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Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c | 1018 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1018 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c deleted file mode 100644 index d93760755d..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,1018 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.31 2025/03/28 13:11:57 tb Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* | ||
3 | * Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any | ||
6 | * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above | ||
7 | * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES | ||
10 | * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | ||
11 | * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY | ||
12 | * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES | ||
13 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION | ||
14 | * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN | ||
15 | * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | ||
16 | */ | ||
17 | |||
18 | #include <string.h> | ||
19 | |||
20 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
21 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
22 | #include <openssl/stack.h> | ||
23 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
24 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
25 | |||
26 | #include "stack_local.h" | ||
27 | #include "x509_internal.h" | ||
28 | #include "x509_local.h" | ||
29 | |||
30 | /* XXX move to proper place */ | ||
31 | #define X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 201 | ||
32 | |||
33 | /* | ||
34 | * This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, | ||
35 | * section 6.1 and RFC 9618. It differs in that: | ||
36 | * | ||
37 | * (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not | ||
38 | * output by this implementation. | ||
39 | * | ||
40 | * (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given | ||
41 | * policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for | ||
42 | * each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with | ||
43 | * multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph", | ||
44 | * rather than a "policy tree". | ||
45 | * | ||
46 | * (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily | ||
47 | * as part of building the graph. | ||
48 | * | ||
49 | * (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly. | ||
50 | * | ||
51 | * (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a | ||
52 | * reachability pass. | ||
53 | */ | ||
54 | |||
55 | /* | ||
56 | * An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node | ||
57 | * from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently. | ||
58 | */ | ||
59 | typedef struct x509_policy_node_st { | ||
60 | /* policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280. */ | ||
61 | ASN1_OBJECT *policy; | ||
62 | |||
63 | /* | ||
64 | * parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values | ||
65 | * for all nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry | ||
66 | * in this list will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order | ||
67 | * and may contain duplicates if the corresponding certificate had | ||
68 | * duplicate mappings. | ||
69 | * | ||
70 | * If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then | ||
71 | * a root policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it | ||
72 | * has a path to a leaf node. | ||
73 | * | ||
74 | * Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a | ||
75 | * concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs | ||
76 | * if there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a | ||
77 | * parent list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}. | ||
78 | */ | ||
79 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies; | ||
80 | |||
81 | /* | ||
82 | * mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the | ||
83 | * certificate and zero otherwise. | ||
84 | */ | ||
85 | int mapped; | ||
86 | |||
87 | /* | ||
88 | * reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in | ||
89 | * the end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|. | ||
90 | */ | ||
91 | int reachable; | ||
92 | } X509_POLICY_NODE; | ||
93 | |||
94 | DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) | ||
95 | |||
96 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_NODE, (cmp)) | ||
97 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_NODE) | ||
98 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
99 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
100 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i)) | ||
101 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i), (val)) | ||
102 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
103 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
104 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
105 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
106 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i)) | ||
107 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (ptr)) | ||
108 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val), (i)) | ||
109 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (cmp)) | ||
110 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_NODE, st) | ||
111 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (free_func)) | ||
112 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
113 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
114 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
115 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
116 | |||
117 | /* | ||
118 | * An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the | ||
119 | * policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's | ||
120 | * "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|. | ||
121 | */ | ||
122 | typedef struct x509_policy_level_st { | ||
123 | /* | ||
124 | * nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy | ||
