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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
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1/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.46 2015/07/19 01:07:40 doug Exp $ */
2/*
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 * distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * acknowledgment:
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 *
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 *
58 */
59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
61 *
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 *
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 *
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 *
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 * are met:
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 *
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 *
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 */
115
116#include <machine/endian.h>
117
118#include <errno.h>
119#include <stdio.h>
120
121#include "ssl_locl.h"
122
123#include <openssl/buffer.h>
124#include <openssl/evp.h>
125
126#include "pqueue.h"
127#include "bytestring.h"
128
129/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
130static int
131satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
132{
133 int ret, sat, brw, i;
134
135 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
136 do {
137 long l;
138
139 if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
140 break;
141 /* not reached on little-endians */
142 /* following test is redundant, because input is
143 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
144 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
145 break;
146
147 l = *((long *)v1);
148 l -= *((long *)v2);
149 if (l > 128)
150 return 128;
151 else if (l<-128)
152 return -128;
153 else
154 return (int)l;
155 } while (0);
156
157 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
158 sat = 0;
159 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
160 if (ret & 0x80) {
161 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
162 brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 sat |= ~brw;
164 brw >>= 8;
165 }
166 } else {
167 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
168 brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
169 sat |= brw;
170 brw >>= 8;
171 }
172 }
173 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
174
175 if (sat & 0xff)
176 return brw | 0x80;
177 else
178 return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
179}
180
181static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
182 int len, int peek);
183static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
184static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
185static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
186 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
187static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
188 unsigned char *priority);
189static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
190
191/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
192static int
193dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
194{
195 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
196
197 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
198
199 free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
200
201 s->packet = rdata->packet;
202 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
203 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
204 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
205
206 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
207 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
208
209 return (1);
210}
211
212
213static int
214dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
215{
216 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
217 pitem *item;
218
219 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
220 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
221 return 0;
222
223 rdata = malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
224 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
225 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
226 goto init_err;
227
228 rdata->packet = s->packet;
229 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
231 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
232
233 item->data = rdata;
234
235
236 s->packet = NULL;
237 s->packet_length = 0;
238 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
239 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
240
241 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
242 goto err;
243
244 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
245 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
246 goto err;
247
248 return (1);
249
250err:
251 free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
252
253init_err:
254 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 free(rdata);
256 pitem_free(item);
257 return (-1);
258}
259
260
261static int
262dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
263{
264 pitem *item;
265
266 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
267 if (item) {
268 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
269
270 free(item->data);
271 pitem_free(item);
272
273 return (1);
274 }
275
276 return (0);
277}
278
279
280/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
281 * yet */
282#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
283 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
284 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
285
286/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
287#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
288 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
289 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
290
291static int
292dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
293{
294 pitem *item;
295
296 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
297 if (item) {
298 /* Check if epoch is current. */
299 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
300 return (1);
301 /* Nothing to do. */
302
303 /* Process all the records. */
304 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
305 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
306 if (! dtls1_process_record(s))
307 return (0);
308 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
309 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
310 return (-1);
311 }
312 }
313
314 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
315 * have been processed */
316 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
317 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
318
319 return (1);
320}
321
322static int
323dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
324{
325 int i, al;
326 int enc_err;
327 SSL_SESSION *sess;
328 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
329 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
330 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
331
332 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
333 sess = s->session;
334
335 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
336 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
337 */
338 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
339
340 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
341 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
342 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
343 * the decryption or by the decompression
344 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
345 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
346
347 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
348 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
349
350 /* check is not needed I believe */
351 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
352 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
354 goto f_err;
355 }
356
357 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
358 rr->data = rr->input;
359
360 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
361 /* enc_err is:
362 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
363 * 1: if the padding is valid
364 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
365 if (enc_err == 0) {
366 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
367 rr->length = 0;
368 s->packet_length = 0;
369 goto err;
370 }
371
372
373 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
374 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
375 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
376 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
377 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
378 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
379 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
380 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
381
382 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
383 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
384
385 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
386 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
387 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
388 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
389 */
390 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
391 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
392 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
393 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
394 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
396 goto f_err;
397 }
398
399 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
400 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
401 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
402 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
403 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
404 * */
405 mac = mac_tmp;
406 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
407 rr->length -= mac_size;
408 } else {
409 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
410 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
411 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
412 rr->length -= mac_size;
413 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
414 }
415
416 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */);
417 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
418 enc_err = -1;
419 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
420 enc_err = -1;
421 }
422
423 if (enc_err < 0) {
424 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
425 rr->length = 0;
426 s->packet_length = 0;
427 goto err;
428 }
429
430 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
431 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
433 goto f_err;
434 }
435
436 rr->off = 0;
437 /* So at this point the following is true
438 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
439 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
440 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
441 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
442 * after use :-).
