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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <time.h>
61#include <errno.h>
62
63#include "cryptlib.h"
64#include <openssl/crypto.h>
65#include <openssl/lhash.h>
66#include <openssl/buffer.h>
67#include <openssl/evp.h>
68#include <openssl/asn1.h>
69#include <openssl/x509.h>
70#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71#include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
82
83
84static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
85 {
86 return ok;
87 }
88
89#if 0
90static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
91 {
92 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
93 }
94#endif
95
96int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
97 {
98 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
99 X509_NAME *xn;
100 int depth,i,ok=0;
101 int num;
102 int (*cb)();
103 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
104
105 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
106 {
107 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
108 return -1;
109 }
110
111 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
112
113 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
114 * present and that the first entry is in place */
115 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
116 {
117 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
118 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
119 {
120 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
121 goto end;
122 }
123 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
124 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
125 }
126
127 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
128 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
129 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
130 {
131 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
132 goto end;
133 }
134
135 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
136 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
137 depth=ctx->depth;
138
139
140 for (;;)
141 {
142 /* If we have enough, we break */
143 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
144 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
145 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
146 * code later.
147 */
148
149 /* If we are self signed, we break */
150 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
151 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
152
153 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
154 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
155 {
156 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
157 if (xtmp != NULL)
158 {
159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
160 {
161 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
162 goto end;
163 }
164 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
165 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
166 ctx->last_untrusted++;
167 x=xtmp;
168 num++;
169 /* reparse the full chain for
170 * the next one */
171 continue;
172 }
173 }
174 break;
175 }
176
177 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
178 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
179 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
180
181 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
182 * is self signed.
183 */
184
185 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
186 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
187 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
188 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
189 {
190 /* we have a self signed certificate */
191 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
192 {
193 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
194 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
195 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
196 */
197 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
198 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
199 {
200 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
201 ctx->current_cert=x;
202 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
203 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
204 ok=cb(0,ctx);
205 if (!ok) goto end;
206 }
207 else
208 {
209 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
210 * so we get any trust settings.
211 */
212 X509_free(x);
213 x = xtmp;
214 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
215 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
216 }
217 }
218 else
219 {
220 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
221 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
222 ctx->last_untrusted--;
223 num--;
224 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
225 }
226 }
227
228 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
229 for (;;)
230 {
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 if (depth < num) break;
233
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
236 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
237
238 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
239
240 if (ok < 0) return ok;
241 if (ok == 0) break;
242
243 x = xtmp;
244 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
245 {
246 X509_free(xtmp);
247 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
248 return 0;
249 }
250 num++;
251 }
252
253 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
254 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
255
256 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
257 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
258 {
259 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
260 {
261 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
262 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
263 else
264 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
265 ctx->current_cert=x;
266 }
267 else
268 {
269
270 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
271 num++;
272 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
273 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
274 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
275 chain_ss=NULL;
276 }
277
278 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
279 ok=cb(0,ctx);
280 if (!ok) goto end;
281 }
282
283 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
284 if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
285
286 if (!ok) goto end;
287
288 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
289
290 if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
291
292 if (!ok) goto end;
293
294 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
295 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
296
297 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
298 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
299 */
300
301 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
302 if(!ok) goto end;
303
304 /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
305 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
306 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
307 else
308 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
309 if (0)
310 {
311end:
312 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
313 }
314 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
315 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
316 return ok;
317 }
318
319
320/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
321 */
322
323static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
324{
325 int i;
326 X509 *issuer;
327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
328 {
329 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
330 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
331 return issuer;
332 }
333 return NULL;
334}
335
336/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
337
338static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
339{
340 int ret;
341 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
