diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 628 |
1 files changed, 628 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a3f549d8e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
62 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
63 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
64 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | ||
65 | |||
66 | #ifndef RSA_NULL | ||
67 | |||
68 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
69 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
70 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
71 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
72 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
73 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
74 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
75 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
76 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa); | ||
77 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); | ||
78 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | ||
79 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ | ||
80 | "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | ||
81 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | ||
82 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ | ||
83 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ | ||
84 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt, | ||
85 | RSA_eay_mod_exp, | ||
86 | BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ | ||
87 | RSA_eay_init, | ||
88 | RSA_eay_finish, | ||
89 | 0, /* flags */ | ||
90 | NULL, | ||
91 | 0, /* rsa_sign */ | ||
92 | 0 /* rsa_verify */ | ||
93 | }; | ||
94 | |||
95 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) | ||
96 | { | ||
97 | return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); | ||
98 | } | ||
99 | |||
100 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
101 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
102 | { | ||
103 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
104 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
105 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
106 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
107 | |||
108 | BN_init(&f); | ||
109 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
110 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
111 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
112 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
113 | { | ||
114 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
115 | goto err; | ||
116 | } | ||
117 | |||
118 | switch (padding) | ||
119 | { | ||
120 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
121 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
122 | break; | ||
123 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
124 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
125 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); | ||
126 | break; | ||
127 | #endif | ||
128 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
129 | i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
130 | break; | ||
131 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
132 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
133 | break; | ||
134 | default: | ||
135 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
136 | goto err; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
139 | |||
140 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
141 | |||
142 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
143 | { | ||
144 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
145 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
146 | goto err; | ||
147 | } | ||
148 | |||
149 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
150 | { | ||
151 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
152 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
153 | goto err; | ||
154 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
155 | { | ||
156 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
157 | goto err; | ||
158 | } | ||
159 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
160 | { | ||
161 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
162 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
163 | { | ||
164 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
165 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
166 | } | ||
167 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
170 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
171 | } | ||
172 | |||
173 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
174 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
175 | |||
176 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
177 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
178 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
179 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
180 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
181 | to[k]=0; | ||
182 | |||
183 | r=num; | ||
184 | err: | ||
185 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
186 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
187 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
188 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
189 | { | ||
190 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
191 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
192 | } | ||
193 | return(r); | ||
194 | } | ||
195 | |||
196 | static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) | ||
197 | { | ||
198 | int ret = 1; | ||
199 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
200 | /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */ | ||
201 | if(rsa->blinding == NULL) | ||
202 | ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx); | ||
203 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
204 | return ret; | ||
205 | } | ||
206 | |||
207 | #define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \ | ||
208 | do { \ | ||
209 | if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \ | ||
210 | ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \ | ||
211 | !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \ | ||
212 | err_instr \ | ||
213 | } while(0) | ||
214 | |||
215 | /* signing */ | ||
216 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
217 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
218 | { | ||
219 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
220 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
221 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
222 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
223 | |||
224 | BN_init(&f); | ||
225 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
226 | |||
227 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
228 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
229 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
230 | { | ||
231 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
232 | goto err; | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | |||
235 | switch (padding) | ||
236 | { | ||
237 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
238 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
239 | break; | ||
240 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
241 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
242 | break; | ||
243 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
244 | default: | ||
245 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
246 | goto err; | ||
247 | } | ||
248 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
249 | |||
250 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
251 | |||
252 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
253 | { | ||
254 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
255 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
256 | goto err; | ||
257 | } | ||
258 | |||
259 | BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;); | ||
260 | |||
261 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
262 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
263 | |||
264 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
265 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
266 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
267 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
268 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
269 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
270 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
271 | else | ||
272 | { | ||
273 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
274 | } | ||
275 | |||
276 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
277 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
278 | |||
279 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
280 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
281 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
282 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
283 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
284 | to[k]=0; | ||
285 | |||
286 | r=num; | ||
287 | err: | ||
288 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
289 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
290 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
291 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
292 | { | ||
293 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
294 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
295 | } | ||
296 | return(r); | ||
297 | } | ||
298 | |||
299 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
300 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
301 | { | ||
302 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
303 | int j,num=0,r= -1; | ||
304 | unsigned char *p; | ||
305 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
306 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
307 | |||
308 | BN_init(&f); | ||
309 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
310 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
311 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
312 | |||
313 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
314 | |||
315 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
316 | { | ||
317 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
318 | goto err; | ||
319 | } | ||
320 | |||
321 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
322 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
323 | if (flen > num) | ||
324 | { | ||
325 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
326 | goto err; | ||
327 | } | ||
328 | |||
329 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
330 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
331 | |||
332 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
333 | { | ||
334 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
335 | goto err; | ||
336 | } | ||
337 | |||
338 | BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;); | ||
339 | |||
340 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
341 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
342 | |||
343 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
