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1/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.40 2015/02/09 10:53:28 jsing Exp $ */
2/*
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 * distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * acknowledgment:
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 *
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 *
58 */
59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
61 *
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 *
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 *
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 *
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 * are met:
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 *
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 *
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 */
115
116#include <machine/endian.h>
117
118#include <errno.h>
119#include <stdio.h>
120
121#include "ssl_locl.h"
122
123#include <openssl/buffer.h>
124#include <openssl/evp.h>
125
126#include "pqueue.h"
127
128/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
129static int
130satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
131{
132 int ret, sat, brw, i;
133
134 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
135 do {
136 long l;
137
138 if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
139 break;
140 /* not reached on little-endians */
141 /* following test is redundant, because input is
142 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
143 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
144 break;
145
146 l = *((long *)v1);
147 l -= *((long *)v2);
148 if (l > 128)
149 return 128;
150 else if (l<-128)
151 return -128;
152 else
153 return (int)l;
154 } while (0);
155
156 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
157 sat = 0;
158 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
159 if (ret & 0x80) {
160 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
161 brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
162 sat |= ~brw;
163 brw >>= 8;
164 }
165 } else {
166 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
167 brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
168 sat |= brw;
169 brw >>= 8;
170 }
171 }
172 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
173
174 if (sat & 0xff)
175 return brw | 0x80;
176 else
177 return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
178}
179
180static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
181 int len, int peek);
182static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
183static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
184static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
185 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
186static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
187 unsigned char *priority);
188static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
189
190/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
191static int
192dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
193{
194 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
195
196 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
197
198 free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
199
200 s->packet = rdata->packet;
201 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
202 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
203 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
204
205 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
206 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
207
208 return (1);
209}
210
211
212static int
213dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
214{
215 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
216 pitem *item;
217
218 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
219 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
220 return 0;
221
222 rdata = malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
223 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
224 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
225 goto init_err;
226
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
231
232 item->data = rdata;
233
234
235 s->packet = NULL;
236 s->packet_length = 0;
237 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
238 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
239
240 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
241 goto err;
242
243 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
244 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
245 goto err;
246
247 return (1);
248
249err:
250 free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
251
252init_err:
253 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
254 free(rdata);
255 pitem_free(item);
256 return (-1);
257}
258
259
260static int
261dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
262{
263 pitem *item;
264
265 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
266 if (item) {
267 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
268
269 free(item->data);
270 pitem_free(item);
271
272 return (1);
273 }
274
275 return (0);
276}
277
278
279/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
280 * yet */
281#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
282 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
283 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
284
285/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
286#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
287 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
288 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
289
290static int
291dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
292{
293 pitem *item;
294
295 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
296 if (item) {
297 /* Check if epoch is current. */
298 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
299 return (1);
300 /* Nothing to do. */
301
302 /* Process all the records. */
303 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
304 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
305 if (! dtls1_process_record(s))
306 return (0);
307 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
308 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
309 return (-1);
310 }
311 }
312
313 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
314 * have been processed */
315 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
316 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
317
318 return (1);
319}
320
321static int
322dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
323{
324 int i, al;
325 int enc_err;
326 SSL_SESSION *sess;
327 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
328 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
329 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
330
331 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
332 sess = s->session;
333
334 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
335 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
336 */
337 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
338
339 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
340 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
341 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
342 * the decryption or by the decompression
343 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
344 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
345
346 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
347 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
348
349 /* check is not needed I believe */
350 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
351 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
352 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
353 goto f_err;
354 }
355
356 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
357 rr->data = rr->input;
358
359 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
360 /* enc_err is:
361 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
362 * 1: if the padding is valid
363 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
364 if (enc_err == 0) {
365 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
366 rr->length = 0;
367 s->packet_length = 0;
368 goto err;
369 }
370
371
372 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
373 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
374 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
375 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
376 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
377 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
378 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
379 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
380
381 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
382 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
383
384 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
385 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
386 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
387 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
388 */
389 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
390 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
391 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
392 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
395 goto f_err;
396 }
397
398 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
399 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
400 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
401 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
402 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
403 * */
404 mac = mac_tmp;
405 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
406 rr->length -= mac_size;
407 } else {
408 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
409 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
410 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
411 rr->length -= mac_size;
412 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
413 }
414
415 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */);
416 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
417 enc_err = -1;
418 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
419 enc_err = -1;
420 }
421
422 if (enc_err < 0) {
423 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
424 rr->length = 0;
425 s->packet_length = 0;
426 goto err;
427 }
428
429 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
430 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
431 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
432 goto f_err;
433 }
434
435 rr->off = 0;
436 /* So at this point the following is true
437 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
438 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
439 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
440 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
441 * after use :-).
