diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c | 1018 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1018 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c deleted file mode 100644 index d93760755d..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,1018 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.31 2025/03/28 13:11:57 tb Exp $ */ | ||
| 2 | /* | ||
| 3 | * Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any | ||
| 6 | * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above | ||
| 7 | * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES | ||
| 10 | * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | ||
| 11 | * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY | ||
| 12 | * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES | ||
| 13 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION | ||
| 14 | * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN | ||
| 15 | * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | ||
| 16 | */ | ||
| 17 | |||
| 18 | #include <string.h> | ||
| 19 | |||
| 20 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
| 21 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
| 22 | #include <openssl/stack.h> | ||
| 23 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
| 24 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
| 25 | |||
| 26 | #include "stack_local.h" | ||
| 27 | #include "x509_internal.h" | ||
| 28 | #include "x509_local.h" | ||
| 29 | |||
| 30 | /* XXX move to proper place */ | ||
| 31 | #define X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 201 | ||
| 32 | |||
| 33 | /* | ||
| 34 | * This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, | ||
| 35 | * section 6.1 and RFC 9618. It differs in that: | ||
| 36 | * | ||
| 37 | * (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not | ||
| 38 | * output by this implementation. | ||
| 39 | * | ||
| 40 | * (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given | ||
| 41 | * policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for | ||
| 42 | * each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with | ||
| 43 | * multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph", | ||
| 44 | * rather than a "policy tree". | ||
| 45 | * | ||
| 46 | * (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily | ||
| 47 | * as part of building the graph. | ||
| 48 | * | ||
| 49 | * (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly. | ||
| 50 | * | ||
| 51 | * (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a | ||
| 52 | * reachability pass. | ||
| 53 | */ | ||
| 54 | |||
| 55 | /* | ||
| 56 | * An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node | ||
| 57 | * from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently. | ||
| 58 | */ | ||
| 59 | typedef struct x509_policy_node_st { | ||
| 60 | /* policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280. */ | ||
| 61 | ASN1_OBJECT *policy; | ||
| 62 | |||
| 63 | /* | ||
| 64 | * parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values | ||
| 65 | * for all nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry | ||
| 66 | * in this list will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order | ||
| 67 | * and may contain duplicates if the corresponding certificate had | ||
| 68 | * duplicate mappings. | ||
| 69 | * | ||
| 70 | * If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then | ||
| 71 | * a root policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it | ||
| 72 | * has a path to a leaf node. | ||
| 73 | * | ||
| 74 | * Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a | ||
| 75 | * concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs | ||
| 76 | * if there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a | ||
| 77 | * parent list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}. | ||
| 78 | */ | ||
| 79 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies; | ||
| 80 | |||
| 81 | /* | ||
| 82 | * mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the | ||
| 83 | * certificate and zero otherwise. | ||
| 84 | */ | ||
| 85 | int mapped; | ||
| 86 | |||
| 87 | /* | ||
| 88 | * reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in | ||
| 89 | * the end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|. | ||
| 90 | */ | ||
| 91 | int reachable; | ||
| 92 | } X509_POLICY_NODE; | ||
| 93 | |||
| 94 | DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) | ||
| 95 | |||
| 96 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_NODE, (cmp)) | ||
| 97 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_NODE) | ||
| 98 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 99 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 100 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i)) | ||
| 101 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i), (val)) | ||
| 102 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 103 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
| 104 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
| 105 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val)) | ||
| 106 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i)) | ||
| 107 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (ptr)) | ||
| 108 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val), (i)) | ||
| 109 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (cmp)) | ||
| 110 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_NODE, st) | ||
| 111 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (free_func)) | ||
