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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
new file mode 100644
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1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include "cryptlib.h"
61#include <openssl/bn.h>
62#include <openssl/rsa.h>
63#include <openssl/rand.h>
64
65#ifndef RSA_NULL
66
67static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
68 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
69static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
70 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
71static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
72 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
73static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
74 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
75static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
76static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
77static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
78static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
79 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
80 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
81 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
82 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
83 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
84 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
85 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
86 RSA_eay_init,
87 RSA_eay_finish,
88 0, /* flags */
89 NULL,
90 0, /* rsa_sign */
91 0 /* rsa_verify */
92 };
93
94const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
95 {
96 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
97 }
98
99static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
100 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
101 {
102 BIGNUM f,ret;
103 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
104 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
105 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
106
107 BN_init(&f);
108 BN_init(&ret);
109 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
110 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
111 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
112 {
113 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
114 goto err;
115 }
116
117 switch (padding)
118 {
119 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
120 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
121 break;
122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
123 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
124 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
125 break;
126#endif
127 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
128 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
129 break;
130 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
131 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
132 break;
133 default:
134 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
135 goto err;
136 }
137 if (i <= 0) goto err;
138
139 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
140
141 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
142 {
143 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
144 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
145 goto err;
146 }
147
148 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
149 {
150 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
151 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
152 goto err;
153 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
154 {
155 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
156 goto err;
157 }
158 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
159 {
160 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
161 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
162 {
163 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
164 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
165 }
166 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
167 }
168 if (bn_mont_ctx)
169 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
170 }
171
172 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
173 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
174
175 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
176 * length of the modulus */
177 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
178 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
179 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
180 to[k]=0;
181
182 r=num;
183err:
184 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
185 BN_clear_free(&f);
186 BN_clear_free(&ret);
187 if (buf != NULL)
188 {
189 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
190 OPENSSL_free(buf);
191 }
192 return(r);
193 }
194
195static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
196 {
197 int ret = 1;
198 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
199 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
200 if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
201 ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
202 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
203 return ret;
204 }
205
206#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
207 do { \
208 if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
209 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
210 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
211 err_instr \
212 } while(0)
213
214static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
215 {
216 BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
217 BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
218
219 /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
220
221 /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
222 * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
223 * of binary compatibility can't */
224
225 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
226 A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
227 if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
228 {
229 /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
230 RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
231 if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
232 }
233 else
234 {
235 if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
236 }
237 if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
238
239 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
240 goto err;
241 ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
242 BN_free(Ai);
243err:
244 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
245 return ret;
246 }
247
248/* signing */
249static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
250 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
251 {
252 BIGNUM f,ret;
253 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
254 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
255 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
256 int local_blinding = 0;
257 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
258
259 BN_init(&f);
260 BN_init(&ret);
261
262 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
263 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
264 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
265 {
266 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
267 goto err;
268 }
269
270 switch (padding)
271 {
272 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
273 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
274 break;
275 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
276 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
277 break;
278 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
279 default:
280 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
281 goto err;
282 }
283 if (i <= 0) goto err;
284
285 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
286
287 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
288 {
289 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
290 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
291 goto err;
292 }
293
294 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
295 blinding = rsa->blinding;
296
297 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
298 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
299 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
300 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
301 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
302 * factors) */
303 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
304 {
305 if (blinding == NULL)
306 {
307 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 goto err;
309 }
310 }
311
312 if (blinding != NULL)
313 {
314 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
315 {
316 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
317
318 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
319 if (blinding == NULL)
320 goto err;
321 local_blinding = 1;
322 }
323 }
324
325 if (blinding)
326 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
327
328 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
329 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
330 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
331 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
332 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
333 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
334 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
335 else
336 {
337 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
338 }
339
340 if (blinding)
341 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
342
343 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
344 * length of the modulus */
345 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
346 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
347 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
348 to[k]=0;
349
350 r=num;
351err:
352 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
353 BN_clear_free(&ret);
354 BN_clear_free(&f);
355 if (local_blinding)
356 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
357 if (buf != NULL)
358 {
359 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
360 OPENSSL_free(buf);
361 }
362 return(r);
363 }
364
365static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
366 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
367 {
368 BIGNUM f,ret;
369 int j,num=0,r= -1;
370 unsigned char *p;
371 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
372 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
373 int local_blinding = 0;
374 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
375
376 BN_init(&f);
377 BN_init(&ret);
378 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
379 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
380
381 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
382
383 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
384 {
385 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
