diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 1187 |
1 files changed, 1187 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04997ba456 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,1187 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <time.h> | ||
61 | #include <errno.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | ||
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
72 | |||
73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | ||
74 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); | ||
75 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | ||
76 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
77 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
78 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
79 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
80 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
81 | const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | ||
82 | |||
83 | |||
84 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) | ||
85 | { | ||
86 | return ok; | ||
87 | } | ||
88 | |||
89 | #if 0 | ||
90 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) | ||
91 | { | ||
92 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); | ||
93 | } | ||
94 | #endif | ||
95 | |||
96 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
97 | { | ||
98 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | ||
99 | X509_NAME *xn; | ||
100 | int depth,i,ok=0; | ||
101 | int num; | ||
102 | int (*cb)(); | ||
103 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; | ||
104 | |||
105 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) | ||
106 | { | ||
107 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | ||
108 | return -1; | ||
109 | } | ||
110 | |||
111 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
112 | |||
113 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | ||
114 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | ||
115 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | ||
116 | { | ||
117 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | ||
118 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | ||
119 | { | ||
120 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
121 | goto end; | ||
122 | } | ||
123 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
124 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | ||
125 | } | ||
126 | |||
127 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | ||
128 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | ||
129 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | ||
130 | { | ||
131 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
132 | goto end; | ||
133 | } | ||
134 | |||
135 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
136 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
137 | depth=ctx->depth; | ||
138 | |||
139 | |||
140 | for (;;) | ||
141 | { | ||
142 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
143 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | ||
144 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | ||
145 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | ||
146 | * code later. | ||
147 | */ | ||
148 | |||
149 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
150 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
151 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; | ||
152 | |||
153 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | ||
154 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | ||
155 | { | ||
156 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); | ||
157 | if (xtmp != NULL) | ||
158 | { | ||
159 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) | ||
160 | { | ||
161 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
162 | goto end; | ||
163 | } | ||
164 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
165 | sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); | ||
166 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | ||
167 | x=xtmp; | ||
168 | num++; | ||
169 | /* reparse the full chain for | ||
170 | * the next one */ | ||
171 | continue; | ||
172 | } | ||
173 | } | ||
174 | break; | ||
175 | } | ||
176 | |||
177 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | ||
178 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | ||
179 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | ||
180 | |||
181 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it | ||
182 | * is self signed. | ||
183 | */ | ||
184 | |||
185 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
186 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | ||
187 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); | ||
188 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | ||
189 | { | ||
190 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | ||
191 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | ||
192 | { | ||
193 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if | ||
194 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | ||
195 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | ||
196 | */ | ||
197 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | ||
198 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | ||
199 | { | ||
200 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | ||
201 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
202 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | ||
203 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); | ||
204 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
205 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
206 | } | ||
207 | else | ||
208 | { | ||
209 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | ||
210 | * so we get any trust settings. | ||
211 | */ | ||
212 | X509_free(x); | ||
213 | x = xtmp; | ||
214 | sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | ||
215 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
216 | } | ||
217 | } | ||
218 | else | ||
219 | { | ||
220 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ | ||
221 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | ||
222 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | ||
223 | num--; | ||
224 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
225 | } | ||
226 | } | ||
227 | |||
228 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | ||
229 | for (;;) | ||
230 | { | ||
231 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
232 | if (depth < num) break; | ||
233 | |||
234 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
235 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
236 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; | ||
237 | |||
238 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | ||
239 | |||
240 | if (ok < 0) return ok; | ||
241 | if (ok == 0) break; | ||
242 | |||
243 | x = xtmp; | ||
