diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 609 |
1 files changed, 609 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0eda816081 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,609 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ | ||
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
| 3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 15 | * | ||
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
| 22 | * | ||
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 25 | * are met: | ||
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 40 | * | ||
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 52 | * | ||
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
| 57 | */ | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
| 60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
| 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
| 62 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
| 63 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
| 64 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | ||
| 65 | |||
| 66 | #ifndef RSA_NULL | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 69 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 70 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 71 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 72 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 73 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 74 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 75 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
| 76 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa); | ||
| 77 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); | ||
| 78 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | ||
| 79 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ | ||
| 80 | "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | ||
| 81 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | ||
| 82 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ | ||
| 83 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ | ||
| 84 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt, | ||
| 85 | RSA_eay_mod_exp, | ||
| 86 | BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ | ||
| 87 | RSA_eay_init, | ||
| 88 | RSA_eay_finish, | ||
| 89 | 0, /* flags */ | ||
| 90 | NULL, | ||
| 91 | 0, /* rsa_sign */ | ||
| 92 | 0 /* rsa_verify */ | ||
| 93 | }; | ||
| 94 | |||
| 95 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) | ||
| 96 | { | ||
| 97 | return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); | ||
| 98 | } | ||
| 99 | |||
| 100 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 101 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 102 | { | ||
| 103 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 104 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 105 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 106 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 107 | |||
| 108 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 109 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 110 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 111 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 112 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 113 | { | ||
| 114 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 115 | goto err; | ||
| 116 | } | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | switch (padding) | ||
| 119 | { | ||
| 120 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 121 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 122 | break; | ||
| 123 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
| 124 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
| 125 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); | ||
| 126 | break; | ||
| 127 | #endif | ||
| 128 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 129 | i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 130 | break; | ||
| 131 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 132 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 133 | break; | ||
| 134 | default: | ||
| 135 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 136 | goto err; | ||
| 137 | } | ||
| 138 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
| 139 | |||
| 140 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 141 | |||
| 142 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
| 143 | { | ||
| 144 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
| 145 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
| 146 | goto err; | ||
| 147 | } | ||
| 148 | |||
| 149 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
| 150 | { | ||
| 151 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 152 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 153 | goto err; | ||
| 154 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
| 155 | { | ||
| 156 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 157 | goto err; | ||
| 158 | } | ||
| 159 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 160 | { | ||
| 161 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 162 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
| 163 | { | ||
| 164 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 165 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 166 | } | ||
| 167 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 168 | } | ||
| 169 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 170 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 171 | } | ||
| 172 | |||
| 173 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
| 174 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
| 175 | |||
| 176 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
| 177 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
| 178 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
| 179 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
| 180 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
| 181 | to[k]=0; | ||
| 182 | |||
| 183 | r=num; | ||
| 184 | err: | ||
| 185 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 186 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 187 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 188 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 189 | { | ||
| 190 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 191 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 192 | } | ||
| 193 | return(r); | ||
| 194 | } | ||
| 195 | |||
| 196 | /* signing */ | ||
| 197 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 198 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 199 | { | ||
| 200 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 201 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 202 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 203 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 204 | |||
| 205 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 206 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 207 | |||
| 208 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 209 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 210 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 211 | { | ||
| 212 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 213 | goto err; | ||
| 214 | } | ||
| 215 | |||
| 216 | switch (padding) | ||
| 217 | { | ||
| 218 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 219 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 220 | break; | ||
| 221 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 222 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
| 223 | break; | ||
| 224 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 225 | default: | ||
| 226 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 227 | goto err; | ||
| 228 | } | ||
