summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c628
1 files changed, 628 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3f549d8e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@
1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include "cryptlib.h"
61#include <openssl/bn.h>
62#include <openssl/rsa.h>
63#include <openssl/rand.h>
64#include <openssl/engine.h>
65
66#ifndef RSA_NULL
67
68static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
69 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
70static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
71 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
72static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
73 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
74static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
75 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
76static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
77static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
78static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
79static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
80 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
81 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
82 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
83 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
84 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
85 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
86 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
87 RSA_eay_init,
88 RSA_eay_finish,
89 0, /* flags */
90 NULL,
91 0, /* rsa_sign */
92 0 /* rsa_verify */
93 };
94
95const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
96 {
97 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
98 }
99
100static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
101 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
102 {
103 BIGNUM f,ret;
104 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
105 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
106 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
107
108 BN_init(&f);
109 BN_init(&ret);
110 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
111 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
112 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
113 {
114 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
115 goto err;
116 }
117
118 switch (padding)
119 {
120 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
121 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
122 break;
123#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
124 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
125 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
126 break;
127#endif
128 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
129 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
130 break;
131 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
132 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
133 break;
134 default:
135 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
136 goto err;
137 }
138 if (i <= 0) goto err;
139
140 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
141
142 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
143 {
144 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
145 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
146 goto err;
147 }
148
149 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
150 {
151 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
152 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
153 goto err;
154 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
155 {
156 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
157 goto err;
158 }
159 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
160 {
161 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
162 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
163 {
164 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
165 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
166 }
167 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
168 }
169 if (bn_mont_ctx)
170 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
171 }
172
173 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
174 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
175
176 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
177 * length of the modulus */
178 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
179 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
180 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
181 to[k]=0;
182
183 r=num;
184err:
185 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
186 BN_clear_free(&f);
187 BN_clear_free(&ret);
188 if (buf != NULL)
189 {
190 memset(buf,0,num);
191 OPENSSL_free(buf);
192 }
193 return(r);
194 }
195
196static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
197 {
198 int ret = 1;
199 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
200 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
201 if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
202 ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
203 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
204 return ret;
205 }
206
207#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
208 do { \
209 if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \
210 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
211 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
212 err_instr \
213 } while(0)
214
215/* signing */
216static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
217 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
218 {
219 BIGNUM f,ret;
220 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
221 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
222 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
223
224 BN_init(&f);
225 BN_init(&ret);
226
227 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
228 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
229 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
230 {
231 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
232 goto err;
233 }
234
235 switch (padding)
236 {
237 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
238 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
239 break;
240 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
241 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
242 break;
243 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
244 default:
245 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
246 goto err;
247 }
248 if (i <= 0) goto err;
249
250 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
251
252 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
253 {
254 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
255 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
256 goto err;
257 }
258
259 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
260
261 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
262 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
263
264 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
265 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
266 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
267 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
268 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
269 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
270 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
271 else
272 {
273 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
274 }
275
276 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
277 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
278
279 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
280 * length of the modulus */
281 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
282 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
283 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
284 to[k]=0;
285
286 r=num;
287err:
288 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
289 BN_clear_free(&ret);
290 BN_clear_free(&f);
291 if (buf != NULL)
292 {
293 memset(buf,0,num);
294 OPENSSL_free(buf);
295 }
296 return(r);
297 }
298
299static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
300 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
301 {
302 BIGNUM f,ret;
303 int j,num=0,r= -1;
304 unsigned char *p;
305 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
306 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
307
308 BN_init(&f);
309 BN_init(&ret);
310 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
311 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
312
313 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
314
315 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
316 {
317 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
318 goto err;
319 }
320
321 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
322 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
323 if (flen > num)
324 {
325 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
326 goto err;
327 }
328
329 /* make data into a big number */
330 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
331
332 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
333 {
334 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
335 goto err;
336 }
337
338 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
339
340 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
341 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
342
343 /* do the decrypt */
344 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
345 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
346 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
347 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
348 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
349 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
350 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
351 else
352 {
353 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
354 goto err;
355 }
356
357 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
358 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
359
360 p=buf;
361 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
362
363 switch (padding)
364 {
365 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
366 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
367 break;
368#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
369 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
370 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
371 break;
372#endif
373 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
374 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
375 break;
376 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
377 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
378 break;
379 default:
380 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
381 goto err;
382 }
383 if (r < 0)
384 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
385
386err:
387 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
388 BN_clear_free(&f);
389 BN_clear_free(&ret);
390 if (buf != NULL)
391 {
392 memset(buf,0,num);
393 OPENSSL_free(buf);
394 }
395 return(r);
396 }
397
398/* signature verification */
399static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
400 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
401 {
402 BIGNUM f,ret;
403 int i,num=0,r= -1;
404 unsigned char *p;
405 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
406 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
407
408 BN_init(&f);
409 BN_init(&ret);
410 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
411 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
412
413 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
414 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
415 if (buf == NULL)
416 {
417 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
418 goto err;
419 }
420
421 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
422 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
423 if (flen > num)
424 {
425 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
426 goto err;
427 }
428
429 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
430
431 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
432 {
433 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
434 goto err;
435 }
436
437 /* do the decrypt */
438 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
439 {
440 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
441 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
442 goto err;
443 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
444 {
445 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
446 goto err;
447 }
448 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
449 {
450 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
451 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
452 {
453 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
454 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
455 }
456 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
457 }
458 if (bn_mont_ctx)
459 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
460 }
461
462 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
463 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
464
465 p=buf;
466 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
467
468 switch (padding)
469 {
470 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
471 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
472 break;
473 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
474 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
475 break;
476 default:
477 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
478 goto err;
479 }
480 if (r < 0)
481 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
482
483err:
484 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
485 BN_clear_free(&f);
486 BN_clear_free(&ret);
487 if (buf != NULL)
488 {
489 memset(buf,0,num);
490 OPENSSL_free(buf);
491 }
492 return(r);
493 }
494
495static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
496 {
497 BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
498 int ret=0;
499 BN_CTX *ctx;
500
501 BN_init(&m1);
502 BN_init(&r1);
503 BN_init(&vrfy);
504 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
505
506 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
507 {
508 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
509 {
510 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
511 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
512 goto err;
513 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
514 {
515 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
516 goto err;
517 }
518 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
519 {
520 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
521 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
522 {
523 rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
524 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
525 }
526 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
527 }
528 if (bn_mont_ctx)
529 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
530 }
531
532 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
533 {
534 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
535 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
536 goto err;
537 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
538 {
539 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
540 goto err;
541 }
542 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
543 {
544 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
545 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
546 {
547 rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
548 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
549 }
550 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
551 }
552 if (bn_mont_ctx)
553 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
554 }
555 }
556
557 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
558 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
559 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
560
561 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
562 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
563 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
564
565 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
566 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
567 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
568 if (r0->neg)
569 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
570
571 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
572 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
573 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
574 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
575 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
576 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
577 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
578 * they ensure p > q [steve]
579 */
580 if (r0->neg)
581 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
582 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
583 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
584
585 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
586 {
587 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
588 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
589 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
590 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
591 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
592 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
593 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
594 if (vrfy.neg)
595 if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
596 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
597 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
598 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
599 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
600 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
601 }
602 ret=1;
603err:
604 BN_clear_free(&m1);
605 BN_clear_free(&r1);
606 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
607 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
608 return(ret);
609 }
610
611static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
612 {
613 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
614 return(1);
615 }
616
617static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
618 {
619 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
620 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
621 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
622 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
623 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
624 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
625 return(1);
626 }
627
628#endif