Update()
-        followed by a MD5_Final() (using a local MD5_CTX).
-        The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL.
-        Regardless of the value of 'md', the message
-        digest is returned from the function.  If 'md' was NULL, the message
-        digest returned is being stored in a static structure.
-==== memory.doc ========================================================
-In the interests of debugging SSLeay, there is an option to compile
-using some simple memory leak checking.
-All malloc(), free() and realloc() calls in SSLeay now go via
-Malloc(), Free() and Realloc() (except those in crypto/lhash).
-If CRYPTO_MDEBUG is defined, these calls are #defined to
-CRYPTO_malloc(), CRYPTO_free() and CRYPTO_realloc().
-If it is not defined, they are #defined to malloc(), free() and realloc().
-the CRYPTO_malloc() routines by default just call the underlying library
-functons.
-If CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) is called, memory leak detection is
-turned on.  CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) turns it off.
-When turned on, each Malloc() or Realloc() call is recored along with the file
-and line number from where the call was made.   (This is done using the
-lhash library which always uses normal system malloc(3) routines).
-void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b);
-void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp);
-These both print out the list of memory that has not been free()ed.
-This will probably be rather hard to read, but if you look for the 'top level'
-structure allocation, this will often give an idea as to what is not being
-free()ed.  I don't expect people to use this stuff normally.
-==== ca.1 ========================================================
-From eay@orb.mincom.oz.au Thu Dec 28 23:56:45 1995
-Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA07374
-  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Thu, 28 Dec 1995 13:56:45 +1000
-Date: Thu, 28 Dec 1995 13:56:45 +1000 (EST)
-From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>
-X-Sender: eay@orb
-To: sameer <sameer@c2.org>
-Cc: ssleay@mincom.oz.au
-Subject: Re: 'ca'
-In-Reply-To: <199512230440.UAA23410@infinity.c2.org>
-Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951228133525.7269A-100000@orb>
-Mime-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
-Status: RO
-X-Status: 
-On Fri, 22 Dec 1995, sameer wrote:
->       I could use documentation on 'ca'. Thanks.
-Very quickly.
-The ca program uses the ssleay.conf file for most of its configuration
-./ca -help
- -verbose        - Talk alot while doing things
- -config file    - A config file. If you don't want to use the
-                   default config file
- -name arg       - The particular CA definition to use
-        In the config file, the section to use for parameters.  This lets 
-        multiple setups to be contained in the one file.  By default, the 
-        default_ca variable is looked up in the [ ca ] section.  So in the 
-        shipped ssleay.conf, the CA definition used is CA_default.  It could be 
-        any other name.
- -gencrl days    - Generate a new CRL, days is when the next CRL is due
-        This will generate a new certificate revocion list.
- -days arg       - number of days to certify the certificate for
-        When certifiying certificates, this is the number of days to use.
- -md arg         - md to use, one of md2, md5, sha or sha1
- -policy arg     - The CA 'policy' to support
-        I'll describe this later, but there are 2 policies definied in the 
-        shipped ssleay.conf
- -keyfile arg    - PEM RSA private key file
- -key arg        - key to decode the RSA private key if it is encrypted
-        since we need to keep the CA's RSA key encrypted
- -cert           - The CA certificate
- -in file        - The input PEM encoded certificate request(s)
- -out file       - Where to put the output file(s)
- -outdir dir     - Where to put output certificates
-        The -out options concatinates all the output certificied
-        certificates to one file, -outdir puts them in a directory,
-        named by serial number.
- -infiles ....   - The last argument, requests to process
-        The certificate requests to process, -in is the same.
-Just about all the above have default values defined in ssleay.conf.
-The key variables in ssleay.conf are (for the pariticular '-name' being 
-used, in the default, it is CA_default).
-dir is where all the CA database stuff is kept.
-certs is where all the previously issued certificates are kept.
-The database is a simple text database containing the following tab separated 
-fields.
-status: a value of 'R' - revoked, 'E' -expired or 'V' valid.
-issued date:  When the certificate was certified.
-revoked date:  When it was revoked, blank if not revoked.
-serial number:  The certificate serial number.
-certificate:    Where the certificate is located.
-CN:     The name of the certificate.
-The demo file has quite a few made up values it it.  The last 2 were 
-added by the ca program and are acurate.
-The CA program does not update the 'certificate' file correctly right now.
-The serial field should be unique as should the CN/status combination.
-The ca program checks these at startup.  What still needs to be 
-wrtten is a program to 'regenerate' the data base file from the issued 
-certificate list (and a CRL list).
-Back to the CA_default variables.
-Most of the variables are commented.
-policy is the default policy.
-Ok for policies, they define the order and which fields must be present 
-in the certificate request and what gets filled in.
-So a value of
-countryName             = match
-means that the country name must match the CA certificate.
-organizationalUnitName  = optional
-The org.Unit,Name does not have to be present and
-commonName              = supplied
-commonName must be supplied in the certificate request.
-For the 'policy_match' polocy, the order of the attributes in the 
-generated certiticate would be
-countryName
-stateOrProvinceName
-organizationName
-organizationalUnitName
-commonName
-emailAddress
-Have a play, it sort of makes sense.  If you think about how the persona 
-requests operate, it is similar to the 'policy_match' policy and the
-'policy_anything' is similar to what versign is doing.
-I hope this helps a bit.  Some backend scripts are definitly needed to 
-update the database and to make certificate revocion easy.  All 
-certificates issued should also be kept forever (or until they expire?)
-hope this helps
-eric (who has to run off an buy some cheap knee pads for the caving in 4 
-days time :-)
--
-Eric Young                  | Signature removed since it was generating
-AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au    | more followups than the message contents :-)
-==== ms3-ca.doc ========================================================
-Date: Mon, 9 Jun 97 08:00:33 +0200
-From: Holger.Reif@PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE (Holger Reif)
-Subject: ms3-ca.doc
-Organization: TU Ilmenau, Fak. IA, FG Telematik
-Content-Length: 14575
-Status: RO
-X-Status: 
-Loading client certs into MSIE 3.01
-===================================
-This document contains all the information necessary to successfully set up 
-some scripts to issue client certs to Microsoft Internet Explorer. It 
-includes the required knowledge about the model MSIE uses for client 
-certification and includes complete sample scripts ready to play with. The 
-scripts were tested against a modified ca program of SSLeay 0.6.6 and should 
-work with the regular ca program that comes with version 0.8.0. I haven't 
-tested against MSIE 4.0
-You can use the information contained in this document in either way you 
-want. However if you feel it saved you a lot of time I ask you to be as fair 
-as to mention my name: Holger Reif <reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de>.
-1.) The model used by MSIE
--------------------------
-The Internet Explorer doesn't come with a embedded engine for installing 
-client certs like Netscape's Navigator. It rather uses the CryptoAPI (CAPI) 
-defined by Microsoft. CAPI comes with WindowsNT 4.0 or is installed together 
-with Internet Explorer since 3.01. The advantage of this approach is a higher 
-flexibility because the certificates in the (per user) system open 
-certificate store may be used by other applications as well. The drawback 
-however is that you need to do a bit more work to get a client cert issued.
-CAPI defines functions which will handle basic cryptographic work, eg. 
-generating keys, encrypting some data, signing text or building a certificate 
-request. The procedure is as follows: A CAPI function generates you a key 
-pair and saves it into the certificate store. After that one builds a 
-Distinguished Name. Together with that key pair another CAPI function forms a 
-PKCS#10 request which you somehow need to submit to a CA. Finally the issued 
-cert is given to a yet another CAPI function which saves it into the 
-certificate store.
-The certificate store with the user's keys and certs is in the registry. You 
-will find it under HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/Microsoft/Cryptography/ (I 
-leave it to you as a little exercise to figure out what all the entries mean 
-;-). Note that the keys are protected only with the user's usual Windows 
-login password.
-2.) The practical usage
-----------------------
-Unfortunatly since CAPI is a system API you can't access its functions from 
-HTML code directly. For this purpose Microsoft provides a wrapper called 
-certenr3.dll. This DLL accesses the CAPI functions and provides an interface 
-usable from Visual Basic Script. One needs to install that library on the 
-computer which wants to have client cert. The easiest way is to load it as an 
-ActiveX control (certenr3.dll is properly authenticode signed by MS ;-). If 
-you have ever enrolled e cert request at a CA you will have installed it.
-At time of writing certenr3.dll is contained in 
-http://www.microsoft.com/workshop/prog/security/csa/certenr3.exe. It comes 
-with an README file which explains the available functions. It is labeled 
-beta but every CA seems to use it anyway. The license.txt allows you the 
-usage for your own purposes (as far as I understood) and a somehow limited 
-distribution. 
-The two functions of main interest are GenerateKeyPair and AcceptCredentials. 
-For complete explanation of all possible parameters see the README file. Here 
-are only minimal required parameters and their values.
-GenerateKeyPair(sessionID, FASLE, szName, 0, "ClientAuth", TRUE, FALSE, 1)
- sessionID is a (locally to that computer) unique string to correlate the 
-generated key pair with a cert installed later.
- szName is the DN of the form "C=DE; S=Thueringen; L=Ilmenau; CN=Holger 
-Reif; 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de". Note that S is the 
-abreviation for StateOrProvince. The recognized abreviation include CN, O, C, 
-OU, G, I, L, S, T. If the abreviation is unknown (eg. for PKCS#9 email addr) 
-you need to use the full object identifier. The starting point for searching 
-them could be crypto/objects.h since all OIDs know to SSLeay are listed 
-there.
- note: the possible ninth parameter which should give a default name to the 
-certificate storage location doesn't seem to work. Changes to the constant 
-values in the call above doesn't seem to make sense. You can't generate 
-PKCS#10 extensions with that function.
-The result of GenerateKeyPair is the base64 encoded PKCS#10 request. However 
-it has a little strange format that SSLeay doesn't accept. (BTW I feel the 
-decision of rejecting that format as standard conforming.) It looks like 
-follows:
-        1st line with 76 chars
-        2nd line with 76 chars
-        ...
-        (n-2)th line with 76 chars
-        (n-1)th line contains a multiple of 4 chars less then 76 (possible 
-empty)
-        (n)th line has zero or 4 chars (then with 1 or 2 equal signs - the 
-                original text's lenght wasn'T a multiple of 3) 
-        The line separator has two chars: 0x0d 0x0a
-AcceptCredentials(sessionID, credentials, 0, FALSE)
- sessionID needs to be the same as while generating the key pair
- credentials is the base64 encoded PKCS#7 object containing the cert. 
-CRL's and CA certs are not required simply just the client cert. (It seems to 
-me that both are not even checked somehow.) The only format of the base64 
-encoded object I succesfully used was all characters in a very long string 
-without line feeds or carriage returns. (Hey, it doesn't matter, only a 
-computer reads it!)
-The result should be S_OK. For error handling see the example that comes with 
-certenr3.dll.
-A note about ASN.1 character encodings. certenr3.dll seems to know only about 
-2 of them: UniversalString and PrintableString. First it is definitely wrong 
-for an email address which is IA5STRING (checked by ssleay's ca). Second 
-unfortunately MSIE (at least until version 3.02) can't handle UniversalString 
-correctly - they just blow up you cert store! Therefore ssleay's ca (starting 
-from version 0.8.0) tries to convert the encodings automatically to IA5STRING 
-or TeletexString. The beef is it will work only for the latin-1 (western) 
-charset. Microsoft still has to do abit of homework...
-3.) An example
--------------
-At least you need two steps: generating the key & request and then installing 
-the certificate. A real world CA would have some more steps involved, eg. 
-accepting some license. Note that both scripts shown below are just 
-experimental state without any warrenty!
-First how to generate a request. Note that we can't use a static page because 
-of the sessionID. I generate it from system time plus pid and hope it is 
-unique enough. Your are free to feed it through md5 to get more impressive 
-ID's ;-) Then the intended text is read in with sed which inserts the 
-sessionID. 
