diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c | 507 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 507 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4b2716e734..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,507 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* $OpenBSD: ct_sct.c,v 1.10 2023/07/22 17:02:49 tb Exp $ */ | ||
| 2 | /* | ||
| 3 | * Written by Rob Stradling (rob@comodo.com), Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org) | ||
| 4 | * and Adam Eijdenberg (adam.eijdenberg@gmail.com) for the OpenSSL project 2016. | ||
| 5 | */ | ||
| 6 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
| 7 | * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 10 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 11 | * are met: | ||
| 12 | * | ||
| 13 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
| 14 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 15 | * | ||
| 16 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 17 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
| 18 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
| 19 | * distribution. | ||
| 20 | * | ||
| 21 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
| 22 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
| 23 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
| 24 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
| 25 | * | ||
| 26 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
| 27 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
| 28 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
| 29 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
| 30 | * | ||
| 31 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
| 32 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
| 33 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
| 34 | * | ||
| 35 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
| 36 | * acknowledgment: | ||
| 37 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
| 38 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
| 39 | * | ||
| 40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
| 41 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
| 43 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
| 44 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
| 45 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
| 46 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
| 47 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
| 49 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
| 50 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
| 51 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 52 | * ==================================================================== | ||
| 53 | * | ||
| 54 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
| 55 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
| 56 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 57 | * | ||
| 58 | */ | ||
| 59 | |||
| 60 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT | ||
| 61 | # error "CT disabled" | ||
| 62 | #endif | ||
| 63 | |||
| 64 | #include <stdint.h> | ||
| 65 | #include <stdlib.h> | ||
| 66 | #include <string.h> | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
| 69 | #include <openssl/ct.h> | ||
| 70 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
| 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
| 72 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
| 73 | |||
| 74 | #include "ct_local.h" | ||
| 75 | |||
| 76 | SCT * | ||
| 77 | SCT_new(void) | ||
| 78 | { | ||
| 79 | SCT *sct = calloc(1, sizeof(*sct)); | ||
| 80 | |||
| 81 | if (sct == NULL) { | ||
| 82 | CTerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 83 | return NULL; | ||
| 84 | } | ||
| 85 | |||
| 86 | sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET; | ||
| 87 | sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET; | ||
| 88 | return sct; | ||
| 89 | } | ||
| 90 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_new); | ||
| 91 | |||
| 92 | void | ||
| 93 | SCT_free(SCT *sct) | ||
| 94 | { | ||
| 95 | if (sct == NULL) | ||
| 96 | return; | ||
| 97 | |||
| 98 | free(sct->log_id); | ||
| 99 | free(sct->ext); | ||
| 100 | free(sct->sig); | ||
| 101 | free(sct->sct); | ||
| 102 | free(sct); | ||
| 103 | } | ||
| 104 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_free); | ||
| 105 | |||
| 106 | void | ||
| 107 | SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *scts) | ||
| 108 | { | ||
| 109 | sk_SCT_pop_free(scts, SCT_free); | ||
| 110 | } | ||
| 111 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_LIST_free); | ||
| 112 | |||
| 113 | int | ||
| 114 | SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version) | ||
| 115 | { | ||
| 116 | if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { | ||
| 117 | CTerror(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); | ||
| 118 | return 0; | ||
| 119 | } | ||
| 120 | sct->version = version; | ||
| 121 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 122 | return 1; | ||