386 goto err;
387 }
388
389 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
390 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
391 if (flen > num)
392 {
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
394 goto err;
395 }
396
397 /* make data into a big number */
398 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
399
400 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
401 {
402 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
403 goto err;
404 }
405
406 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
407 blinding = rsa->blinding;
408
409 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
410 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
411 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
412 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
413 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
414 * factors) */
415 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
416 {
417 if (blinding == NULL)
418 {
419 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 goto err;
421 }
422 }
423
424 if (blinding != NULL)
425 {
426 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
427 {
428 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
429
430 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
431 if (blinding == NULL)
432 goto err;
433 local_blinding = 1;
434 }
435 }
436
437 if (blinding)
438 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
439
440 /* do the decrypt */
441 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
442 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
443 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
444 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
445 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
446 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
447 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
448 else
449 {
450 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
451 goto err;
452 }
453
454 if (blinding)
455 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
456
457 p=buf;
458 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
459
460 switch (padding)
461 {
462 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
463 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
464 break;
465#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
466 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
467 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
468 break;
469#endif
470 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
471 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
472 break;
473 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
474 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
475 break;
476 default:
477 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
478 goto err;
479 }
480 if (r < 0)
481 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
482
483err:
484 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
485 BN_clear_free(&f);
486 BN_clear_free(&ret);
487 if (buf != NULL)
488 {
489 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
490 OPENSSL_free(buf);
491 }
492 return(r);
493 }
494
495/* signature verification */
496static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
497 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
498 {
499 BIGNUM f,ret;
500 int i,num=0,r= -1;
501 unsigned char *p;
502 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
503 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
504
505 BN_init(&f);
506 BN_init(&ret);
507 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
508 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
509
510 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
511 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
512 if (buf == NULL)
513 {
514 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
515 goto err;
516 }
517
518 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
519 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
520 if (flen > num)
521 {
522 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
523 goto err;
524 }
525
526 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
527
528 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
529 {
530 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
531 goto err;
532 }
533
534 /* do the decrypt */
535 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
536 {
537 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
538 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
539 goto err;
540 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
541 {
542 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
543 goto err;
544 }
545 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
546 {
547 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
548 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
549 {
550 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
551 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
552 }
553 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
554 }
555 if (bn_mont_ctx)
556 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
557 }
558
559 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
560 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
561
562 p=buf;
563 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
564
565 switch (padding)
566 {
567 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
568 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
569 break;
570 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
571 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
572 break;
573 default:
574 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
575 goto err;
576 }
577 if (r < 0)
578 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
579
580err:
581 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
582 BN_clear_free(&f);
583 BN_clear_free(&ret);
584 if (buf != NULL)
585 {
586 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
587 OPENSSL_free(buf);
588 }
589 return(r);
590 }
591
592static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
593 {
594 BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
595 int ret=0;
596 BN_CTX *ctx;
597
598 BN_init(&m1);
599 BN_init(&r1);
600 BN_init(&vrfy);
601 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
602
603 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
604 {
605 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
606 {
607 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
608 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
609 goto err;
610 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
611 {
612 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
613 goto err;
614 }
615 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
616 {
617 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
618 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
619 {
620 rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
621 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
622 }
623 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
624 }
625 if (bn_mont_ctx)
626 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
627 }
628
629 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
630 {
631 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
632 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
633 goto err;
634 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
635 {
636 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
637 goto err;
638 }
639 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
640 {
641 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
642 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
643 {
644 rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
645 bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
646 }
647 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
648 }
649 if (bn_mont_ctx)
650 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
651 }
652 }
653
654 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
655 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
656 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
657
658 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
659 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
660 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
661
662 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
663 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
664 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
665 if (r0->neg)
666 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
667
668 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
669 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
670 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
671 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
672 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
673 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
674 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
675 * they ensure p > q [steve]
676 */
677 if (r0->neg)
678 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
679 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
680 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
681
682 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
683 {
684 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
685 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
686 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
687 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
688 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
689 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
690 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
691 if (vrfy.neg)
692 if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
693 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
694 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
695 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
696 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
697 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
698 }
699 ret=1;
700err:
701 BN_clear_free(&m1);
702 BN_clear_free(&r1);
703 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
704 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
705 return(ret);
706 }
707
708static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
709 {
710 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
711 return(1);
712 }
713
714static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
715 {
716 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
717 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
718 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
719 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
720 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
721 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
722 return(1);
723 }
724
725#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-26 18:25:55 +0000