diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 1067 |
1 files changed, 775 insertions, 292 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index c1be91edba..db12f7bd35 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | |||
| @@ -59,76 +59,63 @@ | |||
| 59 | #include <stdio.h> | 59 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 60 | #include <time.h> | 60 | #include <time.h> |
| 61 | #include <errno.h> | 61 | #include <errno.h> |
| 62 | #include <sys/types.h> | ||
| 63 | #include <sys/stat.h> | ||
| 64 | 62 | ||
| 65 | #include "crypto.h" | ||
| 66 | #include "cryptlib.h" | 63 | #include "cryptlib.h" |
| 67 | #include "lhash.h" | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| 68 | #include "buffer.h" | 65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| 69 | #include "evp.h" | 66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 70 | #include "asn1.h" | 67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 71 | #include "x509.h" | 68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| 72 | #include "objects.h" | 69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 73 | #include "pem.h" | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 74 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
| 75 | #ifndef NOPROTO | 72 | |
| 76 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | 73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
| 74 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); | ||
| 75 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | ||
| 76 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
| 77 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
| 78 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
| 79 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
| 77 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | 80 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 78 | #else | 81 | const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| 79 | static int null_callback(); | ||
| 80 | static int internal_verify(); | ||
| 81 | #endif | ||
| 82 | 82 | ||
| 83 | char *X509_version="X509 part of SSLeay 0.9.0b 29-Jun-1998"; | ||
| 84 | static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL; | ||
| 85 | static int x509_store_ctx_num=0; | ||
| 86 | #if 0 | ||
| 87 | static int x509_store_num=1; | ||
| 88 | static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL; | ||
| 89 | #endif | ||
| 90 | 83 | ||
| 91 | static int null_callback(ok,e) | 84 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
| 92 | int ok; | ||
| 93 | X509_STORE_CTX *e; | ||
| 94 | { | 85 | { |
| 95 | return(ok); | 86 | return ok; |
| 96 | } | 87 | } |
| 97 | 88 | ||
| 98 | #if 0 | 89 | #if 0 |
| 99 | static int x509_subject_cmp(a,b) | 90 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
| 100 | X509 **a,**b; | ||
| 101 | { | 91 | { |
| 102 | return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b)); | 92 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); |
| 103 | } | 93 | } |
| 104 | #endif | 94 | #endif |
| 105 | 95 | ||
| 106 | int X509_verify_cert(ctx) | 96 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 107 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 108 | { | 97 | { |
| 109 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | 98 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; |
| 110 | X509_NAME *xn; | 99 | X509_NAME *xn; |
| 111 | X509_OBJECT obj; | ||
| 112 | int depth,i,ok=0; | 100 | int depth,i,ok=0; |
| 113 | int num; | 101 | int num; |
| 114 | int (*cb)(); | 102 | int (*cb)(); |
| 115 | STACK *sktmp=NULL; | 103 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; |
| 116 | 104 | ||
| 117 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) | 105 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) |
| 118 | { | 106 | { |
| 119 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | 107 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
| 120 | return(-1); | 108 | return -1; |
| 121 | } | 109 | } |
| 122 | 110 | ||
| 123 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | 111 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
| 124 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
| 125 | 112 | ||
| 126 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | 113 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is |
| 127 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | 114 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ |
| 128 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | 115 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) |
| 129 | { | 116 | { |
| 130 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) || | 117 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
| 131 | (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert))) | 118 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) |
| 132 | { | 119 | { |
| 133 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | 120 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 134 | goto end; | 121 | goto end; |
| @@ -137,41 +124,45 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 137 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | 124 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; |
| 138 | } | 125 | } |
| 139 | 126 | ||
| 140 | /* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */ | 127 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ |
| 141 | if ((ctx->untrusted != NULL) && (sktmp=sk_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | 128 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
| 129 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | ||
| 142 | { | 130 | { |
| 143 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | 131 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 144 | goto end; | 132 | goto end; |
| 145 | } | 133 | } |
| 146 | 134 | ||
| 147 | num=sk_num(ctx->chain); | 135 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 148 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | 136 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); |
| 149 | depth=ctx->depth; | 137 | depth=ctx->depth; |
| 150 | 138 | ||
| 151 | 139 | ||
| 152 | for (;;) | 140 | for (;;) |
| 153 | { | 141 | { |
| 154 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | 142 | /* If we have enough, we break */ |
| 155 | if (depth <= num) break; | 143 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
| 144 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | ||
| 145 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | ||
| 146 | * code later. | ||
| 147 | */ | ||
| 156 | 148 | ||
| 157 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | 149 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| 158 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | 150 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 159 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | 151 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; |
| 160 | break; | ||
| 161 | 152 | ||
| 162 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | 153 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ |
| 163 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | 154 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) |
| 164 | { | 155 | { |
| 165 | xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn); | 156 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); |