| 229 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
| 230 | |||
| 231 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 232 | |||
| 233 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
| 234 | { | ||
| 235 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
| 236 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
| 237 | goto err; | ||
| 238 | } | ||
| 239 | |||
| 240 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
| 241 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
| 242 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 243 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 244 | |||
| 245 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
| 246 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
| 247 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
| 248 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 249 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 250 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 251 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 252 | else | ||
| 253 | { | ||
| 254 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 255 | } | ||
| 256 | |||
| 257 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 258 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 259 | |||
| 260 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
| 261 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
| 262 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
| 263 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
| 264 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
| 265 | to[k]=0; | ||
| 266 | |||
| 267 | r=num; | ||
| 268 | err: | ||
| 269 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 270 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 271 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 272 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 273 | { | ||
| 274 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 275 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 276 | } | ||
| 277 | return(r); | ||
| 278 | } | ||
| 279 | |||
| 280 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 281 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 282 | { | ||
| 283 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 284 | int j,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 285 | unsigned char *p; | ||
| 286 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 287 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 288 | |||
| 289 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 290 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 291 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 292 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 293 | |||
| 294 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 295 | |||
| 296 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
| 297 | { | ||
| 298 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 299 | goto err; | ||
| 300 | } | ||
| 301 | |||
| 302 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
| 303 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
| 304 | if (flen > num) | ||
| 305 | { | ||
| 306 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 307 | goto err; | ||
| 308 | } | ||
| 309 | |||
| 310 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
| 311 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 312 | |||
| 313 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
| 314 | { | ||
| 315 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
| 316 | goto err; | ||
| 317 | } | ||
| 318 | |||
| 319 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
| 320 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
| 321 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 322 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 323 | |||
| 324 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 325 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
| 326 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
| 327 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
| 328 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
| 329 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
| 330 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
| 331 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
| 332 | else | ||
| 333 | { | ||
| 334 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) | ||
| 335 | goto err; | ||
| 336 | } | ||
| 337 | |||
| 338 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
| 339 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 340 | |||
| 341 | p=buf; | ||
| 342 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
| 343 | |||
| 344 | switch (padding) | ||
| 345 | { | ||
| 346 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 347 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 348 | break; | ||
| 349 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
| 350 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
| 351 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | ||
| 352 | break; | ||
| 353 | #endif | ||
| 354 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
| 355 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 356 | break; | ||
| 357 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 358 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
| 359 | break; | ||
| 360 | default: | ||
| 361 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 362 | goto err; | ||
| 363 | } | ||
| 364 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 365 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 366 | |||
| 367 | err: | ||
| 368 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 369 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 370 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 371 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 372 | { | ||
| 373 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 374 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 375 | } | ||
| 376 | return(r); | ||
| 377 | } | ||
| 378 | |||
| 379 | /* signature verification */ | ||
| 380 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
| 381 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
| 382 | { | ||
| 383 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
| 384 | int i,num=0,r= -1; | ||
| 385 | unsigned char *p; | ||
| 386 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
| 387 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
| 388 | |||
| 389 | BN_init(&f); | ||
| 390 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
| 391 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
| 392 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 393 | |||
| 394 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
| 395 | buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); | ||
| 396 | if (buf == NULL) | ||
| 397 | { | ||
| 398 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 399 | goto err; | ||
| 400 | } | ||
| 401 | |||
| 402 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
| 403 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
| 404 | if (flen > num) | ||
| 405 | { | ||
| 406 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
| 407 | goto err; | ||
| 408 | } | ||
| 409 | |||
| 410 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 411 | |||
| 412 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | ||
| 413 | { | ||
| 414 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
| 415 | goto err; | ||
| 416 | } | ||
| 417 | |||
| 418 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
| 419 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
| 420 | { | ||
| 421 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 422 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 423 | goto err; | ||