-----BEGIN ms-enroll.cgi-----
-#!/bin/sh
-SESSION_ID=`date '+%y%m%d%H%M%S'`$$
-echo Content-type: text/html
-echo
-sed s/template_for_sessId/$SESSION_ID/ <<EOF
-<HTML><HEAD>
-<TITLE>Certificate Enrollment Test Page</TITLE>
-</HEAD><BODY>
-<OBJECT
-    classid="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43"
-    codebase=certenr3.dll
-    id=certHelper
-    >
-</OBJECT>
-<CENTER>
-<H2>enrollment for a personal cert</H2>
-<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P>
-<FORM NAME="MSIE_Enrollment" ACTION="ms-gencert.cgi" ENCTYPE=x-www-form-
-encoded METHOD=POST>
-<TABLE>
-    <TR><TD>Country</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Country" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>State</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="StateOrProvince" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>Location</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Location" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>Organization</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Organization" 
-VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>Organizational Unit</TD>
-        <TD><INPUT NAME="OrganizationalUnit" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>Name</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="CommonName" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD>eMail Address</TD>
-        <TD><INPUT NAME="EmailAddress" VALUE=""></TD></TR>
-    <TR><TD></TD>
-        <TD><INPUT TYPE="BUTTON" NAME="submit" VALUE="Beantragen"></TD></TR>
-</TABLE>
-        <INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME="SessionId" VALUE="template_for_sessId">
-        <INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME="Request" VALUE="">
-</FORM>
-<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P>
-</CENTER>
-<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=VBS>
-    Dim DN
-    Sub Submit_OnClick
-        Dim TheForm
-        Set TheForm = Document.MSIE_Enrollment
-        sessionId       = TheForm.SessionId.value
-        reqHardware     = FALSE
-        C               = TheForm.Country.value
-        SP              = TheForm.StateOrProvince.value
-        L               = TheForm.Location.value
-        O               = TheForm.Organization.value
-        OU              = TheForm.OrganizationalUnit.value
-        CN              = TheForm.CommonName.value
-        Email           = TheForm.EmailAddress.value
-        szPurpose       = "ClientAuth"
-        doAcceptanceUINow   = FALSE
-        doOnline        = TRUE
-        DN = ""
-        Call Add_RDN("C", C)
-        Call Add_RDN("S", SP)
-        Call Add_RDN("L", L)
-        Call Add_RDN("O", O)
-        Call Add_RDN("OU", OU)
-        Call Add_RDN("CN", CN)
-        Call Add_RDN("1.2.840.113549.1.9.1", Email)
-                      ' rsadsi
-                                     ' pkcs
-                                       ' pkcs9
-                                         ' eMailAddress
-        On Error Resume Next
-        sz10 = certHelper.GenerateKeyPair(sessionId, _
-                FALSE, DN, 0, ClientAuth, FASLE, TRUE, 1)_
-        theError = Err.Number
-        On Error Goto 0
-        if (sz10 = Empty OR theError <> 0) Then
-            sz = "The error '" & Hex(theError) & "' occurred." & chr(13) & _
-                chr(10) & "Your credentials could not be generated."
-            result = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Enrollment")
-            Exit Sub
-        else 
-            TheForm.Request.value = sz10
-            TheForm.Submit
-        end if
-    End Sub
-    Sub Add_RDN(sn, value)
-        if (value <> "") then
-            if (DN <> "") then
-                DN = DN & "; "
-            end if
-            DN = DN & sn & "=" & value
-        end if
-    End Sub
-</SCRIPT>
-</BODY>
-</HTML>
-EOF
-----END ms-enroll.cgi-----
-Second, how to extract the request and feed the certificate back? We need to 
-"normalize" the base64 encoding of the PKCS#10 format which means 
-regenerating the lines and wrapping with BEGIN and END line. This is done by 
-gawk. The request is taken by ca the normal way. Then the cert needs to be 
-packed into a PKCS#7 structure (note: the use of a CRL is necessary for 
-crl2pkcs7 as of version 0.6.6. Starting with 0.8.0 it it might probably be 
-ommited). Finally we need to format the PKCS#7 object and generate the HTML 
-text. I use two templates to have a clearer script.
-1st note: postit2 is slightly modified from a program I found at ncsa's ftp 
-site. Grab it from http://www.easterngraphics.com/certs/IX9704/postit2.c. You 
-need utils.c from there too.
-2nd note: I'm note quite sure wether the gawk script really handles all 
-possible inputs for the request right! Today I don't use this construction 
-anymore myself.
-3d note: the cert must be of version 3! This could be done with the nsComment 
-line in ssleay.cnf...
------BEGIN ms-gencert.cgi-----
-#!/bin/sh
-FILE="/tmp/"`date '+%y%m%d%H%M%S'-`$$
-rm -f "$FILE".*
-HOME=`pwd`; export HOME  # as ssleay.cnf insists on having such an env var
-cd /usr/local/ssl #where demoCA (as named in ssleay.conf) is located
-postit2 -s " " -i 0x0d > "$FILE".inp  # process the FORM vars
-SESSION_ID=`gawk '$1 == "SessionId" { print $2; exit }' "$FILE".inp`
-gawk \
-        'BEGIN { \
-                OFS = ""; \
-                print "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----"; \
-                req_seen=0 \
-        } \
-        $1 == "Request" { \
-                req_seen=1; \
-                if (length($2) == 72) print($2); \
-                lastline=$2; \
-                next; \
-        } \
-        { \
-                if (req_seen == 1) { \
-                        if (length($1) >= 72) print($1); \
-                        else if (length(lastline) < 72) { \
-                                req_seen=0; \
-                                print (lastline,$1); \
-                        } \
-                lastline=$1; \
-                } \
-        } \
-        END { \
-                print "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----"; \
-        }' > "$FILE".pem < "$FILE".inp 
-ssleay ca -batch -in "$FILE".pem -key passwd -out "$FILE".out
-ssleay crl2pkcs7 -certfile "$FILE".out -out "$FILE".pkcs7 -in demoCA/crl.pem
-sed s/template_for_sessId/$SESSION_ID/ <ms-enroll2a.html >"$FILE".cert
-/usr/local/bin/gawk \
-        'BEGIN  { \
-                OFS = ""; \
-                dq = sprintf("%c",34); \
-        } \
-        $0 ~ "PKCS7" { next; } \
-        { \
-                print dq$0dq" & _"; \
-        }' <"$FILE".pkcs7 >> "$FILE".cert
-cat  ms-enroll2b.html >>"$FILE".cert
-echo Content-type: text/html
-echo Content-length: `wc -c "$FILE".cert`
-echo
-cat "$FILE".cert
-rm -f "$FILE".*
-----END ms-gencert.cgi-----
----BEGIN ms-enroll2a.html----
-<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Certificate Acceptance Test Page</TITLE></HEAD><BODY>
-<OBJECT
-    classid="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43"
-    codebase=certenr3.dll
-    id=certHelper
-    >
-</OBJECT>
-<CENTER>
-<H2>Your personal certificate</H2>
-<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P>
-Press the button!
-<P><INPUT TYPE=BUTTON VALUE="Nimm mich!" NAME="InstallCert">
-</CENTER>
-<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR>
-<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=VBS>
-    Sub InstallCert_OnClick
-        sessionId       = "template_for_sessId"
-credentials = "" & _
----END ms-enroll2a.html----
----BEGIN ms-enroll2b.html----
-""
-        On Error Resume Next
-        result = certHelper.AcceptCredentials(sessionId, credentials, 0, 
-FALSE)
-        if (IsEmpty(result)) Then
-           sz = "The error '" & Err.Number & "' occurred." & chr(13) & 
-chr(10) & "This Digital ID could not be registered."
-           msgOut = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Registration Error")
-           navigate "error.html"
-        else
-           sz = "Digital ID successfully registered."
-           msgOut = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Registration")
-           navigate "success.html"
-        end if
-        Exit Sub
-    End Sub
-</SCRIPT>
-</BODY>
-</HTML>
----END ms-enroll2b.html----
-4.) What do do with the cert?
-----------------------------
-The cert is visible (without restarting MSIE) under the following menu:
-View->Options->Security->Personal certs. You can examine it's contents at 
-least partially.
-To use it for client authentication you need to use SSL3.0 (fortunately 
-SSLeay supports it with 0.8.0). Furthermore MSIE is told to only supports a 
-kind of automatic selection of certs (I personally wasn't able to test it 
-myself). But there is a requirement that the issuer of the server cert and 
-the issuer of the client cert needs to be the same (according to a developer 
-from MS). Which means: you need may more then one cert to talk to all 
-servers...
-I'm sure we will get a bit more experience after ApacheSSL is available for 
-SSLeay 0.8.8.
-I hope you enjoyed reading and that in future questions on this topic will 
-rarely appear on ssl-users@moncom.com ;-)
-Ilmenau, 9th of June 1997
-Holger Reif <reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de>
-- 
-read you later  -  Holger Reif
----------------------------------------  Signaturprojekt Deutsche Einheit
-TU Ilmenau - Informatik - Telematik                      (Verdamp lang her)
-Holger.Reif@PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE         Alt wie ein Baum werden, um ueber
-http://Remus.PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE/Reif/  alle 7 Bruecken gehen zu koennen
-==== ns-ca.doc ========================================================
-The following documentation was supplied by Jeff Barber, who provided the
-patch to the CA program to add this functionality.
-eric
--
-Jeff Barber                                Email: jeffb@issl.atl.hp.com
-Hewlett Packard                            Phone: (404) 648-9503
-Internet and System Security Lab           Fax:   (404) 648-9516
-                         oo
---------------------cut /\ here for ns-ca.doc ------------------------------
-This document briefly describes how to use SSLeay to implement a 
-certificate authority capable of dynamically serving up client
-certificates for version 3.0 beta 5 (and presumably later) versions of
-the Netscape Navigator.  Before describing how this is done, it's
-important to understand a little about how the browser implements its
-client certificate support.  This is documented in some detail in the
-URLs based at <URL:http://home.netscape.com/eng/security/certs.html>.
-Here's a brief overview:
-       The Navigator supports a new HTML tag "KEYGEN" which will cause
-        the browser to generate an RSA key pair when you submit a form
-        containing the tag.  The public key, along with an optional
-        challenge (supposedly provided for use in certificate revocation
-        but I don't use it) is signed, DER-encoded, base-64 encoded
-        and sent to the web server as the value of the variable
-        whose NAME is provided in the KEYGEN tag.  The private key is
-        stored by the browser in a local key database.
-        This "Signed Public Key And Challenge" (SPKAC) arrives formatted
-        into 64 character lines (which are of course URL-encoded when 
-        sent via HTTP -- i.e. spaces, newlines and most punctuatation are
-        encoded as "%HH" where HH is the hex equivalent of the ASCII code).
-        Note that the SPKAC does not contain the other usual attributes
-        of a certificate request, especially the subject name fields.
-        These must be otherwise encoded in the form for submission along
-        with the SPKAC.
-       Either immediately (in response to this form submission), or at
-        some later date (a real CA will probably verify your identity in
-        some way before issuing the certificate), a web server can send a
-        certificate based on the public key and other attributes back to
-        the browser by encoding it in DER (the binary form) and sending it
-        to the browser as MIME type:
-        "Content-type: application/x-x509-user-cert"
-        The browser uses the public key encoded in the certificate to
-        associate the certificate with the appropriate private key in
-        its local key database.  Now, the certificate is "installed".
-       When a server wants to require authentication based on client
-        certificates, it uses the right signals via the SSL protocol to
-        trigger the Navigator to ask you which certificate you want to
-        send.  Whether the certificate is accepted is dependent on CA
-        certificates and so forth installed in the server and is beyond
-        the scope of this document.
-Now, here's how the SSLeay package can be used to provide client 
-certficates:
-       You prepare a file for input to the SSLeay ca application.
-        The file contains a number of "name = value" pairs that identify
-        the subject.  The names here are the same subject name component
-        identifiers used in the CA section of the lib/ssleay.conf file,
-        such as "emailAddress", "commonName" "organizationName" and so
-        forth.  Both the long version and the short version (e.g. "Email",
-        "CN", "O") can be used.
-        One more name is supported: this one is "SPKAC".  Its value
-        is simply the value of the base-64 encoded SPKAC sent by the
-        browser (with all the newlines and other space charaters
-        removed -- and newline escapes are NOT supported).
-        [ As of SSLeay 0.6.4, multiple lines are supported.
-          Put a \ at the end of each line and it will be joined with the
-          previous line with the '\n' removed - eay ]
-        
-        Here's a sample input file:
-C = US
-SP = Georgia
-O = Some Organization, Inc.
-OU = Netscape Compatibility Group
-CN = John X. Doe
-Email = jxdoe@someorg.com
-SPKAC = MIG0MGAwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAwmk6FMJ4uAVIYbcvIOx5+bDGTfvL8X5gE+R67ccMk6rCSGbVQz2cetyQtnI+VIs0NwdD6wjuSuVtVFbLoHonowIDAQABFgAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQBFZDUWFl6BJdomtN1Bi53mwijy1rRgJ4YirF15yBEDM3DjAQkKXHYOIX+qpz4KXKnl6EYxTnGSFL5wWt8X2iyx
-       You execute the ca command (either from a CGI program run out of
-        the web server, or as a later manual task) giving it the above
-        file as input.  For example, if the file were named /tmp/cert.req,
-        you'd run:
-        $SSLDIR/bin/ca -spkac /tmp/cert.req -out /tmp/cert
-        The output is in DER format (binary) if a -out argument is 
-        provided, as above; otherwise, it's in the PEM format (base-64
-        encoded DER).  Also, the "-batch" switch is implied by the
-        "-spkac" so you don't get asked whether to complete the signing
-        (probably it shouldn't work this way but I was only interested
-        in hacking together an online CA that could be used for issuing
-        test certificates).
-        The "-spkac" capability doesn't support multiple files (I think).
-        Any CHALLENGE provided in the SPKAC is simply ignored.
-        The interactions between the identification fields you provide
-        and those identified in your lib/ssleay.conf are the same as if
-        you did an ordinary "ca -in infile -out outfile" -- that is, if
-        something is marked as required in the ssleay.conf file and it
-        isn't found in the -spkac file, the certificate won't be issued.
-       Now, you pick up the output from /tmp/cert and pass it back to
-        the Navigator prepending the Content-type string described earlier.
-       In order to run the ca command out of a CGI program, you must
-        provide a password to decrypt the CA's private key.  You can
-        do this by using "echo MyKeyPassword | $SSLDIR/bin/ca ..."
-        I think there's a way to not encrypt the key file in the first
-        place, but I didn't see how to do that, so I made a small change
-        to the library that allows the password to be accepted from a pipe.
-        Either way is UTTERLY INSECURE and a real CA would never do that.
