1 files changed, 297 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b31999e11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/* p12_kiss.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
+
+static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+
+static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+                       int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                       char *keymatch);
+
+static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                        EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
+                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
+
+/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert
+ * and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,
+ * or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be
+ * passed unitialised.
+ */
+
+int PKCS12_parse (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+             STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+
+        /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
+
+        if(!p12) {
+                PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
+        if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {
+                if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new_null())) {
+                        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+        if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
+        if(cert) *cert = NULL;
+
+        /* Check the mac */
+
+        /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
+         * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
+         * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+         * password are two different things...
+         */
+
+        if(!pass || !*pass) {
+                if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;
+                else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";
+                else {
+                        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
+                PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))
+                {
+                PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        return 1;
+
+ err:
+
+        if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+        if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert);
+        if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
+
+static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+             EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+        STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+        STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+        int i, bagnid;
+        PKCS7 *p7;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
+
+        char keymatch = 0;
+        if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
+                p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
+                bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
+                if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+                        bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+                } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+                        bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+                } else continue;
+                if (!bags) {
+                        sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
+                                                         &keyid, &keymatch)) {
+                        sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+                        sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+        }
+        sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+        if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);
+        return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int parse_bags (STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+                       int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+                       char *keymatch)
+{
+        int i;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+                if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),
+                         pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
+                                                         keymatch)) return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+}
+
+#define MATCH_KEY  0x1
+#define MATCH_CERT 0x2
+#define MATCH_ALL  0x3
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+                      EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
+                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+             char *keymatch)
+{
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+        X509 *x509;
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL, *ckid = NULL;
+        ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+        ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+
+        if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+                fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
+
+        if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) {
+                lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
+                ckid = lkey;
+        }
+
+        /* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
+        if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
+                if (*keyid) {
+                        if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
+                } else {
+                        if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) {
+                                PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAGS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                return 0;
+                    }
+                }
+        }
+        
+        switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag))
+        {
+        case NID_keyBag:
+                if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;   
+                if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
+                *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
+        break;
+
+        case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+                if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;   
+                if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
+                                return 0;
+                *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+                PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+                if (!(*pkey)) return 0;
+                *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
+        break;
+
+        case NID_certBag:
+                if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )
+                                                                 return 1;
+                if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
+                if(ckid)
+                        {
+                        if (!X509_keyid_set1(x509, ckid->data, ckid->length))
+                                {
+                                X509_free(x509);
+                                return 0;
+                                }
+                        }
+                if(fname) {
+                        int len, r;
+                        unsigned char *data;
+                        len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+                        if(len > 0) {
+                                r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+                                OPENSSL_free(data);
+                                if (!r)
+                                        {
+                                        X509_free(x509);
+                                        return 0;
+                                        }
+                        }
+                }
+
+
+                if (lkey) {
+                        *keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
+                        if (cert) *cert = x509;
+                        else X509_free(x509);
+                } else {
+                        if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509);
+                        else X509_free(x509);
+                }
+        break;
+
+        case NID_safeContentsBag:
+                return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen,
+                                        pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch);
+        break;
+
+        default:
+                return 1;
+        break;
+        }
+        return 1;
+}
+