442 */
443
444 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
445 s->packet_length = 0;
446 return (1);
447
448f_err:
449 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
450err:
451 return (0);
452}
453
454
455/* Call this to get a new input record.
456 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
457 * or non-blocking IO.
458 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
459 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
460 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
461 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
462 */
463/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
464int
465dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
466{
467 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
468 int i, n;
469 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
470 unsigned char *p = NULL;
471 unsigned short version;
472 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
473 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
474
475 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
476
477 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
478 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
479 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
480 return (-1);
481
482 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
483 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
484 return 1;
485
486 /* get something from the wire */
487again:
488 /* check if we have the header */
489 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
490 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
491 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
492 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
493 if (n <= 0)
494 return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
495
496 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
497 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
498 s->packet_length = 0;
499 goto again;
500 }
501
502 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
503
504 p = s->packet;
505
506 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
507 rr->type= *(p++);
508 ssl_major= *(p++);
509 ssl_minor= *(p++);
510 version = (ssl_major << 8)|ssl_minor;
511
512 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
513 n2s(p, rr->epoch);
514
515 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
516 p += 6;
517
518 n2s(p, rr->length);
519
520 /* Lets check version */
521 if (!s->first_packet) {
522 if (version != s->version) {
523 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
524 rr->length = 0;
525 s->packet_length = 0;
526 goto again;
527 }
528 }
529
530 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
531 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
532 rr->length = 0;
533 s->packet_length = 0;
534 goto again;
535 }
536
537 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
538 /* record too long, silently discard it */
539 rr->length = 0;
540 s->packet_length = 0;
541 goto again;
542 }
543
544 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
545 }
546
547 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
548
549 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
550 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
551 i = rr->length;
552 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
553 if (n <= 0)
554 return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
555
556 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
557 if (n != i) {
558 rr->length = 0;
559 s->packet_length = 0;
560 goto again;
561 }
562
563 /* now n == rr->length,
564 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
565 }
566 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
567
568 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
569 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
570 if (bitmap == NULL) {
571 rr->length = 0;
572 s->packet_length = 0;
573 /* dump this record */
574 goto again;
575 /* get another record */
576 }
577
578 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
579 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
580 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
581 * since they arrive from different connections and
582 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
583 */
584 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
585 p != NULL && *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
586 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
587 rr->length = 0;
588 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
589 goto again;
590 /* get another record */
591 }
592
593 /* just read a 0 length packet */
594 if (rr->length == 0)
595 goto again;
596
597 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
598 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
599 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
600 * anything while listening.