| 166 | if (xtmp != NULL) | 157 | if (xtmp != NULL) |
| 167 | { | 158 | { |
| 168 | if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp)) | 159 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) |
| 169 | { | 160 | { |
| 170 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | 161 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 171 | goto end; | 162 | goto end; |
| 172 | } | 163 | } |
| 173 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | 164 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 174 | sk_delete_ptr(sktmp,(char *)xtmp); | 165 | sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); |
| 175 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | 166 | ctx->last_untrusted++; |
| 176 | x=xtmp; | 167 | x=xtmp; |
| 177 | num++; | 168 | num++; |
| @@ -187,27 +178,50 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 187 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | 178 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, |
| 188 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | 179 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ |
| 189 | 180 | ||
| 190 | i=sk_num(ctx->chain); | 181 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it |
| 191 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | 182 | * is self signed. |
| 192 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x)) | 183 | */ |
| 193 | == 0) | 184 | |
| 185 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
| 186 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | ||
| 187 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); | ||
| 188 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | ||
| 194 | { | 189 | { |
| 195 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | 190 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ |
| 196 | if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | 191 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
| 197 | { | 192 | { |
| 198 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | 193 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if |
| 199 | ctx->current_cert=x; | 194 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact |
| 200 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | 195 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. |
| 201 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | 196 | */ |
| 202 | if (!ok) goto end; | 197 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| 198 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | ||
| 199 | { | ||
| 200 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | ||
| 201 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
| 202 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | ||
| 203 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); | ||
| 204 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
| 205 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 206 | } | ||
| 207 | else | ||
| 208 | { | ||
| 209 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | ||
| 210 | * so we get any trust settings. | ||
| 211 | */ | ||
| 212 | X509_free(x); | ||
| 213 | x = xtmp; | ||
| 214 | sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | ||
| 215 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
| 216 | } | ||
| 203 | } | 217 | } |
| 204 | else | 218 | else |
| 205 | { | 219 | { |
| 206 | /* worry more about this one elsewhere */ | 220 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ |
| 207 | chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain); | 221 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
| 208 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | 222 | ctx->last_untrusted--; |
| 209 | num--; | 223 | num--; |
| 210 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | 224 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); |
| 211 | } | 225 | } |
| 212 | } | 226 | } |
| 213 | 227 | ||
| @@ -215,45 +229,34 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 215 | for (;;) | 229 | for (;;) |
| 216 | { | 230 | { |
| 217 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | 231 | /* If we have enough, we break */ |
| 218 | if (depth <= num) break; | 232 | if (depth < num) break; |
| 219 | 233 | ||
| 220 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | 234 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| 221 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | 235 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 222 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | 236 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; |
| 223 | break; | ||
| 224 | 237 | ||
| 225 | ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj); | 238 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| 226 | if (ok != X509_LU_X509) | 239 | |
| 227 | { | 240 | if (ok < 0) return ok; |
| 228 | if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) | 241 | if (ok == 0) break; |
| 229 | { | 242 | |
| 230 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | 243 | x = xtmp; |
| 231 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY); | 244 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) |
| 232 | return(ok); | ||
| 233 | } | ||
| 234 | else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) | ||
| 235 | { | ||
| 236 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
| 237 | /* not good :-(, break anyway */ | ||
| 238 | return(ok); | ||
| 239 | } | ||
| 240 | break; | ||
| 241 | } | ||
| 242 | x=obj.data.x509; | ||
| 243 | if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509)) | ||
| 244 | { | 245 | { |
| 245 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | 246 | X509_free(xtmp); |
| 246 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | 247 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 247 | return(0); | 248 | return 0; |
| 248 | } | 249 | } |
| 249 | num++; | 250 | num++; |
| 250 | } | 251 | } |
| 251 | 252 | ||
| 252 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | 253 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ |
| 253 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | 254 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 254 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0) | 255 | |
| 256 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | ||
| 257 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | ||
| 255 | { | 258 | { |
| 256 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0)) | 259 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) |
| 257 | { | 260 | { |
| 258 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | 261 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) |
| 259 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | 262 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; |
| @@ -264,7 +267,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 264 | else | 267 | else |
| 265 | { | 268 | { |
| 266 | 269 | ||
| 267 | sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss); | 270 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); |
| 268 | num++; | 271 | num++; |
| 269 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | 272 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; |
| 270 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | 273 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; |
| @@ -277,37 +280,369 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 277 | if (!ok) goto end; | 280 | if (!ok) goto end; |
