diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 579 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 579 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c deleted file mode 100644 index cde5ca27d5..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,579 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ | ||
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
| 3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 15 | * | ||
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
| 22 | * | ||
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 25 | * are met: | ||
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 40 | * | ||
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 52 | * | ||
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
| 57 | */ | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
| 60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
| 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
| 62 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
| 63 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
| 64 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | ||
| 65 | |||
| 66 | #ifndef RSA_NULL | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 69 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 70 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 71 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 72 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 73 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 74 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 75 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 76 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa); | ||
| 77 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); | ||
| 78 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | ||
| 79 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ | ||
| 80 | "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | ||
| 81 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | ||
| 82 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt, | ||
| 83 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt, | ||
| 84 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt, | ||
| 85 | RSA_eay_mod_exp, | ||
| 86 | BN_mod_exp_mont, | ||
| 87 | RSA_eay_init, | ||
| 88 | RSA_eay_finish, | ||
| 89 | 0, | ||
| 90 | NULL, | ||
| 91 | }; | ||
| 92 | |||
| 93 | RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) | ||
| 94 | { | ||
| 95 | return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); | ||
| 96 | } | ||
| 97 | |||
| 98 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 99 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 100 | { | ||
| 101 | const RSA_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 102 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 103 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 104 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 105 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 106 | |||
| 107 | meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine); | ||
| 108 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 109 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 110 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 111 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 112 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 113 | { | ||
| 114 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 115 | goto err; | ||
| 116 | } | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | switch (padding) | ||
| 119 | { | ||
| 120 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 121 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 122 | break; | ||
| 123 | #ifndef NO_SHA | ||
| 124 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
| 125 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); | ||
| 126 | break; | ||
| 127 | #endif | ||
| 128 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 129 | i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 130 | break; | ||
| 131 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 132 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 133 | break; | ||
| 134 | default: | ||
| 135 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 136 | goto err; | ||
| 137 | } | ||
| 138 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
| 139 | |||
| 140 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 141 | |||
| 142 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
| 143 | { | ||
| 144 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 145 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 146 | goto err; | ||
| 147 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
| 148 | { | ||
| 149 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 150 | goto err; | ||
| 151 | } | ||
| 152 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 153 | { | ||
| 154 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 155 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
| 156 | { | ||
| 157 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 158 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 159 | } | ||
| 160 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 161 | } | ||
| 162 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 163 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 164 | } | ||
| 165 | |||
| 166 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
| 167 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
| 168 | |||
| 169 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
| 170 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
| 171 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
| 172 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
| 173 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
| 174 | to[k]=0; | ||
| 175 | |||
| 176 | r=num; | ||
| 177 | err: | ||
| 178 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 179 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 180 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 181 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 182 | { | ||
| 183 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 184 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 185 | } | ||
| 186 | return(r); | ||
| 187 | } | ||
| 188 | |||
| 189 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 190 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 191 | { | ||
| 192 | const RSA_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 193 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 194 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 195 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 196 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 197 | |||
| 198 | meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine); | ||
| 199 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 200 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 201 | |||
| 202 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 203 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 204 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 205 | { | ||
| 206 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 207 | goto err; | ||
| 208 | } | ||
| 209 | |||
| 210 | switch (padding) | ||
| 211 | { | ||
| 212 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 213 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 214 | break; | ||
| 215 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 216 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 217 | break; | ||
| 218 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 219 | default: | ||
| 220 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 221 | goto err; | ||
| 222 | } | ||
| 223 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
| 224 | |||
| 225 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 226 | |||
| 227 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
| 228 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
| 229 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 230 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 231 | |||
| 232 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
| 233 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
| 234 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
| 235 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 236 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 237 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 238 | { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 239 | else | ||
| 240 | { | ||
| 241 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 242 | } | ||
| 243 | |||
| 244 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 245 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 246 | |||
| 247 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
| 248 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
| 249 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
| 250 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
| 251 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
| 252 | to[k]=0; | ||
| 253 | |||
| 254 | r=num; | ||
| 255 | err: | ||
| 256 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 257 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 258 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 259 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 260 | { | ||
| 261 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 262 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 263 | } | ||
| 264 | return(r); | ||
| 265 | } | ||
| 266 | |||
| 267 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 268 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 269 | { | ||
| 270 | const RSA_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 271 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 272 | int j,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 273 | unsigned char *p; | ||
| 274 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 275 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 276 | |||
| 277 | meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine); | ||
| 278 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 279 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 280 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 281 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 282 | |||
| 283 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 284 | |||
| 285 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 286 | { | ||
| 287 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 288 | goto err; | ||
| 289 | } | ||
| 290 | |||
| 291 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
| 292 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
| 293 | if (flen > num) | ||
| 294 | { | ||
| 295 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 296 | goto err; | ||
| 297 | } | ||
| 298 | |||
| 299 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
| 300 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 301 | |||
| 302 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
| 303 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