125 | * node, if any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup. | ||
126 | */ | ||
127 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; | ||
128 | |||
129 | /* | ||
130 | * has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth, | ||
131 | * and zero otherwise. | ||
132 | */ | ||
133 | int has_any_policy; | ||
134 | } X509_POLICY_LEVEL; | ||
135 | |||
136 | DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) | ||
137 | |||
138 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (cmp)) | ||
139 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) | ||
140 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
141 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
142 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i)) | ||
143 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i), (val)) | ||
144 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
145 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
146 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
147 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
148 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i)) | ||
149 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (ptr)) | ||
150 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val), (i)) | ||
151 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (cmp)) | ||
152 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, st) | ||
153 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (free_func)) | ||
154 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
155 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
156 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
157 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
158 | |||
159 | /* | ||
160 | * Don't look Ethel, but you would really not want to look if we did | ||
161 | * this the OpenSSL way either, and we are not using this boringsslism | ||
162 | * anywhere else. Callers should ensure that the stack in data is sorted. | ||
163 | */ | ||
164 | void | ||
165 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, | ||
166 | int (*delete_if)(X509_POLICY_NODE *, void *), void *data) | ||
167 | { | ||
168 | _STACK *sk = (_STACK *)nodes; | ||
169 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
170 | int new_num = 0; | ||
171 | int i; | ||
172 | |||
173 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { | ||
174 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | ||
175 | if (!delete_if(node, data)) | ||
176 | sk->data[new_num++] = (char *)node; | ||
177 | } | ||
178 | sk->num = new_num; | ||
179 | } | ||
180 | |||
181 | static int | ||
182 | is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) | ||
183 | { | ||
184 | return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy; | ||
185 | } | ||
186 | |||
187 | static void | ||
188 | x509_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) | ||
189 | { | ||
190 | if (node == NULL) | ||
191 | return; | ||
192 | |||
193 | ASN1_OBJECT_free(node->policy); | ||
194 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(node->parent_policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | ||
195 | free(node); | ||
196 | } | ||
197 | |||
198 | static X509_POLICY_NODE * | ||
199 | x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) | ||
200 | { | ||
201 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = NULL; | ||
202 | |||
203 | if (is_any_policy(policy)) | ||
204 | goto err; | ||
205 | if ((node = calloc(1, sizeof(*node))) == NULL) | ||
206 | goto err; | ||
207 | if ((node->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL) | ||
208 | goto err; | ||
209 | if ((node->parent_policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) | ||
210 | goto err; | ||
211 | |||
212 | return node; | ||
213 | |||
214 | err: | ||
215 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
216 | return NULL; | ||
217 | } | ||
218 | |||
219 | static int | ||
220 | x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a, | ||
221 | const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b) | ||
222 | { | ||
223 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy); | ||
224 | } | ||
225 | |||
226 | static void | ||
227 | x509_policy_level_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
228 | { | ||
229 | if (level == NULL) | ||
230 | return; | ||
231 | |||
232 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(level->nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
233 | free(level); | ||
234 | } | ||
235 | |||
236 | static X509_POLICY_LEVEL * | ||
237 | x509_policy_level_new(void) | ||
238 | { | ||
239 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; | ||
240 | |||
241 | if ((level = calloc(1, sizeof(*level))) == NULL) | ||
242 | goto err; | ||
243 | level->nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(x509_policy_node_cmp); | ||
244 | if (level->nodes == NULL) | ||
245 | goto err; | ||
246 | |||
247 | return level; | ||
248 | |||
249 | err: | ||
250 | x509_policy_level_free(level); | ||
251 | return NULL; | ||
252 | } | ||
253 | |||
254 | static int | ||
255 | x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
256 | { | ||
257 | if (level->has_any_policy) | ||
258 | return 0; | ||
259 | |||
260 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes) == 0; | ||
261 | } | ||
262 | |||
263 | static void | ||
264 | x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
265 | { | ||
266 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
267 | int i; | ||
268 | |||
269 | level->has_any_policy = 0; | ||
270 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) { | ||
271 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); | ||
272 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
273 | } | ||
274 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes); | ||
275 | } | ||
276 | |||
277 | /* | ||
278 | * x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|, | ||
279 | * or NULL if none exists. Callers should ensure that level->nodes is sorted | ||
280 | * to avoid the cost of sorting it in sk_find(). | ||