| 278 | } | 281 | } |
| 279 | 282 | ||
| 283 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | ||
| 284 | if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx); | ||
| 285 | |||
| 286 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 287 | |||
| 288 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | ||
| 289 | |||
| 290 | if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); | ||
| 291 | |||
| 292 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 293 | |||
| 280 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | 294 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ |
| 281 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | 295 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); |
| 282 | 296 | ||
| 297 | /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters | ||
| 298 | * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | ||
| 299 | */ | ||
| 300 | |||
| 301 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | ||
| 302 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
| 303 | |||
| 283 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ | 304 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ |
| 284 | if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL) | 305 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
| 285 | ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx); | 306 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); |
| 286 | else | 307 | else |
| 287 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | 308 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); |
| 309 | if (0) | ||
| 310 | { | ||
| 288 | end: | 311 | end: |
| 289 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_free(sktmp); | 312 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); |
| 313 | } | ||
| 314 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); | ||
| 290 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | 315 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); |
| 291 | return(ok); | 316 | return ok; |
| 317 | } | ||
| 318 | |||
| 319 | |||
| 320 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | ||
| 321 | */ | ||
| 322 | |||
| 323 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | ||
| 324 | { | ||
| 325 | int i; | ||
| 326 | X509 *issuer; | ||
| 327 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) | ||
| 328 | { | ||
| 329 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
| 330 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | ||
| 331 | return issuer; | ||
| 332 | } | ||
| 333 | return NULL; | ||
| 334 | } | ||
| 335 | |||
| 336 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | ||
| 337 | |||
| 338 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | ||
| 339 | { | ||
| 340 | int ret; | ||
| 341 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | ||
| 342 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | ||
| 343 | return 1; | ||
| 344 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | ||
| 345 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | ||
| 346 | return 0; | ||
| 347 | |||
| 348 | ctx->error = ret; | ||
| 349 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 350 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | ||
| 351 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 352 | return 0; | ||
| 353 | } | ||
| 354 | |||
| 355 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | ||
| 356 | |||
| 357 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
| 358 | { | ||
| 359 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | ||
| 360 | if (*issuer) | ||
| 361 | { | ||
| 362 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
| 363 | return 1; | ||
| 364 | } | ||
| 365 | else | ||
| 366 | return 0; | ||
| 367 | } | ||
| 368 | |||
| 369 | |||
| 370 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency | ||
| 371 | * with the supplied purpose | ||
| 372 | */ | ||
| 373 | |||
| 374 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 375 | { | ||
| 376 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
| 377 | return 1; | ||
| 378 | #else | ||
| 379 | int i, ok=0; | ||
| 380 | X509 *x; | ||
| 381 | int (*cb)(); | ||
| 382 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
| 383 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | ||
| 384 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) | ||
| 385 | { | ||
| 386 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
| 387 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | ||
| 388 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | ||
| 389 | { | ||
| 390 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | ||
| 391 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
| 392 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 393 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
| 394 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 395 | } | ||
| 396 | if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i)) | ||
| 397 | { | ||
| 398 | if (i) | ||
| 399 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | ||
| 400 | else | ||
| 401 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | ||
| 402 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
| 403 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 404 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
| 405 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 406 | } | ||
| 407 | /* Check pathlen */ | ||
| 408 | if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | ||
| 409 | && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) | ||
| 410 | { | ||
| 411 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | ||
| 412 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
| 413 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 414 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
| 415 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
| 416 | } | ||
| 417 | } | ||
| 418 | ok = 1; | ||
| 419 | end: | ||
| 420 | return ok; | ||
| 421 | #endif | ||
| 422 | } | ||
| 423 | |||
| 424 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 425 | { | ||
| 426 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
| 427 | return 1; | ||
| 428 | #else | ||
| 429 | int i, ok; | ||
| 430 | X509 *x; | ||
| 431 | int (*cb)(); | ||
| 432 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
| 433 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ | ||
| 434 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
| 435 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
| 436 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0); | ||
| 437 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | ||
| 438 | return 1; | ||
| 439 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
| 440 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 441 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | ||
| 442 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | ||
| 443 | else | ||
| 444 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | ||
| 445 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 446 | return ok; | ||
| 447 | #endif | ||
| 448 | } | ||
| 449 | |||
| 450 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 451 | { | ||
| 452 | int i, last, ok; | ||
| 453 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | ||
| 454 | return 1; | ||
| 455 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | ||
