1 files changed, 222 insertions, 30 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index f835be8afc..b7d2460754 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -1,13 +1,3 @@
-
-/* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July
- * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the
- * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an
- * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be
- * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once
- * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric
- * Young's original copyright is below. 
- */
-
 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -184,13 +174,62 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+
+        if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+        if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+                break;
+        case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+        if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+                RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+                ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+                { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+        else
+                {
+                if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+         * length of the modulus */
+        j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+        i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+        for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+                to[k]=0;
 
+        r=num;
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
         BN_clear_free(&ret);
@@ -212,12 +251,77 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+        ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+        if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+         * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+        if (flen > num)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* make data into a big number */
+        if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+                RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        /* do the decrypt */
+        if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+                ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+                (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+                { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+        else
+                {
+                if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+                if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+        p=buf;
+        j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+#ifndef NO_SHA
+        case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+                break;
+#endif
+        case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
+                break;
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (r < 0)
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -240,12 +344,56 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
         unsigned char *buf=NULL;
         BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+        BN_init(&f);
+        BN_init(&ret);
+        ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+        if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+        num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+        buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num);
+        if (buf == NULL)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+         * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+        if (flen > num)
+                {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+        /* do the decrypt */
+        if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+                {
+                if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+                        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
+                            goto err;
+                }
+
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+        p=buf;
+        i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+
+        switch (padding)
+                {
+        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+                break;
+        case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
+                break;
+        default:
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        if (r < 0)
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
         if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -263,15 +411,59 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
         {
         BIGNUM r1,m1;
         int ret=0;
-        BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+        BN_CTX *ctx;
 
+        if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
         BN_init(&m1);
         BN_init(&r1);
-        if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 
-        /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-         * when the RSA patent expires
-         */
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+                {
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+                        {
+                        if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+                                if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
+                                                     ctx))
+                                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+                        {
+                        if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+                                if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
+                                                     ctx))
+                                        goto err;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+                rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+        /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+         * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+        if (r0->neg)
+                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+        /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+         * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+         * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+         * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+         * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+         * they ensure p > q [steve]
+         */
+        if (r0->neg)
+                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+        if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+
+        ret=1;
 err:
         BN_clear_free(&m1);
         BN_clear_free(&r1);