244 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | ||
245 | { | ||
246 | X509_free(xtmp); | ||
247 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
248 | return 0; | ||
249 | } | ||
250 | num++; | ||
251 | } | ||
252 | |||
253 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | ||
254 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
255 | |||
256 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | ||
257 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | ||
258 | { | ||
259 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) | ||
260 | { | ||
261 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | ||
262 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | ||
263 | else | ||
264 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | ||
265 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
266 | } | ||
267 | else | ||
268 | { | ||
269 | |||
270 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); | ||
271 | num++; | ||
272 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | ||
273 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | ||
274 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | ||
275 | chain_ss=NULL; | ||
276 | } | ||
277 | |||
278 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | ||
279 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
280 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
281 | } | ||
282 | |||
283 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | ||
284 | if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx); | ||
285 | |||
286 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
287 | |||
288 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | ||
289 | |||
290 | if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); | ||
291 | |||
292 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
293 | |||
294 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | ||
295 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
296 | |||
297 | /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters | ||
298 | * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | ||
299 | */ | ||
300 | |||
301 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | ||
302 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
303 | |||
304 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ | ||
305 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | ||
306 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | ||
307 | else | ||
308 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | ||
309 | if (0) | ||
310 | { | ||
311 | end: | ||
312 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
313 | } | ||
314 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); | ||
315 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | ||
316 | return ok; | ||
317 | } | ||
318 | |||
319 | |||
320 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | ||
321 | */ | ||
322 | |||
323 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | ||
324 | { | ||
325 | int i; | ||
326 | X509 *issuer; | ||
327 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) | ||
328 | { | ||
329 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
330 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | ||
331 | return issuer; | ||
332 | } | ||
333 | return NULL; | ||
334 | } | ||
335 | |||
336 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | ||
337 | |||
338 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | ||
339 | { | ||
340 | int ret; | ||
341 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | ||
342 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | ||
343 | return 1; | ||
344 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | ||
345 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | ||
346 | return 0; | ||
347 | |||
348 | ctx->error = ret; | ||
349 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
350 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | ||
351 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
352 | return 0; | ||
353 | } | ||
354 | |||
355 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | ||
356 | |||
357 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
358 | { | ||
359 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | ||
360 | if (*issuer) | ||
361 | { | ||
362 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
363 | return 1; | ||
364 | } | ||
365 | else | ||
366 | return 0; | ||
367 | } | ||
368 | |||
369 | |||
370 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency | ||
371 | * with the supplied purpose | ||
372 | */ | ||
373 | |||
374 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
375 | { | ||
376 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
377 | return 1; | ||
378 | #else | ||
379 | int i, ok=0; | ||
380 | X509 *x; | ||
381 | int (*cb)(); | ||
382 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
383 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | ||
384 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) | ||
385 | { | ||
386 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
387 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | ||
388 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | ||
389 | { | ||
390 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | ||
391 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
392 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
393 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
394 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
395 | } | ||
396 | if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i)) | ||
397 | { | ||
398 | if (i) | ||
399 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | ||
400 | else | ||
401 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | ||
402 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
403 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
404 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
405 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
406 | } | ||
407 | /* Check pathlen */ | ||
408 | if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | ||
409 | && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) | ||
410 | { | ||
411 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | ||
412 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
413 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
414 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
415 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
416 | } | ||
417 | } | ||
418 | ok = 1; | ||
419 | end: | ||
420 | return ok; | ||
421 | #endif | ||
422 | } | ||
423 | |||
424 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
425 | { | ||
426 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
427 | return 1; | ||
428 | #else | ||
429 | int i, ok; | ||
430 | X509 *x; | ||
431 | int (*cb)(); | ||