| 456 | last = 0; | ||
| 457 | else | ||
| 458 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
| 459 | for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) | ||
| 460 | { | ||
| 461 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
| 462 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | ||
| 463 | if (!ok) return ok; | ||
| 464 | } | ||
| 465 | return 1; | ||
| 466 | } | ||
| 467 | |||
| 468 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 469 | { | ||
| 470 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | ||
| 471 | X509 *x; | ||
| 472 | int ok, cnum; | ||
| 473 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | ||
| 474 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | ||
| 475 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
| 476 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | ||
| 477 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | ||
| 478 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except | ||
| 479 | * notify callback | ||
| 480 | */ | ||
| 481 | if(!ok) | ||
| 482 | { | ||
| 483 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | ||
| 484 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 485 | goto err; | ||
| 486 | } | ||
| 487 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | ||
| 488 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | ||
| 489 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 490 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | ||
| 491 | err: | ||
| 492 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | ||
| 493 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | ||
| 494 | return ok; | ||
| 495 | |||
| 496 | } | ||
| 497 | |||
| 498 | /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a | ||
| 499 | * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... | ||
| 500 | * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData). | ||
| 501 | */ | ||
| 502 | static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x) | ||
| 503 | { | ||
| 504 | int ok; | ||
| 505 | X509_OBJECT xobj; | ||
| 506 | ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj); | ||
| 507 | if (!ok) return 0; | ||
| 508 | *crl = xobj.data.crl; | ||
| 509 | return 1; | ||
| 510 | } | ||
| 511 | |||
| 512 | /* Check CRL validity */ | ||
| 513 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | ||
| 514 | { | ||
| 515 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | ||
| 516 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | ||
| 517 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i; | ||
| 518 | time_t *ptime; | ||
| 519 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | ||
| 520 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
| 521 | /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer | ||
| 522 | * is next certificate in chain. | ||
| 523 | */ | ||
| 524 | if(cnum < chnum) | ||
| 525 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | ||
| 526 | else | ||
| 527 | { | ||
| 528 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | ||
| 529 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | ||
| 530 | if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | ||
| 531 | { | ||
| 532 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | ||
| 533 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 534 | if(!ok) goto err; | ||
| 535 | } | ||
| 536 | } | ||
| 537 | |||
| 538 | if(issuer) | ||
| 539 | { | ||
| 540 | |||
| 541 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | ||
| 542 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | ||
| 543 | |||
| 544 | if(!ikey) | ||
| 545 | { | ||
| 546 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
| 547 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 548 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 549 | } | ||
| 550 | else | ||
| 551 | { | ||
| 552 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | ||
| 553 | if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | ||
| 554 | { | ||
| 555 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
| 556 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 557 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 558 | } | ||
| 559 | } | ||
| 560 | } | ||
| 561 | |||
| 562 | /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */ | ||
| 563 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | ||
| 564 | ptime = &ctx->check_time; | ||
| 565 | else | ||
| 566 | ptime = NULL; | ||
| 567 | |||
| 568 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | ||
| 569 | if (i == 0) | ||
| 570 | { | ||
| 571 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | ||
| 572 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 573 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 574 | } | ||
| 575 | |||
| 576 | if (i > 0) | ||
| 577 | { | ||
| 578 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
| 579 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 580 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 581 | } | ||
| 582 | |||
| 583 | if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | ||
| 584 | { | ||
| 585 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | ||
| 586 | |||
| 587 | if (i == 0) | ||
| 588 | { | ||
| 589 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | ||
| 590 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 591 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 592 | } | ||
| 593 | |||
| 594 | if (i < 0) | ||
| 595 | { | ||
| 596 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
| 597 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 598 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
| 599 | } | ||
| 600 | } | ||
| 601 | |||
| 602 | ok = 1; | ||
| 603 | |||
| 604 | err: | ||
| 605 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | ||
| 606 | return ok; | ||
| 607 | } | ||
| 608 | |||
| 609 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | ||
| 610 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | ||
| 611 | { | ||
| 612 | int idx, ok; | ||
| 613 | X509_REVOKED rtmp; | ||
| 614 | /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ | ||
| 615 | rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); | ||
| 616 | idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); | ||
| 617 | /* Not found: OK */ | ||
| 618 | if(idx == -1) return 1; | ||
| 619 | /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than | ||
| 620 | * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. | ||
| 621 | */ | ||
| 622 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | ||
| 623 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
| 624 | return ok; | ||
| 292 | } | 625 | } |
| 293 | 626 | ||
| 294 | static int internal_verify(ctx) | 627 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 295 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 296 | { | 628 | { |
| 297 | int i,ok=0,n; | 629 | int i,ok=0,n; |
| 298 | X509 *xs,*xi; | 630 | X509 *xs,*xi; |
| 299 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | 631 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| 632 | time_t *ptime; | ||
| 300 | int (*cb)(); | 633 | int (*cb)(); |
| 301 | 634 | ||
| 302 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | 635 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
| 303 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
| 304 | 636 | ||