| 112 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 113 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 114 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 115 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st)) | ||
| 116 | |||
| 117 | /* | ||
| 118 | * An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the | ||
| 119 | * policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's | ||
| 120 | * "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|. | ||
| 121 | */ | ||
| 122 | typedef struct x509_policy_level_st { | ||
| 123 | /* | ||
| 124 | * nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy | ||
| 125 | * node, if any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup. | ||
| 126 | */ | ||
| 127 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; | ||
| 128 | |||
| 129 | /* | ||
| 130 | * has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth, | ||
| 131 | * and zero otherwise. | ||
| 132 | */ | ||
| 133 | int has_any_policy; | ||
| 134 | } X509_POLICY_LEVEL; | ||
| 135 | |||
| 136 | DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) | ||
| 137 | |||
| 138 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (cmp)) | ||
| 139 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) | ||
| 140 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 141 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 142 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i)) | ||
| 143 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i), (val)) | ||
| 144 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 145 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
| 146 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
| 147 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val)) | ||
| 148 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i)) | ||
| 149 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (ptr)) | ||
| 150 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val), (i)) | ||
| 151 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (cmp)) | ||
| 152 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, st) | ||
| 153 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (free_func)) | ||
| 154 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 155 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 156 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 157 | #define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st)) | ||
| 158 | |||
| 159 | /* | ||
| 160 | * Don't look Ethel, but you would really not want to look if we did | ||
| 161 | * this the OpenSSL way either, and we are not using this boringsslism | ||
| 162 | * anywhere else. Callers should ensure that the stack in data is sorted. | ||
| 163 | */ | ||
| 164 | void | ||
| 165 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, | ||
| 166 | int (*delete_if)(X509_POLICY_NODE *, void *), void *data) | ||
| 167 | { | ||
| 168 | _STACK *sk = (_STACK *)nodes; | ||
| 169 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
| 170 | int new_num = 0; | ||
| 171 | int i; | ||
| 172 | |||
| 173 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { | ||
| 174 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | ||
| 175 | if (!delete_if(node, data)) | ||
| 176 | sk->data[new_num++] = (char *)node; | ||
| 177 | } | ||
| 178 | sk->num = new_num; | ||
| 179 | } | ||
| 180 | |||
| 181 | static int | ||
| 182 | is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) | ||
| 183 | { | ||
| 184 | return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy; | ||
| 185 | } | ||
| 186 | |||
| 187 | static void | ||
| 188 | x509_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) | ||
| 189 | { | ||
| 190 | if (node == NULL) | ||
| 191 | return; | ||
| 192 | |||
| 193 | ASN1_OBJECT_free(node->policy); | ||
| 194 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(node->parent_policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | ||
| 195 | free(node); | ||
| 196 | } | ||
| 197 | |||
| 198 | static X509_POLICY_NODE * | ||
| 199 | x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) | ||
| 200 | { | ||
| 201 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = NULL; | ||
| 202 | |||
| 203 | if (is_any_policy(policy)) | ||
| 204 | goto err; | ||
| 205 | if ((node = calloc(1, sizeof(*node))) == NULL) | ||
| 206 | goto err; | ||
| 207 | if ((node->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL) | ||
| 208 | goto err; | ||
| 209 | if ((node->parent_policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) | ||
| 210 | goto err; | ||
| 211 | |||
| 212 | return node; | ||
| 213 | |||
| 214 | err: | ||
| 215 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 216 | return NULL; | ||
| 217 | } | ||
| 218 | |||
| 219 | static int | ||
| 220 | x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a, | ||
| 221 | const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b) | ||
| 222 | { | ||
| 223 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy); | ||
| 224 | } | ||
| 225 | |||
| 226 | static void | ||
| 227 | x509_policy_level_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
| 228 | { | ||
| 229 | if (level == NULL) | ||
| 230 | return; | ||
| 231 | |||
| 232 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(level->nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
| 233 | free(level); | ||
| 234 | } | ||
| 235 | |||
| 236 | static X509_POLICY_LEVEL * | ||
| 237 | x509_policy_level_new(void) | ||
| 238 | { | ||