432 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
433 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ | ||
434 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
435 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
436 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0); | ||
437 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | ||
438 | return 1; | ||
439 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
440 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
441 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | ||
442 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | ||
443 | else | ||
444 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | ||
445 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | ||
446 | return ok; | ||
447 | #endif | ||
448 | } | ||
449 | |||
450 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
451 | { | ||
452 | int i, last, ok; | ||
453 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | ||
454 | return 1; | ||
455 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | ||
456 | last = 0; | ||
457 | else | ||
458 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
459 | for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) | ||
460 | { | ||
461 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
462 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | ||
463 | if (!ok) return ok; | ||
464 | } | ||
465 | return 1; | ||
466 | } | ||
467 | |||
468 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
469 | { | ||
470 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | ||
471 | X509 *x; | ||
472 | int ok, cnum; | ||
473 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | ||
474 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | ||
475 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
476 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | ||
477 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | ||
478 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except | ||
479 | * notify callback | ||
480 | */ | ||
481 | if(!ok) | ||
482 | { | ||
483 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | ||
484 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
485 | goto err; | ||
486 | } | ||
487 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | ||
488 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | ||
489 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
490 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | ||
491 | err: | ||
492 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | ||
493 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | ||
494 | return ok; | ||
495 | |||
496 | } | ||
497 | |||
498 | /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a | ||
499 | * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... | ||
500 | * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData). | ||
501 | */ | ||
502 | static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x) | ||
503 | { | ||
504 | int ok; | ||
505 | X509_OBJECT xobj; | ||
506 | ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj); | ||
507 | if (!ok) return 0; | ||
508 | *crl = xobj.data.crl; | ||
509 | return 1; | ||
510 | } | ||
511 | |||
512 | /* Check CRL validity */ | ||
513 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | ||
514 | { | ||
515 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | ||
516 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | ||
517 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i; | ||
518 | time_t *ptime; | ||
519 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | ||
520 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
521 | /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer | ||
522 | * is next certificate in chain. | ||
523 | */ | ||
524 | if(cnum < chnum) | ||
525 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | ||
526 | else | ||
527 | { | ||
528 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | ||
529 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | ||
530 | if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | ||
531 | { | ||
532 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | ||
533 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
534 | if(!ok) goto err; | ||
535 | } | ||
536 | } | ||
537 | |||
538 | if(issuer) | ||
539 | { | ||
540 | |||
541 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | ||
542 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | ||
543 | |||
544 | if(!ikey) | ||
545 | { | ||
546 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
547 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
548 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
549 | } | ||
550 | else | ||
551 | { | ||
552 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | ||
553 | if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | ||
554 | { | ||
555 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
556 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
557 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
558 | } | ||
559 | } | ||
560 | } | ||
561 | |||
562 | /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */ | ||
563 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | ||
564 | ptime = &ctx->check_time; | ||
565 | else | ||
566 | ptime = NULL; | ||
567 | |||
568 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | ||
569 | if (i == 0) | ||
570 | { | ||
571 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | ||
572 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
573 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
574 | } | ||
575 | |||
576 | if (i > 0) | ||
577 | { | ||
578 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
579 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
580 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
581 | } | ||
582 | |||
583 | if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | ||
584 | { | ||
585 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | ||
586 | |||
587 | if (i == 0) | ||
588 | { | ||
589 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | ||
590 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
591 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
592 | } | ||
593 | |||
594 | if (i < 0) | ||
595 | { | ||
596 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
597 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
598 | if (!ok) goto err; | ||
599 | } | ||
600 | } | ||
601 | |||
602 | ok = 1; | ||
603 | |||
604 | err: | ||
605 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | ||
606 | return ok; | ||
607 | } | ||
608 | |||
609 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | ||
610 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | ||
611 | { | ||
612 | int idx, ok; | ||
613 | X509_REVOKED rtmp; | ||
614 | /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ | ||
