summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c893
1 files changed, 893 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5eaeeae6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -0,0 +1,893 @@
1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include "cryptlib.h"
114#include <openssl/bn.h>
115#include <openssl/rsa.h>
116#include <openssl/rand.h>
117
118#ifndef RSA_NULL
119
120static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
122static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
124static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
129static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
132 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
133 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
134 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
135 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
136 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
137 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
138 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
139 RSA_eay_init,
140 RSA_eay_finish,
141 0, /* flags */
142 NULL,
143 0, /* rsa_sign */
144 0, /* rsa_verify */
145 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
146 };
147
148const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
149 {
150 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
151 }
152
153static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
154 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
155 {
156 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
157 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
158 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
159 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
160
161 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
162 {
163 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
164 return -1;
165 }
166
167 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
168 {
169 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
170 return -1;
171 }
172
173 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
174 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
175 {
176 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
177 {
178 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
179 return -1;
180 }
181 }
182
183 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
184 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
185 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
186 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
187 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
188 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
189 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
190 {
191 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
192 goto err;
193 }
194
195 switch (padding)
196 {
197 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
198 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
199 break;
200#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
201 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
202 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
203 break;
204#endif
205 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
206 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
207 break;
208 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
209 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
210 break;
211 default:
212 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
213 goto err;
214 }
215 if (i <= 0) goto err;
216
217 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
218
219 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
220 {
221 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
222 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
223 goto err;
224 }
225
226 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
227 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
228 goto err;
229
230 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
231 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
232
233 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
234 * length of the modulus */
235 j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
236 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
237 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
238 to[k]=0;
239
240 r=num;
241err:
242 if (ctx != NULL)
243 {
244 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
245 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
246 }
247 if (buf != NULL)
248 {
249 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
250 OPENSSL_free(buf);
251 }
252 return(r);
253 }
254
255static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
256{
257 BN_BLINDING *ret;
258 int got_write_lock = 0;
259 CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
260
261 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
262
263 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
264 {
265 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
266 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
267 got_write_lock = 1;
268
269 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
270 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
271 }
272
273 ret = rsa->blinding;
274 if (ret == NULL)
275 goto err;
276
277 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
278 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
279 {
280 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
281
282 *local = 1;
283 }
284 else
285 {
286 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
287
288 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
289 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
290 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
291 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
292 */
293
294 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
295 {
296 if (!got_write_lock)
297 {
298 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
299 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
300 got_write_lock = 1;
301 }
302
303 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
304 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
305 }
306 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
307 }
308
309 err:
310 if (got_write_lock)
311 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
312 else
313 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
314 return ret;
315}
316
317static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
318 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
319{
320 if (local)
321 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
322 else
323 {
324 int ret;
325 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
326 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
327 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
328 return ret;
329 }
330}
331
332static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
333 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
334{
335 if (local)
336 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
337 else
338 {
339 int ret;
340 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
341 ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
342 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
343 return ret;
344 }
345}
346
347/* signing */
348static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
349 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
350 {
351 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
352 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
353 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
354 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
355 int local_blinding = 0;
356 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
357
358 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
359 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
360 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
361 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
362 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
363 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
364 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
365 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
366 {
367 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
368 goto err;
369 }
370
371 switch (padding)
372 {
373 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
374 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
375 break;
376 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
377 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
378 break;
379 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
380 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
381 break;
382 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
383 default:
384 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
385 goto err;
386 }
387 if (i <= 0) goto err;
388
389 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
390
391 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
392 {
393 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
394 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
395 goto err;
396 }
397
398 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
399 {
400 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
401 if (blinding == NULL)
402 {
403 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 goto err;
405 }
406 }
407
408 if (blinding != NULL)
409 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
410 goto err;
411
412 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
413 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
414 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
415 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
416 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
417 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
418 {
419 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
420 }
421 else
422 {
423 BIGNUM local_d;
424 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
425
426 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
427 {
428 BN_init(&local_d);
429 d = &local_d;
430 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
431 }
432 else
433 d= rsa->d;
434
435 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
436 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
437 goto err;
438
439 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
440 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
441 }
442
443 if (blinding)
444 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
445 goto err;
446
447 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
448 {
449 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
450 if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
451 res = f;
452 else
453 res = ret;
454 }
455 else
456 res = ret;
457
458 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
459 * length of the modulus */
460 j=BN_num_bytes(res);
461 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
462 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
463 to[k]=0;
464
465 r=num;
466err:
467 if (ctx != NULL)
468 {
469 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
470 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
471 }
472 if (buf != NULL)
473 {
474 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
475 OPENSSL_free(buf);
476 }
477 return(r);
478 }
479
480static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
481 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
482 {
483 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
484 int j,num=0,r= -1;
485 unsigned char *p;
486 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
487 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
488 int local_blinding = 0;
489 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
490
491 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
492 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
493 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
494 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
495 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
496 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
497 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
498 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
499 {
500 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
