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-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c930
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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 619a4b890a..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c
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@@ -1,930 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: x509_purp.c,v 1.43 2024/07/12 18:15:10 beck Exp $ */
2/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
3 * project 2001.
4 */
5/* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 *
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 *
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18 * distribution.
19 *
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24 *
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29 *
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33 *
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35 * acknowledgment:
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38 *
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
52 *
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56 *
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <string.h>
61
62#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
63
64#include <openssl/err.h>
65#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
67
68#include "x509_internal.h"
69#include "x509_local.h"
70
71struct x509_purpose_st {
72 int purpose;
73 int trust; /* Default trust ID */
74 int flags;
75 int (*check_purpose)(const struct x509_purpose_st *, const X509 *, int);
76 char *name;
77 char *sname;
78 void *usr_data;
79} /* X509_PURPOSE */;
80
81#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
82#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
83 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
84#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
85 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
86#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
87 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
88
89static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
90static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
91 int ca);
92static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
93 int ca);
94static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
95 int ca);
96static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
97static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
98 int ca);
99static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
100 int ca);
101static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
102 int ca);
103static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
104 int ca);
105static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
106static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
107
108static const X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
109 {
110 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT,
111 .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT,
112 .check_purpose = check_purpose_ssl_client,
113 .name = "SSL client",
114 .sname = "sslclient",
115 },
116 {
117 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER,
118 .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER,
119 .check_purpose = check_purpose_ssl_server,
120 .name = "SSL server",
121 .sname = "sslserver",
122 },
123 {
124 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER,
125 .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER,
126 .check_purpose = check_purpose_ns_ssl_server,
127 .name = "Netscape SSL server",
128 .sname = "nssslserver",
129 },
130 {
131 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN,
132 .trust = X509_TRUST_EMAIL,
133 .check_purpose = check_purpose_smime_sign,
134 .name = "S/MIME signing",
135 .sname = "smimesign",
136 },
137 {
138 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT,
139 .trust = X509_TRUST_EMAIL,
140 .check_purpose = check_purpose_smime_encrypt,
141 .name = "S/MIME encryption",
142 .sname = "smimeencrypt",
143 },
144 {
145 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN,
146 .trust = X509_TRUST_COMPAT,
147 .check_purpose = check_purpose_crl_sign,
148 .name = "CRL signing",
149 .sname = "crlsign",
150 },
151 {
152 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_ANY,
153 .trust = X509_TRUST_ACCEPT_ALL,
154 .check_purpose = no_check,
155 .name = "Any Purpose",
156 .sname = "any",
157 },
158 {
159 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER,
160 .trust = X509_TRUST_COMPAT,
161 .check_purpose = ocsp_helper,
162 .name = "OCSP helper",
163 .sname = "ocsphelper",
164 },
165 {
166 .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN,
167 .trust = X509_TRUST_TSA,
168 .check_purpose = check_purpose_timestamp_sign,
169 .name = "Time Stamp signing",
170 .sname = "timestampsign",
171 },
172};
173
174#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard) / sizeof(xstandard[0]))
175
176/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
177 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
178 * things. */
179int
180X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
181{
182 int idx;
183 const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
184
185 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
186 return -1;
187
188 if (id == -1)
189 return 1;
190
191 if ((idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id)) == -1)
192 return -1;
193 if ((pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx)) == NULL)
194 return -1;
195
196 return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
197}
198LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_purpose);
199
200int
201X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
202{
203 return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
204}
205LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_count);
206
207const X509_PURPOSE *
208X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
209{
210 if (idx < 0 || (size_t)idx >= X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
211 return NULL;
212
213 return &xstandard[idx];
214}
215LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0);
216
217int
218X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname)
219{
220 int i;
221 const X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
222
223 for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
224 xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
225 if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
226 return i;
227 }
228 return -1;
229}
230LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname);
231
232int
233X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
234{
235 /*
236 * Ensure the purpose identifier is between MIN and MAX inclusive.
237 * If so, translate it to an index into the xstandard[] table.
238 */
239 if (purpose < X509_PURPOSE_MIN || purpose > X509_PURPOSE_MAX)
240 return -1;
241
242 return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
243}
244
245int
246X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
247{
248 return xp->purpose;
249}
250LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_id);
251
252const char *
253X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
254{
255 return xp->name;
256}
257LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0_name);
258
259const char *
260X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
261{
262 return xp->sname;
263}
264LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname);
265
266int
267X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
268{
269 return xp->trust;
270}
271
272/*
273 * List of NIDs of extensions supported by the verifier. If an extension
274 * is critical and doesn't appear in this list, then the certificate will
275 * normally be rejected.