443 */
444
445 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
446 s->packet_length = 0;
447 return (1);
448
449f_err:
450 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
451err:
452 return (0);
453}
454
455
456/* Call this to get a new input record.
457 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
458 * or non-blocking IO.
459 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
460 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
461 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
462 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
463 */
464/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
465int
466dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
467{
468 int i, n;
469 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
470 unsigned char *p = NULL;
471 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
472 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
473
474 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
475
476 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
477 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
478 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
479 return (-1);
480
481 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
482 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
483 return 1;
484
485 /* get something from the wire */
486 if (0) {
487again:
488 /* dump this record on all retries */
489 rr->length = 0;
490 s->packet_length = 0;
491 }
492
493 /* check if we have the header */
494 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
495 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
496 CBS header, seq_no;
497 uint16_t epoch, len, ssl_version;
498 uint8_t type;
499
500 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
501 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
502 if (n <= 0)
503 return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
504
505 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
506 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
507 goto again;
508
509 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
510
511 CBS_init(&header, s->packet, s->packet_length);
512
513 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
514 if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type))
515 goto again;
516 if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version))
517 goto again;
518
519 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
520 if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &epoch) ||
521 !CBS_get_bytes(&header, &seq_no, 6))
522 goto again;
523
524 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&seq_no, &(s->s3->read_sequence[2]),
525 sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence) - 2, NULL))
526 goto again;
527 if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &len))
528 goto again;
529
530 rr->type = type;
531 rr->epoch = epoch;
532 rr->length = len;
533
534 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
535 if (!s->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version)
536 goto again;
537
538 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
539 if ((ssl_version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
540 goto again;
541
542 /* record too long, silently discard it */
543 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
544 goto again;
545
546 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
547 p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&header);
548 }
549
550 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
551
552 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
553 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
554 i = rr->length;
555 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
556 if (n <= 0)
557 return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
558
559 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
560 if (n != i)
561 goto again;
562
563 /* now n == rr->length,
564 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
565 }
566 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
567
568 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
569 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
570 if (bitmap == NULL)
571 goto again;
572
573 /*
574 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
575 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
576 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
577 * since they arrive from different connections and
578 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
579 */
580 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
581 p != NULL && *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
582 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
583 goto again;
584
585 /* just read a 0 length packet */
586 if (rr->length == 0)
587 goto again;
588
589 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
590 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
591 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
592 * anything while listening.
593 */
594 if (is_next_epoch) {
595 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
596 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds),
597 rr->seq_num) < 0)
598 return (-1);
599 /* Mark receipt of record. */
600 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
601 }
602 goto again;
603 }
604
605 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
606 goto again;
607
608 /* Mark receipt of record. */
609 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
610
611 return (1);
612}
613
614/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
615 * 'type' is one of the following:
616 *
617 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
618 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
619 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
620 *
621 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
622 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
623 *
624 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
625 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
626 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
627 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
628 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
629 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
630 * Change cipher spec protocol
631 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
632 * Alert protocol
633 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
634 * Handshake protocol
635 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
636 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
637 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
638 * Application data protocol
639 * none of our business
640 */
641int
642dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
643{
644 int al, i, j, ret;
645 unsigned int n;
646 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
647 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
648
649 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
650 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
651 return (-1);
652
653 if ((type &&
654 type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
655 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
657 return -1;
658 }
659
660 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
661 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
662 return ret;
663
664 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
665
666 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
667 {
668 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
669 i = s->handshake_func(s);
670 if (i < 0)
671 return (i);
672 if (i == 0) {
673 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
674 return (-1);
675 }
676 }
677
678start:
679 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
680
681 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
682 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
683 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
684 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
685 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
686
687 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
688 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
689 * in advance, if any.
690 */
691 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
692 pitem *item;
693 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
694 if (item) {
695
696 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
697
698 free(item->data);
699 pitem_free(item);
700 }
701 }
702
703 /* Check for timeout */
704 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
705 goto start;
706
707 /* get new packet if necessary */
708 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
709 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
710 if (ret <= 0) {
711 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
712 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
713 if (ret <= 0)
714 return (ret);
715 else
716 goto start;
717 }
718 }
719
720 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
721 rr->length = 0;
722 goto start;
723 }
724
725 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
726
727 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
728 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
729 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
730 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
731 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
732 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
733 * than dropping the connection.
734 */
735 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data),
736 rr->seq_num) < 0) {
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
738 return (-1);
739 }
740 rr->length = 0;
741 goto start;
742 }
743
744 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
745 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
746 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
747 rr->length = 0;
748 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
749 return (0);
750 }
751
752
753 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
754 {
755 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
756 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
757 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
758 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
759 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
761 goto f_err;
762 }
763
764 if (len <= 0)
765 return (len);
766
767 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
768 n = rr->length;
769 else
770 n = (unsigned int)len;
771
772 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
773 if (!peek) {
774 rr->length -= n;
775 rr->off += n;
776 if (rr->length == 0) {
777 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
778 rr->off = 0;
779 }
780 }
781
782 return (n);
783 }
784
785
786 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
787 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
788
789 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
790 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
791 */
792 {
793 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
794 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
795 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
796
797 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
798 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
799 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
800 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
801 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
802 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
803 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
804 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
805 }
806 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
807 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
808 /* Application data while renegotiating
809 * is allowed. Try again reading.