| 305 | n=sk_num(ctx->chain); | 637 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 306 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; | 638 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; |
| 307 | n--; | 639 | n--; |
| 308 | xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | 640 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
| 309 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi), | 641 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
| 310 | X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0) | 642 | ptime = &ctx->check_time; |
| 643 | else | ||
| 644 | ptime = NULL; | ||
| 645 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | ||
| 311 | xs=xi; | 646 | xs=xi; |
| 312 | else | 647 | else |
| 313 | { | 648 | { |
| @@ -322,7 +657,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 322 | { | 657 | { |
| 323 | n--; | 658 | n--; |
| 324 | ctx->error_depth=n; | 659 | ctx->error_depth=n; |
| 325 | xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | 660 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
| 326 | } | 661 | } |
| 327 | } | 662 | } |
| 328 | 663 | ||
| @@ -340,15 +675,27 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 340 | if (!ok) goto end; | 675 | if (!ok) goto end; |
| 341 | } | 676 | } |
| 342 | if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | 677 | if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) |
| 678 | /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, | ||
| 679 | * this is a waste of time. That check should | ||
| 680 | * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be | ||
| 681 | * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but | ||
| 682 | * we don't verify again and again in SSL | ||
| 683 | * handshakes and the like once the cert has | ||
| 684 | * been declared trusted. */ | ||
| 343 | { | 685 | { |
| 344 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | 686 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; |
| 345 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | 687 | ctx->current_cert=xs; |
| 346 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | 688 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); |
| 347 | if (!ok) goto end; | 689 | if (!ok) |
| 690 | { | ||
| 691 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
| 692 | goto end; | ||
| 693 | } | ||
| 348 | } | 694 | } |
| 695 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
| 349 | pkey=NULL; | 696 | pkey=NULL; |
| 350 | 697 | ||
| 351 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs)); | 698 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime); |
| 352 | if (i == 0) | 699 | if (i == 0) |
| 353 | { | 700 | { |
| 354 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | 701 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; |
| @@ -366,7 +713,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 366 | xs->valid=1; | 713 | xs->valid=1; |
| 367 | } | 714 | } |
| 368 | 715 | ||
| 369 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs)); | 716 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime); |
| 370 | if (i == 0) | 717 | if (i == 0) |
| 371 | { | 718 | { |
| 372 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | 719 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; |
| @@ -383,8 +730,6 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 383 | if (!ok) goto end; | 730 | if (!ok) goto end; |
| 384 | } | 731 | } |
| 385 | 732 | ||
| 386 | /* CRL CHECK */ | ||
| 387 | |||
| 388 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | 733 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
| 389 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | 734 | ctx->current_cert=xs; |
| 390 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | 735 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); |
| @@ -394,19 +739,23 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |||
| 394 | if (n >= 0) | 739 | if (n >= 0) |
| 395 | { | 740 | { |
| 396 | xi=xs; | 741 | xi=xs; |
| 397 | xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | 742 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
| 398 | } | 743 | } |
| 399 | } | 744 | } |
| 400 | ok=1; | 745 | ok=1; |
| 401 | end: | 746 | end: |
| 402 | return(ok); | 747 | return ok; |
| 403 | } | 748 | } |
| 404 | 749 | ||
| 405 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ctm) | 750 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
| 406 | ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm; | 751 | { |
| 752 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | ||
| 753 | } | ||
| 754 | |||
| 755 | int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) | ||
| 407 | { | 756 | { |
| 408 | char *str; | 757 | char *str; |
| 409 | ASN1_UTCTIME atm; | 758 | ASN1_TIME atm; |
| 410 | time_t offset; | 759 | time_t offset; |
| 411 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | 760 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; |
| 412 | int i,j; | 761 | int i,j; |
| @@ -414,14 +763,35 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm; | |||
| 414 | p=buff1; | 763 | p=buff1; |
| 415 | i=ctm->length; | 764 | i=ctm->length; |
| 416 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | 765 | str=(char *)ctm->data; |
| 417 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0); | 766 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
| 418 | memcpy(p,str,10); | 767 | { |
| 419 | p+=10; | 768 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; |
| 420 | str+=10; | 769 | memcpy(p,str,10); |
| 770 | p+=10; | ||
| 771 | str+=10; | ||
| 772 | } | ||
| 773 | else | ||
| 774 | { | ||
| 775 | if (i < 13) return 0; | ||
| 776 | memcpy(p,str,12); | ||
| 777 | p+=12; | ||
| 778 | str+=12; | ||
| 779 | } | ||
| 421 | 780 | ||
| 422 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | 781 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) |
| 423 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | 782 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } |
| 424 | else { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); } | 783 | else |
| 784 | { | ||
| 785 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
| 786 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
| 787 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | ||
| 788 | if (*str == '.') | ||
| 789 | { | ||
| 790 | str++; | ||
| 791 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; | ||
| 792 | } | ||
| 793 | |||
| 794 | } | ||
| 425 | *(p++)='Z'; | 795 | *(p++)='Z'; |
| 426 | *(p++)='\0'; | 796 | *(p++)='\0'; |
| 427 | 797 | ||
| @@ -430,275 +800,388 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm; | |||
| 430 | else | 800 | else |
| 431 | { | 801 | { |
| 432 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) | 802 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) |
| 433 | return(0); | 803 | return 0; |
| 434 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | 804 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; |
| 435 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | 805 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); |
| 436 | if (*str == '-') | 806 | if (*str == '-') |
| 437 | offset=-offset; | 807 | offset= -offset; |
| 438 | } | 808 | } |
| 439 | atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME; | 809 | atm.type=ctm->type; |
| 440 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | 810 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); |