| 123 | } | ||
| 124 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set_version); | ||
| 125 | |||
| 126 | int | ||
| 127 | SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type) | ||
| 128 | { | ||
| 129 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 130 | |||
| 131 | switch (entry_type) { | ||
| 132 | case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509: | ||
| 133 | case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT: | ||
| 134 | sct->entry_type = entry_type; | ||
| 135 | return 1; | ||
| 136 | case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET: | ||
| 137 | break; | ||
| 138 | } | ||
| 139 | CTerror(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE); | ||
| 140 | return 0; | ||
| 141 | } | ||
| 142 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set_log_entry_type); | ||
| 143 | |||
| 144 | int | ||
| 145 | SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) | ||
| 146 | { | ||
| 147 | if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { | ||
| 148 | CTerror(CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); | ||
| 149 | return 0; | ||
| 150 | } | ||
| 151 | |||
| 152 | free(sct->log_id); | ||
| 153 | sct->log_id = log_id; | ||
| 154 | sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; | ||
| 155 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 156 | return 1; | ||
| 157 | } | ||
| 158 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set0_log_id); | ||
| 159 | |||
| 160 | int | ||
| 161 | SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) | ||
| 162 | { | ||
| 163 | if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { | ||
| 164 | CTerror(CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); | ||
| 165 | return 0; | ||
| 166 | } | ||
| 167 | |||
| 168 | free(sct->log_id); | ||
| 169 | sct->log_id = NULL; | ||
| 170 | sct->log_id_len = 0; | ||
| 171 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 172 | |||
| 173 | if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) { | ||
| 174 | sct->log_id = malloc(log_id_len); | ||
| 175 | if (sct->log_id == NULL) { | ||
| 176 | CTerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 177 | return 0; | ||
| 178 | } | ||
| 179 | memcpy(sct->log_id, log_id, log_id_len); | ||
| 180 | sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; | ||
| 181 | } | ||
| 182 | return 1; | ||
| 183 | } | ||
| 184 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set1_log_id); | ||
| 185 | |||
| 186 | |||
| 187 | void | ||
| 188 | SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp) | ||
| 189 | { | ||
| 190 | sct->timestamp = timestamp; | ||
| 191 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 192 | } | ||
| 193 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set_timestamp); | ||
| 194 | |||
| 195 | int | ||
| 196 | SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid) | ||
| 197 | { | ||
| 198 | switch (nid) { | ||
| 199 | case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: | ||
| 200 | sct->hash_alg = 4; /* XXX */ | ||
| 201 | sct->sig_alg = 1; /* XXX */ | ||
| 202 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 203 | return 1; | ||
| 204 | case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256: | ||
| 205 | sct->hash_alg = 4; /* XXX */ | ||
| 206 | sct->sig_alg = 3; /* XXX */ | ||
| 207 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 208 | return 1; | ||
| 209 | default: | ||
| 210 | CTerror(CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID); | ||
| 211 | return 0; | ||
| 212 | } | ||
| 213 | } | ||
| 214 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set_signature_nid); | ||
| 215 | |||
| 216 | void | ||
| 217 | SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) | ||
| 218 | { | ||
| 219 | free(sct->ext); | ||
| 220 | sct->ext = ext; | ||
| 221 | sct->ext_len = ext_len; | ||
| 222 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 223 | } | ||
| 224 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set0_extensions); | ||
| 225 | |||
| 226 | int | ||
| 227 | SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) | ||
| 228 | { | ||
| 229 | free(sct->ext); | ||
| 230 | sct->ext = NULL; | ||
| 231 | sct->ext_len = 0; | ||
| 232 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 233 | |||
| 234 | if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) { | ||
| 235 | sct->ext = malloc(ext_len); | ||
| 236 | if (sct->ext == NULL) { | ||
| 237 | CTerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 238 | return 0; | ||
| 239 | } | ||
| 240 | memcpy(sct->ext, ext, ext_len); | ||
| 241 | sct->ext_len = ext_len; | ||
| 242 | } | ||
| 243 | return 1; | ||
| 244 | } | ||
| 245 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set1_extensions); | ||
| 246 | |||
| 247 | void | ||
| 248 | SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) | ||
| 249 | { | ||
| 250 | free(sct->sig); | ||
| 251 | sct->sig = sig; | ||
| 252 | sct->sig_len = sig_len; | ||
| 253 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 254 | } | ||