601 */
602 if (is_next_epoch) {
603 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
604 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds),
605 rr->seq_num) < 0)
606 return (-1);
607 /* Mark receipt of record. */
608 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
609 }
610 rr->length = 0;
611 s->packet_length = 0;
612 goto again;
613 }
614
615 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
616 rr->length = 0;
617 s->packet_length = 0;
618 /* dump this record */
619 goto again;
620 /* get another record */
621 }
622 /* Mark receipt of record. */
623 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
624
625 return (1);
626
627}
628
629/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
630 * 'type' is one of the following:
631 *
632 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
633 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
634 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
635 *
636 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
637 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
638 *
639 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
640 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
641 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
642 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
643 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
644 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
645 * Change cipher spec protocol
646 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
647 * Alert protocol
648 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
649 * Handshake protocol
650 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
651 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
652 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
653 * Application data protocol
654 * none of our business
655 */
656int
657dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
658{
659 int al, i, j, ret;
660 unsigned int n;
661 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
662 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
663
664 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
665 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
666 return (-1);
667
668 if ((type &&
669 type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
670 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
672 return -1;
673 }
674
675 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
676 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
677 return ret;
678
679 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
680
681 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
682 {
683 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
684 i = s->handshake_func(s);
685 if (i < 0)
686 return (i);
687 if (i == 0) {
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
689 return (-1);
690 }
691 }
692
693start:
694 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
695
696 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
697 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
698 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
699 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
700 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
701
702 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
703 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
704 * in advance, if any.
705 */
706 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
707 pitem *item;
708 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
709 if (item) {
710
711 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
712
713 free(item->data);
714 pitem_free(item);
715 }
716 }
717
718 /* Check for timeout */
719 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
720 goto start;
721
722 /* get new packet if necessary */
723 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
724 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
725 if (ret <= 0) {
726 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
727 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
728 if (ret <= 0)
729 return (ret);
730 else
731 goto start;
732 }
733 }
734
735 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
736 rr->length = 0;
737 goto start;
738 }
739
740 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
741
742 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
743 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
744 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
745 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
746 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
747 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
748 * than dropping the connection.
749 */
750 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data),
751 rr->seq_num) < 0) {
752 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
753 return (-1);
754 }
755 rr->length = 0;
756 goto start;
757 }
758
759 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
760 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
761 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
762 rr->length = 0;
763 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
764 return (0);
765 }
766
767
768 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
769 {
770 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
771 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
772 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
773 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
774 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
776 goto f_err;
777 }
778
779 if (len <= 0)
780 return (len);
781
782 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
783 n = rr->length;
784 else
785 n = (unsigned int)len;
786
787 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
788 if (!peek) {
789 rr->length -= n;
790 rr->off += n;
791 if (rr->length == 0) {
792 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
793 rr->off = 0;
794 }
795 }
796
797 return (n);
798 }
799
800
801 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
802 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
803
804 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
805 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
806 */
807 {
808 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
809 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
810 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
811
812 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
813 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
814 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
815 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
816 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
817 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
818 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
819 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
820 }
821 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
822 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
823 /* Application data while renegotiating
824 * is allowed. Try again reading.
825 */
826 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
827 BIO *bio;
828 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
829 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
830 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
831 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
832 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
833 return (-1);
834 }
835
836 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
837 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
839 goto f_err;
840 }
841
842 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
843 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
844 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
845 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
846#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
847 /*
848 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
849 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
850 * non-existing alert...
