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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c
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1/* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.56 2015/07/24 02:39:43 doug Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <errno.h>
113#include <stdio.h>
114
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118#include <openssl/evp.h>
119
120#include "bytestring.h"
121
122static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
123 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
124static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
125
126/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133int
134ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
135{
136 int i, len, left;
137 size_t align;
138 unsigned char *pkt;
139 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
140
141 if (n <= 0)
142 return n;
143
144 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
145 if (rb->buf == NULL)
146 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
147 return -1;
148
149 left = rb->left;
150 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
151 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
152
153 if (!extend) {
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
155 if (left == 0)
156 rb->offset = align;
157 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
162 (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
183 if (left > 0 && n > left)
184 n = left;
185 }
186
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
188 if (left >= n) {
189 s->packet_length += n;
190 rb->left = left - n;
191 rb->offset += n;
192 return (n);
193 }
194
195 /* else we need to read more data */
196
197 len = s->packet_length;
198 pkt = rb->buf + align;
199 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
200 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
201 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
202 if (s->packet != pkt) {
203 /* len > 0 */
204 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
205 s->packet = pkt;
206 rb->offset = len + align;
207 }
208
209 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
210 /* does not happen */
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
212 return -1;
213 }
214
215 if (!s->read_ahead) {
216 /* ignore max parameter */
217 max = n;
218 } else {
219 if (max < n)
220 max = n;
221 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
222 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
223 }
224
225 while (left < n) {
226 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
227 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
228 * len+max if possible) */
229
230 errno = 0;
231 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
232 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
233 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
234 } else {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
236 i = -1;
237 }
238
239 if (i <= 0) {
240 rb->left = left;
241 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
242 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
243 if (len + left == 0)
244 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
245 }
246 return (i);
247 }
248 left += i;
249
250 /*
251 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
252 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
253 * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
254 */
255 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
256 if (n > left)
257 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
258 }
259 }
260
261 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
262 rb->offset += n;
263 rb->left = left - n;
264 s->packet_length += n;
265 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
266 return (n);
267}
268
269/* Call this to get a new input record.
270 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
271 * or non-blocking IO.
272 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
273 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
274 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
275 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
276 */
277/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
278static int
279ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
280{
281 int al;
282 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
283 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
284 SSL_SESSION *sess;
285 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
286 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
287
288 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
289 sess = s->session;
290
291again:
292 /* check if we have the header */
293 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
294 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
295 CBS header;
296 uint16_t len, ssl_version;
297 uint8_t type;
298
299 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
300 if (n <= 0)
301 return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
302 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
303
304 CBS_init(&header, s->packet, n);
305
306 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
307 if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) ||
308 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) ||
309 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
311 SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
312 goto err;
313 }
314
315 rr->type = type;
316 rr->length = len;
317
318 /* Lets check version */
319 if (!s->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) {
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
321 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
322 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) &&
323 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
324 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
325 s->version = ssl_version;
326 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
327 goto f_err;
328 }
329
330 if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
332 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
333 goto err;
334 }
335
336 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
337 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
339 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
340 goto f_err;
341 }
342
343 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
344 }
345
346 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
347
348 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
349 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
350 i = rr->length;
351 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
352 if (n <= 0)
353 return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
354 /* now n == rr->length,
355 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
356 }
357
358 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
359
360 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
361 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
362 */
363 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
364
365 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
366 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
367 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
368 * the decryption or by the decompression
369 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
370 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
371
372 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
373 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
374
375 /* check is not needed I believe */
376 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
377 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
379 goto f_err;
380 }
381
382 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
383 rr->data = rr->input;
384
385 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
386 /* enc_err is:
387 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
388 * 1: if the padding is valid
389 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
390 if (enc_err == 0) {
391 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
393 goto f_err;
394 }
395
396
397 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
398 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
399 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
400 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
401 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
402 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
403
404 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
405 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
406
407 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
408 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
409
410 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
411 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
412 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
413 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
414 */
415 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
416 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
417 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
418 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
419 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
421 goto f_err;
422 }
423
424 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
425 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
426 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
427 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
428 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
429 * */
430 mac = mac_tmp;
431 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
432 rr->length -= mac_size;
433 } else {
434 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
435 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
436 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
437 rr->length -= mac_size;
438 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
439 }
440
441 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
442 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL ||
443 timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
444 enc_err = -1;
445 if (rr->length >
446 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
447 enc_err = -1;
448 }
449
450 if (enc_err < 0) {
451 /*
452 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with
453 * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a
454 * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext
455 * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error
456 * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker
457 * (e.g. via a logfile)
458 */
459 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
461 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
462 goto f_err;
463 }
464
465 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
466 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
468 goto f_err;
469 }
470
471 rr->off = 0;
472 /*
473 * So at this point the following is true
474 *
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
476 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
477 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
478 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
479 * after use :-).
