1 files changed, 806 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2fd5c6f80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+/* ssl/s3_both.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int
+ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+{
+        int ret;
+
+        ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+        s->init_num);
+        if (ret < 0)
+                return (-1);
+        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+                /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+                 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+                ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], ret);
+
+        if (ret == s->init_num) {
+                if (s->msg_callback)
+                        s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+                return (1);
+        }
+        s->init_off += ret;
+        s->init_num -= ret;
+        return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+{
+        unsigned char *p, *d;
+        int i;
+        unsigned long l;
+
+        if (s->state == a) {
+                d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+                p = &(d[4]);
+
+                i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+                sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+                if (i == 0)
+                        return 0;
+                s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+                memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+                p += i;
+                l = i;
+
+                /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+                   renegotiation checks */
+                if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+                        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                        memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+                        s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+                } else {
+                        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+                        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+                }
+
+                *(d++) = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
+                l2n3(l, d);
+                s->init_num = (int)l + 4;
+                s->init_off = 0;
+
+                s->state = b;
+        }
+
+        /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+        return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
+static void
+ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+        const char *sender;
+        int slen;
+        /* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
+         * set the appropriate error.
+         */
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+                return;
+        if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+                sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+                slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+        } else {
+                sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+                slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+        sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+        int al, i, ok;
+        long n;
+        unsigned char *p;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        /* the mac has already been generated when we received the
+         * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md.
+         */ 
+#endif
+
+        n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+            64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ &ok);
+
+        if (!ok)
+                return ((int)n);
+
+        /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+        if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+                goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+        p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+        i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+        if (i != n) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+                goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+           renegotiation checks */
+        if (s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+                s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+        } else {
+                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+                s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+        }
+
+        return (1);
+f_err:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        return (0);
+}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx                    re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence               zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret             re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc           assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression       assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash              assign
+ */
+int
+ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+        unsigned char *p;
+
+        if (s->state == a) {
+                p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+                *p = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+                s->init_num = 1;
+                s->init_off = 0;
+
+                s->state = b;
+        }
+
+        /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+        return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+{
+        int n;
+        unsigned char *p;
+
+        n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                return (-1);
+        }
+        p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+        l2n3(n, p);
+        i2d_X509(x, &p);
+        *l += n + 3;
+
+        return (0);
+}
+
+unsigned long
+ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+{
+        unsigned char *p;
+        int i;
+        unsigned long l = 7;
+        BUF_MEM *buf;
+        int no_chain;
+
+        if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs)
+                no_chain = 1;
+        else
+                no_chain = 0;
+
+        /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+        buf = s->init_buf;
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                return (0);
+        }
+        if (x != NULL) {
+                if (no_chain) {
+                        if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+                                return (0);
+                } else {
+                        X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+                        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                                return (0);
+                        }
+                        X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+                        /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+                        ERR_clear_error();
+                        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+                                x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+                                if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) {
+                                        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+                                        return 0;
+                                }
+                        }
+                        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+                }
+        }
+        /* Thawte special :-) */
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) {
+                x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i);
+                if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+                        return (0);
+        }
+
+        l -= 7;
+        p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+        l2n3(l, p);
+        l += 3;
+        p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+        *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
+        l2n3(l, p);
+        l += 4;
+        return (l);
+}
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
+ * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+ */
+long
+ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+{
+        unsigned char *p;
+        unsigned long l;
+        long n;
+        int i, al;
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+                s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+                if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
+                        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                        goto f_err;
+                }
+                *ok = 1;
+                s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+                s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+                return s->init_num;
+        }
+
+        p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+        if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
+        {
+                int skip_message;
+
+                do {
+                        while (s->init_num < 4) {
+                                i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,
+                                    SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num],
+                                    4 - s->init_num, 0);
+                                if (i <= 0) {
+                                        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                                        *ok = 0;
+                                        return i;
+                                }
+                                s->init_num += i;
+                        }
+
+                        skip_message = 0;
+                        if (!s->server)
+                                if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+                                        /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+                                         * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+                                         * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+                                         * 'Finished' MAC. */
+                        if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) {
+                                s->init_num = 0;
+                                skip_message = 1;
+
+                                if (s->msg_callback)
+                                        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+                        }
+                }
+                while (skip_message);
+
+                /* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+                if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) {
+                        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                        goto f_err;
+                }
+                if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+                    (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) && (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B)) {
+                        /* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
+                         * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
+                         * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
+                         * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
+                         * we have not completed the handshake. */
+                        ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+                }
+
+                s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
+
+                n2l3(p, l);
+                if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
+                        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+                        goto f_err;
+                }
+                if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+                {
+                        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+                        goto f_err;
+                }
+                if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l + 4)) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+                s->state = stn;
+
+                s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+                s->init_num = 0;
+        }
+
+        /* next state (stn) */
+        p = s->init_msg;
+        n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+        while (n > 0) {
+                i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                    &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
+                if (i <= 0) {
+                        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+                        *ok = 0;
+                        return i;
+                }
+                s->init_num += i;
+                n -= i;
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+         * Finished verification. */
+        if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+                ssl3_take_mac(s);
+#endif
+
+        /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+        ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+        *ok = 1;
+        return s->init_num;
+f_err:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+        *ok = 0;
+        return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *pk;
+        int ret = -1, i;
+
+        if (pkey == NULL)
+                pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+        else
+                pk = pkey;
+        if (pk == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+        i = pk->type;
+        if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+                ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+        } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+                ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+                ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+        }
+#endif
+        else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) {
+                ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+        } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) {
+                ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+        }
+err:
+        if (!pkey)
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+        return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+{
+        int al;
+
+        switch (type) {
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+                al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+                al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+                al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+                al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+                al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+        case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+        case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+        case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+                al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+                al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+                break;
+        default:
+                al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+                break;
+        }
+        return (al);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
+ * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
+ * unused buffers.  Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
+ * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
+ * This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
+ * with a given context.  (The options affecting buffer size are
+ * max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
+ * SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
+ * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.)  Using a separate freelist for every
+ * possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
+ * different values.
+ *
+ * If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
+ * connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
+ * use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
+ *    - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
+ *    - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
+ *    - Improve this code.
+ */
+static void *
+freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
+{
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
+        void *result = NULL;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+        if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
+                ent = list->head;
+        if (ent != NULL) {
+                list->head = ent->next;
+                result = ent;
+                if (--list->len == 0)
+                        list->chunklen = 0;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if (!result)
+                result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
+        return result;
+}
+
+static void
+freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
+{
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+        if (list != NULL && (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
+            list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len && sz >= sizeof(*ent)) {
+                list->chunklen = sz;
+                ent = mem;
+                ent->next = list->head;
+                list->head = ent;
+                ++list->len;
+                mem = NULL;
+        }
+
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if (mem)
+                OPENSSL_free(mem);
+}
+#else
+#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
+#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
+#endif
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+        unsigned char *p;
+        size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+        if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        else
+                headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+        align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+        if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
+                len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH +
+                    SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+                if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
+                        s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+                        len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+                }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+                        len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+                if ((p = freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+                s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+        }
+
+        s->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+        return 1;
+
+err:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+        unsigned char *p;
+        size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+        if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+        else
+                headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+        align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+        if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) {
+                len = s->max_send_fragment +
+                    SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+                        len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+                        len += headerlen + align +
+                            SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+
+                if ((p = freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+                s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+
+err:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
+{
+        if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+                return 0;
+        if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+                return 0;
+        return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+        if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) {
+                freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+                s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+        }
+        return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+        if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) {
+                freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+                s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+        }
+        return 1;
+}
+