| 304 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 305 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 306 | |||
| 307 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 308 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
| 309 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
| 310 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
| 311 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 312 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 313 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 314 | { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 315 | else | ||
| 316 | { | ||
| 317 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) | ||
| 318 | goto err; | ||
| 319 | } | ||
| 320 | |||
| 321 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 322 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 323 | |||
| 324 | p=buf; | ||
| 325 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
| 326 | |||
| 327 | switch (padding) | ||
| 328 | { | ||
| 329 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 330 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 331 | break; | ||
| 332 | #ifndef NO_SHA | ||
| 333 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
| 334 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | ||
| 335 | break; | ||
| 336 | #endif | ||
| 337 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 338 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 339 | break; | ||
| 340 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 341 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 342 | break; | ||
| 343 | default: | ||
| 344 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 345 | goto err; | ||
| 346 | } | ||
| 347 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 348 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 349 | |||
| 350 | err: | ||
| 351 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 352 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 353 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 354 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 355 | { | ||
| 356 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 357 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 358 | } | ||
| 359 | return(r); | ||
| 360 | } | ||
| 361 | |||
| 362 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
| 363 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 364 | { | ||
| 365 | const RSA_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 366 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 367 | int i,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 368 | unsigned char *p; | ||
| 369 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 370 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 371 | |||
| 372 | meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine); | ||
| 373 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 374 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 375 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 376 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 377 | |||
| 378 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 379 | buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); | ||
| 380 | if (buf == NULL) | ||
| 381 | { | ||
| 382 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 383 | goto err; | ||
| 384 | } | ||
| 385 | |||
| 386 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
| 387 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
| 388 | if (flen > num) | ||
| 389 | { | ||
| 390 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 391 | goto err; | ||
| 392 | } | ||
| 393 | |||
| 394 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 395 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 396 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
| 397 | { | ||
| 398 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 399 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 400 | goto err; | ||
| 401 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
| 402 | { | ||
| 403 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 404 | goto err; | ||
| 405 | } | ||
| 406 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 407 | { | ||
| 408 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 409 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
| 410 | { | ||
| 411 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 412 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 413 | } | ||
| 414 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 415 | } | ||
| 416 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 417 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 418 | } | ||
| 419 | |||
| 420 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
| 421 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
| 422 | |||
| 423 | p=buf; | ||
| 424 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); | ||
| 425 | |||
| 426 | switch (padding) | ||
| 427 | { | ||
| 428 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 429 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 430 | break; | ||
| 431 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 432 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 433 | break; | ||
| 434 | default: | ||
| 435 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 436 | goto err; | ||
| 437 | } | ||
| 438 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 439 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 440 | |||
| 441 | err: | ||
| 442 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 443 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 444 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 445 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 446 | { | ||
| 447 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 448 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 449 | } | ||
| 450 | return(r); | ||
| 451 | } | ||
| 452 | |||
| 453 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) | ||
| 454 | { | ||
| 455 | const RSA_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 456 | BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy; | ||
| 457 | int ret=0; | ||
| 458 | BN_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 459 | |||
| 460 | meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine); | ||
| 461 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 462 | BN_init(&m1); | ||
| 463 | BN_init(&r1); | ||
| 464 | BN_init(&vrfy); | ||
| 465 | |||
| 466 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) | ||
| 467 | { | ||
| 468 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
| 469 | { | ||
| 470 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 471 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 472 | goto err; | ||
| 473 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx)) | ||
| 474 | { | ||
| 475 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 476 | goto err; | ||
| 477 | } | ||
| 478 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 479 | { | ||
| 480 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 481 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
| 482 | { | ||
| 483 | rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 484 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 485 | } | ||
| 486 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 487 | } | ||
| 488 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 489 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 490 | } | ||
| 491 | |||
| 492 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
| 493 | { | ||
| 494 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 495 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 496 | goto err; | ||
| 497 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx)) | ||
| 498 | { | ||
| 499 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 500 | goto err; | ||
| 501 | } | ||
| 502 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 503 | { | ||
| 504 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 505 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
| 506 | { | ||
| 507 | rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 508 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 509 | } | ||
| 510 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 511 | } | ||
| 512 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 513 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 514 | } | ||
| 515 | } | ||
| 516 | |||
| 517 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 518 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, | ||
| 519 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; | ||
| 520 | |||
| 521 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 522 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, | ||
| 523 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; | ||
| 524 | |||
| 525 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 526 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
| 527 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | ||
| 528 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 529 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 530 | |||
| 531 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 532 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 533 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
| 534 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
| 535 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
| 536 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
| 537 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
| 538 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
| 539 | */ | ||
| 540 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 541 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 542 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 543 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 544 | |||
| 545 | if (rsa->e && rsa->n) | ||
| 546 | { | ||
| 547 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 548 | if (BN_cmp(I, &vrfy) != 0) | ||
| 549 | { | ||
| 550 | if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 551 | } | ||
| 552 | } | ||
| 553 | ret=1; | ||
| 554 | err: | ||
| 555 | BN_clear_free(&m1); | ||
| 556 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | ||
| 557 | BN_clear_free(&vrfy); | ||
| 558 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 559 | return(ret); | ||
| 560 | } | ||
| 561 | |||
| 562 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) | ||
| 563 | { | ||
| 564 | rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | ||
| 565 | return(1); | ||
| 566 | } | ||
| 567 | |||
| 568 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) | ||
| 569 | { | ||
| 570 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) | ||
| 571 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | ||
| 572 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) | ||
| 573 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | ||
| 574 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) | ||
| 575 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | ||
| 576 | return(1); | ||
| 577 | } | ||
| 578 | |||
| 579 | #endif | ||