480 */
481
482 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
483 s->packet_length = 0;
484
485 /* just read a 0 length packet */
486 if (rr->length == 0)
487 goto again;
488
489 return (1);
490
491f_err:
492 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
493err:
494 return (ret);
495}
496
497/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
498 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
499 */
500int
501ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
502{
503 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
504 unsigned int tot, n, nw;
505 int i;
506
507 if (len < 0) {
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
509 return -1;
510 }
511
512 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
513 tot = s->s3->wnum;
514 s->s3->wnum = 0;
515
516 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
517 i = s->handshake_func(s);
518 if (i < 0)
519 return (i);
520 if (i == 0) {
521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
522 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
523 return -1;
524 }
525 }
526
527 if (len < tot)
528 len = tot;
529 n = (len - tot);
530 for (;;) {
531 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
532 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
533 else
534 nw = n;
535
536 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
537 if (i <= 0) {
538 s->s3->wnum = tot;
539 return i;
540 }
541
542 if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
543 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
544 /*
545 * Next chunk of data should get another prepended
546 * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
547 * weakness.
548 */
549 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
550
551 return tot + i;
552 }
553
554 n -= i;
555 tot += i;
556 }
557}
558
559static int
560do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
561 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
562{
563 unsigned char *p, *plen;
564 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
565 int prefix_len = 0;
566 int eivlen;
567 size_t align;
568 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
569 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
570 SSL_SESSION *sess;
571
572 if (wb->buf == NULL)
573 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
574 return -1;
575
576 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
577 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
578 if (wb->left != 0)
579 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
580
581 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
582 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
583 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
584 if (i <= 0)
585 return (i);
586 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
587 /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
588 if (wb->buf == NULL)
589 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
590 return -1;
591 }
592
593 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
594 return 0;
595
596 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
597 sess = s->session;
598
599 if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
600 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
601 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
602 mac_size = 0;
603 } else {
604 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
605 if (mac_size < 0)
606 goto err;
607 }
608
609 /*
610 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls
611 * itself.
612 */
613 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
614 /*
615 * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
616 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
617 */
618 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments &&
619 type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
620 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
621 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
622 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
623 * together with the actual payload) */
624 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
625 if (prefix_len <= 0)
626 goto err;
627
628 if (prefix_len >
629 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
630 /* insufficient space */
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
632 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 goto err;
634 }
635 }
636
637 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
638 }
639
640 if (create_empty_fragment) {
641 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
642 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
643 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
644 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
645 align = (size_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
646 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
647
648 p = wb->buf + align;
649 wb->offset = align;
650 } else if (prefix_len) {
651 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
652 } else {
653 align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
654 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
655
656 p = wb->buf + align;
657 wb->offset = align;
658 }
659
660 /* write the header */
661
662 *(p++) = type&0xff;
663 wr->type = type;
664
665 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
666 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
667 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
668 */
669 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->renegotiate &&
670 TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
671 *(p++) = 0x1;
672 else
673 *(p++) = s->version&0xff;
674
675 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
676 plen = p;
677 p += 2;
678
679 /* Explicit IV length. */
680 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
681 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
682 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
683 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
684 if (eivlen <= 1)
685 eivlen = 0;
686 }
687 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
688 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
689 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
690 else
691 eivlen = 0;
692 } else if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
693 s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) {
694 eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
695 } else
696 eivlen = 0;
697
698 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
699 wr->data = p + eivlen;
700 wr->length = (int)len;
701 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
702
703 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
704
705 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
706 wr->input = wr->data;
707
708 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
709 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
710 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
711
712 if (mac_size != 0) {
713 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
714 &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
715 goto err;
716 wr->length += mac_size;
717 }
718
719 wr->input = p;
720 wr->data = p;
721
722 if (eivlen) {
723 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
724 goto err;
725 */
726 wr->length += eivlen;
727 }
728
729 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
730 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
731
732 /* record length after mac and block padding */
733 s2n(wr->length, plen);
734
735 /* we should now have
736 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
737 * wr->length long */
738 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
739 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
740
741 if (create_empty_fragment) {
742 /* we are in a recursive call;
743 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
744 */
745 return wr->length;
746 }
747
748 /* now let's set up wb */
749 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
750
751 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
752 * bad write retries later */
753 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
754 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
755 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
756 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
757
758 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
759 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
760err:
761 return -1;
762}
763
764/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
765int
766ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
767{
768 int i;
769 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
770
771 /* XXXX */
772 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
773 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
774 (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
776 return (-1);
777 }
778
779 for (;;) {
780 errno = 0;
781 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
782 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
783 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
784 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
785 (unsigned int)wb->left);
786 } else {
787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
788 i = -1;
789 }
790 if (i == wb->left) {
791 wb->left = 0;
792 wb->offset += i;
793 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
794 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
795 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
796 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
797 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
798 } else if (i <= 0) {
799 /*
800 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
801 * whole point in using a datagram service.