851 */
852 FIX ME
853#endif
854 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
855 rr->length = 0;
856 goto start;
857 }
858
859 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
860 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
861 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
862 rr->length--;
863 }
864 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
865 }
866 }
867
868 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
869 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
870 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
871
872 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
873 if ((!s->server) &&
874 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
875 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
876 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
877 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
878
879 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
880 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
881 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
882 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
884 goto err;
885 }
886
887 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
888
889 if (s->msg_callback)
890 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
891 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
892
893 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
894 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
895 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
896 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
897 s->new_session = 1;
898 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
899 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
900 i = s->handshake_func(s);
901 if (i < 0)
902 return (i);
903 if (i == 0) {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
905 return (-1);
906 }
907
908 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
909 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
910 {
911 BIO *bio;
912 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
913 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
914 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
915 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
916 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
917 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
918 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
919 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
920 return (-1);
921 }
922 }
923 }
924 }
925 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
926 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
927 goto start;
928 }
929
930 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
931 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
932 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
933
934 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
935
936 if (s->msg_callback)
937 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
938 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
939
940 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
941 cb = s->info_callback;
942 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
943 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
944
945 if (cb != NULL) {
946 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
947 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
948 }
949
950 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
951 {
952 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
953 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
954 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
955 return (0);
956 }
957 } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
958 {
959 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
960 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
962 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
963 alert_descr);
964 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
965 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
966 return (0);
967 } else {
968 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
970 goto f_err;
971 }
972
973 goto start;
974 }
975
976 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
977 {
978 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
979 rr->length = 0;
980 return (0);
981 }
982
983 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
984 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
985 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
986
987 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
988
989 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
990 ccs_hdr_len = 3;
991
992 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
993 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
994 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
995 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
996 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
997 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
999 goto err;
1000 }
1001
1002 rr->length = 0;
1003
1004 if (s->msg_callback)
1005 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1006 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1007
1008 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1009 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1010 */
1011 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1012 goto start;
1013 }
1014
1015 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1016
1017 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1018 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1019 goto err;
1020
1021 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1022 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1023
1024 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1025 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1026
1027
1028 goto start;
1029 }
1030
1031 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1032 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1033 !s->in_handshake) {
1034 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1035
1036 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1037 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1038 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1039 rr->length = 0;
1040 goto start;
1041 }
1042
1043 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1044 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1045 */
1046 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1047 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1048 return -1;
1049
1050 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1051 rr->length = 0;
1052 goto start;
1053 }
1054
1055 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1056 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1057 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1058 s->renegotiate = 1;
1059 s->new_session = 1;
1060 }
1061 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1062 if (i < 0)
1063 return (i);
1064 if (i == 0) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1066 return (-1);
1067 }
1068
1069 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1070 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1071 {
1072 BIO *bio;
1073 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1074 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1075 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1076 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1077 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1078 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1079 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1080 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1081 return (-1);
1082 }
1083 }
1084 goto start;
1085 }
1086
1087 switch (rr->type) {
1088 default:
1089 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1090 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1091 rr->length = 0;
1092 goto start;
1093 }
1094 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1096 goto f_err;
1097 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1098 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1099 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1100 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1101 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1102 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1103 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 goto f_err;
1106 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1107 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1108 * but have application data. If the library was
1109 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1110 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1111 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1112 * we will indulge it.
1113 */
1114 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1115 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1116 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1117 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1118 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
1119 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1120 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1121 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1122 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1123 return (-1);
1124 } else {
1125 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1127 goto f_err;
1128 }
1129 }
1130 /* not reached */
1131
1132f_err:
1133 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1134err:
1135 return (-1);
1136}
1137
1138int
1139dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1140{
1141 int i;
1142
1143 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1144 {
1145 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1146 if (i < 0)
1147 return (i);
1148 if (i == 0) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1150 return -1;
1151 }
1152 }
1153
1154 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1156 return -1;
1157 }
1158
1159 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1160 return i;
1161}
1162
1163
1164 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1165 * is started. */
1166static int
1167have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1168 int len, int peek)
1169{
1170