344 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
345 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
346 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
347 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
348 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
349 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
350 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
351 | else | ||
352 | { | ||
353 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) | ||
354 | goto err; | ||
355 | } | ||
356 | |||
357 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
358 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
359 | |||
360 | p=buf; | ||
361 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
362 | |||
363 | switch (padding) | ||
364 | { | ||
365 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
366 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
367 | break; | ||
368 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
369 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
370 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | ||
371 | break; | ||
372 | #endif | ||
373 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
374 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
375 | break; | ||
376 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
377 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
378 | break; | ||
379 | default: | ||
380 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
381 | goto err; | ||
382 | } | ||
383 | if (r < 0) | ||
384 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
385 | |||
386 | err: | ||
387 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
388 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
389 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
390 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
391 | { | ||
392 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
393 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
394 | } | ||
395 | return(r); | ||
396 | } | ||
397 | |||
398 | /* signature verification */ | ||
399 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
400 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
401 | { | ||
402 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
403 | int i,num=0,r= -1; | ||
404 | unsigned char *p; | ||
405 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
406 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
407 | |||
408 | BN_init(&f); | ||
409 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
410 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
411 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
412 | |||
413 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
414 | buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); | ||
415 | if (buf == NULL) | ||
416 | { | ||
417 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
418 | goto err; | ||
419 | } | ||
420 | |||
421 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
422 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
423 | if (flen > num) | ||
424 | { | ||
425 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
426 | goto err; | ||
427 | } | ||
428 | |||
429 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
430 | |||
431 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
432 | { | ||
433 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
434 | goto err; | ||
435 | } | ||
436 | |||
437 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
438 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
439 | { | ||
440 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
441 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
442 | goto err; | ||
443 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
444 | { | ||
445 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
446 | goto err; | ||
447 | } | ||
448 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
449 | { | ||
450 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
451 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
452 | { | ||
453 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
454 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
455 | } | ||
456 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
457 | } | ||
458 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
459 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
460 | } | ||
461 | |||
462 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
463 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
464 | |||
465 | p=buf; | ||
466 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); | ||
467 | |||
468 | switch (padding) | ||
469 | { | ||
470 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
471 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
472 | break; | ||
473 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
474 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
475 | break; | ||
476 | default: | ||
477 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
478 | goto err; | ||
479 | } | ||
480 | if (r < 0) | ||
481 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
482 | |||
483 | err: | ||
484 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
485 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
486 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
487 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
488 | { | ||
489 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
490 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
491 | } | ||
492 | return(r); | ||
493 | } | ||
494 | |||
495 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) | ||
496 | { | ||
497 | BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy; | ||
498 | int ret=0; | ||
499 | BN_CTX *ctx; | ||
500 | |||
501 | BN_init(&m1); | ||
502 | BN_init(&r1); | ||
503 | BN_init(&vrfy); | ||
504 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
505 | |||
506 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) | ||
507 | { | ||
508 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
509 | { | ||
510 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
511 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
512 | goto err; | ||
513 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx)) | ||
514 | { | ||
515 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
516 | goto err; | ||
517 | } | ||
518 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
519 | { | ||
520 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
521 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
522 | { | ||
523 | rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
524 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
525 | } | ||
526 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
527 | } | ||
528 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
529 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
530 | } | ||
531 | |||
532 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
533 | { | ||
534 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
535 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
536 | goto err; | ||
537 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx)) | ||
538 | { | ||
539 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
540 | goto err; | ||
541 | } | ||
542 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
543 | { | ||
544 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
545 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
546 | { | ||
547 | rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
548 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
549 | } | ||
550 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
551 | } | ||
552 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
553 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
554 | } | ||
555 | } | ||
556 | |||
557 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
558 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, | ||
559 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; | ||
560 | |||
561 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
562 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, | ||
563 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; | ||
564 | |||
565 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; | ||
566 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
567 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | ||
568 | if (r0->neg) | ||
569 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
570 | |||
571 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; | ||
572 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
573 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
574 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
575 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
576 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
577 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
578 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
579 | */ | ||
580 | if (r0->neg) | ||
581 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
582 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
583 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | ||
584 | |||
585 | if (rsa->e && rsa->n) | ||
586 | { | ||
587 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
588 | /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation | ||
589 | * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of | ||
590 | * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check | ||
591 | * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ | ||
592 | if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err; | ||
593 | if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; | ||
594 | if (vrfy.neg) | ||
595 | if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; | ||
596 | if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy)) | ||
597 | /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak | ||
598 | * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) | ||
599 | * mod_exp and return that instead. */ | ||
600 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
601 | } | ||
602 | ret=1; | ||
603 | err: | ||
604 | BN_clear_free(&m1); | ||
605 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | ||
606 | BN_clear_free(&vrfy); | ||
607 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
608 | return(ret); | ||
609 | } | ||
610 | |||
611 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) | ||
612 | { | ||
613 | rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | ||
614 | return(1); | ||
615 | } | ||
616 | |||
617 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) | ||
618 | { | ||
619 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) | ||
620 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | ||
621 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) | ||
622 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | ||
623 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) | ||
624 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | ||
625 | return(1); | ||
626 | } | ||
627 | |||
628 | #endif | ||