501 goto err;
502 }
503
504 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
505 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
506 if (flen > num)
507 {
508 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
509 goto err;
510 }
511
512 /* make data into a big number */
513 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
514
515 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
516 {
517 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
518 goto err;
519 }
520
521 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
522 {
523 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
524 if (blinding == NULL)
525 {
526 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
527 goto err;
528 }
529 }
530
531 if (blinding != NULL)
532 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
533 goto err;
534
535 /* do the decrypt */
536 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
537 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
538 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
539 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
540 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
541 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
542 {
543 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
544 }
545 else
546 {
547 BIGNUM local_d;
548 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
549
550 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
551 {
552 d = &local_d;
553 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
554 }
555 else
556 d = rsa->d;
557
558 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
559 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
560 goto err;
561 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
562 rsa->_method_mod_n))
563 goto err;
564 }
565
566 if (blinding)
567 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
568 goto err;
569
570 p=buf;
571 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
572
573 switch (padding)
574 {
575 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
576 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
577 break;
578#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
579 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
580 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
581 break;
582#endif
583 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
584 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
585 break;
586 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
587 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
588 break;
589 default:
590 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
591 goto err;
592 }
593 if (r < 0)
594 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
595
596err:
597 if (ctx != NULL)
598 {
599 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
600 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
601 }
602 if (buf != NULL)
603 {
604 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
605 OPENSSL_free(buf);
606 }
607 return(r);
608 }
609
610/* signature verification */
611static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
612 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
613 {
614 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
615 int i,num=0,r= -1;
616 unsigned char *p;
617 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
618 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
619
620 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
621 {
622 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
623 return -1;
624 }
625
626 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
627 {
628 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
629 return -1;
630 }
631
632 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
633 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
634 {
635 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
636 {
637 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
638 return -1;
639 }
640 }
641
642 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
643 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
644 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
645 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
646 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
647 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
648 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
649 {
650 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
651 goto err;
652 }
653
654 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
655 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
656 if (flen > num)
657 {
658 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
659 goto err;
660 }
661
662 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
663
664 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
665 {
666 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
667 goto err;
668 }
669
670 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
671 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
672 goto err;
673
674 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
675 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
676
677 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
678 BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
679
680 p=buf;
681 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
682
683 switch (padding)
684 {
685 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
686 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
687 break;
688 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
689 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
690 break;
691 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
692 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
693 break;
694 default:
695 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
696 goto err;
697 }
698 if (r < 0)
699 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
700
701err:
702 if (ctx != NULL)
703 {
704 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
705 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
706 }
707 if (buf != NULL)
708 {
709 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
710 OPENSSL_free(buf);
711 }
712 return(r);
713 }
714
715static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
716 {
717 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
718 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
719 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
720 int ret=0;
721
722 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
723 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
724 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
725 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
726
727 {
728 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
729 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
730
731 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
732 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
733 */
734 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
735 {
736 BN_init(&local_p);
737 p = &local_p;
738 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
739
740 BN_init(&local_q);
741 q = &local_q;
742 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
743 }
744 else
745 {
746 p = rsa->p;
747 q = rsa->q;
748 }
749
750 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
751 {
752 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
753 goto err;
754 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
755 goto err;
756 }
757 }
758
759 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
760 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
761 goto err;
762
763 /* compute I mod q */
764 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
765 {
766 c = &local_c;
767 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
768 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
769 }
770 else
771 {
772 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
773 }
774
775 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
776 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
777 {
778 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
779 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
780 }
781 else
782 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
783 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
784 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
785
786 /* compute I mod p */
787 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
788 {
789 c = &local_c;
790 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
791 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
792 }
793 else
794 {
795 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
796 }
797
798 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
799 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
800 {
801 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
802 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
803 }
804 else
805 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
806 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
807 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
808
809 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
810 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
811 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
812 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
813 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
814
815 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
816
817 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
818 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
819 {
820 pr1 = &local_r1;
821 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
822 }
823 else
824 pr1 = r1;
825 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
826
827 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
828 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
829 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
830 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
831 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
832 * they ensure p > q [steve]
833 */
834 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
835 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
836 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
837 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
838
839 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
840 {
841 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
842 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
843 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
844 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
845 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
846 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
847 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
848 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
849 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
850 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
851 {
852 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
853 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
854 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
855
856 BIGNUM local_d;
857 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
858
859 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
860 {
861 d = &local_d;
862 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
863 }
864 else
865 d = rsa->d;
866 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
867 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
868 }
869 }
870 ret=1;
871err:
872 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
873 return(ret);
874 }
875
876static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
877 {
878 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
879 return(1);
880 }
881
882static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
883 {
884 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
885 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
886 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
887 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
888 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
889 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
890 return(1);
891 }
892
893#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-26 14:30:37 +0000