| 239 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; | ||
| 240 | |||
| 241 | if ((level = calloc(1, sizeof(*level))) == NULL) | ||
| 242 | goto err; | ||
| 243 | level->nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(x509_policy_node_cmp); | ||
| 244 | if (level->nodes == NULL) | ||
| 245 | goto err; | ||
| 246 | |||
| 247 | return level; | ||
| 248 | |||
| 249 | err: | ||
| 250 | x509_policy_level_free(level); | ||
| 251 | return NULL; | ||
| 252 | } | ||
| 253 | |||
| 254 | static int | ||
| 255 | x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
| 256 | { | ||
| 257 | if (level->has_any_policy) | ||
| 258 | return 0; | ||
| 259 | |||
| 260 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes) == 0; | ||
| 261 | } | ||
| 262 | |||
| 263 | static void | ||
| 264 | x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) | ||
| 265 | { | ||
| 266 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
| 267 | int i; | ||
| 268 | |||
| 269 | level->has_any_policy = 0; | ||
| 270 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) { | ||
| 271 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); | ||
| 272 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 273 | } | ||
| 274 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes); | ||
| 275 | } | ||
| 276 | |||
| 277 | /* | ||
| 278 | * x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|, | ||
| 279 | * or NULL if none exists. Callers should ensure that level->nodes is sorted | ||
| 280 | * to avoid the cost of sorting it in sk_find(). | ||
| 281 | */ | ||
| 282 | static X509_POLICY_NODE * | ||
| 283 | x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) | ||
| 284 | { | ||
| 285 | X509_POLICY_NODE node; | ||
| 286 | node.policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)policy; | ||
| 287 | int idx; | ||
| 288 | |||
| 289 | if ((idx = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(level->nodes, &node)) < 0) | ||
| 290 | return NULL; | ||
| 291 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx); | ||
| 292 | } | ||
| 293 | |||
| 294 | /* | ||
| 295 | * x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns | ||
| 296 | * one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present | ||
| 297 | * in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the | ||
| 298 | * caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself. | ||
| 299 | * | ||
| 300 | * This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting | ||
| 301 | * |level| after each addition. | ||
| 302 | */ | ||
| 303 | static int | ||
| 304 | x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
| 305 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) | ||
| 306 | { | ||
| 307 | int i; | ||
| 308 | |||
| 309 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { | ||
| 310 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | ||
| 311 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) | ||
| 312 | return 0; | ||
| 313 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(nodes, i, NULL); | ||
| 314 | } | ||
| 315 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes); | ||
| 316 | |||
| 317 | return 1; | ||
| 318 | } | ||
| 319 | |||
| 320 | static int | ||
| 321 | policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO *const *a, | ||
| 322 | const POLICYINFO *const *b) | ||
| 323 | { | ||
| 324 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid); | ||
| 325 | } | ||
| 326 | |||
| 327 | static int | ||
| 328 | delete_if_not_in_policies(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) | ||
| 329 | { | ||
| 330 | const CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies = data; | ||
| 331 | POLICYINFO info; | ||
| 332 | info.policyid = node->policy; | ||
| 333 | |||
| 334 | if (sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies, &info) >= 0) | ||
| 335 | return 0; | ||
| 336 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 337 | return 1; | ||
| 338 | } | ||
| 339 | |||
| 340 | /* | ||
| 341 | * process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s | ||
| 342 | * certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC | ||
| 343 | * 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's | ||
| 344 | * "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is | ||
| 345 | * the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies | ||
| 346 | * whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception | ||
| 347 | * for self-issued certificates. | ||
| 348 | */ | ||
| 349 | static int | ||
| 350 | process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
| 351 | int any_policy_allowed) | ||
| 352 | { | ||
| 353 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL; | ||
| 354 | CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies; | ||
| 355 | const POLICYINFO *policy; | ||
| 356 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
| 357 | int cert_has_any_policy, critical, i, previous_level_has_any_policy; | ||
| 358 | int ret = 0; | ||
| 359 | |||
| 360 | policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, | ||
| 361 | NULL); | ||
| 362 | if (policies == NULL) { | ||
| 363 | if (critical != -1) | ||
| 364 | return 0; /* Syntax error in the extension. */ | ||
| 365 | |||
| 366 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e). */ | ||
| 367 | x509_policy_level_clear(level); | ||
| 368 | return 1; | ||
| 369 | } | ||
| 370 | |||
| 371 | /* | ||
| 372 | * certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4. | ||
| 373 | * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. | ||