| 255 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set0_signature); | ||
| 256 | |||
| 257 | int | ||
| 258 | SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) | ||
| 259 | { | ||
| 260 | free(sct->sig); | ||
| 261 | sct->sig = NULL; | ||
| 262 | sct->sig_len = 0; | ||
| 263 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 264 | |||
| 265 | if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) { | ||
| 266 | sct->sig = malloc(sig_len); | ||
| 267 | if (sct->sig == NULL) { | ||
| 268 | CTerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 269 | return 0; | ||
| 270 | } | ||
| 271 | memcpy(sct->sig, sig, sig_len); | ||
| 272 | sct->sig_len = sig_len; | ||
| 273 | } | ||
| 274 | return 1; | ||
| 275 | } | ||
| 276 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set1_signature); | ||
| 277 | |||
| 278 | sct_version_t | ||
| 279 | SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 280 | { | ||
| 281 | return sct->version; | ||
| 282 | } | ||
| 283 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_version); | ||
| 284 | |||
| 285 | ct_log_entry_type_t | ||
| 286 | SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 287 | { | ||
| 288 | return sct->entry_type; | ||
| 289 | } | ||
| 290 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_log_entry_type); | ||
| 291 | |||
| 292 | size_t | ||
| 293 | SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id) | ||
| 294 | { | ||
| 295 | *log_id = sct->log_id; | ||
| 296 | return sct->log_id_len; | ||
| 297 | } | ||
| 298 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get0_log_id); | ||
| 299 | |||
| 300 | uint64_t | ||
| 301 | SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 302 | { | ||
| 303 | return sct->timestamp; | ||
| 304 | } | ||
| 305 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_timestamp); | ||
| 306 | |||
| 307 | int | ||
| 308 | SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 309 | { | ||
| 310 | if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { | ||
| 311 | /* XXX sigalg numbers */ | ||
| 312 | if (sct->hash_alg == 4) { | ||
| 313 | switch (sct->sig_alg) { | ||
| 314 | case 3: | ||
| 315 | return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; | ||
| 316 | case 1: | ||
| 317 | return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption; | ||
| 318 | default: | ||
| 319 | return NID_undef; | ||
| 320 | } | ||
| 321 | } | ||
| 322 | } | ||
| 323 | return NID_undef; | ||
| 324 | } | ||
| 325 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_signature_nid); | ||
| 326 | |||
| 327 | size_t | ||
| 328 | SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext) | ||
| 329 | { | ||
| 330 | *ext = sct->ext; | ||
| 331 | return sct->ext_len; | ||
| 332 | } | ||
| 333 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get0_extensions); | ||
| 334 | |||
| 335 | size_t | ||
| 336 | SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig) | ||
| 337 | { | ||
| 338 | *sig = sct->sig; | ||
| 339 | return sct->sig_len; | ||
| 340 | } | ||
| 341 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get0_signature); | ||
| 342 | |||
| 343 | int | ||
| 344 | SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 345 | { | ||
| 346 | switch (sct->version) { | ||
| 347 | case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET: | ||
| 348 | return 0; | ||
| 349 | case SCT_VERSION_V1: | ||
| 350 | return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct); | ||
| 351 | default: | ||
| 352 | return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */ | ||
| 353 | } | ||
| 354 | } | ||
| 355 | |||
| 356 | int | ||
| 357 | SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 358 | { | ||
| 359 | return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef && | ||
| 360 | sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0; | ||
| 361 | } | ||
| 362 | |||
| 363 | sct_source_t | ||
| 364 | SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 365 | { | ||
| 366 | return sct->source; | ||
| 367 | } | ||
| 368 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_source); | ||
| 369 | |||
| 370 | int | ||
| 371 | SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source) | ||
| 372 | { | ||
| 373 | sct->source = source; | ||
| 374 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; | ||
| 375 | switch (source) { | ||
| 376 | case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION: | ||
| 377 | case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE: | ||
| 378 | return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509); | ||
| 379 | case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION: | ||
| 380 | return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT); | ||
| 381 | case SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN: | ||
| 382 | break; | ||
| 383 | } | ||
| 384 | /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */ | ||
| 385 | return 1; | ||
| 386 | } | ||
| 387 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_set_source); | ||