-        [ You can use the 'ssleay rsa' command to remove the password
-          from the private key, or you can use the '-key' option to the
-          ca command to specify the decryption key on the command line
-          or use the -nodes option when generating the key.
-          ca will try to clear the command line version of the password
-          but for quite a few operating systems, this is not possible.
-          - eric ]
-So, what do you have to do to make use of this stuff to create an online 
-demo CA capability with SSLeay?
-1       Create an HTML form for your users.  The form should contain
-        fields for all of the required or optional fields in ssleay.conf.
-        The form must contain a KEYGEN tag somewhere with at least a NAME
-        attribute.
-2       Create a CGI program to process the form input submitted by the
-        browser.  The CGI program must URL-decode the variables and create
-        the file described above, containing subject identification info
-        as well as the SPKAC block.  It should then run the the ca program
-        with the -spkac option.  If it works (check the exit status),
-        return the new certificate with the appropriate MIME type.  If not,
-        return the output of the ca command with MIME type "text/plain".
-3       Set up your web server to accept connections signed by your demo
-        CA.  This probably involves obtaining the PEM-encoded CA certificate
-        (ordinarily in $SSLDIR/CA/cacert.pem) and installing it into a
-        server database.  See your server manual for instructions.
-==== obj.doc ========================================================
-The Object library.
-As part of my Crypto library, I found I required a method of identifying various
-objects.  These objects normally had 3 different values associated with
-them, a short text name, a long (or lower case) text name, and an
-ASN.1 Object Identifier (which is a sequence of numbers).
-This library contains a static list of objects and functions to lookup
-according to one type and to return the other types.
-To use these routines, 'Object.h' needs to be included.
-For each supported object, #define entries are defined as follows
-#define SN_Algorithm                    "Algorithm"
-#define LN_algorithm                    "algorithm"
-#define NID_algorithm                   38
-#define OBJ_algorithm                   1L,3L,14L,3L,2L
-SN_  stands for short name.
-LN_  stands for either long name or lowercase name.
-NID_ stands for Numeric ID.  I each object has a unique NID and this
-     should be used internally to identify objects.
-OBJ_ stands for ASN.1 Object Identifier or ASN1_OBJECT as defined in the
-     ASN1 routines.  These values are used in ASN1 encoding.
-The following functions are to be used to return pointers into a static
-definition of these types.  What this means is "don't try to free() any
-pointers returned from these functions.
-ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(
-int n);
-        Return the ASN1_OBJECT that corresponds to a NID of n.
-        
-char *OBJ_nid2ln(
-int n);
-        Return the long/lower case name of the object represented by the
-        NID of n.
-        
-char *OBJ_nid2sn(
-int n);
-        Return the short name for the object represented by the NID of n.
-ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(
-ASN1_OBJECT *o);
-        Duplicate and return a new ASN1_OBJECT that is the same as the
-        passed parameter.
-        
-int OBJ_obj2nid(
-ASN1_OBJECT *o);
-        Given ASN1_OBJECT o, return the NID that corresponds.
-        
-int OBJ_ln2nid(
-char *s);
-        Given the long/lower case name 's', return the NID of the object.
-        
-int OBJ_sn2nid(
-char *s);
-        Given the short name 's', return the NID of the object.
-        
-char *OBJ_bsearch(
-char *key,
-char *base,
-int num,
-int size,
-int (*cmp)());
-        Since I have come across a few platforms that do not have the
-        bsearch() function, OBJ_bsearch is my version of that function.
-        Feel free to use this function, but you may as well just use the
-        normal system bsearch(3) if it is present.  This version also
-        has tolerance of being passed NULL pointers.
-==== keys ===========================================================
-EVP_PKEY_DSA
-EVP_PKEY_DSA2
-EVP_PKEY_DSA3
-EVP_PKEY_DSA4
-EVP_PKEY_RSA
-EVP_PKEY_RSA2
-valid DSA pkey types
-        NID_dsa
-        NID_dsaWithSHA
-        NID_dsaWithSHA1
-        NID_dsaWithSHA1_2
-valid RSA pkey types
-        NID_rsaEncryption
-        NID_rsa
-NID_dsaWithSHA  NID_dsaWithSHA                  DSA             SHA
-NID_dsa         NID_dsaWithSHA1                 DSA             SHA1
-NID_md2         NID_md2WithRSAEncryption        RSA-pkcs1       MD2
-NID_md5         NID_md5WithRSAEncryption        RSA-pkcs1       MD5
-NID_mdc2        NID_mdc2WithRSA                 RSA-none        MDC2
-NID_ripemd160   NID_ripemd160WithRSA            RSA-pkcs1       RIPEMD160
-NID_sha         NID_shaWithRSAEncryption        RSA-pkcs1       SHA
-NID_sha1        NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption       RSA-pkcs1       SHA1
-==== rand.doc ========================================================
-My Random number library.
-These routines can be used to generate pseudo random numbers and can be
-used to 'seed' the pseudo random number generator (RNG).  The RNG make no
-effort to reproduce the same random number stream with each execution.
-Various other routines in the SSLeay library 'seed' the RNG when suitable
-'random' input data is available.  Read the section at the end for details
-on the design of the RNG.
-void RAND_bytes(
-unsigned char *buf,
-int num);
-        This routine puts 'num' random bytes into 'buf'.  One should make
-        sure RAND_seed() has been called before using this routine.
-        
-void RAND_seed(
-unsigned char *buf,
-int num);
-        This routine adds more 'seed' data the RNG state.  'num' bytes
-        are added to the RNG state, they are taken from 'buf'.  This
-        routine can be called with sensitive data such as user entered
-        passwords.  This sensitive data is in no way recoverable from
-        the RAND library routines or state.  Try to pass as much data
-        from 'random' sources as possible into the RNG via this function.
-        Also strongly consider using the RAND_load_file() and
-        RAND_write_file() routines.
-void RAND_cleanup();
-        When a program has finished with the RAND library, if it so
-        desires, it can 'zero' all RNG state.
-        
-The following 3 routines are convenience routines that can be used to
-'save' and 'restore' data from/to the RNG and it's state.
-Since the more 'random' data that is feed as seed data the better, why not
-keep it around between executions of the program?  Of course the
-application should pass more 'random' data in via RAND_seed() and 
-make sure no-one can read the 'random' data file.
-        
-char *RAND_file_name(
-char *buf,
-int size);
-        This routine returns a 'default' name for the location of a 'rand'
-        file.  The 'rand' file should keep a sequence of random bytes used
-        to initialise the RNG.  The filename is put in 'buf'.  Buf is 'size'
-        bytes long.  Buf is returned if things go well, if they do not,
-        NULL is returned.  The 'rand' file name is generated in the
-        following way.  First, if there is a 'RANDFILE' environment
-        variable, it is returned.  Second, if there is a 'HOME' environment
-        variable, $HOME/.rand is returned.  Third, NULL is returned.  NULL
-        is also returned if a buf would overflow.
-int RAND_load_file(
-char *file,
-long number);
-        This function 'adds' the 'file' into the RNG state.  It does this by
-        doing a RAND_seed() on the value returned from a stat() system call
-        on the file and if 'number' is non-zero, upto 'number' bytes read
-        from the file.  The number of bytes passed to RAND_seed() is returned.
-int RAND_write_file(
-char *file),
-        RAND_write_file() writes N random bytes to the file 'file', where
-        N is the size of the internal RND state (currently 1k).
-        This is a suitable method of saving RNG state for reloading via
-        RAND_load_file().
-What follows is a description of this RNG and a description of the rational
-behind it's design.
-It should be noted that this RNG is intended to be used to generate
-'random' keys for various ciphers including generation of DH and RSA keys.  
-It should also be noted that I have just created a system that I am happy with.
-It may be overkill but that does not worry me.  I have not spent that much
-time on this algorithm so if there are glaring errors, please let me know.
-Speed has not been a consideration in the design of these routines.
-First up I will state the things I believe I need for a good RNG.
-1) A good hashing algorithm to mix things up and to convert the RNG 'state'
-   to random numbers.
-2) An initial source of random 'state'.
-3) The state should be very large.  If the RNG is being used to generate
-   4096 bit RSA keys, 2 2048 bit random strings are required (at a minimum).
-   If your RNG state only has 128 bits, you are obviously limiting the
-   search space to 128 bits, not 2048.  I'm probably getting a little
-   carried away on this last point but it does indicate that it may not be
-   a bad idea to keep quite a lot of RNG state.  It should be easier to
-   break a cipher than guess the RNG seed data.
-4) Any RNG seed data should influence all subsequent random numbers
-   generated.  This implies that any random seed data entered will have
-   an influence on all subsequent random numbers generated.
-5) When using data to seed the RNG state, the data used should not be
-   extractable from the RNG state.  I believe this should be a
-   requirement because one possible source of 'secret' semi random
-   data would be a private key or a password.  This data must
-   not be disclosed by either subsequent random numbers or a
-   'core' dump left by a program crash.
-6) Given the same initial 'state', 2 systems should deviate in their RNG state
-   (and hence the random numbers generated) over time if at all possible.
-7) Given the random number output stream, it should not be possible to determine
-   the RNG state or the next random number.
-The algorithm is as follows.
-There is global state made up of a 1023 byte buffer (the 'state'), a
-working message digest ('md') and a counter ('count').
-Whenever seed data is added, it is inserted into the 'state' as
-follows.
-        The input is chopped up into units of 16 bytes (or less for
-        the last block).  Each of these blocks is run through the MD5
-        message digest.  The data passed to the MD5 digest is the
-        current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
-        (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
-        the current 'block' and the new key data 'block'.  The result
-        of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the 'state' at the
-        same locations that were used as input into the MD5.
-        I believe this system addresses points 1 (MD5), 3 (the 'state'),
-        4 (via the 'md'), 5 (by the use of MD5 and xor).
-When bytes are extracted from the RNG, the following process is used.
-For each group of 8 bytes (or less), we do the following,
-        Input into MD5, the top 8 bytes from 'md', the byte that are
-        to be overwritten by the random bytes and bytes from the
-        'state' (incrementing looping index).  From this digest output
-        (which is kept in 'md'), the top (upto) 8 bytes are
-        returned to the caller and the bottom (upto) 8 bytes are xored
-        into the 'state'.
-        Finally, after we have finished 'generation' random bytes for the
-        called, 'count' (which is incremented) and 'md' are fed into MD5 and
-        the results are kept in 'md'.
-        I believe the above addressed points 1 (use of MD5), 6 (by
-        hashing into the 'state' the 'old' data from the caller that
-        is about to be overwritten) and 7 (by not using the 8 bytes
-        given to the caller to update the 'state', but they are used
-        to update 'md').
-So of the points raised, only 2 is not addressed, but sources of
-random data will always be a problem.
-        
-==== rc2.doc ========================================================
-The RC2 library.
-RC2 is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities.  It
-uses variable size key, but 128bit (16 byte) key would normally be considered
-good.  It can be used in all the modes that DES can be used.  This
-library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64, ofb64 modes.
-I have implemented this library from an article posted to sci.crypt on
-11-Feb-1996.  I personally don't know how far to trust the RC2 cipher.
-While it is capable of having a key of any size, not much reseach has
-publically been done on it at this point in time (Apr-1996)
-since the cipher has only been public for a few months :-)
-It is of a similar speed to DES and IDEA, so unless it is required for
-meeting some standard (SSLv2, perhaps S/MIME), it would probably be advisable
-to stick to IDEA, or for the paranoid, Tripple DES.
-Mind you, having said all that, I should mention that I just read alot and
-implement ciphers, I'm a 'babe in the woods' when it comes to evaluating
-ciphers :-).
-For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the
-same.
-This library requires the inclusion of 'rc2.h'.
-All of the encryption functions take what is called an RC2_KEY as an 
-argument.  An RC2_KEY is an expanded form of the RC2 key.
-For all modes of the RC2 algorithm, the RC2_KEY used for
-decryption is the same one that was used for encryption.
-The define RC2_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions
-that require an encryption/decryption flag. RC2_DECRYPT is passed to
-specify decryption.
-Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library
-could be used with RC2.  I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and
-ofb64 for the following reasons.
- ecb is the basic RC2 encryption.
- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers.
- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output
-  do not need to be a multiple of 8.
- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as
-  secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode.
- If you want triple RC2, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally
-  obsessed with security.  Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to
-  copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to
-  RC2_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-).
-The functions are as follows:
-void RC2_set_key(
-RC2_KEY *ks;
-int len;
-unsigned char *key;
-int bits;
-        RC2_set_key converts an 'len' byte key into a RC2_KEY.
-        A 'ks' is an expanded form of the 'key' which is used to
-        perform actual encryption.  It can be regenerated from the RC2 key
-        so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about
-        to occur.  Don't save or pass around RC2_KEY's since they
-        are CPU architecture dependent, 'key's are not.  RC2 is an
-        interesting cipher in that it can be used with a variable length
-        key.  'len' is the length of 'key' to be used as the key.
-        A 'len' of 16 is recomended.  The 'bits' argument is an
-        interesting addition which I only found out about in Aug 96.
-        BSAFE uses this parameter to 'limit' the number of bits used
-        for the key.  To use the 'key' unmodified, set bits to 1024.
-        This is what old versions of my RC2 library did (SSLeay 0.6.3).