802 */
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
804 wb->left = 0;
805 return (i);
806 }
807 wb->offset += i;
808 wb->left -= i;
809 }
810}
811
812/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
813 * 'type' is one of the following:
814 *
815 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
816 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
817 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
818 *
819 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
820 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
821 *
822 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
823 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
824 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
825 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
826 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
827 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
828 * Change cipher spec protocol
829 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
830 * Alert protocol
831 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
832 * Handshake protocol
833 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
834 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
835 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
836 * Application data protocol
837 * none of our business
838 */
839int
840ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
841{
842 int al, i, j, ret;
843 unsigned int n;
844 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
845 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
846
847 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
848 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
849 return (-1);
850
851 if (len < 0) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 return -1;
854 }
855
856 if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
857 type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
858 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 return -1;
861 }
862
863 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
864 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
865 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
866 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
867 unsigned char *dst = buf;
868 unsigned int k;
869
870 /* peek == 0 */
871 n = 0;
872 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
873 *dst++ = *src++;
874 len--;
875 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
876 n++;
877 }
878 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
879 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
880 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
881 return n;
882 }
883
884 /*
885 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
886 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
887 */
888 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
889 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
890 i = s->handshake_func(s);
891 if (i < 0)
892 return (i);
893 if (i == 0) {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
895 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
896 return (-1);
897 }
898 }
899start:
900 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
901
902 /*
903 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
904 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
905 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
906 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
907 */
908 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
909
910 /* get new packet if necessary */
911 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
912 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
913 if (ret <= 0)
914 return (ret);
915 }
916
917 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
918
919 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
920 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
921 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
922 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
924 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
925 goto f_err;
926 }
927
928 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
929 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
930 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
931 rr->length = 0;
932 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
933 return (0);
934 }
935
936
937 /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
938 if (type == rr->type) {
939 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
940 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
941 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
942 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
943 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
945 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
946 goto f_err;
947 }
948
949 if (len <= 0)
950 return (len);
951
952 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
953 n = rr->length;
954 else
955 n = (unsigned int)len;
956
957 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
958 if (!peek) {
959 rr->length -= n;
960 rr->off += n;
961 if (rr->length == 0) {
962 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
963 rr->off = 0;
964 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
965 s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
966 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
967 }
968 }
969 return (n);
970 }
971
972
973 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
974 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
975
976 {
977 /*
978 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment'
979 * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data
980 * at a fixed place.