281 | */ | ||
282 | static X509_POLICY_NODE * | ||
283 | x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) | ||
284 | { | ||
285 | X509_POLICY_NODE node; | ||
286 | node.policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)policy; | ||
287 | int idx; | ||
288 | |||
289 | if ((idx = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(level->nodes, &node)) < 0) | ||
290 | return NULL; | ||
291 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx); | ||
292 | } | ||
293 | |||
294 | /* | ||
295 | * x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns | ||
296 | * one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present | ||
297 | * in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the | ||
298 | * caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself. | ||
299 | * | ||
300 | * This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting | ||
301 | * |level| after each addition. | ||
302 | */ | ||
303 | static int | ||
304 | x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
305 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) | ||
306 | { | ||
307 | int i; | ||
308 | |||
309 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { | ||
310 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | ||
311 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) | ||
312 | return 0; | ||
313 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(nodes, i, NULL); | ||
314 | } | ||
315 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes); | ||
316 | |||
317 | return 1; | ||
318 | } | ||
319 | |||
320 | static int | ||
321 | policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO *const *a, | ||
322 | const POLICYINFO *const *b) | ||
323 | { | ||
324 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid); | ||
325 | } | ||
326 | |||
327 | static int | ||
328 | delete_if_not_in_policies(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) | ||
329 | { | ||
330 | const CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies = data; | ||
331 | POLICYINFO info; | ||
332 | info.policyid = node->policy; | ||
333 | |||
334 | if (sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies, &info) >= 0) | ||
335 | return 0; | ||
336 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
337 | return 1; | ||
338 | } | ||
339 | |||
340 | /* | ||
341 | * process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s | ||
342 | * certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC | ||
343 | * 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's | ||
344 | * "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is | ||
345 | * the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies | ||
346 | * whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception | ||
347 | * for self-issued certificates. | ||
348 | */ | ||
349 | static int | ||
350 | process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
351 | int any_policy_allowed) | ||
352 | { | ||
353 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL; | ||
354 | CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies; | ||
355 | const POLICYINFO *policy; | ||
356 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
357 | int cert_has_any_policy, critical, i, previous_level_has_any_policy; | ||
358 | int ret = 0; | ||
359 | |||
360 | policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, | ||
361 | NULL); | ||
362 | if (policies == NULL) { | ||
363 | if (critical != -1) | ||
364 | return 0; /* Syntax error in the extension. */ | ||
365 | |||
366 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e). */ | ||
367 | x509_policy_level_clear(level); | ||
368 | return 1; | ||
369 | } | ||
370 | |||
371 | /* | ||
372 | * certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4. | ||
373 | * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. | ||
374 | */ | ||
375 | if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) { | ||
376 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
377 | goto err; | ||
378 | } | ||
379 | |||
380 | (void)sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies, policyinfo_cmp); | ||
381 | sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies); | ||
382 | cert_has_any_policy = 0; | ||
383 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) { | ||
384 | policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i); | ||
385 | if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) | ||
386 | cert_has_any_policy = 1; | ||
387 | if (i > 0 && | ||
388 | OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid, | ||
389 | policy->policyid) == 0) { | ||
390 | /* | ||
391 | * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not | ||
392 | * have duplicates. | ||
393 | */ | ||
394 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
395 | goto err; | ||
396 | } | ||
397 | } | ||
398 | |||
399 | /* | ||
400 | * This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), | ||
401 | * though in a slightly different order. |level| currently contains | ||
402 | * "expected_policy_set" values of the previous level. | ||
403 | * See |process_policy_mappings| for details. | ||
404 | */ | ||
405 | previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy; | ||
406 | |||
407 | /* | ||
408 | * First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these | ||
409 | * two steps is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring | ||
410 | * anyPolicy if it is inhibited. | ||
411 | */ | ||
412 | if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) { | ||
413 | if (!sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies)) | ||
414 | goto err; | ||
415 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, | ||
416 | delete_if_not_in_policies, policies); | ||
417 | level->has_any_policy = 0; | ||
418 | } | ||
419 | |||
420 | /* | ||
421 | * Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy | ||
422 | * node. | ||
423 | */ | ||
424 | if (previous_level_has_any_policy) { | ||
425 | new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | ||