-        RSAs BSAFE library sets this parameter to be 128 if 128 bit
-        keys are being used.  So to be compatable with BSAFE, set it
-        to 128, if you don't want to reduce RC2's key length, leave it
-        at 1024.
-        
-void RC2_encrypt(
-unsigned long *data,
-RC2_KEY *key,
-int encrypt);
-        This is the RC2 encryption function that gets called by just about
-        every other RC2 routine in the library.  You should not use this
-        function except to implement 'modes' of RC2.  I say this because the
-        functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to
-        long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory
-        access do not occur.
-        Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and key is the
-        RC2_KEY to use.  Encryption or decryption is indicated by 'encrypt'.
-        which can have the values RC2_ENCRYPT or RC2_DECRYPT.
-void RC2_ecb_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-RC2_KEY *key,
-int encrypt);
-        This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of RC2 (in DES this
-        mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term
-        for rc2 as well.
-        Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by
-        key.  Depending on the encrypt, encryption or
-        decryption occurs.  Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes.
-        
-void RC2_cbc_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-RC2_KEY *ks,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int encrypt);
-        This routine implements RC2 in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
-        Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted
-        (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes.
-        The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above,
-        should be a multiple of 8).  If length is not a multiple of 8, bad 
-        things will probably happen.  ivec is the initialisation vector.
-        This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to
-        the next call to RC2_cbc_encrypt().
-        
-void RC2_cfb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-RC2_KEY *schedule,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int *num,
-int encrypt);
-        This is one of the more useful functions in this RC2 library, it
-        implements CFB mode of RC2 with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        'Encrypt' is used to indicate encryption or decryption.
-        CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to generate a stream
-        of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text.
-        The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to
-        be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain
-        text.  As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt,
-        the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next
-        block of data is gathered for encryption is different for
-        encryption and decryption.
-        
-void RC2_ofb64_encrypt(
-unsigned char *in,
-unsigned char *out,
-long length,
-RC2_KEY *schedule,
-unsigned char *ivec,
-int *num);
-        This functions implements OFB mode of RC2 with 64bit feedback.
-        This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes,
-        you do not require 8 byte padding.  Each call to this
-        routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec
-        and num.  Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec.
-        This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or
-        decryption mode.
-        
-For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library.
-To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to
-produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to
-RC2_set_key().
-=====
-For more information about the specific RC2 modes in this library
-(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the
-documentation on my DES library.  What is said about DES is directly
-applicable for RC2.
-==== rc4.doc ========================================================
-The RC4 library.
-RC4 is a stream cipher that operates on a byte stream.  It can be used with
-any length key but I would recommend normally using 16 bytes.
-This library requires the inclusion of 'rc4.h'.
-The RC4 encryption function takes what is called an RC4_KEY as an argument.
-The RC4_KEY is generated by the RC4_set_key function from the key bytes.
-RC4, being a stream cipher, does not have an encryption or decryption mode.
-It produces a stream of bytes that the input stream is xor'ed against and
-so decryption is just a case of 'encrypting' again with the same key.
-I have only put in one 'mode' for RC4 which is the normal one.  This means
-there is no initialisation vector and there is no feedback of the cipher
-text into the cipher.  This implies that you should not ever use the
-same key twice if you can help it.  If you do, you leave yourself open to
-known plain text attacks; if you know the plain text and
-corresponding cipher text in one message, all messages that used the same
-key can have the cipher text decoded for the corresponding positions in the
-cipher stream.
-The main positive feature of RC4 is that it is a very fast cipher; about 4
-times faster that DES.  This makes it ideally suited to protocols where the
-key is randomly chosen, like SSL.
-The functions are as follows:
-void RC4_set_key(
-RC4_KEY *key;
-int len;
-unsigned char *data);
-        This function initialises the RC4_KEY structure with the key passed
-        in 'data', which is 'len' bytes long.  The key data can be any
-        length but 16 bytes seems to be a good number.
-void RC4(
-RC4_KEY *key;
-unsigned long len;
-unsigned char *in;
-unsigned char *out);
-        Do the actual RC4 encryption/decryption.  Using the 'key', 'len'
-        bytes are transformed from 'in' to 'out'.  As mentioned above,
-        decryption is the operation as encryption.
-==== ref.doc ========================================================
-I have lots more references etc, and will update this list in the future,
-30 Aug 1996 - eay
-SSL     The SSL Protocol - from Netscapes.
-RC4     Newsgroups: sci.crypt
-        From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark)
-        Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed.
-        Message-ID: <sternCvKL4B.Hyy@netcom.com>
-RC2     Newsgroups: sci.crypt
-        From: pgut01@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
-        Subject: Specification for Ron Rivests Cipher No.2
-        Message-ID: <4fk39f$f70@net.auckland.ac.nz>
-MD2     RFC1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm
-MD5     RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
-X509 Certificates
-        RFC1421 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I
-        RFC1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II
-        RFC1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III
-        RFC1424 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV
-RSA and various standard encoding
-        PKCS#1 RSA Encryption Standard
-        PKCS#5 Password-Based Encryption Standard
-        PKCS#7 Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard
-        A Layman's Guide to a Subset of ASN.1, BER, and DER
-        An Overview of the PKCS Standards
-        Some Examples of the PKCS Standards
-IDEA    Chapter 3 The Block Cipher IDEA
-RSA, prime number generation and bignum algorithms
-        Introduction To Algorithms,
-        Thomas Cormen, Charles Leiserson, Ronald Rivest,
-        Section 29 Arithmetic Circuits
-        Section 33 Number-Theoretic Algorithms
-Fast Private Key algorithm
-        Fast Decipherment Algorithm for RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem
-        J.-J. Quisquater and C. Couvreur, Electronics Letters,
-        14th October 1982, Vol. 18 No. 21
-Prime number generation and bignum algorithms.
-        PGP-2.3a
-==== rsa.doc ========================================================
-The RSA encryption and utility routines.
-The RSA routines are built on top of a big number library (the BN library).
-There are support routines in the X509 library for loading and manipulating
-the various objects in the RSA library.  When errors are returned, read
-about the ERR library for how to access the error codes.
-All RSA encryption is done according to the PKCS-1 standard which is
-compatible with PEM and RSAref.  This means that any values being encrypted
-must be less than the size of the modulus in bytes, minus 10, bytes long.
-This library uses RAND_bytes()() for it's random data, make sure to feed
-RAND_seed() with lots of interesting and varied data before using these
-routines.
-The RSA library has one specific data type, the RSA structure.
-It is composed of 8 BIGNUM variables (see the BN library for details) and
-can hold either a private RSA key or a public RSA key.
-Some RSA libraries have different structures for public and private keys, I
-don't.  For my libraries, a public key is determined by the fact that the
-RSA->d value is NULL.  These routines will operate on any size RSA keys.
-While I'm sure 4096 bit keys are very very secure, they take a lot longer
-to process that 1024 bit keys :-).
-The function in the RSA library are as follows.
-RSA *RSA_new();
-        This function creates a new RSA object.  The sub-fields of the RSA
-        type are also malloced so you should always use this routine to
-        create RSA variables.
-        
-void RSA_free(
-RSA *rsa);
-        This function 'frees' an RSA structure.  This routine should always
-        be used to free the RSA structure since it will also 'free' any
-        sub-fields of the RSA type that need freeing.
-        
-int RSA_size(
-RSA *rsa);      
-        This function returns the size of the RSA modulus in bytes.  Why do
-        I need this you may ask, well the reason is that when you encrypt
-        with RSA, the output string will be the size of the RSA modulus.
-        So the output for the RSA_encrypt and the input for the RSA_decrypt
-        routines need to be RSA_size() bytes long, because this is how many
-        bytes are expected.
-        
-For the following 4 RSA encryption routines, it should be noted that
-RSA_private_decrypt() should be used on the output from 
-RSA_public_encrypt() and RSA_public_decrypt() should be used on
-the output from RSA_private_encrypt().
-        
-int RSA_public_encrypt(
-int from_len;
-unsigned char *from     
-unsigned char *to       
-RSA *rsa);
-        This function implements RSA public encryption, the rsa variable
-        should be a public key (but can be a private key).  'from_len'
-        bytes taken from 'from' and encrypted and put into 'to'.  'to' needs
-        to be at least RSA_size(rsa) bytes long.  The number of bytes
-        written into 'to' is returned.  -1 is returned on an error.  The
-        operation performed is
-        to = from^rsa->e mod rsa->n.
-        
-int RSA_private_encrypt(
-int from_len;
-unsigned char *from     
-unsigned char *to       
-RSA *rsa);
-        This function implements RSA private encryption, the rsa variable
-        should be a private key.  'from_len' bytes taken from
-        'from' and encrypted and put into 'to'.  'to' needs
-        to be at least RSA_size(rsa) bytes long.  The number of bytes
-        written into 'to' is returned.  -1 is returned on an error.  The
-        operation performed is
-        to = from^rsa->d mod rsa->n.
-int RSA_public_decrypt(
-int from_len;
-unsigned char *from     
-unsigned char *to       
-RSA *rsa);
-        This function implements RSA public decryption, the rsa variable
-        should be a public key (but can be a private key).  'from_len'
-        bytes are taken from 'from' and decrypted.  The decrypted data is
-        put into 'to'.  The number of bytes encrypted is returned.  -1 is
-        returned to indicate an error. The operation performed is
-        to = from^rsa->e mod rsa->n.
-int RSA_private_decrypt(
-int from_len;
-unsigned char *from     
-unsigned char *to       
-RSA *rsa);
-        This function implements RSA private decryption, the rsa variable
-        should be a private key.  'from_len' bytes are taken
-        from 'from' and decrypted.  The decrypted data is
-        put into 'to'.  The number of bytes encrypted is returned.  -1 is
-        returned to indicate an error. The operation performed is
-        to = from^rsa->d mod rsa->n.
-int RSA_mod_exp(
-BIGNUM *n;
-BIGNUM *p;
-RSA *rsa);
-        Normally you will never use this routine.
-        This is really an internal function which is called by
-        RSA_private_encrypt() and RSA_private_decrypt().  It performs
-        n=n^p mod rsa->n except that it uses the 5 extra variables in the
-        RSA structure to make this more efficient.
-        
-RSA *RSA_generate_key(
-int bits;
-unsigned long e;
-void (*callback)();
-char *cb_arg;
-        This routine is used to generate RSA private keys.  It takes
-        quite a period of time to run and should only be used to
-        generate initial private keys that should then be stored
-        for later use.  The passed callback function 
-        will be called periodically so that feedback can be given
-        as to how this function is progressing.
-        'bits' is the length desired for the modulus, so it would be 1024
-        to generate a 1024 bit private key.
-        'e' is the value to use for the public exponent 'e'.  Traditionally
-        it is set to either 3 or 0x10001.
-        The callback function (if not NULL) is called in the following
-        situations.
-        when we have generated a suspected prime number to test,
-        callback(0,num1++,cb_arg).  When it passes a prime number test,
-        callback(1,num2++,cb_arg).  When it is rejected as one of
-        the 2 primes required due to gcd(prime,e value) != 0,
-        callback(2,num3++,cb_arg).  When finally accepted as one
-        of the 2 primes, callback(3,num4++,cb_arg).
-==== rsaref.doc ========================================================
-This package can be compiled to use the RSAref library.
-This library is not allowed outside of the USA but inside the USA it is
-claimed by RSA to be the only RSA public key library that can be used
-besides BSAFE..
-There are 2 files, rsaref/rsaref.c and rsaref/rsaref.h that contain the glue
-code to use RSAref.  These files were written by looking at the PGP
-source code and seeing which routines it used to access RSAref.
-I have also been sent by some-one a copy of the RSAref header file that
-contains the library error codes.
-[ Jun 1996 update - I have recently gotten hold of RSAref 2.0 from
-  South Africa and have been doing some performace tests. ]
-        
-They have now been tested against the recently announced RSAEURO
-library.
-There are 2 ways to use SSLeay and RSAref.  First, to build so that
-the programs must be linked with RSAref, add '-DRSAref' to CFLAG in the top
-level makefile and -lrsaref (or where ever you are keeping RSAref) to
-EX_LIBS.
-To build a makefile via util/mk1mf.pl to do this, use the 'rsaref' option.
-The second method is to build as per normal and link applications with
-the RSAglue library.  The correct library order would be
-cc -o cmd cmd.o -lssl -lRSAglue -lcrypto -lrsaref -ldes
-The RSAglue library is built in the rsa directory and is NOT
-automatically installed.
-Be warned that the RSAEURO library, that is claimed to be compatible
-with RSAref contains a different value for the maximum number of bits
-supported.  This changes structure sizes and so if you are using
-RSAEURO, change the value of RSAref_MAX_BITS in rsa/rsaref.h
-==== s_mult.doc ========================================================
-s_mult is a test program I hacked up on a Sunday for testing non-blocking
-IO.  It has a select loop at it's centre that handles multiple readers
-and writers.
-Try the following command
-ssleay s_mult -echo -nbio -ssl -v
-echo - sends any sent text back to the sender
-nbio - turns on non-blocking IO
-ssl  - accept SSL connections, default is normal text
-v    - print lots
-        type Q<cr> to quit
-In another window, run the following
-ssleay s_client -pause </etc/termcap
-The pause option puts in a 1 second pause in each read(2)/write(2) call
-so the other end will have read()s fail.