| 374 | */ | ||
| 375 | if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) { | ||
| 376 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
| 377 | goto err; | ||
| 378 | } | ||
| 379 | |||
| 380 | (void)sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies, policyinfo_cmp); | ||
| 381 | sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies); | ||
| 382 | cert_has_any_policy = 0; | ||
| 383 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) { | ||
| 384 | policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i); | ||
| 385 | if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) | ||
| 386 | cert_has_any_policy = 1; | ||
| 387 | if (i > 0 && | ||
| 388 | OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid, | ||
| 389 | policy->policyid) == 0) { | ||
| 390 | /* | ||
| 391 | * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not | ||
| 392 | * have duplicates. | ||
| 393 | */ | ||
| 394 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
| 395 | goto err; | ||
| 396 | } | ||
| 397 | } | ||
| 398 | |||
| 399 | /* | ||
| 400 | * This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), | ||
| 401 | * though in a slightly different order. |level| currently contains | ||
| 402 | * "expected_policy_set" values of the previous level. | ||
| 403 | * See |process_policy_mappings| for details. | ||
| 404 | */ | ||
| 405 | previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy; | ||
| 406 | |||
| 407 | /* | ||
| 408 | * First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these | ||
| 409 | * two steps is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring | ||
| 410 | * anyPolicy if it is inhibited. | ||
| 411 | */ | ||
| 412 | if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) { | ||
| 413 | if (!sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies)) | ||
| 414 | goto err; | ||
| 415 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, | ||
| 416 | delete_if_not_in_policies, policies); | ||
| 417 | level->has_any_policy = 0; | ||
| 418 | } | ||
| 419 | |||
| 420 | /* | ||
| 421 | * Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy | ||
| 422 | * node. | ||
| 423 | */ | ||
| 424 | if (previous_level_has_any_policy) { | ||
| 425 | new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | ||
| 426 | if (new_nodes == NULL) | ||
| 427 | goto err; | ||
| 428 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) { | ||
| 429 | policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i); | ||
| 430 | /* | ||
| 431 | * Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy| | ||
| 432 | * is in |level| if and only if it would have been a | ||
| 433 | * match in step (d.1.ii). | ||
| 434 | */ | ||
| 435 | if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) | ||
| 436 | continue; | ||
| 437 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
| 438 | goto err; | ||
| 439 | if (x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) != NULL) | ||
| 440 | continue; | ||
| 441 | node = x509_policy_node_new(policy->policyid); | ||
| 442 | if (node == NULL || | ||
| 443 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) { | ||
| 444 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 445 | goto err; | ||
| 446 | } | ||
| 447 | } | ||
| 448 | if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) | ||
| 449 | goto err; | ||
| 450 | } | ||
| 451 | |||
| 452 | ret = 1; | ||
| 453 | |||
| 454 | err: | ||
| 455 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
| 456 | CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free(policies); | ||
| 457 | return ret; | ||
| 458 | } | ||
| 459 | |||
| 460 | static int | ||
| 461 | compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a, | ||
| 462 | const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) | ||
| 463 | { | ||
| 464 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
| 465 | } | ||
| 466 | |||
| 467 | static int | ||
| 468 | compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a, | ||
| 469 | const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) | ||
| 470 | { | ||
| 471 | return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy); | ||
| 472 | } | ||
| 473 | |||
| 474 | static int | ||
| 475 | delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) | ||
| 476 | { | ||
| 477 | const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data; | ||
| 478 | POLICY_MAPPING mapping; | ||
| 479 | mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy; | ||
| 480 | if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings, &mapping) < 0) | ||
| 481 | return 0; | ||
| 482 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 483 | return 1; | ||
| 484 | } | ||
| 485 | |||
| 486 | /* | ||
| 487 | * process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|, | ||
| 488 | * whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies | ||
| 489 | * whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an | ||
| 490 | * |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On | ||
| 491 | * error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280, | ||
| 492 | * section 6.1.4. | ||
| 493 | * | ||
| 494 | * We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|. | ||
| 495 | * |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with | ||
| 496 | * "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains | ||
| 497 | * P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2 | ||
| 498 | * with P1 in |parent_policies|. | ||
| 499 | * | ||
| 500 | * This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next | ||