| 441 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | 811 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; |
| 442 | 812 | ||
| 443 | X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset); | 813 | X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time); |
| 444 | 814 | ||
| 445 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | 815 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
| 446 | if (i < 70) i+=100; | 816 | { |
| 447 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | 817 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); |
| 448 | if (j < 70) j+=100; | 818 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ |
| 819 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | ||
| 820 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | ||
| 449 | 821 | ||
| 450 | if (i < j) return (-1); | 822 | if (i < j) return -1; |
| 451 | if (i > j) return (1); | 823 | if (i > j) return 1; |
| 824 | } | ||
| 452 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | 825 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); |
| 453 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | 826 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ |
| 454 | return(-1); | 827 | return -1; |
| 455 | else | 828 | else |
| 456 | return(i); | 829 | return i; |
| 457 | } | 830 | } |
| 458 | 831 | ||
| 459 | ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(s, adj) | 832 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
| 460 | ASN1_UTCTIME *s; | 833 | { |
| 461 | long adj; | 834 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
| 835 | } | ||
| 836 | |||
| 837 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) | ||
| 462 | { | 838 | { |
| 463 | time_t t; | 839 | time_t t; |
| 840 | int type = -1; | ||
| 841 | |||
| 842 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; | ||
| 843 | else time(&t); | ||
| 464 | 844 | ||
| 465 | time(&t); | ||
| 466 | t+=adj; | 845 | t+=adj; |
| 467 | return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t)); | 846 | if (s) type = s->type; |
| 847 | if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); | ||
| 848 | if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); | ||
| 849 | return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); | ||
| 468 | } | 850 | } |
| 469 | 851 | ||
| 470 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(pkey,chain) | 852 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| 471 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | ||
| 472 | STACK *chain; | ||
| 473 | { | 853 | { |
| 474 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | 854 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; |
| 475 | int i,j; | 855 | int i,j; |
| 476 | 856 | ||
| 477 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1); | 857 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; |
| 478 | 858 | ||
| 479 | for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++) | 859 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) |
| 480 | { | 860 | { |
| 481 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i)); | 861 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); |
| 482 | if (ktmp == NULL) | 862 | if (ktmp == NULL) |
| 483 | { | 863 | { |
| 484 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | 864 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| 485 | return(0); | 865 | return 0; |
| 486 | } | 866 | } |
| 487 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | 867 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) |
| 488 | break; | 868 | break; |
| 489 | else | 869 | else |
| 490 | { | 870 | { |
| 871 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
| 491 | ktmp=NULL; | 872 | ktmp=NULL; |
| 492 | } | 873 | } |
| 493 | } | 874 | } |
| 494 | if (ktmp == NULL) | 875 | if (ktmp == NULL) |
| 495 | { | 876 | { |
| 496 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | 877 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); |
| 497 | return(0); | 878 | return 0; |
| 498 | } | 879 | } |
| 499 | 880 | ||
| 500 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | 881 | /* first, populate the other certs */ |
| 501 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | 882 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) |
| 502 | { | 883 | { |
| 503 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j)); | 884 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); |
| 504 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | 885 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); |
| 886 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | ||
| 505 | } | 887 | } |
| 506 | 888 | ||
| 507 | if (pkey != NULL) | 889 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); |
| 508 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | 890 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
| 509 | return(1); | 891 | return 1; |
| 510 | } | 892 | } |
| 511 | 893 | ||
| 512 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(x) | 894 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| 513 | X509 *x; | 895 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
| 514 | { | 896 | { |
| 515 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) | 897 | /* This function is (usually) called only once, by |
| 516 | return(NULL); | 898 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ |
| 517 | return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | 899 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, |
| 900 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | ||
| 518 | } | 901 | } |
| 519 | 902 | ||
| 520 | int X509_check_private_key(x,k) | 903 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
| 521 | X509 *x; | ||
| 522 | EVP_PKEY *k; | ||
| 523 | { | 904 | { |
| 524 | EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL; | 905 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); |
| 525 | int ok=0; | ||
| 526 | |||
| 527 | xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); | ||
| 528 | if (xk->type != k->type) goto err; | ||
| 529 | switch (k->type) | ||
| 530 | { | ||
| 531 | #ifndef NO_RSA | ||
| 532 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | ||
| 533 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0) goto err; | ||
| 534 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) goto err; | ||
| 535 | break; | ||
| 536 | #endif | ||
| 537 | #ifndef NO_DSA | ||
| 538 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | ||
| 539 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0) | ||
| 540 | goto err; | ||
| 541 | break; | ||
| 542 | #endif | ||
| 543 | #ifndef NO_DH | ||
| 544 | case EVP_PKEY_DH: | ||
| 545 | /* No idea */ | ||
| 546 | goto err; | ||
| 547 | #endif | ||
| 548 | default: | ||
| 549 | goto err; | ||
| 550 | } | ||
| 551 | |||
| 552 | ok=1; | ||
| 553 | err: | ||
| 554 | return(ok); | ||
| 555 | } | 906 | } |
| 556 | 907 | ||
| 557 | int X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx,x) | 908 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
| 558 | X509_STORE *ctx; | ||
| 559 | X509 *x; | ||
| 560 | { | 909 | { |
| 561 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | 910 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); |
| 562 | int ret=1; | 911 | } |
| 563 | |||
| 564 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 565 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | ||
| 566 | if (obj == NULL) | ||