-==== session.doc ========================================================
-I have just checked over and re-worked the session stuff.
-The following brief example will ignore all setup information to do with
-authentication.
-Things operate as follows.
-The SSL environment has a 'context', a SSL_CTX structure.  This holds the
-cached SSL_SESSIONS (which can be reused) and the certificate lookup
-information.  Each SSL structure needs to be associated with a SSL_CTX.
-Normally only one SSL_CTX structure is needed per program.
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(void ); 
-void    SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
-These 2 functions create and destroy SSL_CTX structures
-The SSL_CTX has a session_cache_mode which is by default,
-in SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER mode.  What this means is that the library
-will automatically add new session-id's to the cache upon successful
-SSL_accept() calls.
-If SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT is set, then client certificates are also added
-to the cache.
-SSL_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,mode)  will set the 'mode' and
-SSL_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) will get the cache 'mode'.
-The modes can be
-SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF      - no caching
-SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT   - only SSL_connect()
-SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER   - only SSL_accept()
-SSL_SESS_NO_CACHE_BOTH  - Either SSL_accept() or SSL_connect().
-If SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR is set, old timed out sessions are
-not automatically removed each 255, SSL_connect()s or SSL_accept()s.
-By default, upon every 255 successful SSL_connect() or SSL_accept()s,
-the cache is flush.  Please note that this could be expensive on
-a heavily loaded SSL server, in which case, turn this off and
-clear the cache of old entries 'manually' (with one of the functions
-listed below) every few hours.  Perhaps I should up this number, it is hard
-to say.  Remember, the '255' new calls is just a mechanism to get called
-every now and then, in theory at most 255 new session-id's will have been
-added but if 100 are added every minute, you would still have
-500 in the cache before any would start being flushed (assuming a 3 minute
-timeout)..
-int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-These 3 functions return statistics about the SSL_CTX.  These 3 are the
-number of session id reuses.  hits is the number of reuses, misses are the
-number of lookups that failed, and timeouts is the number of cached
-entries ignored because they had timeouted.
-ctx->new_session_cb is a function pointer to a function of type
-int new_session_callback(SSL *ssl,SSL_SESSION *new);
-This function, if set in the SSL_CTX structure is called whenever a new
-SSL_SESSION is added to the cache.  If the callback returns non-zero, it
-means that the application will have to do a SSL_SESSION_free()
-on the structure (this is
-to do with the cache keeping the reference counts correct, without the
-application needing to know about it.
-The 'active' parameter is the current SSL session for which this connection
-was created.
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)());
-to set the callback,
-int (*cb)() SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-to get the callback.
-If the 'get session' callback is set, when a session id is looked up and
-it is not in the session-id cache, this callback is called.  The callback is
-of the form
-SSL_SESSION *get_session_callback(unsigned char *sess_id,int sess_id_len,
-        int *copy);
-The get_session_callback is intended to return null if no session id is found.
-The reference count on the SSL_SESSION in incremented by the SSL library,
-if copy is 1.  Otherwise, the reference count is not modified.
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx,cb) sets the callback and
-int (*cb)()SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(ctx) returns the callback.
-These callbacks are basically intended to be used by processes to
-send their session-id's to other processes.  I currently have not implemented
-non-blocking semantics for these callbacks, it is upto the application
-to make the callbacks efficient if they require blocking (perhaps
-by 'saving' them and then 'posting them' when control returns from
-the SSL_accept().
-LHASH *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-This returns the session cache.  The lhash strucutre can be accessed for
-statistics about the cache.
-void lh_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out);
-void lh_node_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out);
-void lh_node_usage_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out);
-can be used to print details about it's activity and current state.
-You can also delve directly into the lhash structure for 14 different
-counters that are kept against the structure.  When I wrote the lhash library,
-I was interested in gathering statistics :-).
-Have a read of doc/lhash.doc in the SSLeay distribution area for more details
-on the lhash library.
-Now as mentioned ealier, when a SSL is created, it needs a SSL_CTX.
-SSL *   SSL_new(SSL_CTX *);
-This stores a session.  A session is secret information shared between 2
-SSL contexts.  It will only be created if both ends of the connection have
-authenticated their peer to their satisfaction.  It basically contains
-the information required to use a particular secret key cipher.
-To retrieve the SSL_CTX being used by a SSL,
-SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *s);
-Now when a SSL session is established between to programs, the 'session'
-information that is cached in the SSL_CTX can me manipulated by the
-following functions.
-int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session);
-This will set the SSL_SESSION to use for the next SSL_connect().  If you use
-this function on an already 'open' established SSL connection, 'bad things
-will happen'.  This function is meaning-less when used on a ssl strucutre
-that is just about to be used in a SSL_accept() call since the
-SSL_accept() will either create a new session or retrieve one from the
-cache.
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *s);
-This will return the SSL_SESSION for the current SSL, NULL if there is
-no session associated with the SSL structure.
-The SSL sessions are kept in the SSL_CTX in a hash table, to remove a
-session
-void    SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c);
-and to add one
-int    SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
-SSL_CTX_add_session() returns 1 if the session was already in the cache (so it
-was not added).
-Whenever a new session is created via SSL_connect()/SSL_accept(),
-they are automatically added to the cache, depending on the session_cache_mode
-settings.  SSL_set_session()
-does not add it to the cache.  Just call SSL_CTX_add_session() if you do want the
-session added.  For a 'client' this would not normally be the case.
-SSL_CTX_add_session() is not normally ever used, except for doing 'evil' things
-which the next 2 funtions help you do.
-int     i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp);
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a,unsigned char **pp,long length);
-These 2 functions are in the standard ASN1 library form and can be used to
-load and save to a byte format, the SSL_SESSION structure.
-With these functions, you can save and read these structures to a files or
-arbitary byte string.
-The PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(fp,x) and PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb) will
-write to a file pointer in base64 encoding.
-What you can do with this, is pass session information between separate
-processes.  Please note, that you will probably also need to modify the
-timeout information on the SSL_SESSIONs.
-long SSL_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s)
-will return the 'time' that the session
-was loaded.  The timeout is relative to this time.  This information is
-saved when the SSL_SESSION is converted to binarary but it is stored
-in as a unix long, which is rather OS dependant, but easy to convert back.
-long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s,long t) will set the above mentioned time.
-The time value is just the value returned from time(3), and should really
-be defined by be to be time_t.
-long SSL_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s);
-long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s,long t);
-These 2 retrieve and set the timeout which is just a number of secconds
-from the 'SSL_get_time()' value.  When this time period has elapesed,
-the session will no longer be in the cache (well it will actually be removed
-the next time it is attempted to be retrieved, so you could 'bump'
-the timeout so it remains valid).
-The 'time' and 'timeout' are set on a session when it is created, not reset
-each time it is reused.  If you did wish to 'bump it', just after establishing
-a connection, do a
-SSL_set_time(ssl,time(NULL));
-You can also use
-SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx,unsigned long t) and
-SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx) to manipulate the default timeouts for
-all SSL connections created against a SSL_CTX.  If you set a timeout in
-an SSL_CTX, all new SSL's created will inherit the timeout.  It can be over
-written by the SSL_set_timeout(SSL *s,unsigned long t) function call.
-If you 'set' the timeout back to 0, the system default will be used.
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new();
-void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
-These 2 functions are used to create and dispose of SSL_SESSION functions.
-You should not ever normally need to use them unless you are using 
-i2d_SSL_SESSION() and/or d2i_SSL_SESSION().  If you 'load' a SSL_SESSION
-via d2i_SSL_SESSION(), you will need to SSL_SESSION_free() it.
-Both SSL_set_session() and SSL_CTX_add_session() will 'take copies' of the
-structure (via reference counts) when it is passed to them.
-SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,time);
-The first function will clear all sessions from the cache, which have expired
-relative to 'time' (which could just be time(NULL)).
-SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,0);
-This is a special case that clears everything.
-As a final comment, a 'session' is not enough to establish a new
-connection.  If a session has timed out, a certificate and private key
-need to have been associated with the SSL structure.
-SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,SSL *from); will copy not only the session
-strucutre but also the private key and certificate associated with
-'from'.
-EXAMPLES.
-So lets play at being a weird SSL server.
-/* setup a context */
-ctx=SSL_CTX_new();
-/* Lets load some session from binary into the cache, why one would do
- * this is not toally clear, but passing between programs does make sense
- * Perhaps you are using 4096 bit keys and are happy to keep them
- * valid for a week, to avoid the RSA overhead of 15 seconds, I'm not toally
- * sure, perhaps this is a process called from an SSL inetd and this is being 
- * passed to the application. */
-session=d2i_SSL_SESSION(....)
-SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx,session);
-/* Lets even add a session from a file */
-session=PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(....)
-SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx,session);
-/* create a new SSL structure */
-ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
-/* At this point we want to be able to 'create' new session if
- * required, so we need a certificate and RSAkey. */
-SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(ssl,...)
-SSL_use_certificate_file(ssl,...)
-/* Now since we are a server, it make little sence to load a session against
- * the ssl strucutre since a SSL_accept() will either create a new session or
- * grab an existing one from the cache. */
-/* grab a socket descriptor */
-fd=accept(...);
-/* associated it with the ssl strucutre */
-SSL_set_fd(ssl,fd);
-SSL_accept(ssl); /* 'do' SSL using out cert and RSA key */
-/* Lets print out the session details or lets save it to a file,
- * perhaps with a secret key cipher, so that we can pass it to the FBI
- * when they want to decode the session :-).  While we have RSA
- * this does not matter much but when I do SSLv3, this will allow a mechanism
- * for the server/client to record the information needed to decode
- * the traffic that went over the wire, even when using Diffie-Hellman */
-PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(SSL_get_session(ssl),stdout,....)
-Lets 'connect' back to the caller using the same session id.
-ssl2=SSL_new(ctx);
-fd2=connect(them);
-SSL_set_fd(ssl2,fd2);
-SSL_set_session(ssl2,SSL_get_session(ssl));
-SSL_connect(ssl2);
-/* what the hell, lets accept no more connections using this session */
-SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl),SSL_get_session(ssl));
-/* we could have just as easily used ssl2 since they both are using the
- * same session.
- * You will note that both ssl and ssl2 are still using the session, and
- * the SSL_SESSION structure will be free()ed when both ssl and ssl2
- * finish using the session.  Also note that you could continue to initiate
- * connections using this session by doing SSL_get_session(ssl) to get the
- * existing session, but SSL_accept() will not be able to find it to
- * use for incoming connections.
- * Of corse, the session will timeout at the far end and it will no
- * longer be accepted after a while.  The time and timeout are ignored except
- * by SSL_accept(). */
-/* Since we have had our server running for 10 weeks, and memory is getting
- * short, perhaps we should clear the session cache to remove those
- * 100000 session entries that have expired.  Some may consider this
- * a memory leak :-) */
-SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,time(NULL));
-/* Ok, after a bit more time we wish to flush all sessions from the cache
- * so that all new connections will be authenticated and incure the
- * public key operation overhead */
-SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,0);
-/* As a final note, to copy everything to do with a SSL, use */
-SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,SSL *from);
-/* as this also copies the certificate and RSA key so new session can
- * be established using the same details */
-==== sha.doc ========================================================
-The SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) library.
-SHA is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary
-length message down to a 20 byte hash.  The functions all need to be passed
-a SHA_CTX which is used to hold the SHA context during multiple SHA_Update()
-function calls.  The normal method of use for this library is as follows
-This library contains both SHA and SHA-1 digest algorithms.  SHA-1 is
-an update to SHA (which should really be called SHA-0 now) which
-tweaks the algorithm slightly.  The SHA-1 algorithm is used by simply
-using SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update(), SHA1_Final() and SHA1() instead of the
-SHA*() calls
-SHA_Init(...);
-SHA_Update(...);
-...
-SHA_Update(...);
-SHA_Final(...);
-This library requires the inclusion of 'sha.h'.
-The functions are as follows:
-void SHA_Init(
-SHA_CTX *c);
-        This function needs to be called to initiate a SHA_CTX structure for
-        use.
-        
-void SHA_Update(
-SHA_CTX *c;
-unsigned char *data;
-unsigned long len);
-        This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len'
-        bytes from the 'data' pointer.  The number of bytes can be any
-        length.
-void SHA_Final(
-unsigned char *md;
-SHA_CTX *c;
-        This function is called when a message digest of the data digested
-        with SHA_Update() is wanted.  The message digest is put in the 'md'
-        array and is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH (20) bytes long.
-unsigned char *SHA(
-unsigned char *d;
-unsigned long n;
-unsigned char *md;
-        This function performs a SHA_Init(), followed by a SHA_Update()
-        followed by a SHA_Final() (using a local SHA_CTX).
-        The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL.
-        Regardless of the value of 'md', the message
-        digest is returned from the function.  If 'md' was NULL, the message
-        digest returned is being stored in a static structure.
-        
-==== speed.doc ========================================================
-To get an idea of the performance of this library, use
-ssleay speed
-perl util/sp-diff.pl file1 file2
-will print out the relative differences between the 2 files which are
-expected to be the output from the speed program.
-The performace of the library is very dependant on the Compiler
-quality and various flags used to build.
---
-These are some numbers I did comparing RSAref and SSLeay on a Pentium 100.
-[ These numbers are all out of date, as of SSL - 0.6.1 the RSA
-operations are about 2 times faster, so check the version number ]
-RSA performance.
