1 files changed, 590 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88088ce73c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
+/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
+# ifndef NDEBUG
+#   define NDEBUG
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+# define PREDICT
+#endif
+
+/* #define PREDICT      1 */
+
+#define STATE_SIZE      1023
+static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
+static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static long md_count[2]={0,0};
+static double entropy=0;
+static int initialized=0;
+
+static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
+                                           * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
+                                           * (to prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+
+
+#ifdef PREDICT
+int rand_predictable=0;
+#endif
+
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
+static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
+
+RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
+        ssleay_rand_seed,
+        ssleay_rand_bytes,
+        ssleay_rand_cleanup,
+        ssleay_rand_add,
+        ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
+        ssleay_rand_status
+        }; 
+
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
+        {
+        return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
+        }
+
+static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
+        {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
+        state_num=0;
+        state_index=0;
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        md_count[0]=0;
+        md_count[1]=0;
+        entropy=0;
+        initialized=0;
+        }
+
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+        {
+        int i,j,k,st_idx;
+        long md_c[2];
+        unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        EVP_MD_CTX m;
+        int do_not_lock;
+
+        /*
+         * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+         *
+         * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
+         * the last block).  Each of these blocks is run through the hash
+         * function as follows:  The data passed to the hash function
+         * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
+         * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
+         * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
+         * (which is incremented after each use).
+         * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
+         * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
+         * hash function.
+         */
+
+        /* check if we already have the lock */
+        if (crypto_lock_rand)
+                {
+                CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+                CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                }
+        else
+                do_not_lock = 0;
+
+        if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+        st_idx=state_index;
+
+        /* use our own copies of the counters so that even
+         * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the
+         * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_
+         * difference */
+        md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+        md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+
+        memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+        /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+        state_index += num;
+        if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
+                {
+                state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
+                state_num=STATE_SIZE;
+                }
+        else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)        
+                {
+                if (state_index > state_num)
+                        state_num=state_index;
+                }
+        /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+
+        /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE]
+         * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them
+         * as well */
+
+        md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+        if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+        for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+                {
+                j=(num-i);
+                j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
+
+                MD_Init(&m);
+                MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
+                if (k > 0)
+                        {
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+                        }
+                else
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
+
+                /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+                MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+                /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+                   purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+                   uninitialized data.  The problem is not, it's
+                   with the caller.  Removing that line will make
+                   sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+                   other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
+                MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
+                MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+                md_c[1]++;
+
+                buf=(const char *)buf + j;
+
+                for (k=0; k<j; k++)
+                        {
+                        /* Parallel threads may interfere with this,
+                         * but always each byte of the new state is
+                         * the XOR of some previous value of its
+                         * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost).
+                         * Alway using locking could hurt performance more
+                         * than necessary given that conflicts occur only
+                         * when the total seeding is longer than the random
+                         * state. */
+                        state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k];
+                        if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
+                                st_idx=0;
+                        }
+                }
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+
+        if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+        /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
+         * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
+         * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
+         * much entropy as fits into md. */
+        for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
+                {
+                md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+                }
+        if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+            entropy += add;
+        if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+        
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+        assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
+#endif
+        }
+
+static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+        {
+        ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+        }
+
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+        {
+        static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
+        int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
+        int num_ceil;
+        int ok;
+        long md_c[2];
+        unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        EVP_MD_CTX m;
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+        pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+#endif
+        int do_stir_pool = 0;
+
+#ifdef PREDICT
+        if (rand_predictable)
+                {
+                static unsigned char val=0;
+
+                for (i=0; i<num; i++)
+                        buf[i]=val++;
+                return(1);
+                }
+#endif
+
+        if (num <= 0)
+                return 1;
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+        /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+        num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+
+        /*
+         * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
+         *
+         * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
+         *
+         * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+         * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+         * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+         * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+         * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+         * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+         * 
+         * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
+         * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+         * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+         * global 'md'.
+         */
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+        /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+        if (!initialized)
+                {
+                RAND_poll();
+                initialized = 1;
+                }
+        
+        if (!stirred_pool)
+                do_stir_pool = 1;
+        
+        ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+        if (!ok)
+                {
+                /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
+                 * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
+                 * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
+                 * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
+                 * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
+                 * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
+                 *
+                 * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+                 * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected
+                 * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the
+                 * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached.
+                 */
+                entropy -= num;
+                if (entropy < 0)
+                        entropy = 0;
+                }
+
+        if (do_stir_pool)
+                {
+                /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
+                 * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
+                 * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
+                 * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
+                 * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
+                 */
+
+                int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+                while (n > 0)
+                        {
+#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
+#endif
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+                        /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+                         * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */
+                        ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+                        n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        }
+                if (ok)
+                        stirred_pool = 1;
+                }
+
+        st_idx=state_index;
+        st_num=state_num;
+        md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+        md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+        memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+        state_index+=num_ceil;
+        if (state_index > state_num)
+                state_index %= state_num;
+
+        /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
+         * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
+
+        md_count[0] += 1;
+
+        /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+        crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+        while (num > 0)
+                {
+                /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+                j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
+                num-=j;
+                MD_Init(&m);
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+                if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+                        {
+                        MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
+                        curr_pid = 0;
+                        }
+#endif
+                MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+                /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+                MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+                /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+                   purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+                   uninitialized data.  */
+#endif
+
+                k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
+                if (k > 0)
+                        {
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+                        }
+                else
+                        MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+                MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+
+                for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
+                        {
+                        state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
+                        if (st_idx >= st_num)
+                                st_idx=0;
+                        if (i < j)
+                                *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
+                        }
+                }
+
+        MD_Init(&m);
+        MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
+        MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+        MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        MD_Final(&m,md);
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+        if (ok)
+                return(1);
+        else
+                {
+                RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+                ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+                        "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
+                return(0);
+                }
+        }
+
+/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
+   unpredictable */
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 
+        {
+        int ret;
+        unsigned long err;
+
+        ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
+        if (ret == 0)
+                {
+                err = ERR_peek_error();
+                if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
+                    ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
+                        ERR_clear_error();
+                }
+        return (ret);
+        }
+
+static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
+        {
+        CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+        int ret;
+        int do_not_lock;
+
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+        /* check if we already have the lock
+         * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
+        if (crypto_lock_rand)
+                {
+                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                }
+        else
+                do_not_lock = 0;
+        
+        if (!do_not_lock)
+                {
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+                
+                /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+                crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+                }
+        
+        if (!initialized)
+                {
+                RAND_poll();
+                initialized = 1;
+                }
+
+        ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+        if (!do_not_lock)
+                {
+                /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+                crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+                
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+                }
+        
+        return ret;
+        }