426 | if (new_nodes == NULL) | ||
427 | goto err; | ||
428 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) { | ||
429 | policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i); | ||
430 | /* | ||
431 | * Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy| | ||
432 | * is in |level| if and only if it would have been a | ||
433 | * match in step (d.1.ii). | ||
434 | */ | ||
435 | if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) | ||
436 | continue; | ||
437 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
438 | goto err; | ||
439 | if (x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) != NULL) | ||
440 | continue; | ||
441 | node = x509_policy_node_new(policy->policyid); | ||
442 | if (node == NULL || | ||
443 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) { | ||
444 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
445 | goto err; | ||
446 | } | ||
447 | } | ||
448 | if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) | ||
449 | goto err; | ||
450 | } | ||
451 | |||
452 | ret = 1; | ||
453 | |||
454 | err: | ||
455 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
456 | CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free(policies); | ||
457 | return ret; | ||
458 | } | ||
459 | |||
460 | static int | ||
461 | compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a, | ||
462 | const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) | ||
463 | { | ||
464 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
465 | } | ||
466 | |||
467 | static int | ||
468 | compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a, | ||
469 | const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) | ||
470 | { | ||
471 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy); | ||
472 | } | ||
473 | |||
474 | static int | ||
475 | delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) | ||
476 | { | ||
477 | const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data; | ||
478 | POLICY_MAPPING mapping; | ||
479 | mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy; | ||
480 | if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings, &mapping) < 0) | ||
481 | return 0; | ||
482 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
483 | return 1; | ||
484 | } | ||
485 | |||
486 | /* | ||
487 | * process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|, | ||
488 | * whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies | ||
489 | * whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an | ||
490 | * |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On | ||
491 | * error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280, | ||
492 | * section 6.1.4. | ||
493 | * | ||
494 | * We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|. | ||
495 | * |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with | ||
496 | * "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains | ||
497 | * P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2 | ||
498 | * with P1 in |parent_policies|. | ||
499 | * | ||
500 | * This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next | ||
501 | * certificate contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter | ||
502 | * this result down to compute the actual level. | ||
503 | */ | ||
504 | static X509_POLICY_LEVEL * | ||
505 | process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert, | ||
506 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
507 | int mapping_allowed) | ||
508 | { | ||
509 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL; | ||
510 | POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings; | ||
511 | const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy; | ||
512 | POLICY_MAPPING *mapping; | ||
513 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *next = NULL; | ||
514 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
515 | int critical, i; | ||
516 | int ok = 0; | ||
517 | |||
518 | mappings = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL); | ||
519 | if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) { | ||
520 | /* Syntax error in the policy mappings extension. */ | ||
521 | goto err; | ||
522 | } | ||
523 | |||
524 | if (mappings != NULL) { | ||
525 | /* | ||
526 | * PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5. | ||
527 | * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into | ||
528 | * the parser. | ||
529 | */ | ||
530 | if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) { | ||
531 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
532 | goto err; | ||
533 | } | ||
534 | |||
535 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a). */ | ||
536 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
537 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
538 | if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) || | ||
539 | is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) | ||
540 | goto err; | ||
541 | } | ||
542 | |||
543 | /* Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy. */ | ||
544 | (void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, | ||
545 | compare_issuer_policy); | ||
546 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings); | ||
547 | |||
548 | if (mapping_allowed) { | ||
549 | /* | ||
550 | * Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level| | ||
551 | * which may be needed as part of RFC 5280, | ||
552 | * section 6.1.4, step (b.1). | ||
553 | */ | ||
554 | new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | ||
555 | if (new_nodes == NULL) | ||
556 | goto err; | ||
557 | last_policy = NULL; | ||
558 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
559 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
560 | /* | ||
561 | * There may be multiple mappings with the same | ||
562 | * |issuerDomainPolicy|. | ||
563 | */ | ||
564 | if (last_policy != NULL && | ||
565 | OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, | ||
566 | last_policy) == 0) | ||
567 | continue; | ||
568 | last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy; | ||