1171 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1172 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1173 {
1174 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1175 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1176 unsigned int k, n;
1177
1178 /* peek == 0 */
1179 n = 0;
1180 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1181 *dst++ = *src++;
1182 len--;
1183 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1184 n++;
1185 }
1186 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1187 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1188 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1189 return n;
1190 }
1191
1192 return 0;
1193}
1194
1195
1196/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1197 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1198 */
1199int
1200dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1201{
1202 int i;
1203
1204 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1205 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1206 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
1207 return i;
1208}
1209
1210int
1211do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
1212{
1213 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1214 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1215 int prefix_len = 0;
1216 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1217 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1218 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1219 int bs;
1220
1221 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1222 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1223 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1224 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1225 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1226 }
1227
1228 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1229 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1230 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1231 if (i <= 0)
1232 return (i);
1233 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1234 }
1235
1236 if (len == 0)
1237 return 0;
1238
1239 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1240 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1241 sess = s->session;
1242
1243 if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1244 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1245 clear = 1;
1246
1247 if (clear)
1248 mac_size = 0;
1249 else {
1250 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1251 if (mac_size < 0)
1252 goto err;
1253 }
1254
1255 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments. */
1256
1257 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1258
1259 /* write the header */
1260
1261 *(p++) = type&0xff;
1262 wr->type = type;
1263
1264 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
1265 *(p++) = s->version&0xff;
1266
1267 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1268 pseq = p;
1269
1270 p += 10;
1271
1272 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1273
1274 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1275 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1276 */
1277 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
1278 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1279 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1280 else
1281 bs = 0;
1282
1283 wr->data = p + bs;
1284 /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1285 wr->length = (int)len;
1286 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1287
1288 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1289 * wr->data */
1290
1291 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1292 wr->input = wr->data;
1293
1294 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1295 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1296 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1297
1298 if (mac_size != 0) {
1299 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0)
1300 goto err;
1301 wr->length += mac_size;
1302 }
1303
1304 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1305 wr->input = p;
1306 wr->data = p;
1307
1308
1309 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1310 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1311 {
1312 arc4random_buf(p, bs);
1313 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1314 * the rest of randomness */
1315 wr->length += bs;
1316 }
1317
1318 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
1319
1320 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1321/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1322 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1323
1324 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1325
1326 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1327
1328 /* XDTLS: ?? */
1329/* else
1330 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1331*/
1332
1333 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1334 pseq += 6;
1335 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1336
1337 /* we should now have
1338 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1339 * wr->length long */
1340 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1341 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1342
1343 ssl3_record_sequence_increment(s->s3->write_sequence);
1344
1345 /* now let's set up wb */
1346 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1347 wb->offset = 0;
1348
1349 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1350 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1351 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1352 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1353 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1354
1355 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1356 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1357err:
1358 return -1;
1359}
1360
1361
1362
1363static int
1364dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1365{
1366 int cmp;
1367 unsigned int shift;
1368 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1369
1370 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1371 if (cmp > 0) {
1372 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1373 return 1; /* this record in new */
1374 }
1375 shift = -cmp;
1376 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1377 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1378 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1379 return 0; /* record previously received */
1380
1381 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1382 return 1;
1383}
1384
1385
1386static void
1387dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1388{
1389 int cmp;
1390 unsigned int shift;
1391 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1392
1393 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1394 if (cmp > 0) {
1395 shift = cmp;
1396 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1397 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1398 else
1399 bitmap->map = 1UL;
1400 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1401 } else {
1402 shift = -cmp;
1403 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1404 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1405 }
1406}
1407
1408
1409int
1410dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1411{
1412 int i, j;
1413 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1414 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1415 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1416
1417 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1418
1419 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1420 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1421 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1422
1423#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1424 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1425 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1426 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1427 }
1428#endif
1429
1430 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
1431 if (i <= 0) {
1432 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1433 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1434 } else {
1435 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1436#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1437 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1438#endif
1439 )
1440 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1441
1442 if (s->msg_callback)
1443 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1444 s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1445
1446 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1447 cb = s->info_callback;
1448 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1449 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1450
1451 if (cb != NULL) {
1452 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1453 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1454 }
1455 }
1456 return (i);
1457}
1458
1459
1460static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1461dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1462{
1463
1464 *is_next_epoch = 0;
1465
1466 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1467 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1468 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1469
1470 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1471 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1472 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1473 *is_next_epoch = 1;
1474 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1475 }
1476
1477 return NULL;
1478}
1479
1480void
1481dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1482{
1483 unsigned char *seq;
1484 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1485
1486 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1487 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1488 s->d1->r_epoch++;
1489 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1490 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1491 } else {
1492 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1493 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1494 s->d1->w_epoch++;
1495 }
1496
1497 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1498}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-15 02:05:21 +0000