810 */
811 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
812 BIO *bio;
813 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
814 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
815 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
816 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
817 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
818 return (-1);
819 }
820
821 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
822 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
824 goto f_err;
825 }
826
827 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
828 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
829 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
830 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
831#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
832 /*
833 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
834 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
835 * non-existing alert...
836 */
837 FIX ME
838#endif
839 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
840 rr->length = 0;
841 goto start;
842 }
843
844 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
845 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
846 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
847 rr->length--;
848 }
849 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
850 }
851 }
852
853 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
854 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
855 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
856
857 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
858 if ((!s->server) &&
859 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
860 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
861 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
862 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
863
864 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
865 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
866 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
867 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
869 goto err;
870 }
871
872 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
873
874 if (s->msg_callback)
875 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
876 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
877
878 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
879 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
880 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
881 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
882 s->new_session = 1;
883 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
884 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
885 i = s->handshake_func(s);
886 if (i < 0)
887 return (i);
888 if (i == 0) {
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
890 return (-1);
891 }
892
893 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
894 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
895 {
896 BIO *bio;
897 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
898 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
899 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
900 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
901 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
902 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
903 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
904 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
905 return (-1);
906 }
907 }
908 }
909 }
910 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
911 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
912 goto start;
913 }
914
915 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
916 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
917 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
918
919 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
920
921 if (s->msg_callback)
922 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
923 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
924
925 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
926 cb = s->info_callback;
927 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
928 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
929
930 if (cb != NULL) {
931 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
932 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
933 }
934
935 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
936 {
937 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
938 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
939 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
940 return (0);
941 }
942 } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
943 {
944 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
945 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
947 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
948 alert_descr);
949 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
950 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
951 return (0);
952 } else {
953 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
955 goto f_err;
956 }
957
958 goto start;
959 }
960
961 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
962 {
963 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
964 rr->length = 0;
965 return (0);
966 }
967
968 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
969 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
970 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
971
972 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
973
974 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
975 ccs_hdr_len = 3;
976
977 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
978 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
979 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
980 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
981 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
982 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
984 goto err;
985 }
986
987 rr->length = 0;
988
989 if (s->msg_callback)
990 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
991 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
992
993 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
994 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
995 */
996 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
997 goto start;
998 }
999
1000 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1001
1002 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1003 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1004 goto err;
1005
1006 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1007 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1008
1009 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1010 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1011
1012
1013 goto start;
1014 }
1015
1016 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1017 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1018 !s->in_handshake) {
1019 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1020
1021 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1022 if (!dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr))
1023 return -1;
1024 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1025 rr->length = 0;
1026 goto start;
1027 }
1028
1029 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1030 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1031 */
1032 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1033 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1034 return -1;
1035
1036 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1037 rr->length = 0;
1038 goto start;
1039 }
1040
1041 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1042 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1043 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1044 s->renegotiate = 1;
1045 s->new_session = 1;
1046 }
1047 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1048 if (i < 0)
1049 return (i);
1050 if (i == 0) {
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1052 return (-1);
1053 }
1054
1055 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1056 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1057 {
1058 BIO *bio;
1059 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1060 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1061 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1062 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1063 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1064 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1065 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1066 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1067 return (-1);
1068 }
1069 }
1070 goto start;
1071 }
1072
1073 switch (rr->type) {
1074 default:
1075 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1076 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1077 rr->length = 0;
1078 goto start;
1079 }
1080 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1082 goto f_err;
1083 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1084 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1085 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1086 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1087 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1088 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1089 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 goto f_err;
1092 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1093 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1094 * but have application data. If the library was
1095 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1096 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1097 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1098 * we will indulge it.