276 */
277int
278X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ext)
279{
280 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext))) {
281 case NID_basic_constraints:
282 case NID_certificate_policies:
283 case NID_ext_key_usage:
284 case NID_inhibit_any_policy:
285 case NID_key_usage:
286 case NID_name_constraints:
287 case NID_netscape_cert_type:
288 case NID_policy_constraints:
289 case NID_policy_mappings:
290#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
291 case NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock:
292 case NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum:
293#endif
294 case NID_subject_alt_name:
295 return 1;
296 default:
297 return 0;
298 }
299}
300LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_supported_extension);
301
302static void
303setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
304{
305 X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
306 int i;
307
308 if (dp->reasons) {
309 if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
310 dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
311 if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
312 dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
313 dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
314 } else
315 dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
316 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
317 return;
318 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
319 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
320 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
321 iname = gen->d.directoryName;
322 break;
323 }
324 }
325 if (!iname)
326 iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
327
328 DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
329}
330
331static void
332setup_crldp(X509 *x)
333{
334 int i;
335
336 x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL);
337 if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1) {
338 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
339 return;
340 }
341
342 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
343 setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
344}
345
346static int
347x509_extension_oid_cmp(const X509_EXTENSION *const *a,
348 const X509_EXTENSION *const *b)
349{
350 return OBJ_cmp((*a)->object, (*b)->object);
351}
352
353static int
354x509_extension_oids_are_unique(X509 *x509)
355{
356 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL;
357 const X509_EXTENSION *prev_ext, *curr_ext;
358 int i;
359 int ret = 0;
360
361 if (X509_get_ext_count(x509) <= 1)
362 goto done;
363
364 if ((exts = sk_X509_EXTENSION_dup(x509->cert_info->extensions)) == NULL)
365 goto err;
366
367 (void)sk_X509_EXTENSION_set_cmp_func(exts, x509_extension_oid_cmp);
368 sk_X509_EXTENSION_sort(exts);
369
370 prev_ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, 0);
371 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
372 curr_ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
373 if (x509_extension_oid_cmp(&prev_ext, &curr_ext) == 0)
374 goto err;
375 prev_ext = curr_ext;
376 }
377
378 done:
379 ret = 1;
380
381 err:
382 sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(exts);
383
384 return ret;
385}
386
387static void
388x509v3_cache_extensions_internal(X509 *x)
389{
390 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
391 ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
392 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
393 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
394 X509_EXTENSION *ex;
395 long version;
396 int i;
397
398 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
399 return;
400
401 /*
402 * XXX - this should really only set EXFLAG_INVALID if extensions are
403 * invalid. However, the X509_digest() failure matches OpenSSL/BoringSSL
404 * behavior and the version checks are at least vaguely related to
405 * extensions.
406 */
407
408 if (!X509_digest(x, X509_CERT_HASH_EVP, x->hash, NULL))
409 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
410
411 version = X509_get_version(x);
412 if (version < 0 || version > 2)
413 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
414 if (version == 0) {
415 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
416 /* UIDs may only appear in v2 or v3 certs */
417 if (x->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
418 x->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)
419 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
420 }
421 if (version != 2 && X509_get_ext_count(x) != 0)
422 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
423
424 /* Handle basic constraints */
425 if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL))) {
426 if (bs->ca)
427 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
428 if (bs->pathlen) {
429 if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ||
430 !bs->ca) {
431 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
432 x->ex_pathlen = 0;
433 } else
434 x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
435 } else
436 x->ex_pathlen = -1;
437 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
438 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
439 } else if (i != -1) {
440 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
441 }
442
443 /* Handle key usage */
444 if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL))) {
445 if (usage->length > 0) {
446 x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
447 if (usage->length > 1)
448 x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
449 } else
450 x->ex_kusage = 0;
451 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
452 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
453 } else if (i != -1) {
454 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
455 }
456
457 x->ex_xkusage = 0;
458 if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL))) {
459 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
460 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
461 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
462 case NID_server_auth:
463 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
464 break;
465
466 case NID_client_auth:
467 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
468 break;
469
470 case NID_email_protect:
471 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
472 break;
473
474 case NID_code_sign:
475 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
476 break;
477
478 case NID_ms_sgc:
479 case NID_ns_sgc:
480 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
481 break;
482
483 case NID_OCSP_sign:
484 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
485 break;
486
487 case NID_time_stamp:
488 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
489 break;
490
491 case NID_dvcs:
492 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
493 break;
494
495 case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
496 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
497 break;
498 }
499 }
500 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
501 } else if (i != -1) {
502 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
503 }
504
505 if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL))) {
506 if (ns->length > 0)
507 x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
508 else
509 x->ex_nscert = 0;
510 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
511 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
512 } else if (i != -1) {
513 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
514 }
515
516 x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
517 if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1)
518 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
519 x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
520 if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1)
521 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
522
523 /* Does subject name match issuer? */
524 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
525 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
526 /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed. */
527 if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
528 !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
529 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
530 }
531
532 x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL);
533 if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1)
534 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
535 x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
536 if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
537 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
538 setup_crldp(x);
539
540#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
541 x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL);
542 if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1)
543 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
544 if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr))
545 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
546 x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL);
547 if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1)
548 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
549 if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid))
550 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
551#endif
552
553 for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
554 ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
555 if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) ==
556 NID_freshest_crl)
557 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
558 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
559 continue;
560 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
561 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565
566 if (!x509_extension_oids_are_unique(x))
567 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
568
569 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
570}
571
572int
573x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
574{
575 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) == 0) {
576 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
577 x509v3_cache_extensions_internal(x);
578 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