569 | |||
570 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
571 | goto err; | ||
572 | node = x509_policy_level_find(level, | ||
573 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
574 | if (node == NULL) { | ||
575 | if (!level->has_any_policy) | ||
576 | continue; | ||
577 | node = x509_policy_node_new( | ||
578 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
579 | if (node == NULL || | ||
580 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, | ||
581 | node)) { | ||
582 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
583 | goto err; | ||
584 | } | ||
585 | } | ||
586 | node->mapped = 1; | ||
587 | } | ||
588 | if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) | ||
589 | goto err; | ||
590 | } else { | ||
591 | /* | ||
592 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is | ||
593 | * inhibited, delete all mapped nodes. | ||
594 | */ | ||
595 | if (!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings)) | ||
596 | goto err; | ||
597 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, | ||
598 | delete_if_mapped, mappings); | ||
599 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, | ||
600 | POLICY_MAPPING_free); | ||
601 | mappings = NULL; | ||
602 | } | ||
603 | } | ||
604 | |||
605 | /* | ||
606 | * If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set" | ||
607 | * value, itself. Add those to |mappings|. | ||
608 | */ | ||
609 | if (mappings == NULL) { | ||
610 | mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null(); | ||
611 | if (mappings == NULL) | ||
612 | goto err; | ||
613 | } | ||
614 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) { | ||
615 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); | ||
616 | if (!node->mapped) { | ||
617 | mapping = POLICY_MAPPING_new(); | ||
618 | if (mapping == NULL) | ||
619 | goto err; | ||
620 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy); | ||
621 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy); | ||
622 | if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == NULL || | ||
623 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == NULL || | ||
624 | !sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(mappings, mapping)) { | ||
625 | POLICY_MAPPING_free(mapping); | ||
626 | goto err; | ||
627 | } | ||
628 | } | ||
629 | } | ||
630 | |||
631 | /* Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy. */ | ||
632 | (void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy); | ||
633 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings); | ||
634 | |||
635 | /* Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation. */ | ||
636 | next = x509_policy_level_new(); | ||
637 | if (next == NULL) | ||
638 | goto err; | ||
639 | next->has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy; | ||
640 | |||
641 | X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL; | ||
642 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
643 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
644 | /* | ||
645 | * Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in | ||
646 | * the graph. | ||
647 | */ | ||
648 | if (!level->has_any_policy) { | ||
649 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
650 | goto err; | ||
651 | if (x509_policy_level_find(level, | ||
652 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL) | ||
653 | continue; | ||
654 | } | ||
655 | |||
656 | if (last_node == NULL || | ||
657 | OBJ_cmp(last_node->policy, mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) != | ||
658 | 0) { | ||
659 | last_node = x509_policy_node_new( | ||
660 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy); | ||
661 | if (last_node == NULL || | ||
662 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(next->nodes, last_node)) { | ||
663 | x509_policy_node_free(last_node); | ||
664 | goto err; | ||
665 | } | ||
666 | } | ||
667 | |||
668 | if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(last_node->parent_policies, | ||
669 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy)) | ||
670 | goto err; | ||
671 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL; | ||
672 | } | ||
673 | |||
674 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(next->nodes); | ||
675 | ok = 1; | ||
676 | |||
677 | err: | ||
678 | if (!ok) { | ||
679 | x509_policy_level_free(next); | ||
680 | next = NULL; | ||
681 | } | ||
682 | |||
683 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free); | ||
684 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
685 | return next; | ||
686 | } | ||
687 | |||
688 | /* | ||
689 | * apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum | ||
690 | * of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if | ||
691 | * |skip_certs| is negative. | ||
692 | */ | ||
693 | static int | ||
694 | apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value) | ||
695 | { | ||
696 | if (skip_certs == NULL) | ||
697 | return 1; | ||
698 | |||
699 | /* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. */ | ||
700 | if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) { | ||
701 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
702 | return 0; | ||
703 | } | ||
704 | |||
705 | /* If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|. */ | ||
706 | uint64_t u64; | ||
707 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) | ||
708 | *value = (size_t)u64; | ||
709 | ERR_clear_error(); | ||
710 | return 1; | ||
711 | } | ||
712 | |||
713 | /* | ||
714 | * process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and | ||
715 | * |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit | ||
716 | * anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This | ||
717 | * implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4. | ||
718 | */ | ||
719 | static int | ||
720 | process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy, | ||
721 | size_t *policy_mapping, | ||
722 | size_t *inhibit_any_policy) | ||
723 | { | ||
724 | ASN1_INTEGER *inhibit_any_policy_ext; | ||