| 388 | |||
| 389 | sct_validation_status_t | ||
| 390 | SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct) | ||
| 391 | { | ||
| 392 | return sct->validation_status; | ||
| 393 | } | ||
| 394 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_get_validation_status); | ||
| 395 | |||
| 396 | int | ||
| 397 | SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 398 | { | ||
| 399 | int is_sct_valid = -1; | ||
| 400 | SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL; | ||
| 401 | X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL; | ||
| 402 | const CTLOG *log; | ||
| 403 | |||
| 404 | /* | ||
| 405 | * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means, | ||
| 406 | * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0). | ||
| 407 | */ | ||
| 408 | if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { | ||
| 409 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION; | ||
| 410 | return 0; | ||
| 411 | } | ||
| 412 | |||
| 413 | log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, sct->log_id, | ||
| 414 | sct->log_id_len); | ||
| 415 | |||
| 416 | /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */ | ||
| 417 | if (log == NULL) { | ||
| 418 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG; | ||
| 419 | return 0; | ||
| 420 | } | ||
| 421 | |||
| 422 | sctx = SCT_CTX_new(); | ||
| 423 | if (sctx == NULL) | ||
| 424 | goto err; | ||
| 425 | |||
| 426 | if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1) | ||
| 427 | goto err; | ||
| 428 | if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1) | ||
| 429 | goto err; | ||
| 430 | |||
| 431 | if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) { | ||
| 432 | EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey; | ||
| 433 | |||
| 434 | if (ctx->issuer == NULL) { | ||
| 435 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; | ||
| 436 | goto end; | ||
| 437 | } | ||
| 438 | |||
| 439 | if ((issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer)) == NULL) | ||
| 440 | goto err; | ||
| 441 | |||
| 442 | if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1) | ||
| 443 | goto err; | ||
| 444 | if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1) | ||
| 445 | goto err; | ||
| 446 | } | ||
| 447 | |||
| 448 | SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms); | ||
| 449 | |||
| 450 | /* | ||
| 451 | * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy | ||
| 452 | * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not | ||
| 453 | * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is | ||
| 454 | * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps | ||
| 455 | * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx. | ||
| 456 | * | ||
| 457 | * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an | ||
| 458 | * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of | ||
| 459 | * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just | ||
| 460 | * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the | ||
| 461 | * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT | ||
| 462 | * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal | ||
| 463 | * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate | ||
| 464 | * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing | ||
| 465 | * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or | ||
| 466 | * application decide what to do. | ||
| 467 | */ | ||
| 468 | if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1) | ||
| 469 | sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; | ||
| 470 | else | ||
| 471 | sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? | ||
| 472 | SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID; | ||
| 473 | |||
| 474 | end: | ||
| 475 | is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID; | ||
| 476 | err: | ||
| 477 | X509_PUBKEY_free(pub); | ||
| 478 | X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey); | ||
| 479 | SCT_CTX_free(sctx); | ||
| 480 | |||
| 481 | return is_sct_valid; | ||
| 482 | } | ||
| 483 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_validate); | ||
| 484 | |||
| 485 | int | ||
| 486 | SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 487 | { | ||
| 488 | int are_scts_valid = 1; | ||
| 489 | int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; | ||
| 490 | int i; | ||
| 491 | |||
| 492 | for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { | ||
| 493 | int is_sct_valid = -1; | ||
| 494 | SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); | ||
| 495 | |||
| 496 | if (sct == NULL) | ||
| 497 | continue; | ||
| 498 | |||
| 499 | is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx); | ||
| 500 | if (is_sct_valid < 0) | ||
| 501 | return is_sct_valid; | ||
| 502 | are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid; | ||
| 503 | } | ||
| 504 | |||
| 505 | return are_scts_valid; | ||
| 506 | } | ||
| 507 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(SCT_LIST_validate); | ||