| 501 | * certificate contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter | ||
| 502 | * this result down to compute the actual level. | ||
| 503 | */ | ||
| 504 | static X509_POLICY_LEVEL * | ||
| 505 | process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert, | ||
| 506 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
| 507 | int mapping_allowed) | ||
| 508 | { | ||
| 509 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL; | ||
| 510 | POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings; | ||
| 511 | const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy; | ||
| 512 | POLICY_MAPPING *mapping; | ||
| 513 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *next = NULL; | ||
| 514 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
| 515 | int critical, i; | ||
| 516 | int ok = 0; | ||
| 517 | |||
| 518 | mappings = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL); | ||
| 519 | if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) { | ||
| 520 | /* Syntax error in the policy mappings extension. */ | ||
| 521 | goto err; | ||
| 522 | } | ||
| 523 | |||
| 524 | if (mappings != NULL) { | ||
| 525 | /* | ||
| 526 | * PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5. | ||
| 527 | * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into | ||
| 528 | * the parser. | ||
| 529 | */ | ||
| 530 | if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) { | ||
| 531 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
| 532 | goto err; | ||
| 533 | } | ||
| 534 | |||
| 535 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a). */ | ||
| 536 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
| 537 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
| 538 | if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) || | ||
| 539 | is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) | ||
| 540 | goto err; | ||
| 541 | } | ||
| 542 | |||
| 543 | /* Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy. */ | ||
| 544 | (void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, | ||
| 545 | compare_issuer_policy); | ||
| 546 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings); | ||
| 547 | |||
| 548 | if (mapping_allowed) { | ||
| 549 | /* | ||
| 550 | * Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level| | ||
| 551 | * which may be needed as part of RFC 5280, | ||
| 552 | * section 6.1.4, step (b.1). | ||
| 553 | */ | ||
| 554 | new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | ||
| 555 | if (new_nodes == NULL) | ||
| 556 | goto err; | ||
| 557 | last_policy = NULL; | ||
| 558 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
| 559 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
| 560 | /* | ||
| 561 | * There may be multiple mappings with the same | ||
| 562 | * |issuerDomainPolicy|. | ||
| 563 | */ | ||
| 564 | if (last_policy != NULL && | ||
| 565 | OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, | ||
| 566 | last_policy) == 0) | ||
| 567 | continue; | ||
| 568 | last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy; | ||
| 569 | |||
| 570 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
| 571 | goto err; | ||
| 572 | node = x509_policy_level_find(level, | ||
| 573 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
| 574 | if (node == NULL) { | ||
| 575 | if (!level->has_any_policy) | ||
| 576 | continue; | ||
| 577 | node = x509_policy_node_new( | ||
| 578 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy); | ||
| 579 | if (node == NULL || | ||
| 580 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, | ||
| 581 | node)) { | ||
| 582 | x509_policy_node_free(node); | ||
| 583 | goto err; | ||
| 584 | } | ||
| 585 | } | ||
| 586 | node->mapped = 1; | ||
| 587 | } | ||
| 588 | if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) | ||
| 589 | goto err; | ||
| 590 | } else { | ||
| 591 | /* | ||
| 592 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is | ||
| 593 | * inhibited, delete all mapped nodes. | ||
| 594 | */ | ||
| 595 | if (!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings)) | ||
| 596 | goto err; | ||
| 597 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, | ||
| 598 | delete_if_mapped, mappings); | ||
| 599 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, | ||
| 600 | POLICY_MAPPING_free); | ||
| 601 | mappings = NULL; | ||
| 602 | } | ||
| 603 | } | ||
| 604 | |||
| 605 | /* | ||
| 606 | * If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set" | ||
| 607 | * value, itself. Add those to |mappings|. | ||
| 608 | */ | ||
| 609 | if (mappings == NULL) { | ||
| 610 | mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null(); | ||
| 611 | if (mappings == NULL) | ||
| 612 | goto err; | ||
| 613 | } | ||
| 614 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) { | ||
| 615 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); | ||
| 616 | if (!node->mapped) { | ||
| 617 | mapping = POLICY_MAPPING_new(); | ||
| 618 | if (mapping == NULL) | ||
| 619 | goto err; | ||
| 620 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy); | ||
| 621 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy); | ||
| 622 | if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == NULL || | ||
| 623 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == NULL || | ||
| 624 | !sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(mappings, mapping)) { | ||
| 625 | POLICY_MAPPING_free(mapping); | ||
| 626 | goto err; | ||
| 627 | } | ||
| 628 | } | ||
| 629 | } | ||