342 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
343 return 1;
344 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
345 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
346 return 0;
347
348 ctx->error = ret;
349 ctx->current_cert = x;
350 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
351 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
352 return 0;
353}
354
355/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
356
357static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
358{
359 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
360 if (*issuer)
361 {
362 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
363 return 1;
364 }
365 else
366 return 0;
367}
368
369
370/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
371 * with the supplied purpose
372 */
373
374static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
375{
376#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
377 return 1;
378#else
379 int i, ok=0;
380 X509 *x;
381 int (*cb)();
382 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
383 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
384 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
385 {
386 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
387 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
388 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
389 {
390 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
391 ctx->error_depth = i;
392 ctx->current_cert = x;
393 ok=cb(0,ctx);
394 if (!ok) goto end;
395 }
396 if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
397 {
398 if (i)
399 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
400 else
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
402 ctx->error_depth = i;
403 ctx->current_cert = x;
404 ok=cb(0,ctx);
405 if (!ok) goto end;
406 }
407 /* Check pathlen */
408 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
409 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
410 {
411 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
412 ctx->error_depth = i;
413 ctx->current_cert = x;
414 ok=cb(0,ctx);
415 if (!ok) goto end;
416 }
417 }
418 ok = 1;
419 end:
420 return ok;
421#endif
422}
423
424static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
425{
426#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
427 return 1;
428#else
429 int i, ok;
430 X509 *x;
431 int (*cb)();
432 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
433/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
434 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
435 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
436 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
437 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
438 return 1;
439 ctx->error_depth = i;
440 ctx->current_cert = x;
441 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
442 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
443 else
444 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
445 ok = cb(0, ctx);
446 return ok;
447#endif
448}
449
450static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
451 {
452 int i, last, ok;
453 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
454 return 1;
455 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
456 last = 0;
457 else
458 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
459 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
460 {
461 ctx->error_depth = i;
462 ok = check_cert(ctx);
463 if (!ok) return ok;
464 }
465 return 1;
466 }
467
468static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
469 {
470 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
471 X509 *x;
472 int ok, cnum;
473 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
474 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
475 ctx->current_cert = x;
476 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
477 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
478 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
479 * notify callback
480 */
481 if(!ok)
482 {
483 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
484 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
485 goto err;
486 }
487 ctx->current_crl = crl;
488 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
489 if (!ok) goto err;
490 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
491 err:
492 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
493 X509_CRL_free(crl);
494 return ok;
495
496 }
497
498/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
499 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
500 * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
501 */
502static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
503 {
504 int ok;
505 X509_OBJECT xobj;
506 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
507 if (!ok) return 0;
508 *crl = xobj.data.crl;
509 return 1;
510 }
511
512/* Check CRL validity */
513static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
514 {
515 X509 *issuer = NULL;
516 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
517 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
518 time_t *ptime;
519 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
520 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
521 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
522 * is next certificate in chain.
523 */
524 if(cnum < chnum)
525 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
526 else
527 {
528 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
529 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
530 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
531 {
532 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
533 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
534 if(!ok) goto err;
535 }
536 }
537
538 if(issuer)
539 {
540
541 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
542 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
543
544 if(!ikey)
545 {
546 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
547 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
548 if (!ok) goto err;
549 }
550 else
551 {
552 /* Verify CRL signature */
553 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
554 {
555 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
556 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
557 if (!ok) goto err;
558 }
559 }
560 }
561
562 /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
563 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
564 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
565 else
566 ptime = NULL;
567
568 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
569 if (i == 0)
570 {
571 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
572 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
573 if (!ok) goto err;
574 }
575
576 if (i > 0)
577 {
578 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
579 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
580 if (!ok) goto err;
581 }
582
583 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
584 {
585 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
586
587 if (i == 0)
588 {
589 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
590 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
591 if (!ok) goto err;
592 }
593
594 if (i < 0)
595 {
596 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
597 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
598 if (!ok) goto err;
599 }
600 }
601
602 ok = 1;
603
604 err:
605 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
606 return ok;
607 }
608
609/* Check certificate against CRL */
610static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
611 {
612 int idx, ok;
613 X509_REVOKED rtmp;
614 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
615 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
616 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
617 /* Not found: OK */
618 if(idx == -1) return 1;
619 /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
620 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
621 */