| 567 | { | ||
| 568 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 569 | return(0); | ||
| 570 | } | ||
| 571 | obj->type=X509_LU_X509; | ||
| 572 | obj->data.x509=x; | ||
| 573 | |||
| 574 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
| 575 | 912 | ||
| 576 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | 913 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 914 | { | ||
| 915 | return ctx->error; | ||
| 916 | } | ||
| 577 | 917 | ||
| 578 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | 918 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
| 579 | if (r != NULL) | 919 | { |
| 580 | { /* oops, put it back */ | 920 | ctx->error=err; |
| 581 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | 921 | } |
| 582 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
| 583 | Free(obj); | ||
| 584 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r); | ||
| 585 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
| 586 | ret=0; | ||
| 587 | } | ||
| 588 | 922 | ||
| 589 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | 923 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 924 | { | ||
| 925 | return ctx->error_depth; | ||
| 926 | } | ||
| 590 | 927 | ||
| 591 | return(ret); | 928 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 929 | { | ||
| 930 | return ctx->current_cert; | ||
| 592 | } | 931 | } |
| 593 | 932 | ||
| 594 | int X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx,x) | 933 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 595 | X509_STORE *ctx; | ||
| 596 | X509_CRL *x; | ||
| 597 | { | 934 | { |
| 598 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | 935 | return ctx->chain; |
| 599 | int ret=1; | 936 | } |
| 600 | 937 | ||
| 601 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | 938 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 602 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | 939 | { |
| 603 | if (obj == NULL) | 940 | int i; |
| 941 | X509 *x; | ||
| 942 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | ||
| 943 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; | ||
| 944 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
| 604 | { | 945 | { |
| 605 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | 946 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| 606 | return(0); | 947 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 607 | } | 948 | } |
| 608 | obj->type=X509_LU_CRL; | 949 | return chain; |
| 609 | obj->data.crl=x; | ||
| 610 | |||
| 611 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
| 612 | |||
| 613 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | ||
| 614 | |||
| 615 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
| 616 | if (r != NULL) | ||
| 617 | { /* oops, put it back */ | ||
| 618 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
| 619 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
| 620 | Free(obj); | ||
| 621 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r); | ||
| 622 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
| 623 | ret=0; | ||
| 624 | } | ||
| 625 | |||
| 626 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
| 627 | |||
| 628 | return(ret); | ||
| 629 | } | 950 | } |
| 630 | 951 | ||
| 631 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func) | 952 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 632 | long argl; | ||
| 633 | char *argp; | ||
| 634 | int (*new_func)(); | ||
| 635 | int (*dup_func)(); | ||
| 636 | void (*free_func)(); | ||
| 637 | { | ||
| 638 | x509_store_ctx_num++; | ||
| 639 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1, | ||
| 640 | &x509_store_ctx_method, | ||
| 641 | argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); | ||
| 642 | } | ||
| 643 | |||
| 644 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,idx,data) | ||
| 645 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 646 | int idx; | ||
| 647 | char *data; | ||
| 648 | { | 953 | { |
| 649 | return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data)); | 954 | ctx->cert=x; |
| 650 | } | 955 | } |
| 651 | 956 | ||
| 652 | char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,idx) | 957 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| 653 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 654 | int idx; | ||
| 655 | { | 958 | { |
| 656 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx)); | 959 | ctx->untrusted=sk; |
| 657 | } | 960 | } |
| 658 | 961 | ||
| 659 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) | 962 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
| 660 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 661 | { | 963 | { |
| 662 | return(ctx->error); | 964 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
| 663 | } | 965 | } |
| 664 | 966 | ||
| 665 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,err) | 967 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
| 666 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 667 | int err; | ||
| 668 | { | 968 | { |
| 669 | ctx->error=err; | 969 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
| 670 | } | 970 | } |
| 671 | 971 | ||
| 672 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) | 972 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust |
| 673 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | 973 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its |
| 974 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | ||
| 975 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | ||
| 976 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | ||
| 977 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | ||
| 978 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | ||
| 979 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | ||
| 980 | */ | ||
| 981 | |||
| 982 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | ||
| 983 | int purpose, int trust) | ||
| 984 | { | ||
| 985 | int idx; | ||
| 986 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | ||
| 987 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; | ||
| 988 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | ||
| 989 | if (purpose) | ||
| 990 | { | ||
| 991 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
| 992 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | ||
| 993 | if (idx == -1) | ||
| 994 | { | ||
| 995 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
| 996 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
| 997 | return 0; | ||
| 998 | } | ||
| 999 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
| 1000 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) | ||
| 1001 | { | ||
| 1002 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | ||
| 1003 | if (idx == -1) | ||
| 1004 | { | ||
| 1005 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
| 1006 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
| 1007 | return 0; | ||
| 1008 | } | ||
| 1009 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
| 1010 | } | ||
| 1011 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | ||
| 1012 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; | ||
| 1013 | } | ||
| 1014 | if (trust) | ||
| 1015 | { | ||
| 1016 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | ||
| 1017 | if (idx == -1) | ||
| 1018 | { | ||
| 1019 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