-SSLeay 0.6.0
-Pentium 100, 32meg, Windows NT Workstation 3.51
-linux - gcc v 2.7.0 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -m486
-and
-Windows NT  - Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 4.1   - 586 code + 32bit assember
-Windows 3.1 - Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 1.52c - 286 code + 32bit assember
-NT Dos Shell- Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 1.52c - 286 code + 16bit assember
-Times are how long it takes to do an RSA private key operation.
-               512bits 1024bits
-------------------------------
-SSLeay NT dll   0.042s   0.202s see above
-SSLeay linux    0.046s   0.218s Assember inner loops (normal build) 
-SSLeay linux    0.067s   0.380s Pure C code with BN_LLONG defined
-SSLeay W3.1 dll 0.108s   0.478s see above
-SSLeay linux    0.109s   0.713s C without BN_LLONG.
-RSAref2.0 linux 0.149s   0.936s
-SSLeay MS-DOS   0.197s   1.049s see above
-486DX66, 32meg, Windows NT Server 3.51
-               512bits 1024bits
-------------------------------
-SSLeay NT dll   0.084s   0.495s <- SSLeay 0.6.3
-SSLeay NT dll   0.154s   0.882s
-SSLeay W3.1 dll 0.335s   1.538s
-SSLeay MS-DOS   0.490s   2.790s
-What I find cute is that I'm still faster than RSAref when using standard C,
-without using the 'long long' data type :-), %35 faster for 512bit and we
-scale up to 3.2 times faster for the 'default linux' build.  I should mention
-that people should 'try' to use either x86-lnx.s (elf), x86-lnxa.s or
-x86-sol.s for any x86 based unix they are building on.  The only problems
-with be with syntax but the performance gain is quite large, especially for
-servers.  The code is very simple, you just need to modify the 'header'.
-The message is, if you are stuck using RSAref, the RSA performance will be
-bad. Considering the code was compiled for a pentium, the 486DX66 number
-would indicate 'Use RSAref and turn you Pentium 100 into a 486DX66' :-). 
-[ As of verson 0.6.1, it would be correct to say 'turn you pentium 100
- into a 486DX33' :-) ]
-I won't tell people if the DLL's are using RSAref or my stuff if no-one
-asks :-).
-eric
-PS while I know I could speed things up further, I will probably not do
-   so due to the effort involved.  I did do some timings on the
-   SSLeay bignum format -> RSAref number format conversion that occurs
-   each time RSAref is used by SSLeay, and the numbers are trivial.
-   0.00012s a call for 512bit vs 0.149s for the time spent in the function.
-   0.00018s for 1024bit vs 0.938s.  Insignificant.
-   So the 'way to go', to support faster RSA libraries, if people are keen,
-   is to write 'glue' code in a similar way that I do for RSAref and send it
-   to me :-).
-   My base library still has the advantage of being able to operate on 
-   any size numbers, and is not that far from the performance from the
-   leaders in the field. (-%30?)
-   [ Well as of 0.6.1 I am now the leader in the filed on x86 (we at
-     least very close :-) ]
-   I suppose I should also mention some other numbers RSAref numbers, again
-   on my Pentium.
-                DES CBC         EDE-DES         MD5
-   RSAref linux  830k/s          302k/s         4390k/s
-   SSLeay linux  855k/s          319k/s        10025k/s
-   SSLeay NT    1158k/s          410k/s        10470k/s
-   SSLeay w31    378k/s          143k/s         2383k/s (fully 16bit)
-   Got to admit that Visual C++ 4.[01] is a damn fine compiler :-)
--
-Eric Young                  | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates.
-AARNet: eay@cryptsoft.com   | RTFM Win32 GetMessage().
-==== ssl-ciph.doc ========================================================
-This is a quick high level summery of how things work now.
-Each SSLv2 and SSLv3 cipher is composed of 4 major attributes plus a few extra
-minor ones.
-They are 'The key exchange algorithm', which is RSA for SSLv2 but can also
-be Diffle-Hellman for SSLv3.
-An 'Authenticion algorithm', which can be RSA, Diffle-Helman, DSS or
-none.
-The cipher
-The MAC digest.
-A cipher can also be an export cipher and is either an SSLv2 or a
-SSLv3 ciphers.
-To specify which ciphers to use, one can either specify all the ciphers,
-one at a time, or use 'aliases' to specify the preference and order for
-the ciphers.
-There are a large number of aliases, but the most importaint are
-kRSA, kDHr, kDHd and kEDH for key exchange types.
-aRSA, aDSS, aNULL and aDH for authentication
-DES, 3DES, RC4, RC2, IDEA and eNULL for ciphers
-MD5, SHA0 and SHA1 digests
-Now where this becomes interesting is that these can be put together to
-specify the order and ciphers you wish to use.
-To speed this up there are also aliases for certian groups of ciphers.
-The main ones are
-SSLv2   - all SSLv2 ciphers
-SSLv3   - all SSLv3 ciphers
-EXP     - all export ciphers
-LOW     - all low strngth ciphers (no export ciphers, normally single DES)
-MEDIUM  - 128 bit encryption
-HIGH    - Triple DES
-These aliases can be joined in a : separated list which specifies to
-add ciphers, move them to the current location and delete them.
-A simpler way to look at all of this is to use the 'ssleay ciphers -v' command.
-The default library cipher spec is
-!ADH:RC4+RSA:HIGH:MEDIUM:LOW:EXP:+SSLv2:+EXP
-which means, first, remove from consideration any ciphers that do not
-authenticate.  Next up, use ciphers using RC4 and RSA.  Next include the HIGH,
-MEDIUM and the LOW security ciphers.  Finish up by adding all the export
-ciphers on the end, then 'pull' all the SSLv2 and export ciphers to
-the end of the list.
-The results are
-$ ssleay ciphers -v '!ADH:RC4+RSA:HIGH:MEDIUM:LOW:EXP:+SSLv2:+EXP'
-RC4-SHA                 SSLv3 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=RC4(128)  Mac=SHA1
-RC4-MD5                 SSLv3 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=RC4(128)  Mac=MD5 
-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA    SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1
-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA    SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=DSS  Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1
-DES-CBC3-SHA            SSLv3 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1
-IDEA-CBC-MD5            SSLv3 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=SHA1
-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA     SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=DES(56)   Mac=SHA1
-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA     SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=DSS  Enc=DES(56)   Mac=SHA1
-DES-CBC-SHA             SSLv3 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=DES(56)   Mac=SHA1
-DES-CBC3-MD5            SSLv2 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=3DES(168) Mac=MD5 
-DES-CBC-MD5             SSLv2 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=DES(56)   Mac=MD5 
-IDEA-CBC-MD5            SSLv2 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=MD5 
-RC2-CBC-MD5             SSLv2 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=RC2(128)  Mac=MD5 
-RC4-MD5                 SSLv2 Kx=RSA      Au=RSA  Enc=RC4(128)  Mac=MD5 
-EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC     SSLv3 Kx=DH(512)  Au=RSA  Enc=DES(40)   Mac=SHA1 export
-EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH(512)  Au=DSS  Enc=DES(40)   Mac=SHA1 export
-EXP-DES-CBC-SHA         SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA  Enc=DES(40)   Mac=SHA1 export
-EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5         SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA  Enc=RC2(40)   Mac=MD5  export
-EXP-RC4-MD5             SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA  Enc=RC4(40)   Mac=MD5  export
-EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5         SSLv2 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA  Enc=RC2(40)   Mac=MD5  export
-EXP-RC4-MD5             SSLv2 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA  Enc=RC4(40)   Mac=MD5  export
-I would recoment people use the 'ssleay ciphers -v "text"'
-command to check what they are going to use.
-Anyway, I'm falling asleep here so I'll do some more tomorrow.
-eric
-==== ssl.doc ========================================================
-SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) - the session-id hash table.
-/* Session-id cache stats */
-SSL_CTX_sess_number
-SSL_CTX_sess_connect
-SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good
-SSL_CTX_sess_accept
-SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good
-SSL_CTX_sess_hits
-SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits
-SSL_CTX_sess_misses
-SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts
-/* Session-id application notification callbacks */
-SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb
-SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb
-SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb
-SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb
-/* Session-id cache operation mode */
-SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode
-SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode
-/* Set default timeout values to use. */
-SSL_CTX_set_timeout
-SSL_CTX_get_timeout
-/* Global  SSL initalisation informational callback */
-SSL_CTX_set_info_callback
-SSL_CTX_get_info_callback
-SSL_set_info_callback
-SSL_get_info_callback
-/* If the SSL_accept/SSL_connect returned with -1, these indicate when
- * we should re-call *.
-SSL_want
-SSL_want_nothing
-SSL_want_read
-SSL_want_write
-SSL_want_x509_lookup
-/* Where we are in SSL initalisation, used in non-blocking, perhaps
- * have a look at ssl/bio_ssl.c */
-SSL_state
-SSL_is_init_finished
-SSL_in_init
-SSL_in_connect_init
-SSL_in_accept_init
-/* Used to set the 'inital' state so SSL_in_connect_init and SSL_in_accept_init
- * can be used to work out which function to call. */
-SSL_set_connect_state
-SSL_set_accept_state
-/* Where to look for certificates for authentication */
-SSL_set_default_verify_paths /* calles SSL_load_verify_locations */
-SSL_load_verify_locations
-/* get info from an established connection */
-SSL_get_session
-SSL_get_certificate
-SSL_get_SSL_CTX
-SSL_CTX_new
-SSL_CTX_free
-SSL_new
-SSL_clear
-SSL_free
-SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list
-SSL_get_cipher
-SSL_set_cipher_list
-SSL_get_cipher_list
-SSL_get_shared_ciphers
-SSL_accept
-SSL_connect
-SSL_read
-SSL_write
-SSL_debug
-SSL_get_read_ahead
-SSL_set_read_ahead
-SSL_set_verify
-SSL_pending
-SSL_set_fd
-SSL_set_rfd
-SSL_set_wfd
-SSL_set_bio
-SSL_get_fd
-SSL_get_rbio
-SSL_get_wbio
-SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey
-SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1
-SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file
-SSL_use_PrivateKey
-SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1
-SSL_use_PrivateKey_file
-SSL_use_certificate
-SSL_use_certificate_ASN1
-SSL_use_certificate_file
-ERR_load_SSL_strings
-SSL_load_error_strings
-/* human readable version of the 'state' of the SSL connection. */
-SSL_state_string
-SSL_state_string_long
-/* These 2 report what kind of IO operation the library was trying to
- * perform last.  Probably not very usefull. */
-SSL_rstate_string
-SSL_rstate_string_long
-SSL_get_peer_certificate
-SSL_SESSION_new
-SSL_SESSION_print_fp
-SSL_SESSION_print
-SSL_SESSION_free
-i2d_SSL_SESSION
-d2i_SSL_SESSION
-SSL_get_time
-SSL_set_time
-SSL_get_timeout
-SSL_set_timeout
-SSL_copy_session_id
-SSL_set_session
-SSL_CTX_add_session
-SSL_CTX_remove_session
-SSL_CTX_flush_sessions
-BIO_f_ssl
-/* used to hold information as to why a certificate verification failed */
-SSL_set_verify_result
-SSL_get_verify_result
-/* can be used by the application to associate data with an SSL structure.
- * It needs to be 'free()ed' by the application */
-SSL_set_app_data
-SSL_get_app_data
-/* The following all set values that are kept in the SSL_CTX but
- * are used as the default values when an SSL session is created.
- * They are over writen by the relevent SSL_xxxx functions */
-/* SSL_set_verify */
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_verify
-/* This callback, if set, totaly overrides the normal SSLeay verification
- * functions and should return 1 on success and 0 on failure */
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback
-/* The following are the same as the equivilent SSL_xxx functions.
- * Only one copy of this information is kept and if a particular
- * SSL structure has a local override, it is totally separate structure.
- */
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file
-==== ssl_ctx.doc ========================================================
-This is now a bit dated, quite a few of the SSL_ functions could be
-SSL_CTX_ functions.  I will update this in the future. 30 Aug 1996
-From eay@orb.mincom.oz.au Mon Dec 11 21:37:08 1995
-Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA00696
-  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Mon, 11 Dec 1995 11:37:08 +1000
-Date: Mon, 11 Dec 1995 11:37:08 +1000 (EST)
-From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>
-X-Sender: eay@orb
-To: sameer <sameer@c2.org>
-Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>
-Subject: Re: PEM_readX509 oesn't seem to be working
-In-Reply-To: <199512110102.RAA12521@infinity.c2.org>
-Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951211112115.28608D-100000@orb>
-Mime-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
-Status: RO
-X-Status: 
-On Sun, 10 Dec 1995, sameer wrote:
->       OK, that's solved. I've found out that it is saying "no
-> certificate set" in SSL_accept because s->conn == NULL
-> so there is some place I need to initialize s->conn that I am
-> not initializing it.
-The full order of things for a server should be.
-ctx=SSL_CTX_new();
-/* The next line should not really be using ctx->cert but I'll leave it 
- * this way right now... I don't want a X509_ routine to know about an SSL
- * structure, there should be an SSL_load_verify_locations... hmm, I may 
- * add it tonight.
