diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 252 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 103 |
2 files changed, 322 insertions, 33 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index f835be8afc..b7d2460754 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | |||
| @@ -1,13 +1,3 @@ | |||
| 1 | |||
| 2 | /* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July | ||
| 3 | * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the | ||
| 4 | * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an | ||
| 5 | * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be | ||
| 6 | * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once | ||
| 7 | * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric | ||
| 8 | * Young's original copyright is below. | ||
| 9 | */ | ||
| 10 | |||
| 11 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ | 1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ |
| 12 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 13 | * All rights reserved. | 3 | * All rights reserved. |
| @@ -184,13 +174,62 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | |||
| 184 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | 174 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| 185 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | 175 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| 186 | 176 | ||
| 187 | BN_init(&f); | 177 | BN_init(&f); |
| 188 | BN_init(&ret); | 178 | BN_init(&ret); |
| 179 | |||
| 180 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 181 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 182 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 183 | { | ||
| 184 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 185 | goto err; | ||
| 186 | } | ||
| 187 | |||
| 188 | switch (padding) | ||
| 189 | { | ||
| 190 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 191 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 192 | break; | ||
| 193 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 194 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 195 | break; | ||
| 196 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 197 | default: | ||
| 198 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 199 | goto err; | ||
| 200 | } | ||
| 201 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
| 202 | |||
| 203 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 204 | |||
| 205 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
| 206 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
| 207 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 208 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 189 | 209 | ||
| 190 | /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return | 210 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
| 191 | * when the RSA patent expires | 211 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && |
| 192 | */ | 212 | (rsa->q != NULL) && |
| 213 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 214 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 215 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 216 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 217 | else | ||
| 218 | { | ||
| 219 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 220 | } | ||
| 221 | |||
| 222 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 223 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 224 | |||
| 225 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
| 226 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
| 227 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
| 228 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
| 229 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
| 230 | to[k]=0; | ||
| 193 | 231 | ||
| 232 | r=num; | ||
| 194 | err: | 233 | err: |
| 195 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | 234 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 196 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | 235 | BN_clear_free(&ret); |
| @@ -212,12 +251,77 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | |||
| 212 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | 251 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| 213 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | 252 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| 214 | 253 | ||
| 215 | BN_init(&f); | 254 | BN_init(&f); |
| 216 | BN_init(&ret); | 255 | BN_init(&ret); |
| 256 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 257 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 258 | |||
| 259 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 260 | |||
| 261 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 262 | { | ||
| 263 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 264 | goto err; | ||
| 265 | } | ||
| 266 | |||
| 267 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
| 268 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
| 269 | if (flen > num) | ||
| 270 | { | ||
| 271 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 272 | goto err; | ||
| 273 | } | ||
| 274 | |||
| 275 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
| 276 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 217 | 277 | ||
| 218 | /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return | 278 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) |
| 219 | * when the RSA patent expires | 279 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); |
| 220 | */ | 280 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) |
| 281 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 282 | |||
| 283 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 284 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
| 285 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
| 286 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
| 287 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 288 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 289 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 290 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 291 | else | ||
| 292 | { | ||
| 293 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) | ||
| 294 | goto err; | ||
| 295 | } | ||
| 296 | |||
| 297 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 298 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 299 | |||
| 300 | p=buf; | ||
| 301 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
| 302 | |||
| 303 | switch (padding) | ||
| 304 | { | ||
| 305 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 306 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 307 | break; | ||
| 308 | #ifndef NO_SHA | ||
| 309 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
| 310 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | ||
| 311 | break; | ||
| 312 | #endif | ||
| 313 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 314 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 315 | break; | ||
| 316 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 317 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 318 | break; | ||
| 319 | default: | ||
| 320 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 321 | goto err; | ||
| 322 | } | ||
| 323 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 324 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 221 | 325 | ||
| 222 | err: | 326 | err: |
| 223 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | 327 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| @@ -240,12 +344,56 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | |||
| 240 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | 344 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| 241 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | 345 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| 242 | 346 | ||
| 243 | BN_init(&f); | 347 | BN_init(&f); |
| 244 | BN_init(&ret); | 348 | BN_init(&ret); |
| 349 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 350 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 351 | |||
| 352 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 353 | buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num); | ||
| 354 | if (buf == NULL) | ||
| 355 | { | ||
| 356 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 357 | goto err; | ||
| 358 | } | ||
| 245 | 359 | ||
| 246 | /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return | 360 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things |
| 247 | * when the RSA patent expires | 361 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ |
| 248 | */ | 362 | if (flen > num) |
| 363 | { | ||
| 364 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 365 | goto err; | ||
| 366 | } | ||
| 367 | |||
| 368 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 369 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 370 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
| 371 | { | ||
| 372 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
