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Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 456 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 456 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c deleted file mode 100644 index c53c8b9001..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,456 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: dsa_ossl.c,v 1.56 2024/05/11 06:43:50 tb Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | /* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */ | ||
60 | |||
61 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
64 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
65 | #include <openssl/dsa.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/sha.h> | ||
68 | |||
69 | #include "bn_local.h" | ||
70 | #include "dsa_local.h" | ||
71 | |||
72 | /* | ||
73 | * Since DSA parameters are entirely arbitrary and checking them to be | ||
74 | * consistent is very expensive, we cannot do so on every sign operation. | ||
75 | * Instead, cap the number of retries so we do not loop indefinitely if | ||
76 | * the generator of the multiplicative group happens to be nilpotent. | ||
77 | * The probability of needing a retry with valid parameters is negligible, | ||
78 | * so trying 32 times is amply enough. | ||
79 | */ | ||
80 | #define DSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS 32 | ||
81 | |||
82 | static DSA_SIG * | ||
83 | dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) | ||
84 | { | ||
85 | BIGNUM *b = NULL, *bm = NULL, *bxr = NULL, *binv = NULL, *m = NULL; | ||
86 | BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; | ||
87 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
88 | int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; | ||
89 | DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; | ||
90 | int attempts = 0; | ||
91 | int noredo = 0; | ||
92 | |||
93 | if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) { | ||
94 | reason = DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS; | ||
95 | goto err; | ||
96 | } | ||
97 | |||
98 | if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
99 | goto err; | ||
100 | |||
101 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
102 | goto err; | ||
103 | |||
104 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
105 | |||
106 | if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
107 | goto err; | ||
108 | if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
109 | goto err; | ||
110 | if ((bm = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
111 | goto err; | ||
112 | if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
113 | goto err; | ||
114 | if ((m = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
115 | goto err; | ||
116 | |||
117 | /* | ||
118 | * If the digest length is greater than N (the bit length of q), the | ||
119 | * leftmost N bits of the digest shall be used, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2. | ||
120 | * In this case the digest length is given in bytes. | ||
121 | */ | ||
122 | if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) | ||
123 | dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); | ||
124 | if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) | ||
125 | goto err; | ||
126 | |||
127 | redo: | ||
128 | if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) { | ||
129 | if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) | ||
130 | goto err; | ||
131 | } else { | ||
132 | kinv = dsa->kinv; | ||
133 | dsa->kinv = NULL; | ||
134 | r = dsa->r; | ||
135 | dsa->r = NULL; | ||
136 | noredo = 1; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
139 | /* | ||
140 | * Compute: | ||
141 | * | ||
142 | * s = inv(k)(m + xr) mod q | ||
143 | * | ||
144 | * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the | ||
145 | * following is calculated using a blinding value: | ||
146 | * | ||
147 | * s = inv(b)(bm + bxr)inv(k) mod q | ||
148 | * | ||
149 | * Where b is a random value in the range [1, q). | ||
150 | */ | ||
151 | if (!bn_rand_interval(b, 1, dsa->q)) | ||
152 | goto err; | ||
153 | if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) | ||
154 | goto err; | ||
155 | |||
156 | if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bx */ | ||
157 | goto err; | ||
158 | if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bxr */ | ||
159 | goto err; | ||
160 | if (!BN_mod_mul(bm, b, m, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bm */ | ||
161 | goto err; | ||
162 | if (!BN_mod_add(s, bxr, bm, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = bm + bxr */ | ||
163 | goto err; | ||
164 | if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = b(m + xr)k^-1 */ | ||
165 | goto err; | ||
166 | if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = (m + xr)k^-1 */ | ||
167 | goto err; | ||
168 | |||
169 | /* | ||
170 | * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very | ||
171 | * unlikely. | ||
172 | */ | ||