615 | rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); | ||
616 | idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); | ||
617 | /* Not found: OK */ | ||
618 | if(idx == -1) return 1; | ||
619 | /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than | ||
620 | * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. | ||
621 | */ | ||
622 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | ||
623 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
624 | return ok; | ||
625 | } | ||
626 | |||
627 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
628 | { | ||
629 | int i,ok=0,n; | ||
630 | X509 *xs,*xi; | ||
631 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | ||
632 | time_t *ptime; | ||
633 | int (*cb)(); | ||
634 | |||
635 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
636 | |||
637 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
638 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; | ||
639 | n--; | ||
640 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
641 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | ||
642 | ptime = &ctx->check_time; | ||
643 | else | ||
644 | ptime = NULL; | ||
645 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | ||
646 | xs=xi; | ||
647 | else | ||
648 | { | ||
649 | if (n <= 0) | ||
650 | { | ||
651 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | ||
652 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
653 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
654 | goto end; | ||
655 | } | ||
656 | else | ||
657 | { | ||
658 | n--; | ||
659 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
660 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
661 | } | ||
662 | } | ||
663 | |||
664 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | ||
665 | while (n >= 0) | ||
666 | { | ||
667 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
668 | if (!xs->valid) | ||
669 | { | ||
670 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | ||
671 | { | ||
672 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
673 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
674 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
675 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
676 | } | ||
677 | else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | ||
678 | /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, | ||
679 | * this is a waste of time. That check should | ||
680 | * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be | ||
681 | * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but | ||
682 | * we don't verify again and again in SSL | ||
683 | * handshakes and the like once the cert has | ||
684 | * been declared trusted. */ | ||
685 | { | ||
686 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
687 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
688 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
689 | if (!ok) | ||
690 | { | ||
691 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
692 | goto end; | ||
693 | } | ||
694 | } | ||
695 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
696 | pkey=NULL; | ||
697 | |||
698 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime); | ||
699 | if (i == 0) | ||
700 | { | ||
701 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | ||
702 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
703 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
704 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
705 | } | ||
706 | if (i > 0) | ||
707 | { | ||
708 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
709 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
710 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
711 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
712 | } | ||
713 | xs->valid=1; | ||
714 | } | ||
715 | |||
716 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime); | ||
717 | if (i == 0) | ||
718 | { | ||
719 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | ||
720 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
721 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
722 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
723 | } | ||
724 | |||
725 | if (i < 0) | ||
726 | { | ||
727 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
728 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
729 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
730 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
731 | } | ||
732 | |||
733 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | ||
734 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
735 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | ||
736 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
737 | |||
738 | n--; | ||
739 | if (n >= 0) | ||
740 | { | ||
741 | xi=xs; | ||
742 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
743 | } | ||
744 | } | ||
745 | ok=1; | ||
746 | end: | ||
747 | return ok; | ||
748 | } | ||
749 | |||
750 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) | ||
751 | { | ||
752 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | ||
753 | } | ||
754 | |||
755 | int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) | ||
756 | { | ||
757 | char *str; | ||
758 | ASN1_TIME atm; | ||
759 | long offset; | ||
760 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | ||
761 | int i,j; | ||
762 | |||
763 | p=buff1; | ||
764 | i=ctm->length; | ||
765 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | ||
766 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | ||
767 | { | ||
768 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; | ||
769 | memcpy(p,str,10); | ||
770 | p+=10; | ||
771 | str+=10; | ||
772 | } | ||
773 | else | ||
774 | { | ||
775 | if (i < 13) return 0; | ||
776 | memcpy(p,str,12); | ||
777 | p+=12; | ||
778 | str+=12; | ||
779 | } | ||
780 | |||
781 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | ||
782 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | ||
783 | else | ||
784 | { | ||
785 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
786 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
787 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | ||
788 | if (*str == '.') | ||
789 | { | ||
790 | str++; | ||
791 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; | ||
792 | } | ||
793 | |||
794 | } | ||
795 | *(p++)='Z'; | ||
796 | *(p++)='\0'; | ||
797 | |||
798 | if (*str == 'Z') | ||
799 | offset=0; | ||
800 | else | ||
801 | { | ||
802 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) | ||
803 | return 0; | ||
804 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | ||
805 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | ||
806 | if (*str == '-') | ||
807 | offset= -offset; | ||
808 | } | ||
809 | atm.type=ctm->type; | ||
810 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | ||