| 630 | |||
| 631 | /* Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy. */ | ||
| 632 | (void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy); | ||
| 633 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings); | ||
| 634 | |||
| 635 | /* Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation. */ | ||
| 636 | next = x509_policy_level_new(); | ||
| 637 | if (next == NULL) | ||
| 638 | goto err; | ||
| 639 | next->has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy; | ||
| 640 | |||
| 641 | X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL; | ||
| 642 | for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) { | ||
| 643 | mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i); | ||
| 644 | /* | ||
| 645 | * Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in | ||
| 646 | * the graph. | ||
| 647 | */ | ||
| 648 | if (!level->has_any_policy) { | ||
| 649 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes)) | ||
| 650 | goto err; | ||
| 651 | if (x509_policy_level_find(level, | ||
| 652 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL) | ||
| 653 | continue; | ||
| 654 | } | ||
| 655 | |||
| 656 | if (last_node == NULL || | ||
| 657 | OBJ_cmp(last_node->policy, mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) != | ||
| 658 | 0) { | ||
| 659 | last_node = x509_policy_node_new( | ||
| 660 | mapping->subjectDomainPolicy); | ||
| 661 | if (last_node == NULL || | ||
| 662 | !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(next->nodes, last_node)) { | ||
| 663 | x509_policy_node_free(last_node); | ||
| 664 | goto err; | ||
| 665 | } | ||
| 666 | } | ||
| 667 | |||
| 668 | if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(last_node->parent_policies, | ||
| 669 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy)) | ||
| 670 | goto err; | ||
| 671 | mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL; | ||
| 672 | } | ||
| 673 | |||
| 674 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(next->nodes); | ||
| 675 | ok = 1; | ||
| 676 | |||
| 677 | err: | ||
| 678 | if (!ok) { | ||
| 679 | x509_policy_level_free(next); | ||
| 680 | next = NULL; | ||
| 681 | } | ||
| 682 | |||
| 683 | sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free); | ||
| 684 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free); | ||
| 685 | return next; | ||
| 686 | } | ||
| 687 | |||
| 688 | /* | ||
| 689 | * apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum | ||
| 690 | * of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if | ||
| 691 | * |skip_certs| is negative. | ||
| 692 | */ | ||
| 693 | static int | ||
| 694 | apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value) | ||
| 695 | { | ||
| 696 | if (skip_certs == NULL) | ||
| 697 | return 1; | ||
| 698 | |||
| 699 | /* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. */ | ||
| 700 | if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) { | ||
| 701 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
| 702 | return 0; | ||
| 703 | } | ||
| 704 | |||
| 705 | /* If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|. */ | ||
| 706 | uint64_t u64; | ||
| 707 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) | ||
| 708 | *value = (size_t)u64; | ||
| 709 | ERR_clear_error(); | ||
| 710 | return 1; | ||
| 711 | } | ||
| 712 | |||
| 713 | /* | ||
| 714 | * process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and | ||
| 715 | * |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit | ||
| 716 | * anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This | ||
| 717 | * implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4. | ||
| 718 | */ | ||
| 719 | static int | ||
| 720 | process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy, | ||
| 721 | size_t *policy_mapping, | ||
| 722 | size_t *inhibit_any_policy) | ||
| 723 | { | ||
| 724 | ASN1_INTEGER *inhibit_any_policy_ext; | ||
| 725 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *constraints; | ||
| 726 | int critical; | ||
| 727 | int ok = 0; | ||
| 728 | |||
| 729 | constraints = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, | ||
| 730 | NULL); | ||
| 731 | if (constraints == NULL && critical != -1) | ||
| 732 | return 0; | ||
| 733 | if (constraints != NULL) { | ||
| 734 | if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL && | ||
| 735 | constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) { | ||
| 736 | /* | ||
| 737 | * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the | ||
| 738 | * fields must be | ||
| 739 | */ | ||
| 740 | X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | ||
| 741 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints); | ||
| 742 | return 0; | ||
| 743 | } | ||
| 744 | ok = apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy, | ||
| 745 | explicit_policy) && | ||
| 746 | apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping, | ||
| 747 | policy_mapping); | ||
| 748 | POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints); | ||
| 749 | if (!ok) | ||
| 750 | return 0; | ||
| 751 | } | ||
| 752 | |||
| 753 | inhibit_any_policy_ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy, | ||
| 754 | &critical, NULL); | ||
| 755 | if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == NULL && critical != -1) | ||
| 756 | return 0; | ||
| 757 | ok = apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext, inhibit_any_policy); | ||
| 758 | ASN1_INTEGER_free(inhibit_any_policy_ext); | ||
| 759 | return ok; | ||
| 760 | } | ||
| 761 | |||