| 1020 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | ||
| 1021 | return 0; | ||
| 1022 | } | ||
| 1023 | } | ||
| 1024 | |||
| 1025 | if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose; | ||
| 1026 | if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust; | ||
| 1027 | return 1; | ||
| 1028 | } | ||
| 1029 | |||
| 1030 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) | ||
| 1031 | { | ||
| 1032 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 1033 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
| 1034 | if (!ctx) | ||
| 1035 | { | ||
| 1036 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 1037 | return NULL; | ||
| 1038 | } | ||
| 1039 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
| 1040 | return ctx; | ||
| 1041 | } | ||
| 1042 | |||
| 1043 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 1044 | { | ||
| 1045 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | ||
| 1046 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | ||
| 1047 | } | ||
| 1048 | |||
| 1049 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, | ||
| 1050 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
| 674 | { | 1051 | { |
| 675 | return(ctx->error_depth); | 1052 | ctx->ctx=store; |
| 1053 | ctx->current_method=0; | ||
| 1054 | ctx->cert=x509; | ||
| 1055 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | ||
| 1056 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
| 1057 | ctx->check_time=0; | ||
| 1058 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; | ||
| 1059 | ctx->valid=0; | ||
| 1060 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
| 1061 | ctx->depth=9; | ||
| 1062 | ctx->error=0; | ||
| 1063 | ctx->error_depth=0; | ||
| 1064 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; | ||
| 1065 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | ||
| 1066 | |||
| 1067 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | ||
| 1068 | * use defaults. | ||
| 1069 | */ | ||
| 1070 | |||
| 1071 | |||
| 1072 | if (store) | ||
| 1073 | { | ||
| 1074 | ctx->purpose=store->purpose; | ||
| 1075 | ctx->trust=store->trust; | ||
| 1076 | ctx->flags = store->flags; | ||
| 1077 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | ||
| 1078 | } | ||
| 1079 | else | ||
| 1080 | { | ||
| 1081 | ctx->purpose = 0; | ||
| 1082 | ctx->trust = 0; | ||
| 1083 | ctx->flags = 0; | ||
| 1084 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | ||
| 1085 | } | ||
| 1086 | |||
| 1087 | if (store && store->check_issued) | ||
| 1088 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | ||
| 1089 | else | ||
| 1090 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | ||
| 1091 | |||
| 1092 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | ||
| 1093 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | ||
| 1094 | else | ||
| 1095 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | ||
| 1096 | |||
| 1097 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | ||
| 1098 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | ||
| 1099 | else | ||
| 1100 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | ||
| 1101 | |||
| 1102 | if (store && store->verify) | ||
| 1103 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | ||
| 1104 | else | ||
| 1105 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | ||
| 1106 | |||
| 1107 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | ||
| 1108 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | ||
| 1109 | else | ||
| 1110 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | ||
| 1111 | |||
| 1112 | if (store && store->get_crl) | ||
| 1113 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | ||
| 1114 | else | ||
| 1115 | ctx->get_crl = get_crl; | ||
| 1116 | |||
| 1117 | if (store && store->check_crl) | ||
| 1118 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | ||
| 1119 | else | ||
| 1120 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | ||
| 1121 | |||
| 1122 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | ||
| 1123 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | ||
| 1124 | else | ||
| 1125 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | ||
| 1126 | |||
| 1127 | |||
| 1128 | /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | ||
| 1129 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | ||
| 1130 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | ||
| 1131 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | ||
| 1132 | if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | ||
| 1133 | &(ctx->ex_data))) | ||
| 1134 | { | ||
| 1135 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | ||
| 1136 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 1137 | return 0; | ||
| 1138 | } | ||
| 1139 | return 1; | ||
| 676 | } | 1140 | } |
| 677 | 1141 | ||
| 678 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) | 1142 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. |
| 679 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | 1143 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. |
| 1144 | */ | ||
| 1145 | |||
| 1146 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
| 1147 | { | ||
| 1148 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | ||
| 1149 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | ||
| 1150 | } | ||
| 1151 | |||
| 1152 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 680 | { | 1153 | { |
| 681 | return(ctx->current_cert); | 1154 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
| 1155 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) | ||
| 1156 | { | ||
| 1157 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | ||
| 1158 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
| 1159 | } | ||
| 1160 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | ||
| 1161 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | ||
| 682 | } | 1162 | } |
| 683 | 1163 | ||
| 684 | STACK *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(ctx) | 1164 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags) |
| 685 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 686 | { | 1165 | { |
| 687 | return(ctx->chain); | 1166 | ctx->flags |= flags; |
| 688 | } | 1167 | } |
| 689 | 1168 | ||
| 690 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx,x) | 1169 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t) |
| 691 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 692 | X509 *x; | ||
| 693 | { | 1170 | { |
| 694 | ctx->cert=x; | 1171 | ctx->check_time = t; |
| 1172 | ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME; | ||
| 695 | } | 1173 | } |
| 696 | 1174 | ||
| 697 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx,sk) | 1175 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 698 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | 1176 | int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
| 699 | STACK *sk; | ||
| 700 | { | 1177 | { |
| 701 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | 1178 | ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; |
| 702 | } | 1179 | } |
| 703 | 1180 | ||
| 1181 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) | ||
| 1182 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | ||
| 1183 | |||
| 1184 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | ||
| 704 | 1185 | ||
| 1186 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||
| 1187 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||