- */
-X509_load_verify_locations(ctx->cert,CAfile,CApath);
-/* Ok now for each new connection we do the following */
-con=SSL_new(ctx);
-SSL_set_fd(con,s);
-SSL_set_verify(con,verify,verify_callback);
-/* set the certificate and private key to use. */
-SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(con,X509_certificate);
-SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(con,RSA_private_key);
-SSL_accept(con);
-SSL_read(con)/SSL_write(con);
-There is a bit more than that but that is basically the structure.
-Create a context and specify where to lookup certificates.
-foreach connection
-        {
-        create a SSL structure
-        set the certificate and private key
-        do a SSL_accept
-        
-        we should now be ok
-        }
-eric
--
-Eric Young                  | Signature removed since it was generating
-AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au    | more followups than the message contents :-)
-==== ssleay.doc ========================================================
-SSLeay: a cryptographic kitchen sink.
-1st December 1995
-Way back at the start of April 1995, I was looking for a mindless
-programming project.  A friend of mine (Tim Hudson) said "why don't you do SSL,
-it has DES encryption in it and I would not mind using it in a SSL telnet".
-While it was true I had written a DES library in previous years, litle
-did I know what an expansive task SSL would turn into.
-First of all, the SSL protocol contains DES encryption.  Well and good.  My
-DES library was fast and portable.  It also contained the RSA's RC4 stream
-cipher.  Again, not a problem, some-one had just posted to sci.crypt
-something that was claimed to be RC4.  It also contained IDEA, I had the
-specifications, not a problem to implement.  MD5, an RFC, trivial, at most
-I could spend a week or so trying to see if I could speed up the
-implementation.  All in all a nice set of ciphers.
-Then the first 'expantion of the scope', RSA public key
-encryption.  Since I did not knowing a thing about public key encryption
-or number theory, this appeared quite a daunting task.  Just writing a
-big number library would be problomatic in itself, let alone making it fast.
-At this point the scope of 'implementing SSL' expands eponentialy.
-First of all, the RSA private keys  were being kept in ASN.1 format.
-Thankfully the RSA PKCS series of documents explains this format.  So I now
-needed to be able to encode and decode arbitary ASN.1 objects.  The Public
-keys were embeded in X509 certificates.  Hmm... these are not only
-ASN.1 objects but they make up a heirachy of authentication.  To
-authenticate a X509 certificate one needs to retrieve it's issuers
-certificate etc etc.  Hmm..., so I also need to implement some kind
-of certificate management software.  I would also have to implement
-software to authenticate certificates.  At this point the support code made
-the SSL part of my library look quite small.
-Around this time, the first version of SSLeay was released.
-Ah, but here was the problem, I was not happy with the code so far.  As may
-have become obvious, I had been treating all of this as a learning
-exersize, so I have completely written the library myself.  As such, due
-to the way it had grown like a fungus, much of the library was not
-'elagent' or neat.  There were global and static variables all over the
-place, the SSL part did not even handle non-blocking IO.
-The Great rewrite began.
-As of this point in time, the 'Great rewrite' has almost finished.  So what
-follows is an approximate list of what is actually SSLeay 0.5.0
-/********* This needs to be updated for 0.6.0+ *************/
---
-The library contains the following routines.  Please note that most of these
-functions are not specfic for SSL or any other particular cipher
-implementation.  I have tried to make all the routines as general purpose
-as possible.  So you should not think of this library as an SSL
-implemtation, but rather as a library of cryptographic functions
-that also contains SSL.  I refer to each of these function groupings as
-libraries since they are often capable of functioning as independant
-libraries
-First up, the general ciphers and message digests supported by the library.
-MD2     rfc???, a standard 'by parts' interface to this algorithm.
-MD5     rfc???, the same type of interface as for the MD2 library except a
-        different algorithm.
-SHA     THe Secure Hash Algorithm.  Again the same type of interface as
-        MD2/MD5 except the digest is 20 bytes.
-SHA1    The 'revised' version of SHA.  Just about identical to SHA except
-        for one tweak of an inner loop.
-DES     This is my libdes library that has been floating around for the last
-        few years.  It has been enhanced for no other reason than completeness.
-        It now supports ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb, cfb64, ofb64 in normal mode and
-        triple DES modes of ecb, cbc, cfb64 and ofb64.  cfb64 and ofb64 are
-        functional interfaces to the 64 bit modes of cfb and ofb used in
-        such a way thay they function as single character interfaces.
-RC4     The RSA Inc. stream cipher.
-RC2     The RSA Inc. block cipher.
-IDEA    An implmentation of the IDEA cipher, the library supports ecb, cbc,
-        cfb64 and ofb64 modes of operation.
-Now all the above mentioned ciphers and digests libraries support high
-speed, minimal 'crap in the way' type interfaces.  For fastest and
-lowest level access, these routines should be used directly.
-Now there was also the matter of public key crypto systems.  These are
-based on large integer arithmatic.
-BN      This is my large integer library.  It supports all the normal
-        arithmentic operations.  It uses malloc extensivly and as such has
-        no limits of the size of the numbers being manipulated.  If you
-        wish to use 4000 bit RSA moduli, these routines will handle it.
-        This library also contains routines to 'generate' prime numbers and
-        to test for primality.  The RSA and DH libraries sit on top of this
-        library.  As of this point in time, I don't support SHA, but
-        when I do add it, it will just sit on top of the routines contained
-        in this library.
-RSA     This implements the RSA public key algorithm.  It also contains
-        routines that will generate a new private/public key pair.
-        All the RSA functions conform to the PKCS#1 standard.
-DH      This is an implementation of the
-        Diffie-Hellman protocol.  There are all the require routines for
-        the protocol, plus extra routines that can be used to generate a
-        strong prime for use with a specified generator.  While this last
-        routine is not generally required by applications implementing DH,
-        It is present for completeness and because I thing it is much
-        better to be able to 'generate' your own 'magic' numbers as oposed
-        to using numbers suplied by others.  I conform to the PKCS#3
-        standard where required.
-You may have noticed the preceeding section mentions the 'generation' of
-prime numbers.  Now this requries the use of 'random numbers'. 
-RAND    This psuedo-random number library is based on MD5 at it's core
-        and a large internal state (2k bytes).  Once you have entered enough
-        seed data into this random number algorithm I don't feel
-        you will ever need to worry about it generating predictable output.
-        Due to the way I am writing a portable library, I have left the
-        issue of how to get good initial random seed data upto the
-        application but I do have support routines for saving and loading a
-        persistant random number state for use between program runs.
-        
-Now to make all these ciphers easier to use, a higher level
-interface was required.  In this form, the same function would be used to
-encrypt 'by parts', via any one of the above mentioned ciphers.
-EVP     The Digital EnVeloPe library is quite large.  At it's core are
-        function to perform encryption and decryption by parts while using
-        an initial parameter to specify which of the 17 different ciphers
-        or 4 different message digests to use.  On top of these are implmented
-        the digital signature functions, sign, verify, seal and open.
-        Base64 encoding of binary data is also done in this library.
-PEM     rfc???? describe the format for Privacy Enhanced eMail.
-        As part of this standard, methods of encoding digital enveloped
-        data is an ascii format are defined.  As such, I use a form of these
-        to encode enveloped data.  While at this point in time full support
-        for PEM has not been built into the library, a minimal subset of
-        the secret key and Base64 encoding is present.  These reoutines are
-        mostly used to Ascii encode binary data with a 'type' associated
-        with it and perhaps details of private key encryption used to
-        encrypt the data.
-        
-PKCS7   This is another Digital Envelope encoding standard which uses ASN.1
-        to encode the data.  At this point in time, while there are some
-        routines to encode and decode this binary format, full support is
-        not present.
-        
-As Mentioned, above, there are several different ways to encode
-data structures.
-ASN1    This library is more a set of primatives used to encode the packing
-        and unpacking of data structures.  It is used by the X509
-        certificate standard and by the PKCS standards which are used by
-        this library.  It also contains routines for duplicating and signing
-        the structures asocisated with X509.
-        
-X509    The X509 library contains routines for packing and unpacking,
-        verifying and just about every thing else you would want to do with
-        X509 certificates.
-PKCS7   PKCS-7 is a standard for encoding digital envelope data
-        structures.  At this point in time the routines will load and save
-        DER forms of these structees.  They need to be re-worked to support
-        the BER form which is the normal way PKCS-7 is encoded.  If the
-        previous 2 sentances don't make much sense, don't worry, this
-        library is not used by this version of SSLeay anyway.
-OBJ     ASN.1 uses 'object identifiers' to identify objects.  A set of
-        functions were requred to translate from ASN.1 to an intenger, to a
-        character string.  This library provieds these translations
-        
-Now I mentioned an X509 library.  X509 specified a hieachy of certificates
-which needs to be traversed to authenticate particular certificates.
-METH    This library is used to push 'methods' of retrieving certificates
-        into the library.  There are some supplied 'methods' with SSLeay
-        but applications can add new methods if they so desire.
-        This library has not been finished and is not being used in this
-        version.
-        
-Now all the above are required for use in the initial point of this project.
-SSL     The SSL protocol.  This is a full implmentation of SSL v 2.  It
-        support both server and client authentication.  SSL v 3 support
-        will be added when the SSL v 3 specification is released in it's
-        final form.
-Now quite a few of the above mentioned libraries rely on a few 'complex'
-data structures.  For each of these I have a library.
-Lhash   This is a hash table library which is used extensivly.
-STACK   An implemetation of a Stack data structure.
-BUF     A simple character array structure that also support a function to
-        check that the array is greater that a certain size, if it is not,
-        it is realloced so that is it.
-        
-TXT_DB  A simple memory based text file data base.  The application can specify
-        unique indexes that will be enforced at update time.
-CONF    Most of the programs written for this library require a configuration
-        file.  Instead of letting programs constantly re-implment this
-        subsystem, the CONF library provides a consistant and flexable
-        interface to not only configuration files but also environment
-        variables.
-But what about when something goes wrong?
-The one advantage (and perhaps disadvantage) of all of these
-functions being in one library was the ability to implement a
-single error reporting system.
-        
-ERR     This library is used to report errors.  The error system records
-        library number, function number (in the library) and reason
-        number.  Multiple errors can be reported so that an 'error' trace
-        is created.  The errors can be printed in numeric or textual form.
-==== ssluse.doc ========================================================
-We have an SSL_CTX which contains global information for lots of
-SSL connections.  The session-id cache and the certificate verificate cache.
-It also contains default values for use when certificates are used.
-SSL_CTX
-        default cipher list
-        session-id cache
-        certificate cache
-        default session-id timeout period
-        New session-id callback
-        Required session-id callback
-        session-id stats
-        Informational callback
-        Callback that is set, overrides the SSLeay X509 certificate
-          verification
-        The default Certificate/Private Key pair
-        Default read ahead mode.
-        Default verify mode and verify callback.  These are not used
-          if the over ride callback mentioned above is used.
-        
-Each SSL can have the following defined for it before a connection is made.
-Certificate
-Private key
-Ciphers to use
-Certificate verify mode and callback
-IO object to use in the comunication.
-Some 'read-ahead' mode information.
-A previous session-id to re-use.
-A connection is made by using SSL_connect or SSL_accept.
-When non-blocking IO is being used, there are functions that can be used
-to determin where and why the SSL_connect or SSL_accept did not complete.
-This information can be used to recall the functions when the 'error'
-condition has dissapeared.
-After the connection has been made, information can be retrived about the
-SSL session and the session-id values that have been decided upon.
-The 'peer' certificate can be retrieved.
-The session-id values include
-'start time'
-'timeout length'
-==== stack.doc ========================================================
-The stack data structure is used to store an ordered list of objects.
-It is basically misnamed to call it a stack but it can function that way
-and that is what I originally used it for.  Due to the way element
-pointers are kept in a malloc()ed array, the most efficient way to use this
-structure is to add and delete elements from the end via sk_pop() and
-sk_push().  If you wish to do 'lookups' sk_find() is quite efficient since
-it will sort the stack (if required) and then do a binary search to lookup 
-the requested item.  This sorting occurs automatically so just sk_push()
-elements on the stack and don't worry about the order.  Do remember that if
-you do a sk_find(), the order of the elements will change.
-You should never need to 'touch' this structure directly.
-typedef struct stack_st
-        {
-        unsigned int num;
-        char **data;
-        int sorted;
-        unsigned int num_alloc;
-        int (*comp)();
-        } STACK;
-'num' holds the number of elements in the stack, 'data' is the array of
-elements.  'sorted' is 1 is the list has been sorted, 0 if not.
-num_alloc is the number of 'nodes' allocated in 'data'.  When num becomes
-larger than num_alloc, data is realloced to a larger size.
-If 'comp' is set, it is a function that is used to compare 2 of the items
-in the stack.  The function should return -1, 0 or 1, depending on the
-ordering.
-#define sk_num(sk)      ((sk)->num)
-#define sk_value(sk,n)  ((sk)->data[n])
-These 2 macros should be used to access the number of elements in the
-'stack' and to access a pointer to one of the values.
-STACK *sk_new(int (*c)());
-        This creates a new stack.  If 'c', the comparison function, is not
-specified, the various functions that operate on a sorted 'stack' will not
-work (sk_find()).  NULL is returned on failure.
-void sk_free(STACK *);
-        This function free()'s a stack structure.  The elements in the
-stack will not be freed so one should 'pop' and free all elements from the
-stack before calling this function or call sk_pop_free() instead.