811 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | ||
812 | |||
813 | X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time); | ||
814 | |||
815 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | ||
816 | { | ||
817 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | ||
818 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | ||
819 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | ||
820 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | ||
821 | |||
822 | if (i < j) return -1; | ||
823 | if (i > j) return 1; | ||
824 | } | ||
825 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | ||
826 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | ||
827 | return -1; | ||
828 | else | ||
829 | return i; | ||
830 | } | ||
831 | |||
832 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) | ||
833 | { | ||
834 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | ||
835 | } | ||
836 | |||
837 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) | ||
838 | { | ||
839 | time_t t; | ||
840 | int type = -1; | ||
841 | |||
842 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; | ||
843 | else time(&t); | ||
844 | |||
845 | t+=adj; | ||
846 | if (s) type = s->type; | ||
847 | if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); | ||
848 | if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); | ||
849 | return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); | ||
850 | } | ||
851 | |||
852 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
853 | { | ||
854 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | ||
855 | int i,j; | ||
856 | |||
857 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; | ||
858 | |||
859 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
860 | { | ||
861 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); | ||
862 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
863 | { | ||
864 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | ||
865 | return 0; | ||
866 | } | ||
867 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | ||
868 | break; | ||
869 | else | ||
870 | { | ||
871 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
872 | ktmp=NULL; | ||
873 | } | ||
874 | } | ||
875 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
876 | { | ||
877 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | ||
878 | return 0; | ||
879 | } | ||
880 | |||
881 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | ||
882 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | ||
883 | { | ||
884 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); | ||
885 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | ||
886 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | ||
887 | } | ||
888 | |||
889 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | ||
890 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
891 | return 1; | ||
892 | } | ||
893 | |||
894 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | ||
895 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | ||
896 | { | ||
897 | /* This function is (usually) called only once, by | ||
898 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ | ||
899 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | ||
900 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | ||
901 | } | ||
902 | |||
903 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) | ||
904 | { | ||
905 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); | ||
906 | } | ||
907 | |||
908 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) | ||
909 | { | ||
910 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); | ||
911 | } | ||
912 | |||
913 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
914 | { | ||
915 | return ctx->error; | ||
916 | } | ||
917 | |||
918 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | ||
919 | { | ||
920 | ctx->error=err; | ||
921 | } | ||
922 | |||
923 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
924 | { | ||
925 | return ctx->error_depth; | ||
926 | } | ||
927 | |||
928 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
929 | { | ||
930 | return ctx->current_cert; | ||
931 | } | ||
932 | |||
933 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
934 | { | ||
935 | return ctx->chain; | ||
936 | } | ||
937 | |||
938 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
939 | { | ||
940 | int i; | ||
941 | X509 *x; | ||
942 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | ||
943 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; | ||
944 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
945 | { | ||
946 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | ||
947 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
948 | } | ||
949 | return chain; | ||
950 | } | ||
951 | |||
952 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
953 | { | ||
954 | ctx->cert=x; | ||
955 | } | ||
956 | |||
957 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
958 | { | ||
959 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | ||
960 | } | ||
961 | |||
962 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) | ||
963 | { | ||
964 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | ||
965 | } | ||
966 | |||
967 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) | ||
968 | { | ||
969 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | ||
970 | } | ||
971 | |||
972 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust | ||
973 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | ||
974 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | ||
975 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | ||
976 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | ||
977 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | ||
978 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | ||
979 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | ||
980 | */ | ||
981 | |||
982 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | ||
983 | int purpose, int trust) | ||
984 | { | ||
985 | int idx; | ||
986 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | ||
987 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; | ||
988 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | ||
989 | if (purpose) | ||
990 | { | ||
991 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
992 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | ||
993 | if (idx == -1) | ||
994 | { | ||
995 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
996 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
997 | return 0; | ||
998 | } | ||
999 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
1000 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) | ||
1001 | { | ||
1002 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | ||
1003 | if (idx == -1) | ||
1004 | { | ||
1005 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