| 762 | /* | ||
| 763 | * has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs | ||
| 764 | * |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero | ||
| 765 | * otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This | ||
| 766 | * function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy | ||
| 767 | * evaluation. | ||
| 768 | */ | ||
| 769 | static int | ||
| 770 | has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels, | ||
| 771 | const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) | ||
| 772 | { | ||
| 773 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, *prev; | ||
| 774 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *parent; | ||
| 775 | int num_levels, user_has_any_policy; | ||
| 776 | int i, j, k; | ||
| 777 | |||
| 778 | if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies)) | ||
| 779 | return 0; | ||
| 780 | |||
| 781 | /* Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty. */ | ||
| 782 | num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels); | ||
| 783 | level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, num_levels - 1); | ||
| 784 | if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) | ||
| 785 | return 0; | ||
| 786 | |||
| 787 | /* | ||
| 788 | * If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single | ||
| 789 | * anyPolicy value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy | ||
| 790 | * explicitly. | ||
| 791 | */ | ||
| 792 | user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) <= 0; | ||
| 793 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) { | ||
| 794 | if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) { | ||
| 795 | user_has_any_policy = 1; | ||
| 796 | break; | ||
| 797 | } | ||
| 798 | } | ||
| 799 | |||
| 800 | /* | ||
| 801 | * Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set | ||
| 802 | * contains anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph. | ||
| 803 | */ | ||
| 804 | if (user_has_any_policy) | ||
| 805 | return 1; | ||
| 806 | |||
| 807 | /* | ||
| 808 | * Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has | ||
| 809 | * anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection | ||
| 810 | * may synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the | ||
| 811 | * policy list itself, so we skip actually computing this. | ||
| 812 | */ | ||
| 813 | if (level->has_any_policy) | ||
| 814 | return 1; | ||
| 815 | |||
| 816 | /* | ||
| 817 | * We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent | ||
| 818 | * anyPolicy, step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the | ||
| 819 | * bottommost level. Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable. | ||
| 820 | */ | ||
| 821 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) | ||
| 822 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1; | ||
| 823 | |||
| 824 | for (i = num_levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | ||
| 825 | level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i); | ||
| 826 | for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); j++) { | ||
| 827 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, j); | ||
| 828 | if (!node->reachable) | ||
| 829 | continue; | ||
| 830 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) { | ||
| 831 | /* | ||
| 832 | * |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of | ||
| 833 | * "valid_policy_node_set". If it exists in | ||
| 834 | * |user_policies|, the intersection is | ||
| 835 | * non-empty and we * can return immediately. | ||
| 836 | */ | ||
| 837 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies, | ||
| 838 | node->policy) >= 0) | ||
| 839 | return 1; | ||
| 840 | } else if (i > 0) { | ||
| 841 | int num_parent_policies = | ||
| 842 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies); | ||
| 843 | /* | ||
| 844 | * |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark | ||
| 845 | * the parents reachable, to be inspected by the | ||
| 846 | * next loop iteration. | ||
| 847 | */ | ||
| 848 | prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i - 1); | ||
| 849 | for (k = 0; k < num_parent_policies; k++) { | ||
| 850 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(prev->nodes)) | ||
| 851 | return 0; | ||
| 852 | parent = x509_policy_level_find(prev, | ||
| 853 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies, | ||
| 854 | k)); | ||
| 855 | if (parent != NULL) | ||
| 856 | parent->reachable = 1; | ||
| 857 | } | ||
| 858 | } | ||
| 859 | } | ||
| 860 | } | ||
| 861 | |||
| 862 | return 0; | ||
| 863 | } | ||
| 864 | |||
| 865 | static int | ||
| 866 | asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *const *b) | ||
| 867 | { | ||
| 868 | return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b); | ||
| 869 | } | ||
| 870 | |||
| 871 | int | ||
| 872 | X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | ||
| 873 | const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies, | ||
| 874 | unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert) | ||
| 875 | { | ||
| 876 | *out_current_cert = NULL; | ||
| 877 | int ret = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | ||
| 878 | X509 *cert; | ||
| 879 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL; | ||
| 880 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level; | ||
| 881 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL; | ||
| 882 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL; | ||
| 883 | int num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs); | ||
