1 files changed, 32 insertions, 69 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 1d1daca166..29207d6b48 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 22:06:14 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.27 2018/07/15 05:38:48 jsg Exp $ */
 /*
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP * a, const EC_GROUP * b, BN_CTX * ctx)
 
         return r;
 
- err:
+err:
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
         if (ctx_new)
                 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -1026,88 +1026,47 @@ EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[],
 }
 
 
-/* Functions for point multiplication */
+/* Functions for point multiplication.
+ *
+ * If group->meth->mul is 0, we use the wNAF-based implementations in ec_mult.c;
+ * otherwise we dispatch through methods.
+ */
+
 int 
 EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
     size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
-        /*
-         * The function pointers must be set, and only support num == 0 and
-         * num == 1.
-         */
-        if (group->meth->mul_generator_ct == NULL ||
-            group->meth->mul_single_ct == NULL ||
-            group->meth->mul_double_nonct == NULL ||
-            num > 1) {
-                ECerror(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        
-        /* Either bP or aG + bP, this is sane. */
-        if (num == 1 && points != NULL && scalars != NULL)
-                return EC_POINT_mul(group, r, scalar, points[0], scalars[0],
-                    ctx);
-        
-        /* aG, this is sane */
-        if (scalar != NULL && points == NULL && scalars == NULL)
-                return EC_POINT_mul(group, r, scalar, NULL, NULL, ctx);
-        
-        /* anything else is an error */
-        ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        return 0;
+        if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+                /* use default */
+                return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx);
+
+        return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx);
 }
 
 int 
 EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
     const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
-        if (group->meth->mul_generator_ct == NULL ||
-            group->meth->mul_single_ct == NULL ||
-            group->meth->mul_double_nonct == NULL) {
-                ECerror(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        if (g_scalar != NULL && point == NULL && p_scalar == NULL) {
-                /*
-                 * In this case we want to compute g_scalar * GeneratorPoint:
-                 * this codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key
-                 * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign
-                 * setup, ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always
-                 * secret. This is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually
-                 * set and we always call the constant time version.
-                 */
-                return group->meth->mul_generator_ct(group, r, g_scalar, ctx);
-        }
-        if (g_scalar == NULL && point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL) {
-                /* In this case we want to compute p_scalar * GenericPoint:
-                 * this codepath is reached most prominently by the second half
-                 * of ECDH, where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's
-                 * public point. To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if
-                 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we always call the
-                 * constant time version.
-                 */
-                return group->meth->mul_single_ct(group, r, p_scalar, point,
-                    ctx);
-        }
-        if (g_scalar != NULL && point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL) {
-                /*
-                 * In this case we want to compute
-                 *   g_scalar * GeneratorPoint + p_scalar * GenericPoint:
-                 * this codepath is reached most prominently by ECDSA signature
-                 * verification. So we call the non-ct version.
-                 */
-                return group->meth->mul_double_nonct(group, r, g_scalar,
-                    p_scalar, point, ctx);
-        }
-                
-        /* Anything else is an error. */
-        ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        return 0;
+        /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */
+
+        const EC_POINT *points[1];
+        const BIGNUM *scalars[1];
+
+        points[0] = point;
+        scalars[0] = p_scalar;
+
+        return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar,
+            (point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL),
+            points, scalars, ctx);
 }
 
 int 
 EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP * group, BN_CTX * ctx)
 {
+        if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+                /* use default */
+                return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx);
+
         if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0)
                 return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx);
         else
@@ -1117,6 +1076,10 @@ EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP * group, BN_CTX * ctx)
 int 
 EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP * group)
 {
+        if (group->meth->mul == 0)
+                /* use default */
+                return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group);
+
         if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0)
                 return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group);
         else