| 424 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
| 425 | { | ||
| 426 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 427 | goto err; | ||
| 428 | } | ||
| 429 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 430 | { | ||
| 431 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 432 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) | ||
| 433 | { | ||
| 434 | rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 435 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 436 | } | ||
| 437 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 438 | } | ||
| 439 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 440 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 441 | } | ||
| 442 | |||
| 443 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
| 444 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
| 445 | |||
| 446 | p=buf; | ||
| 447 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); | ||
| 448 | |||
| 449 | switch (padding) | ||
| 450 | { | ||
| 451 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
| 452 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 453 | break; | ||
| 454 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
| 455 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
| 456 | break; | ||
| 457 | default: | ||
| 458 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 459 | goto err; | ||
| 460 | } | ||
| 461 | if (r < 0) | ||
| 462 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
| 463 | |||
| 464 | err: | ||
| 465 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 466 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
| 467 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
| 468 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
| 469 | { | ||
| 470 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
| 471 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | ||
| 472 | } | ||
| 473 | return(r); | ||
| 474 | } | ||
| 475 | |||
| 476 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) | ||
| 477 | { | ||
| 478 | BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy; | ||
| 479 | int ret=0; | ||
| 480 | BN_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 481 | |||
| 482 | BN_init(&m1); | ||
| 483 | BN_init(&r1); | ||
| 484 | BN_init(&vrfy); | ||
| 485 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
| 486 | |||
| 487 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) | ||
| 488 | { | ||
| 489 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
| 490 | { | ||
| 491 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 492 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 493 | goto err; | ||
| 494 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx)) | ||
| 495 | { | ||
| 496 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 497 | goto err; | ||
| 498 | } | ||
| 499 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 500 | { | ||
| 501 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 502 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
| 503 | { | ||
| 504 | rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 505 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 506 | } | ||
| 507 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 508 | } | ||
| 509 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 510 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 511 | } | ||
| 512 | |||
| 513 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
| 514 | { | ||
| 515 | BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 516 | if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 517 | goto err; | ||
| 518 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx)) | ||
| 519 | { | ||
| 520 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 521 | goto err; | ||
| 522 | } | ||
| 523 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | ||
| 524 | { | ||
| 525 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 526 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
| 527 | { | ||
| 528 | rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx; | ||
| 529 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | ||
| 530 | } | ||
| 531 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
| 532 | } | ||
| 533 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | ||
| 534 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | ||
| 535 | } | ||
| 536 | } | ||
| 537 | |||
| 538 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 539 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, | ||
| 540 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; | ||
| 541 | |||
| 542 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 543 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, | ||
| 544 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; | ||
| 545 | |||
| 546 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 547 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
| 548 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | ||
| 549 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 550 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 551 | |||
| 552 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 553 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 554 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
| 555 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
| 556 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
| 557 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
| 558 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
| 559 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
| 560 | */ | ||
| 561 | if (r0->neg) | ||
| 562 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
| 563 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 564 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | ||
| 565 | |||
| 566 | if (rsa->e && rsa->n) | ||
| 567 | { | ||
| 568 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 569 | /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation | ||
| 570 | * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of | ||
| 571 | * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check | ||
| 572 | * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ | ||
| 573 | if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err; | ||
| 574 | if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; | ||
| 575 | if (vrfy.neg) | ||
| 576 | if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; | ||
| 577 | if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy)) | ||
| 578 | /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak | ||
| 579 | * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) | ||
| 580 | * mod_exp and return that instead. */ | ||
| 581 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
| 582 | } | ||
| 583 | ret=1; | ||
| 584 | err: | ||
| 585 | BN_clear_free(&m1); | ||
| 586 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | ||
| 587 | BN_clear_free(&vrfy); | ||
| 588 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
| 589 | return(ret); | ||
| 590 | } | ||
| 591 | |||
| 592 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) | ||
| 593 | { | ||
| 594 | rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | ||
| 595 | return(1); | ||
| 596 | } | ||
| 597 | |||
| 598 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) | ||
| 599 | { | ||
| 600 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) | ||
| 601 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | ||
| 602 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) | ||
| 603 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | ||
| 604 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) | ||
| 605 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | ||
| 606 | return(1); | ||
| 607 | } | ||
| 608 | |||
| 609 | #endif | ||