173 | if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) { | ||
174 | if (noredo) { | ||
175 | reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES; | ||
176 | goto err; | ||
177 | } | ||
178 | if (++attempts > DSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) { | ||
179 | reason = DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS; | ||
180 | goto err; | ||
181 | } | ||
182 | goto redo; | ||
183 | } | ||
184 | |||
185 | if ((ret = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { | ||
186 | reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; | ||
187 | goto err; | ||
188 | } | ||
189 | ret->r = r; | ||
190 | ret->s = s; | ||
191 | |||
192 | err: | ||
193 | if (!ret) { | ||
194 | DSAerror(reason); | ||
195 | BN_free(r); | ||
196 | BN_free(s); | ||
197 | } | ||
198 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
199 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
200 | BN_free(kinv); | ||
201 | |||
202 | return ret; | ||
203 | } | ||
204 | |||
205 | static int | ||
206 | dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) | ||
207 | { | ||
208 | BIGNUM *k = NULL, *l = NULL, *m = NULL, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; | ||
209 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
210 | int q_bits; | ||
211 | int ret = 0; | ||
212 | |||
213 | if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) | ||
214 | goto err; | ||
215 | |||
216 | if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
217 | goto err; | ||
218 | |||
219 | if ((ctx = ctx_in) == NULL) | ||
220 | ctx = BN_CTX_new(); | ||
221 | if (ctx == NULL) | ||
222 | goto err; | ||
223 | |||
224 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
225 | |||
226 | if ((k = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
227 | goto err; | ||
228 | if ((l = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
229 | goto err; | ||
230 | if ((m = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
231 | goto err; | ||
232 | |||
233 | /* Preallocate space */ | ||
234 | q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); | ||
235 | if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) || | ||
236 | !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) || | ||
237 | !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) | ||
238 | goto err; | ||
239 | |||
240 | if (!bn_rand_interval(k, 1, dsa->q)) | ||
241 | goto err; | ||
242 | |||
243 | BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
244 | |||
245 | if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { | ||
246 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, | ||
247 | CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) | ||
248 | goto err; | ||
249 | } | ||
250 | |||
251 | /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ | ||
252 | |||
253 | /* | ||
254 | * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, | ||
255 | * so we compute G^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed | ||
256 | * bit-length. | ||
257 | * | ||
258 | * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a | ||
259 | * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is | ||
260 | * one bit longer than the modulus. | ||
261 | * | ||
262 | * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic | ||
263 | * conditional copy. | ||
264 | */ | ||
265 | |||
266 | if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) || | ||
267 | !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) || | ||
268 | !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) | ||
269 | goto err; | ||
270 | |||
271 | if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_ct(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) | ||
272 | goto err; | ||
273 | |||
274 | if (!BN_mod_ct(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) | ||
275 | goto err; | ||
276 | |||
277 | /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ | ||
278 | if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse_ct(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) | ||
279 | goto err; | ||
280 | |||
281 | BN_free(*kinvp); | ||
282 | *kinvp = kinv; | ||
283 | kinv = NULL; | ||
284 | |||
285 | BN_free(*rp); | ||
286 | *rp = r; | ||
287 | |||
288 | ret = 1; | ||
289 | |||
290 | err: | ||
291 | if (!ret) { | ||
292 | DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); | ||
293 | BN_free(r); | ||
294 | } | ||
295 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
296 | if (ctx != ctx_in) | ||
297 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
298 | |||
299 | return ret; | ||
300 | } | ||
301 | |||
302 | static int | ||
303 | dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) | ||
304 | { | ||
305 | BIGNUM *u1 = NULL, *u2 = NULL, *t1 = NULL; | ||
306 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
307 | BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; | ||
308 | int qbits; | ||
309 | int ret = -1; | ||
310 | |||
311 | if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) | ||
312 | goto err; | ||
313 | |||