579 }
580
581 return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
582}
583
584/* CA checks common to all purposes
585 * return codes:
586 * 0 not a CA
587 * 1 is a CA
588 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
589 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
590 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
591 */
592
593static int
594check_ca(const X509 *x)
595{
596 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
597 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
598 return 0;
599 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
600 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
601 return 1;
602 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
603 else
604 return 0;
605 } else {
606 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
607 if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
608 return 3;
609 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
610 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
611 return 4;
612 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
613 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT &&
614 x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
615 return 5;
616 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
617 return 0;
618 }
619}
620
621int
622X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
623{
624 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
625
626 return check_ca(x);
627}
628LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_ca);
629
630/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
631static int
632check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
633{
634 int ca_ret;
635
636 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
637 if (!ca_ret)
638 return 0;
639 /* check nsCertType if present */
640 if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
641 return ca_ret;
642 else
643 return 0;
644}
645
646static int
647check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
648{
649 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
650 return 0;
651 if (ca)
652 return check_ssl_ca(x);
653 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
654 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
655 return 0;
656 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
657 if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
658 return 0;
659 return 1;
660}
661
662static int
663check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
664{
665 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC))
666 return 0;
667 if (ca)
668 return check_ssl_ca(x);
669
670 if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
671 return 0;
672 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
673 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
674 return 0;
675
676 return 1;
677}
678
679static int
680check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
681{
682 int ret;
683
684 ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
685 if (!ret || ca)
686 return ret;
687 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
688 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
689 return 0;
690 return ret;
691}
692
693/* common S/MIME checks */
694static int
695purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
696{
697 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
698 return 0;
699 if (ca) {
700 int ca_ret;
701 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
702 if (!ca_ret)
703 return 0;
704 /* check nsCertType if present */
705 if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
706 return ca_ret;
707 else
708 return 0;
709 }
710 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
711 if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
712 return 1;
713 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
714 if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
715 return 2;
716 return 0;
717 }
718 return 1;
719}
720
721static int
722check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
723{
724 int ret;
725
726 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
727 if (!ret || ca)
728 return ret;
729 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
730 return 0;
731 return ret;
732}
733
734static int
735check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
736{
737 int ret;
738
739 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
740 if (!ret || ca)
741 return ret;
742 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
743 return 0;
744 return ret;
745}
746
747static int
748check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
749{
750 if (ca) {
751 int ca_ret;
752 if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
753 return ca_ret;
754 else
755 return 0;
756 }
757 if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
758 return 0;
759 return 1;
760}
761
762/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
763 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
764 */
765static int
766ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
767{
768 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
769 value (2)? */
770 if (ca)
771 return check_ca(x);
772 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
773 return 1;
774}
775
776static int
777check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
778{
779 int i_ext;
780
781 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
782 if (ca)
783 return check_ca(x);
784
785 /*
786 * Check the optional key usage field:
787 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
788 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
789 * be rejected).
790 */
791 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
792 ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
793 !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
794 return 0;
795
796 /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
797 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
798 return 0;
799
800 /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
801 i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
802 if (i_ext >= 0) {
803 X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
804 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
805 return 0;
806 }
807
808 return 1;
809}
810
811static int
812no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
813{
814 return 1;
815}
816
817/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
818 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
819 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
820 * subject name.
821 * These are:
822 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
823 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
824 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
825 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
826 * codes for X509_verify_cert()
827 */
828
829int
830X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
831{
832 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
833 X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
834 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
835
836 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer))
837 return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
838 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(subject))
839 return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
840
841 if (subject->akid) {
842 int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
843 if (ret != X509_V_OK)
844 return ret;
845 }
846
847 if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
848 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
849 return X509_V_OK;
850}
851LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_issued);
852
853int
854X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
855{
856 if (!akid)
857 return X509_V_OK;
858
859 /* Check key ids (if present) */
860 if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
861 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
862 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
863 /* Check serial number */
864 if (akid->serial &&
865 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
866 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
867 /* Check issuer name */
868 if (akid->issuer) {
869 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
870 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
871 * There may be more than one but we only take any
872 * notice of the first.
873 */
874 GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
875 GENERAL_NAME *gen;
876 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
877 int i;
878 gens = akid->issuer;
879 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
880 gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
881 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
882 nm = gen->d.dirn;
883 break;
884 }
885 }
886 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
887 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
888 }
889 return X509_V_OK;
890}
891LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_akid);
892
893uint32_t
894X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
895{
896 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
897 if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
898 return EXFLAG_INVALID;
899
900 return x->ex_flags;
901}
902LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_extension_flags);
903
904uint32_t
905X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
906{
907 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
908 if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
909 return 0;
910
911 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
912 return x->ex_kusage;
913
914 return UINT32_MAX;
915}
916LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_key_usage);
917
918uint32_t
919X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
920{
921 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
922 if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
923 return 0;
924
925 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
926 return x->ex_xkusage;
927
928 return UINT32_MAX;
929}
930LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_extended_key_usage);
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-05-06 22:41:36 +0000