1 files changed, 446 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..415d67e61c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+/* ocsp_vfy.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
+static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Verify a basic response message */
+
+int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+        {
+        X509 *signer, *x;
+        STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+        int i, ret = 0;
+        ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
+        if (!ret)
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+                goto end;
+                }
+        if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+                flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
+                {
+                EVP_PKEY *skey;
+                skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
+                ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                if(ret <= 0)
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                }
+        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
+                {
+                int init_res;
+                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
+                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
+                else
+                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
+                if(!init_res)
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+                ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+                chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
+                X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+                if (ret <= 0)
+                        {
+                        i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);     
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS)
+                        {
+                        ret = 1;
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                /* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
+                 * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
+                 */
+                ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
+
+                /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
+                if (ret != 0) goto end;
+
+                /* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
+                 * check for explicit trust
+                 */
+                if(flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end;
+
+                x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+                if(X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                ret = 1;
+                }
+
+
+
+        end:
+        if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+        {
+        X509 *signer;
+        OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
+        if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)))
+                {
+                *psigner = signer;
+                return 2;
+                }
+        if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
+            (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid)))
+                {
+                *psigner = signer;
+                return 1;
+                }
+        /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
+
+        *psigner = NULL;
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+
+static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
+        {
+        int i;
+        unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
+        X509 *x;
+
+        /* Easy if lookup by name */
+        if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
+                return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
+
+        /* Lookup by key hash */
+
+        /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
+        if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
+        keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
+        /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+                {
+                x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+                X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
+                if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+                        return x;
+                }
+        return NULL;
+        }
+
+
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+        X509 *signer, *sca;
+        OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
+        int i;
+        sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+
+        if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
+        i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+
+        /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
+        if (i <= 0) return i;
+
+        signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+        /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
+        if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
+                {
+                sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
+                i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+                if (i < 0) return i;
+                if (i)
+                        {
+                        /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
+                        if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
+        return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
+        }
+
+
+/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
+ * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
+ * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
+ */
+        
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
+        {
+        OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
+        int i, idcount;
+
+        idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
+        if (idcount <= 0)
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+
+        *ret = NULL;
+
+        for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
+                {
+                tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+                /* Check to see if IDs match */
+                if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
+                        {
+                        /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
+                        if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
+                                        cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
+                                        return 2;
+                        /* Else mismatch */
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
+        *ret = cid;
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+                        STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+        {
+        /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+        if(cid)
+                {
+                const EVP_MD *dgst;
+                X509_NAME *iname;
+                int mdlen;
+                unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+                if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+                        return -1;
+                        }
+
+                mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+                if (mdlen < 0)
+                    return -1;
+                if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
+                   (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
+                        return 0;
+                iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+                if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+                        return -1;
+                if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
+                        return 0;
+                X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
+                if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
+                        return 0;
+
+                return 1;
+
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                /* We have to match the whole lot */
+                int i, ret;
+                OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+                for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
+                        {
+                        tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+                        ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+                        if (ret <= 0) return ret;
+                        }
+                return 1;
+                }
+                        
+        }
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
+        {
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
+            (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+                return 1;
+        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
+ * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
+ * against a given trust value.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
+        {
+        X509 *signer;
+        X509_NAME *nm;
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+        int ret;
+        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+        if (!req->optionalSignature) 
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
+        if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        nm = gen->d.directoryName;
+        ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+                {
+                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+                flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
+                {
+                EVP_PKEY *skey;
+                skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
+                ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                if(ret <= 0)
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                }
+        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
+                {
+                int init_res;
+                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
+                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
+                else
+                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
+                                        req->optionalSignature->certs);
+                if(!init_res)
+                        {
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+                ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+                X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+                if (ret <= 0)
+                        {
+                        ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);   
+                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                }
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+        {
+        X509 *signer;
+        if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
+                {
+                signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
+                *psigner = signer;
+                return 1;
+                }
+
+        signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
+        if (signer)
+                {
+                *psigner = signer;
+                return 2;
+                }
+        return 0;
+        }