-void sk_pop_free(STACK *st; void (*func)());
-        This function calls 'func' for each element on the stack, passing
-the element as the argument.  sk_free() is then called to free the 'stack'
-structure.
-int sk_insert(STACK *sk,char *data,int where);
-        This function inserts 'data' into stack 'sk' at location 'where'.
-If 'where' is larger that the number of elements in the stack, the element
-is put at the end.  This function tends to be used by other 'stack'
-functions.  Returns 0 on failure, otherwise the number of elements in the
-new stack.
-char *sk_delete(STACK *st,int loc);
-        Remove the item a location 'loc' from the stack and returns it.
-Returns NULL if the 'loc' is out of range.
-char *sk_delete_ptr(STACK *st, char *p);
-        If the data item pointed to by 'p' is in the stack, it is deleted
-from the stack and returned.  NULL is returned if the element is not in the
-stack.
-int sk_find(STACK *st,char *data);
-        Returns the location that contains a value that is equal to 
-the 'data' item.  If the comparison function was not set, this function
-does a linear search.  This function actually qsort()s the stack if it is not
-in order and then uses bsearch() to do the initial search.  If the
-search fails,, -1 is returned.  For mutliple items with the same
-value, the index of the first in the array is returned.
-int sk_push(STACK *st,char *data);
-        Append 'data' to the stack.  0 is returned if there is a failure
-(due to a malloc failure), else 1.  This is 
-sk_insert(st,data,sk_num(st));
-int sk_unshift(STACK *st,char *data);
-        Prepend 'data' to the front (location 0) of the stack.  This is
-sk_insert(st,data,0);
-char *sk_shift(STACK *st);
-        Return and delete from the stack the first element in the stack.
-This is sk_delete(st,0);
-char *sk_pop(STACK *st);
-        Return and delete the last element on the stack.  This is
-sk_delete(st,sk_num(sk)-1);
-void sk_zero(STACK *st);
-        Removes all items from the stack.  It does not 'free'
-pointers but is a quick way to clear a 'stack of references'.
-==== threads.doc ========================================================
-How to compile SSLeay for multi-threading.
-Well basically it is quite simple, set the compiler flags and build.
-I have only really done much testing under Solaris and Windows NT.
-If you library supports localtime_r() and gmtime_r() add,
-DTHREADS to the makefile parameters.  You can probably survive with out
-this define unless you are going to have multiple threads generating
-certificates at once.  It will not affect the SSL side of things.
-The approach I have taken to doing locking is to make the application provide
-callbacks to perform locking and so that the SSLeay library can distinguish
-between threads (for the error state).
-To have a look at an example program, 'cd mt; vi mttest.c'.
-To build under solaris, sh solaris.sh, for Windows NT or Windows 95,
-win32.bat
-This will build mttest which will fire up 10 threads that talk SSL
-to each other 10 times.
-To enable everything to work, the application needs to call
-CRYPTO_set_id_callback(id_function);
-CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(locking_function);
-before any multithreading is started.
-id_function does not need to be defined under Windows NT or 95, the
-correct function will be called if it is not.  Under unix, getpid()
-is call if the id_callback is not defined, for Solaris this is wrong
-(since threads id's are not pid's) but under Linux it is correct
-(threads are just processes sharing the data segement).
-The locking_callback is used to perform locking by the SSLeay library.
-eg.
-void solaris_locking_callback(mode,type,file,line)
-int mode;
-int type;
-char *file;
-int line;
-        {
-        if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
-                mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
-        else
-                mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
-        }
-Now in this case I have used mutexes instead of read/write locks, since they
-are faster and there are not many read locks in SSLeay, you may as well
-always use write locks.  file and line are __FILE__ and __LINE__ from
-the compile and can be usefull when debugging.
-Now as you can see, 'type' can be one of a range of values, these values are
-defined in crypto/crypto.h
-CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type) will return a text version of what the lock is.
-There are CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS locks required, so under solaris, the setup
-for multi-threading can be
-static mutex_t lock_cs[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS];
-void thread_setup()
-        {
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i<CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS; i++)
-                mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]),USYNC_THREAD,NULL);
-        CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())solaris_thread_id);
-        CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())solaris_locking_callback);
-        }
-As a final note, under Windows NT or Windows 95, you have to be careful
-not to mix the various threaded, unthreaded and debug libraries.
-Normally if they are mixed incorrectly, mttest will crash just after printing
-out some usage statistics at the end.  This is because the
-different system libraries use different malloc routines and if
-data is malloc()ed inside crypt32.dll or ssl32.dll and then free()ed by a
-different library malloc, things get very confused.
-The default SSLeay DLL builds use /MD, so if you use this on your
-application, things will work as expected.  If you use /MDd,
-you will probably have to rebuild SSLeay using this flag.
-I should modify util/mk1mf.pl so it does all this correctly, but 
-this has not been done yet.
-One last warning.  Because locking overheads are actually quite large, the
-statistics collected against the SSL_CTX for successfull connections etc
-are not locked when updated.  This does make it possible for these
-values to be slightly lower than they should be, if you are
-running multithreaded on a multi-processor box, but this does not really
-matter much.
-==== txt_db.doc ========================================================
-TXT_DB, a simple text based in memory database.
-It holds rows of ascii data, for which the only special character is '\0'.
-The rows can be of an unlimited length.
-==== why.doc ========================================================
-This file is more of a note for other people who wish to understand why
-the build environment is the way it is :-).
-The include files 'depend' as follows.
-Each of 
-crypto/*/*.c includes crypto/cryptlib.h
-ssl/*.c include ssl/ssl_locl.h
-apps/*.c include apps/apps.h
-crypto/cryptlib.h, ssl/ssl_locl.h and apps/apps.h
-all include e_os.h which contains OS/environment specific information.
-If you need to add something todo with a particular environment,
-add it to this file.  It is worth remembering that quite a few libraries,
-like lhash, des, md, sha etc etc do not include crypto/cryptlib.h.  This
-is because these libraries should be 'independantly compilable' and so I
-try to keep them this way.
-e_os.h is not so much a part of SSLeay, as the placing in one spot all the
-evil OS dependant muck.
-I wanted to automate as many things as possible.  This includes
-error number generation.  A
-make errors
-will scan the source files for error codes, append them to the correct
-header files, and generate the functions to print the text version
-of the error numbers.  So don't even think about adding error numbers by
-hand, put them in the form
-XXXerr(XXXX_F_XXXX,YYYY_R_YYYY);
-on line and it will be automatically picked up my a make errors.
-In a similar vein, programs to be added into ssleay in the apps directory
-just need to have an entry added to E_EXE in makefile.ssl and
-everthing will work as expected.  Don't edit progs.h by hand.
-make links re-generates the symbolic links that are used.  The reason why
-I keep everything in its own directory, and don't put all the
-test programs and header files in 'test' and 'include' is because I want
-to keep the 'sub-libraries' independant.  I still 'pull' out
-indervidual libraries for use in specific projects where the code is
-required.  I have used the 'lhash' library in just about every software
-project I have worked on :-).
-make depend generates dependancies and
-make dclean removes them.
-You will notice that I use perl quite a bit when I could be using 'sed'.
-The reason I decided to do this was to just stick to one 'extra' program.
-For Windows NT, I have perl and no sed.
-The util/mk1mf.pl program can be used to generate a single makefile.
-I use this because makefiles under Microsoft are horrific.
-Each C compiler seems to have different linker formats, which have
-to be used because the retarted C compilers explode when you do
-cl -o file *.o.
-Now some would argue that I should just use the single makefile.  I don't
-like it during develoment for 2 reasons.  First, the actuall make
-command takes a long time.  For my current setup, if I'm in
-crypto/bn and I type make, only the crypto/bn directory gets rebuilt,
-which is nice when you are modifying prototypes in bn.h which
-half the SSLeay depends on.  The second is that to add a new souce file
-I just plonk it in at the required spot in the local makefile.  This
-then alows me to keep things local, I don't need to modify a 'global'
-tables (the make for unix, the make for NT, the make for w31...).
-When I am ripping apart a library structure, it is nice to only
-have to worry about one directory :-).
-Having said all this, for the hell of it I put together 2 files that
-#include all the souce code (generated by doing a ls */*.o after a build).
-crypto.c takes only 30 seconds to build under NT and 2 minutes under linux
-for my pentium100.  Much faster that the normal build :-).
-Again, the problem is that when using libraries, every program linked
-to libcrypto.a would suddenly get 330k of library when it may only need
-1k.  This technique does look like a nice way to do shared libraries though.
-Oh yes, as a final note, to 'build' a distribution, I just type
-make dist.
-This cleans and packages everything.  The directory needs to be called
-SSLeay since the make does a 'cd ..' and renames and tars things up.
-==== req.1 ========================================================
-The 'req' command is used to manipulate and deal with pkcs#10
-certificate requests.
-It's default mode of operation is to load a certificate and then
-write it out again.
-By default the 'req' is read from stdin in 'PEM' format.
-The -inform option can be used to specify 'pem' format or 'der'
-format.  PEM format is the base64 encoding of the DER format.
-By default 'req' then writes the request back out. -outform can be used
-to indicate the desired output format, be it 'pem' or 'der'.
-To specify an input file, use the '-in' option and the '-out' option
-can be used to specify the output file.
-If you wish to perform a command and not output the certificate
-request afterwards, use the '-noout' option.
-When a certificate is loaded, it can be printed in a human readable
-ascii format via the '-text' option.
-To check that the signature on a certificate request is correct, use
-the '-verify' option to make sure that the private key contained in the
-certificate request corresponds to the signature.
-Besides the default mode, there is also the 'generate a certificate
-request' mode.  There are several flags that trigger this mode.
-new will generate a new RSA key (if required) and then prompts
-the user for details for the certificate request.
-newkey has an argument that is the number of bits to make the new
-key.  This function also triggers '-new'.
-The '-new' option can have a key to use specified instead of having to
-load one, '-key' is used to specify the file containg the key.
-keyform can be used to specify the format of the key.  Only
-'pem' and 'der' formats are supported, later, 'netscape' format may be added.
-Finally there is the '-x509' options which makes req output a self
-signed x509 certificate instead of a certificate request.
-Now as you may have noticed, there are lots of default options that
-cannot be specified via the command line.  They are held in a 'template'
-or 'configuration file'.  The -config option specifies which configuration
-file to use.  See conf.doc for details on the syntax of this file.
-The req command uses the 'req' section of the config file.
---
-# The following variables are defined.  For this example I will populate
-# the various values
-[ req ]
-default_bits    = 512           # default number of bits to use.
-default_keyfile = testkey.pem   # Where to write the generated keyfile
-                                # if not specified.
-distinguished_name= req_dn      # The section that contains the
-                                # information about which 'object' we
-                                # want to put in the DN.
-attributes      = req_attr      # The objects we want for the
-                                # attributes field.
-encrypt_rsa_key = no            # Should we encrypt newly generated
-                                # keys.  I strongly recommend 'yes'.
-# The distinguished name section.  For the following entries, the
-# object names must exist in the SSLeay header file objects.h.  If they
-# do not, they will be silently ignored.  The entries have the following
-# format.
-# <object_name>         => string to prompt with
-# <object_name>_default => default value for people
-# <object_name>_value   => Automatically use this value for this field.
-# <object_name>_min     => minimum number of characters for data (def. 0)
-# <object_name>_max     => maximum number of characters for data (def. inf.)
-# All of these entries are optional except for the first one.
-[ req_dn ]
-countryName                     = Country Name (2 letter code)
-countryName_default             = AU
-stateOrProvinceName             = State or Province Name (full name)
-stateOrProvinceName_default     = Queensland
-localityName                    = Locality Name (eg, city)
-organizationName                = Organization Name (eg, company)
-organizationName_default        = Mincom Pty Ltd
-organizationalUnitName          = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
-organizationalUnitName_default  = MTR
-commonName                      = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
-commonName_max                  = 64
-emailAddress                    = Email Address
-emailAddress_max                = 40
-# The next section is the attributes section.  This is exactly the
-# same as for the previous section except that the resulting objects are
-# put in the attributes field. 
-[ req_attr ]
-challengePassword               = A challenge password
-challengePassword_min           = 4
-challengePassword_max           = 20
-unstructuredName                = An optional company name
----
-Also note that the order that attributes appear in this file is the
-order they will be put into the distinguished name.
-Once this request has been generated, it can be sent to a CA for
-certifying.
----
-A few quick examples....
-To generate a new request and a new key
-req -new
-To generate a new request and a 1058 bit key
-req -newkey 1058
-To generate a new request using a pre-existing key
-req -new -key key.pem
-To generate a self signed x509 certificate from a certificate
-request using a supplied key, and we want to see the text form of the
-output certificate (which we will put in the file selfSign.pem
-req -x509 -in req.pem -key key.pem -text -out selfSign.pem
-Verify that the signature is correct on a certificate request.
-req -verify -in req.pem
-Verify that the signature was made using a specified public key.
-req -verify -in req.pem -key key.pem
-Print the contents of a certificate request
-req -text -in req.pem
-==== danger ========================================================
-If you specify a SSLv2 cipher, and the mode is SSLv23 and the server
-can talk SSLv3, it will claim there is no cipher since you should be
-using SSLv3.
-When tracing debug stuff, remember BIO_s_socket() is different to
-BIO_s_connect().
-BSD/OS assember is not working