| 373 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
| 374 | goto err; | ||
| 375 | } | ||
| 376 | |||
| 377 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
| 378 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
| 379 | |||
| 380 | p=buf; | ||
| 381 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); | ||
| 382 | |||
| 383 | switch (padding) | ||
| 384 | { | ||
| 385 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 386 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 387 | break; | ||
| 388 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 389 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 390 | break; | ||
| 391 | default: | ||
| 392 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 393 | goto err; | ||
| 394 | } | ||
| 395 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 396 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 249 | 397 | ||
| 250 | err: | 398 | err: |
| 251 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | 399 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| @@ -263,15 +411,59 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) | |||
| 263 | { | 411 | { |
| 264 | BIGNUM r1,m1; | 412 | BIGNUM r1,m1; |
| 265 | int ret=0; | 413 | int ret=0; |
| 266 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | 414 | BN_CTX *ctx; |
| 267 | 415 | ||
| 416 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 268 | BN_init(&m1); | 417 | BN_init(&m1); |
| 269 | BN_init(&r1); | 418 | BN_init(&r1); |
| 270 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 271 | 419 | ||
| 272 | /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return | 420 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) |
| 273 | * when the RSA patent expires | 421 | { |
| 274 | */ | 422 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) |
| 423 | { | ||
| 424 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
| 425 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p, | ||
| 426 | ctx)) | ||
| 427 | goto err; | ||
| 428 | } | ||
| 429 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
| 430 | { | ||
| 431 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
| 432 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q, | ||
| 433 | ctx)) | ||
| 434 | goto err; | ||
| 435 | } | ||
| 436 | } | ||
| 437 | |||
| 438 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 439 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, | ||
| 440 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; | ||
| 441 | |||
| 442 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 443 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, | ||
| 444 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; | ||
| 445 | |||
| 446 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 447 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
| 448 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | ||
| 449 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 450 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 451 | |||
| 452 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 453 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 454 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
| 455 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
| 456 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
| 457 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
| 458 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
| 459 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
| 460 | */ | ||
| 461 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 462 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 463 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 464 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 465 | |||
| 466 | ret=1; | ||
| 275 | err: | 467 | err: |
| 276 | BN_clear_free(&m1); | 468 | BN_clear_free(&m1); |
| 277 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | 469 | BN_clear_free(&r1); |
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index b1ee5d8dce..95e636d3f0 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | |||
| @@ -74,11 +74,108 @@ RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value, | |||
| 74 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | 74 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; |
| 75 | ctx2=BN_CTX_new(); | 75 | ctx2=BN_CTX_new(); |
| 76 | if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err; | 76 | if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err; |
| 77 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
| 78 | r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
| 79 | r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
| 80 | r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
| 81 | r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
| 82 | if (r3 == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 77 | 83 | ||
| 78 | /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return | 84 | bitsp=(bits+1)/2; |
| 79 | * when the RSA patent expires | 85 | bitsq=bits-bitsp; |
| 80 | */ | 86 | rsa=RSA_new(); |
| 87 | if (rsa == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 81 | 88 | ||
| 89 | /* set e */ | ||
| 90 | rsa->e=BN_new(); | ||
| 91 | if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 92 | |||
| 93 | #if 1 | ||
| 94 | /* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, | ||
| 95 | * unsigned long can be larger */ | ||
| 96 | for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++) | ||
| 97 | { | ||
| 98 | if (e_value & (1<<i)) | ||
| 99 | BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i); | ||
| 100 | } | ||
| 101 | #else | ||
| 102 | if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err; | ||
| 103 | #endif | ||
| 104 | |||
| 105 | /* generate p and q */ | ||
| 106 | for (;;) | ||
| 107 | { | ||
| 108 | rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); | ||
| 109 | if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 110 | if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; | ||
| 111 | if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 112 | if (BN_is_one(r1)) break; | ||
| 113 | if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); | ||
| 114 | BN_free(rsa->p); | ||
| 115 | } | ||
| 116 | if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg); | ||
| 117 | for (;;) | ||
| 118 | { | ||
| 119 | rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); | ||
| 120 | if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 121 | if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; | ||
| 122 | if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 123 | if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0)) | ||
| 124 | break; | ||
| 125 | if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); | ||
| 126 | BN_free(rsa->q); | ||
| 127 | } | ||
| 128 | if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg); | ||
| 129 | if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0) | ||
| 130 | { | ||
| 131 | tmp=rsa->p; | ||
| 132 | rsa->p=rsa->q; | ||
| 133 | rsa->q=tmp; | ||
| 134 | } | ||
| 135 | |||
| 136 | /* calculate n */ | ||
| 137 | rsa->n=BN_new(); | ||
| 138 | if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 139 | if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 140 | |||
| 141 | /* calculate d */ | ||
| 142 | if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ | ||
| 143 | if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ | ||
| 144 | if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ | ||
| 145 | |||
| 146 | /* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */ | ||
| 147 | /* for (;;) | ||
| 148 | { | ||
| 149 | if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 150 | if (BN_is_one(r3)) break; | ||
| 151 | |||
| 152 | if (1) | ||
| 153 | { | ||
| 154 | if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err; | ||
| 155 | continue; | ||
| 156 | } | ||
| 157 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
| 158 | goto err; | ||
| 159 | } | ||
| 160 | */ | ||
| 161 | rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */ | ||
| 162 | if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 163 | |||
| 164 | /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ | ||
| 165 | rsa->dmp1=BN_new(); | ||
| 166 | if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 167 | if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 168 | |||
| 169 | /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ | ||
| 170 | rsa->dmq1=BN_new(); | ||
| 171 | if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 172 | if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 173 | |||
| 174 | /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ | ||
| 175 | rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2); | ||
| 176 | if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 177 | |||
| 178 | ok=1; | ||
| 82 | err: | 179 | err: |
| 83 | if (ok == -1) | 180 | if (ok == -1) |
| 84 | { | 181 | { |