725 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *constraints; | ||
726 | int critical; | ||
727 | int ok = 0; | ||
728 | |||
729 | constraints = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, | ||
730 | NULL); | ||
731 | if (constraints == NULL && critical != -1) | ||
732 | return 0; | ||
733 | if (constraints != NULL) { | ||
734 | if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL && | ||
735 | constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) { | ||
736 | /* | ||
737 | * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the | ||
738 | * fields must be | ||
739 | */ | ||
740 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
741 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints); | ||
742 | return 0; | ||
743 | } | ||
744 | ok = apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy, | ||
745 | explicit_policy) && | ||
746 | apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping, | ||
747 | policy_mapping); | ||
748 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints); | ||
749 | if (!ok) | ||
750 | return 0; | ||
751 | } | ||
752 | |||
753 | inhibit_any_policy_ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy, | ||
754 | &critical, NULL); | ||
755 | if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == NULL && critical != -1) | ||
756 | return 0; | ||
757 | ok = apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext, inhibit_any_policy); | ||
758 | ASN1_INTEGER_free(inhibit_any_policy_ext); | ||
759 | return ok; | ||
760 | } | ||
761 | |||
762 | /* | ||
763 | * has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs | ||
764 | * |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero | ||
765 | * otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This | ||
766 | * function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy | ||
767 | * evaluation. | ||
768 | */ | ||
769 | static int | ||
770 | has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels, | ||
771 | const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) | ||
772 | { | ||
773 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, *prev; | ||
774 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *parent; | ||
775 | int num_levels, user_has_any_policy; | ||
776 | int i, j, k; | ||
777 | |||
778 | if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies)) | ||
779 | return 0; | ||
780 | |||
781 | /* Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty. */ | ||
782 | num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels); | ||
783 | level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, num_levels - 1); | ||
784 | if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) | ||
785 | return 0; | ||
786 | |||
787 | /* | ||
788 | * If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single | ||
789 | * anyPolicy value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy | ||
790 | * explicitly. | ||
791 | */ | ||
792 | user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) <= 0; | ||
793 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) { | ||
794 | if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) { | ||
795 | user_has_any_policy = 1; | ||
796 | break; | ||
797 | } | ||
798 | } | ||
799 | |||
800 | /* | ||
801 | * Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set | ||
802 | * contains anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph. | ||
803 | */ | ||
804 | if (user_has_any_policy) | ||
805 | return 1; | ||
806 | |||
807 | /* | ||
808 | * Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has | ||
809 | * anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection | ||
810 | * may synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the | ||
811 | * policy list itself, so we skip actually computing this. | ||
812 | */ | ||
813 | if (level->has_any_policy) | ||
814 | return 1; | ||
815 | |||
816 | /* | ||
817 | * We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent | ||
818 | * anyPolicy, step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the | ||
819 | * bottommost level. Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable. | ||
820 | */ | ||
821 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) | ||
822 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1; | ||
823 | |||
824 | for (i = num_levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | ||
825 | level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i); | ||
826 | for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); j++) { | ||
827 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, j); | ||
828 | if (!node->reachable) | ||
829 | continue; | ||
830 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) { | ||
831 | /* | ||
832 | * |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of | ||
833 | * "valid_policy_node_set". If it exists in | ||
834 | * |user_policies|, the intersection is | ||
835 | * non-empty and we * can return immediately. | ||
836 | */ | ||
837 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies, | ||
838 | node->policy) >= 0) | ||
839 | return 1; | ||
840 | } else if (i > 0) { | ||
841 | int num_parent_policies = | ||
842 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies); | ||
843 | /* | ||
844 | * |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark | ||
845 | * the parents reachable, to be inspected by the | ||
846 | * next loop iteration. | ||
847 | */ | ||
848 | prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i - 1); | ||
849 | for (k = 0; k < num_parent_policies; k++) { | ||
850 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(prev->nodes)) | ||
851 | return 0; | ||
852 | parent = x509_policy_level_find(prev, | ||
853 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies, | ||
854 | k)); | ||
855 | if (parent != NULL) | ||
856 | parent->reachable = 1; | ||
857 | } | ||
858 | } | ||
859 | } | ||
860 | } | ||
861 | |||
862 | return 0; | ||
863 | } | ||
864 | |||
865 | static int | ||
866 | asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *const *b) | ||
867 | { | ||
