1 files changed, 26 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 0f8dd3e00f..88088ce73c 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -126,10 +126,6 @@
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
 
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG
 # define PREDICT
@@ -149,7 +145,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
                                            * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
                                            * (to prevent double locking) */
 /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
 
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
@@ -217,8 +213,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
         /* check if we already have the lock */
         if (crypto_lock_rand)
                 {
+                CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+                CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
                 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-                do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+                do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                 }
         else
@@ -274,8 +272,16 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
                         }
                 else
                         MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-                        
+
+                /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
                 MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+                /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+                   purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+                   uninitialized data.  The problem is not, it's
+                   with the caller.  Removing that line will make
+                   sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+                   other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
                 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
                 MD_Final(&m,local_md);
                 md_c[1]++;
@@ -336,14 +342,6 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 #endif
         int do_stir_pool = 0;
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-        if(FIPS_mode())
-            {
-            FIPSerr(FIPS_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,FIPS_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD);
-            return 0;
-            }
-#endif
-
 #ifdef PREDICT
         if (rand_predictable)
                 {
@@ -384,7 +382,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
         /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
         CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-        locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
         CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
         crypto_lock_rand = 1;
 
@@ -476,9 +474,15 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 #endif
                 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
                 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
-                MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+                /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+                MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+                /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+                   purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+                   uninitialized data.  */
 #endif
+
                 k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
                 if (k > 0)
                         {
@@ -539,15 +543,17 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
         {
+        CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
         int ret;
         int do_not_lock;
 
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
         /* check if we already have the lock
          * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
         if (crypto_lock_rand)
                 {
                 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-                do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+                do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                 }
         else
@@ -559,7 +565,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
                 
                 /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
                 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-                locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+                CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                 crypto_lock_rand = 1;
                 }