1099 */
1100 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1101 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1102 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1103 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1104 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
1105 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1106 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1107 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1108 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1109 return (-1);
1110 } else {
1111 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1113 goto f_err;
1114 }
1115 }
1116 /* not reached */
1117
1118f_err:
1119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1120err:
1121 return (-1);
1122}
1123
1124int
1125dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1126{
1127 int i;
1128
1129 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1130 {
1131 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1132 if (i < 0)
1133 return (i);
1134 if (i == 0) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1136 return -1;
1137 }
1138 }
1139
1140 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1142 return -1;
1143 }
1144
1145 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1146 return i;
1147}
1148
1149
1150 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1151 * is started. */
1152static int
1153have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1154 int len, int peek)
1155{
1156
1157 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1158 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1159 {
1160 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1161 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1162 unsigned int k, n;
1163
1164 /* peek == 0 */
1165 n = 0;
1166 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1167 *dst++ = *src++;
1168 len--;
1169 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1170 n++;
1171 }
1172 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1173 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1174 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1175 return n;
1176 }
1177
1178 return 0;
1179}
1180
1181
1182/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1183 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1184 */
1185int
1186dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1187{
1188 int i;
1189
1190 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1191 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1192 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
1193 return i;
1194}
1195
1196int
1197do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
1198{
1199 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1200 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1201 int prefix_len = 0;
1202 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1203 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1204 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1205 int bs;
1206
1207 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1208 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1209 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1210 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1211 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1212 }
1213
1214 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1215 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1216 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1217 if (i <= 0)
1218 return (i);
1219 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1220 }
1221
1222 if (len == 0)
1223 return 0;
1224
1225 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1226 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1227 sess = s->session;
1228
1229 if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1230 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1231 clear = 1;
1232
1233 if (clear)
1234 mac_size = 0;
1235 else {
1236 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1237 if (mac_size < 0)
1238 goto err;
1239 }
1240
1241 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments. */
1242
1243 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1244
1245 /* write the header */
1246
1247 *(p++) = type&0xff;
1248 wr->type = type;
1249
1250 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
1251 *(p++) = s->version&0xff;
1252
1253 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1254 pseq = p;
1255
1256 p += 10;
1257
1258 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1259
1260 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1261 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1262 */
1263 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
1264 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1265 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1266 else
1267 bs = 0;
1268
1269 wr->data = p + bs;
1270 /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1271 wr->length = (int)len;
1272 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1273
1274 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1275 * wr->data */
1276
1277 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1278 wr->input = wr->data;
1279
1280 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1281 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1282 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1283
1284 if (mac_size != 0) {
1285 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0)
1286 goto err;
1287 wr->length += mac_size;
1288 }
1289
1290 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1291 wr->input = p;
1292 wr->data = p;
1293
1294
1295 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1296 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1297 {
1298 arc4random_buf(p, bs);
1299 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1300 * the rest of randomness */
1301 wr->length += bs;
1302 }
1303
1304 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
1305
1306 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1307/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1308 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1309
1310 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1311
1312 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1313
1314 /* XDTLS: ?? */
1315/* else
1316 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1317*/
1318
1319 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1320 pseq += 6;
1321 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1322
1323 /* we should now have
1324 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1325 * wr->length long */
1326 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1327 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1328
1329 ssl3_record_sequence_increment(s->s3->write_sequence);
1330
1331 /* now let's set up wb */
1332 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1333 wb->offset = 0;
1334
1335 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1336 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1337 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1338 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1339 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1340
1341 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1342 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1343err:
1344 return -1;
1345}
1346
1347
1348
1349static int
1350dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1351{
1352 int cmp;
1353 unsigned int shift;
1354 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1355
1356 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1357 if (cmp > 0) {
1358 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1359 return 1; /* this record in new */
1360 }
1361 shift = -cmp;
1362 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1363 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1364 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1365 return 0; /* record previously received */
1366
1367 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1368 return 1;
1369}
1370
1371
1372static void
1373dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1374{
1375 int cmp;
1376 unsigned int shift;
1377 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1378
1379 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1380 if (cmp > 0) {
1381 shift = cmp;
1382 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1383 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1384 else
1385 bitmap->map = 1UL;
1386 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1387 } else {
1388 shift = -cmp;
1389 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1390 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1391 }
1392}
1393
1394
1395int
1396dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1397{
1398 int i, j;
1399 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1400 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1401 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1402
1403 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1404
1405 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1406 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1407 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1408
1409#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1410 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1411 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1412 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1413 }
1414#endif
1415
1416 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
1417 if (i <= 0) {
1418 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1419 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1420 } else {
1421 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1422#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1423 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1424#endif
1425 )
1426 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1427
1428 if (s->msg_callback)
1429 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1430 s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1431
1432 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1433 cb = s->info_callback;
1434 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1435 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1436
1437 if (cb != NULL) {
1438 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1439 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1440 }
1441 }
1442 return (i);
1443}
1444
1445
1446static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1447dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1448{
1449
1450 *is_next_epoch = 0;
1451
1452 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1453 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1454 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1455
1456 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1457 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1458 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1459 *is_next_epoch = 1;
1460 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1461 }
1462
1463 return NULL;
1464}
1465
1466void
1467dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1468{
1469 unsigned char *seq;
1470 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1471
1472 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1473 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1474 s->d1->r_epoch++;
1475 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1476 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1477 } else {
1478 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1479 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1480 s->d1->w_epoch++;
1481 }
1482
1483 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1484}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-21 17:24:42 +0000