868 | return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b); | ||
869 | } | ||
870 | |||
871 | int | ||
872 | X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | ||
873 | const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies, | ||
874 | unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert) | ||
875 | { | ||
876 | *out_current_cert = NULL; | ||
877 | int ret = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | ||
878 | X509 *cert; | ||
879 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL; | ||
880 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level; | ||
881 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL; | ||
882 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL; | ||
883 | int num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs); | ||
884 | int is_self_issued, any_policy_allowed; | ||
885 | int i; | ||
886 | |||
887 | /* Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor. */ | ||
888 | if (num_certs <= 1) | ||
889 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
890 | |||
891 | /* See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f). */ | ||
892 | size_t explicit_policy = | ||
893 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
894 | size_t inhibit_any_policy = | ||
895 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
896 | size_t policy_mapping = | ||
897 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
898 | |||
899 | levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null(); | ||
900 | if (levels == NULL) | ||
901 | goto err; | ||
902 | |||
903 | for (i = num_certs - 2; i >= 0; i--) { | ||
904 | cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | ||
905 | if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) | ||
906 | goto err; | ||
907 | is_self_issued = (cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0; | ||
908 | |||
909 | if (level == NULL) { | ||
910 | if (i != num_certs - 2) | ||
911 | goto err; | ||
912 | level = x509_policy_level_new(); | ||
913 | if (level == NULL) | ||
914 | goto err; | ||
915 | level->has_any_policy = 1; | ||
916 | } | ||
917 | |||
918 | /* | ||
919 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed| | ||
920 | * is computed as in step (d.2). | ||
921 | */ | ||
922 | any_policy_allowed = | ||
923 | inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued); | ||
924 | if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level, | ||
925 | any_policy_allowed)) { | ||
926 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
927 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
928 | goto err; | ||
929 | } | ||
930 | |||
931 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f). */ | ||
932 | if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) { | ||
933 | ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | ||
934 | goto err; | ||
935 | } | ||
936 | |||
937 | /* Insert into the list. */ | ||
938 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level)) | ||
939 | goto err; | ||
940 | current_level = level; | ||
941 | level = NULL; | ||
942 | |||
943 | /* | ||
944 | * If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. | ||
945 | * If it is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead. | ||
946 | */ | ||
947 | if (i != 0) { | ||
948 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b). */ | ||
949 | level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level, | ||
950 | policy_mapping > 0); | ||
951 | if (level == NULL) { | ||
952 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
953 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
954 | goto err; | ||
955 | } | ||
956 | } | ||
957 | |||
958 | /* | ||
959 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and | ||
960 | * section 6.1.5, step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, | ||
961 | * RFC 5280 says only to update |explicit_policy|, but | ||
962 | * |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no | ||
963 | * longer read at this point, so we use the same process. | ||
964 | */ | ||
965 | if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) { | ||
966 | if (explicit_policy > 0) | ||
967 | explicit_policy--; | ||
968 | if (policy_mapping > 0) | ||
969 | policy_mapping--; | ||
970 | if (inhibit_any_policy > 0) | ||
971 | inhibit_any_policy--; | ||
972 | } | ||
973 | if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy, | ||
974 | &policy_mapping, &inhibit_any_policy)) { | ||
975 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
976 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
977 | goto err; | ||
978 | } | ||
979 | } | ||
980 | |||
981 | /* | ||
982 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, | ||
983 | * so it is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set | ||
984 | * is not empty. | ||
985 | */ | ||
986 | if (explicit_policy == 0) { | ||
987 | /* | ||
988 | * Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient | ||
989 | * lookup. | ||
990 | */ | ||
991 | if (user_policies != NULL) { | ||
992 | user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup( | ||
993 | user_policies); | ||
994 | if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) | ||
995 | goto err; | ||
996 | (void)sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, | ||
997 | asn1_object_cmp); | ||
998 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted); | ||
999 | } | ||
1000 | |||
1001 | if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) { | ||
1002 | ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | ||
1003 | goto err; | ||
1004 | } | ||
1005 | } | ||
1006 | |||
1007 | ret = X509_V_OK; | ||
1008 | |||
1009 | err: | ||
1010 | x509_policy_level_free(level); | ||
1011 | /* | ||
1012 | * |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so | ||
1013 | * we do not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|. | ||
1014 | */ | ||
1015 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted); | ||
1016 | sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free); | ||
1017 | return ret; | ||
1018 | } | ||