314 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
315 | goto err; | ||
316 | |||
317 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
318 | |||
319 | if ((u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
320 | goto err; | ||
321 | if ((u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
322 | goto err; | ||
323 | if ((t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) | ||
324 | goto err; | ||
325 | |||
326 | if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || | ||
327 | BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { | ||
328 | ret = 0; | ||
329 | goto err; | ||
330 | } | ||
331 | if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || | ||
332 | BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { | ||
333 | ret = 0; | ||
334 | goto err; | ||
335 | } | ||
336 | |||
337 | /* Calculate w = inv(s) mod q, saving w in u2. */ | ||
338 | if ((BN_mod_inverse_ct(u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) | ||
339 | goto err; | ||
340 | |||
341 | /* | ||
342 | * If the digest length is greater than the size of q use the | ||
343 | * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-4, 4.2. | ||
344 | */ | ||
345 | qbits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); | ||
346 | if (dgst_len > (qbits >> 3)) | ||
347 | dgst_len = (qbits >> 3); | ||
348 | |||
349 | /* Save m in u1. */ | ||
350 | if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL) | ||
351 | goto err; | ||
352 | |||
353 | /* u1 = m * w mod q */ | ||
354 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) | ||
355 | goto err; | ||
356 | |||
357 | /* u2 = r * w mod q */ | ||
358 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) | ||
359 | goto err; | ||
360 | |||
361 | if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { | ||
362 | mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, | ||
363 | CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); | ||
364 | if (!mont) | ||
365 | goto err; | ||
366 | } | ||
367 | |||
368 | if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, | ||
369 | ctx, mont)) | ||
370 | goto err; | ||
371 | |||
372 | /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ | ||
373 | if (!BN_mod_ct(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx)) | ||
374 | goto err; | ||
375 | |||
376 | /* v is in u1 - if the signature is correct, it will be equal to r. */ | ||
377 | ret = BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0; | ||
378 | |||
379 | err: | ||
380 | if (ret < 0) | ||
381 | DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); | ||
382 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
383 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
384 | |||
385 | return ret; | ||
386 | } | ||
387 | |||
388 | static int | ||
389 | dsa_init(DSA *dsa) | ||
390 | { | ||
391 | dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; | ||
392 | return 1; | ||
393 | } | ||
394 | |||
395 | static int | ||
396 | dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) | ||
397 | { | ||
398 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); | ||
399 | return 1; | ||
400 | } | ||
401 | |||
402 | static const DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { | ||
403 | .name = "OpenSSL DSA method", | ||
404 | .dsa_do_sign = dsa_do_sign, | ||
405 | .dsa_sign_setup = dsa_sign_setup, | ||
406 | .dsa_do_verify = dsa_do_verify, | ||
407 | .init = dsa_init, | ||
408 | .finish = dsa_finish, | ||
409 | }; | ||
410 | |||
411 | const DSA_METHOD * | ||
412 | DSA_OpenSSL(void) | ||
413 | { | ||
414 | return &openssl_dsa_meth; | ||
415 | } | ||
416 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_OpenSSL); | ||
417 | |||
418 | DSA_SIG * | ||
419 | DSA_SIG_new(void) | ||
420 | { | ||
421 | return calloc(1, sizeof(DSA_SIG)); | ||
422 | } | ||
423 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_SIG_new); | ||
424 | |||
425 | void | ||
426 | DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) | ||
427 | { | ||
428 | if (sig == NULL) | ||
429 | return; | ||
430 | |||
431 | BN_free(sig->r); | ||
432 | BN_free(sig->s); | ||
433 | free(sig); | ||
434 | } | ||
435 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_SIG_free); | ||
436 | |||
437 | int | ||
438 | DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) | ||
439 | { | ||
440 | return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp); | ||
441 | } | ||
442 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_sign_setup); | ||
443 | |||
444 | DSA_SIG * | ||
445 | DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) | ||
446 | { | ||
447 | return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa); | ||
448 | } | ||
449 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_do_sign); | ||
450 | |||
451 | int | ||
452 | DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) | ||
453 | { | ||
454 | return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa); | ||
455 | } | ||
456 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_do_verify); | ||