622 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
623 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
624 return ok;
625 }
626
627static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
628 {
629 int i,ok=0,n;
630 X509 *xs,*xi;
631 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
632 time_t *ptime;
633 int (*cb)();
634
635 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
636
637 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
638 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
639 n--;
640 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
641 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
642 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
643 else
644 ptime = NULL;
645 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
646 xs=xi;
647 else
648 {
649 if (n <= 0)
650 {
651 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
652 ctx->current_cert=xi;
653 ok=cb(0,ctx);
654 goto end;
655 }
656 else
657 {
658 n--;
659 ctx->error_depth=n;
660 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
661 }
662 }
663
664/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
665 while (n >= 0)
666 {
667 ctx->error_depth=n;
668 if (!xs->valid)
669 {
670 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
671 {
672 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
673 ctx->current_cert=xi;
674 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
675 if (!ok) goto end;
676 }
677 if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
678 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
679 * this is a waste of time. That check should
680 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
681 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
682 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
683 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
684 * been declared trusted. */
685 {
686 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
687 ctx->current_cert=xs;
688 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
689 if (!ok)
690 {
691 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
692 goto end;
693 }
694 }
695 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
696 pkey=NULL;
697
698 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
699 if (i == 0)
700 {
701 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
702 ctx->current_cert=xs;
703 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
704 if (!ok) goto end;
705 }
706 if (i > 0)
707 {
708 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
709 ctx->current_cert=xs;
710 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
711 if (!ok) goto end;
712 }
713 xs->valid=1;
714 }
715
716 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
717 if (i == 0)
718 {
719 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
720 ctx->current_cert=xs;
721 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
722 if (!ok) goto end;
723 }
724
725 if (i < 0)
726 {
727 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
728 ctx->current_cert=xs;
729 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
730 if (!ok) goto end;
731 }
732
733 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
734 ctx->current_cert=xs;
735 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
736 if (!ok) goto end;
737
738 n--;
739 if (n >= 0)
740 {
741 xi=xs;
742 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
743 }
744 }
745 ok=1;
746end:
747 return ok;
748 }
749
750int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
751{
752 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
753}
754
755int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
756 {
757 char *str;
758 ASN1_TIME atm;
759 time_t offset;
760 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
761 int i,j;
762
763 p=buff1;
764 i=ctm->length;
765 str=(char *)ctm->data;
766 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
767 {
768 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
769 memcpy(p,str,10);
770 p+=10;
771 str+=10;
772 }
773 else
774 {
775 if (i < 13) return 0;
776 memcpy(p,str,12);
777 p+=12;
778 str+=12;
779 }
780
781 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
782 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
783 else
784 {
785 *(p++)= *(str++);
786 *(p++)= *(str++);
787 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
788 if (*str == '.')
789 {
790 str++;
791 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
792 }
793
794 }
795 *(p++)='Z';
796 *(p++)='\0';
797
798 if (*str == 'Z')
799 offset=0;
800 else
801 {
802 if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
803 return 0;
804 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
805 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
806 if (*str == '-')
807 offset= -offset;
808 }
809 atm.type=ctm->type;
810 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
811 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
812
813 X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
814
815 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
816 {
817 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
818 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
819 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
820 if (j < 50) j+=100;
821
822 if (i < j) return -1;
823 if (i > j) return 1;
824 }
825 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
826 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
827 return -1;
828 else
829 return i;
830 }
831
832ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
833{
834 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
835}
836
837ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
838 {
839 time_t t;
840 int type = -1;
841
842 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
843 else time(&t);
844
845 t+=adj;
846 if (s) type = s->type;
847 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
848 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
849 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
850 }
851
852int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
853 {
854 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
855 int i,j;
856
857 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
858
859 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
860 {
861 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
862 if (ktmp == NULL)
863 {
864 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
865 return 0;
866 }
867 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
868 break;
869 else
870 {
871 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
872 ktmp=NULL;
873 }
874 }
875 if (ktmp == NULL)
876 {
877 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
878 return 0;
879 }
880
881 /* first, populate the other certs */
882 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
883 {
884 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
885 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
886 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
887 }
888
889 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
890 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
891 return 1;
892 }
893
894int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
895 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
896 {
897 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
898 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
899 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
900 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
901 }
902
903int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
904 {
905 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
906 }
907
908void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
909 {
910 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
911 }
912
913int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
914 {
915 return ctx->error;
916 }
917
918void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
919 {
920 ctx->error=err;
921 }
922
923int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
924 {
925 return ctx->error_depth;