1006 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
1007 | return 0; | ||
1008 | } | ||
1009 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
1010 | } | ||
1011 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | ||
1012 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; | ||
1013 | } | ||
1014 | if (trust) | ||
1015 | { | ||
1016 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | ||
1017 | if (idx == -1) | ||
1018 | { | ||
1019 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
1020 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | ||
1021 | return 0; | ||
1022 | } | ||
1023 | } | ||
1024 | |||
1025 | if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose; | ||
1026 | if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust; | ||
1027 | return 1; | ||
1028 | } | ||
1029 | |||
1030 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) | ||
1031 | { | ||
1032 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
1033 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
1034 | if (!ctx) | ||
1035 | { | ||
1036 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1037 | return NULL; | ||
1038 | } | ||
1039 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
1040 | return ctx; | ||
1041 | } | ||
1042 | |||
1043 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
1044 | { | ||
1045 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | ||
1046 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | ||
1047 | } | ||
1048 | |||
1049 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, | ||
1050 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
1051 | { | ||
1052 | ctx->ctx=store; | ||
1053 | ctx->current_method=0; | ||
1054 | ctx->cert=x509; | ||
1055 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | ||
1056 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
1057 | ctx->check_time=0; | ||
1058 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; | ||
1059 | ctx->valid=0; | ||
1060 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
1061 | ctx->depth=9; | ||
1062 | ctx->error=0; | ||
1063 | ctx->error_depth=0; | ||
1064 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; | ||
1065 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | ||
1066 | |||
1067 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | ||
1068 | * use defaults. | ||
1069 | */ | ||
1070 | |||
1071 | |||
1072 | if (store) | ||
1073 | { | ||
1074 | ctx->purpose=store->purpose; | ||
1075 | ctx->trust=store->trust; | ||
1076 | ctx->flags = store->flags; | ||
1077 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | ||
1078 | } | ||
1079 | else | ||
1080 | { | ||
1081 | ctx->purpose = 0; | ||
1082 | ctx->trust = 0; | ||
1083 | ctx->flags = 0; | ||
1084 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | ||
1085 | } | ||
1086 | |||
1087 | if (store && store->check_issued) | ||
1088 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | ||
1089 | else | ||
1090 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | ||
1091 | |||
1092 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | ||
1093 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | ||
1094 | else | ||
1095 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | ||
1096 | |||
1097 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | ||
1098 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | ||
1099 | else | ||
1100 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | ||
1101 | |||
1102 | if (store && store->verify) | ||
1103 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | ||
1104 | else | ||
1105 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | ||
1106 | |||
1107 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | ||
1108 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | ||
1109 | else | ||
1110 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | ||
1111 | |||
1112 | if (store && store->get_crl) | ||
1113 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | ||
1114 | else | ||
1115 | ctx->get_crl = get_crl; | ||
1116 | |||
1117 | if (store && store->check_crl) | ||
1118 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | ||
1119 | else | ||
1120 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | ||
1121 | |||
1122 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | ||
1123 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | ||
1124 | else | ||
1125 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | ||
1126 | |||
1127 | |||
1128 | /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | ||
1129 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | ||
1130 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | ||
1131 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | ||
1132 | if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | ||
1133 | &(ctx->ex_data))) | ||
1134 | { | ||
1135 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | ||
1136 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1137 | return 0; | ||
1138 | } | ||
1139 | return 1; | ||
1140 | } | ||
1141 | |||
1142 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | ||
1143 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | ||
1144 | */ | ||
1145 | |||
1146 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
1147 | { | ||
1148 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | ||
1149 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | ||
1150 | } | ||
1151 | |||
1152 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
1153 | { | ||
1154 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); | ||
1155 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) | ||
1156 | { | ||
1157 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | ||
1158 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
1159 | } | ||
1160 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | ||
1161 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | ||
1162 | } | ||
1163 | |||
1164 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags) | ||
1165 | { | ||
1166 | ctx->flags |= flags; | ||
1167 | } | ||
1168 | |||
1169 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t) | ||
1170 | { | ||
1171 | ctx->check_time = t; | ||
1172 | ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME; | ||
1173 | } | ||
1174 | |||
1175 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | ||
1176 | int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | ||
1177 | { | ||
1178 | ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; | ||
1179 | } | ||
1180 | |||
1181 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) | ||
1182 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | ||
1183 | |||
1184 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | ||
1185 | |||
1186 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||
1187 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||