| 884 | int is_self_issued, any_policy_allowed; | ||
| 885 | int i; | ||
| 886 | |||
| 887 | /* Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor. */ | ||
| 888 | if (num_certs <= 1) | ||
| 889 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
| 890 | |||
| 891 | /* See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f). */ | ||
| 892 | size_t explicit_policy = | ||
| 893 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
| 894 | size_t inhibit_any_policy = | ||
| 895 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
| 896 | size_t policy_mapping = | ||
| 897 | (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1; | ||
| 898 | |||
| 899 | levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null(); | ||
| 900 | if (levels == NULL) | ||
| 901 | goto err; | ||
| 902 | |||
| 903 | for (i = num_certs - 2; i >= 0; i--) { | ||
| 904 | cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | ||
| 905 | if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) | ||
| 906 | goto err; | ||
| 907 | is_self_issued = (cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0; | ||
| 908 | |||
| 909 | if (level == NULL) { | ||
| 910 | if (i != num_certs - 2) | ||
| 911 | goto err; | ||
| 912 | level = x509_policy_level_new(); | ||
| 913 | if (level == NULL) | ||
| 914 | goto err; | ||
| 915 | level->has_any_policy = 1; | ||
| 916 | } | ||
| 917 | |||
| 918 | /* | ||
| 919 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed| | ||
| 920 | * is computed as in step (d.2). | ||
| 921 | */ | ||
| 922 | any_policy_allowed = | ||
| 923 | inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued); | ||
| 924 | if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level, | ||
| 925 | any_policy_allowed)) { | ||
| 926 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
| 927 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
| 928 | goto err; | ||
| 929 | } | ||
| 930 | |||
| 931 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f). */ | ||
| 932 | if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) { | ||
| 933 | ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | ||
| 934 | goto err; | ||
| 935 | } | ||
| 936 | |||
| 937 | /* Insert into the list. */ | ||
| 938 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level)) | ||
| 939 | goto err; | ||
| 940 | current_level = level; | ||
| 941 | level = NULL; | ||
| 942 | |||
| 943 | /* | ||
| 944 | * If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. | ||
| 945 | * If it is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead. | ||
| 946 | */ | ||
| 947 | if (i != 0) { | ||
| 948 | /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b). */ | ||
| 949 | level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level, | ||
| 950 | policy_mapping > 0); | ||
| 951 | if (level == NULL) { | ||
| 952 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
| 953 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
| 954 | goto err; | ||
| 955 | } | ||
| 956 | } | ||
| 957 | |||
| 958 | /* | ||
| 959 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and | ||
| 960 | * section 6.1.5, step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, | ||
| 961 | * RFC 5280 says only to update |explicit_policy|, but | ||
| 962 | * |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no | ||
| 963 | * longer read at this point, so we use the same process. | ||
| 964 | */ | ||
| 965 | if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) { | ||
| 966 | if (explicit_policy > 0) | ||
| 967 | explicit_policy--; | ||
| 968 | if (policy_mapping > 0) | ||
| 969 | policy_mapping--; | ||
| 970 | if (inhibit_any_policy > 0) | ||
| 971 | inhibit_any_policy--; | ||
| 972 | } | ||
| 973 | if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy, | ||
| 974 | &policy_mapping, &inhibit_any_policy)) { | ||
| 975 | ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | ||
| 976 | *out_current_cert = cert; | ||
| 977 | goto err; | ||
| 978 | } | ||
| 979 | } | ||
| 980 | |||
| 981 | /* | ||
| 982 | * RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, | ||
| 983 | * so it is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set | ||
| 984 | * is not empty. | ||
| 985 | */ | ||
| 986 | if (explicit_policy == 0) { | ||
| 987 | /* | ||
| 988 | * Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient | ||
| 989 | * lookup. | ||
| 990 | */ | ||
| 991 | if (user_policies != NULL) { | ||
| 992 | user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup( | ||
| 993 | user_policies); | ||
| 994 | if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) | ||
| 995 | goto err; | ||
| 996 | (void)sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, | ||
| 997 | asn1_object_cmp); | ||
| 998 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted); | ||
| 999 | } | ||
| 1000 | |||
| 1001 | if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) { | ||
| 1002 | ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | ||
| 1003 | goto err; | ||
| 1004 | } | ||
| 1005 | } | ||
| 1006 | |||
| 1007 | ret = X509_V_OK; | ||
| 1008 | |||
| 1009 | err: | ||
| 1010 | x509_policy_level_free(level); | ||
| 1011 | /* | ||
| 1012 | * |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so | ||
| 1013 | * we do not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|. | ||
| 1014 | */ | ||
| 1015 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted); | ||
| 1016 | sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free); | ||
| 1017 | return ret; | ||
| 1018 | } | ||