926 }
927
928X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
929 {
930 return ctx->current_cert;
931 }
932
933STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
934 {
935 return ctx->chain;
936 }
937
938STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
939 {
940 int i;
941 X509 *x;
942 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
943 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
944 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
945 {
946 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
947 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
948 }
949 return chain;
950 }
951
952void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
953 {
954 ctx->cert=x;
955 }
956
957void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
958 {
959 ctx->untrusted=sk;
960 }
961
962int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
963 {
964 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
965 }
966
967int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
968 {
969 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
970 }
971
972/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
973 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
974 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
975 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
976 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
977 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
978 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
979 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
980 */
981
982int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
983 int purpose, int trust)
984{
985 int idx;
986 /* If purpose not set use default */
987 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
988 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
989 if (purpose)
990 {
991 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
992 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
993 if (idx == -1)
994 {
995 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
996 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
997 return 0;
998 }
999 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1000 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1001 {
1002 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1003 if (idx == -1)
1004 {
1005 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1006 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1010 }
1011 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1012 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1013 }
1014 if (trust)
1015 {
1016 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1017 if (idx == -1)
1018 {
1019 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1020 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1021 return 0;
1022 }
1023 }
1024
1025 if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
1026 if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
1027 return 1;
1028}
1029
1030X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1031{
1032 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1033 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1034 if (!ctx)
1035 {
1036 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1037 return NULL;
1038 }
1039 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1040 return ctx;
1041}
1042
1043void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1044{
1045 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1046 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1047}
1048
1049int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1050 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1051 {
1052 ctx->ctx=store;
1053 ctx->current_method=0;
1054 ctx->cert=x509;
1055 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1056 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1057 ctx->check_time=0;
1058 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1059 ctx->valid=0;
1060 ctx->chain=NULL;
1061 ctx->depth=9;
1062 ctx->error=0;
1063 ctx->error_depth=0;
1064 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1065 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1066
1067 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1068 * use defaults.
1069 */
1070
1071
1072 if (store)
1073 {
1074 ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
1075 ctx->trust=store->trust;
1076 ctx->flags = store->flags;
1077 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1078 }
1079 else
1080 {
1081 ctx->purpose = 0;
1082 ctx->trust = 0;
1083 ctx->flags = 0;
1084 ctx->cleanup = 0;
1085 }
1086
1087 if (store && store->check_issued)
1088 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1089 else
1090 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1091
1092 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1093 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1094 else
1095 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1096
1097 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1098 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1099 else
1100 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1101
1102 if (store && store->verify)
1103 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1104 else
1105 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1106
1107 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1108 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1109 else
1110 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1111
1112 if (store && store->get_crl)
1113 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1114 else
1115 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1116
1117 if (store && store->check_crl)
1118 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1119 else
1120 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1121
1122 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1123 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1124 else
1125 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1126
1127
1128 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1129 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1130 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1131 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1132 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1133 &(ctx->ex_data)))
1134 {
1135 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1136 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1137 return 0;
1138 }
1139 return 1;
1140 }
1141
1142/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1143 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1144 */
1145
1146void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1147{
1148 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1149 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1150}
1151
1152void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1153 {
1154 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1155 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1156 {
1157 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1158 ctx->chain=NULL;
1159 }
1160 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1161 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1162 }
1163
1164void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
1165 {
1166 ctx->flags |= flags;
1167 }
1168
1169void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
1170 {
1171 ctx->check_time = t;
1172 ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
1173 }
1174
1175void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1176 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1177 {
1178 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1179 }
1180
1181IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1182IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1183
1184IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1185
1186IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1187IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-08 10:38:47 +0000