981 */
982 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
983 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
984 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
985
986 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
987 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
988 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
989 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
990 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
991 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
992 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
993 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
994 }
995 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
996 /* available space in 'dest' */
997 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len;
998 if (rr->length < n)
999 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1000
1001 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1002 while (n-- > 0) {
1003 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1004 rr->length--;
1005 }
1006
1007 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1008 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1009 }
1010 }
1011
1012 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1013 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1014 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1015
1016 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1017 if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1018 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1019 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1020 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1021
1022 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1023 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1024 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1025 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1027 goto f_err;
1028 }
1029
1030 if (s->msg_callback)
1031 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1032 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1033 s->msg_callback_arg);
1034
1035 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1036 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1037 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1038 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1039 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1040 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1041 if (i < 0)
1042 return (i);
1043 if (i == 0) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1045 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1046 return (-1);
1047 }
1048
1049 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1050 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
1051 /* no read-ahead left? */
1052 BIO *bio;
1053 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1054 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1055 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1056 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1057 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1058 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1059 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1060 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1061 return (-1);
1062 }
1063 }
1064 }
1065 }
1066 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1067 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1068 goto start;
1069 }
1070 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1071 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1072 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1073 */
1074 if (s->server &&
1075 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1076 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1077 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1078 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1079 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1080 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1081 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1082 rr->length = 0;
1083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1084 goto start;
1085 }
1086 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1087 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1088 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1089
1090 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1091
1092 if (s->msg_callback)
1093 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1094 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1095
1096 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1097 cb = s->info_callback;
1098 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1099 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1100
1101 if (cb != NULL) {
1102 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1103 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1104 }
1105
1106 if (alert_level == 1) {
1107 /* warning */
1108 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1109 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1110 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1111 return (0);
1112 }
1113 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1114 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1115 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1116 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1117 * expects it to succeed.
1118 *
1119 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1120 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1121 */
1122 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1125 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1126 goto f_err;
1127 }
1128 } else if (alert_level == 2) {
1129 /* fatal */
1130 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1131 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1133 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1134 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
1135 alert_descr);
1136 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1137 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1138 return (0);
1139 } else {
1140 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1142 goto f_err;
1143 }
1144
1145 goto start;
1146 }
1147
1148 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
1149 /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1150 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1151 rr->length = 0;
1152 return (0);
1153 }
1154
1155 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1156 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1157 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1158 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1159 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1160 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1162 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1163 goto f_err;
1164 }
1165
1166 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1168 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1170 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1171 goto f_err;
1172 }
1173
1174 /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
1175 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1176 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1178 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1179 goto f_err;
1180 }
1181 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1182
1183 rr->length = 0;
1184
1185 if (s->msg_callback) {
1186 s->msg_callback(0, s->version,
1187 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s,
1188 s->msg_callback_arg);
1189 }
1190
1191 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1192 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1193 goto err;
1194 else
1195 goto start;
1196 }
1197
1198 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1199 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1200 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1201 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1202 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1203 s->renegotiate = 1;
1204 s->new_session = 1;
1205 }
1206 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1207 if (i < 0)
1208 return (i);
1209 if (i == 0) {
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1211 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1212 return (-1);
1213 }
1214
1215 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1216 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1217 BIO *bio;
1218 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1219 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1220 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1221 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1222 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1223 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1224 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1225 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1226 return (-1);
1227 }
1228 }
1229 goto start;
1230 }
1231
1232 switch (rr->type) {
1233 default:
1234 /*
1235 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1236 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1237 */
1238 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
1239 s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1240 rr->length = 0;
1241 goto start;
1242 }
1243 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1245 goto f_err;
1246 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1247 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1248 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1249 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1250 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1251 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1252 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1254 goto f_err;
1255 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1256 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1257 * but have application data. If the library was
1258 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1259 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1260 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1261 * we will indulge it.
1262 */
1263 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1264 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1265 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1266 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1267 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) ||
1268 ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1269 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1270 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1271 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1272 return (-1);
1273 } else {
1274 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1276 goto f_err;
1277 }
1278 }
1279 /* not reached */
1280
1281f_err:
1282 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1283err:
1284 return (-1);
1285}
1286
1287int
1288ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1289{
1290 int i;
1291 const char *sender;
1292 int slen;
1293
1294 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1295 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1296 else
1297 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1298
1299 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1300 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1301 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1303 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1304 return (0);
1305 }
1306
1307 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1308 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1309 return (0);
1310 }
1311
1312 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1313 return (0);
1314
1315 /* we have to record the message digest at
1316 * this point so we can get it before we read
1317 * the finished message */
1318 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1319 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1320 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1321 } else {
1322 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1323 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1324 }
1325
1326 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
1327 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1328 if (i == 0) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1333
1334 return (1);
1335}
1336
1337int
1338ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1339{
1340 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1341 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1342 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
1343 /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1344 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1345 }
1346 if (desc < 0)
1347 return -1;
1348 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1349 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1350 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1351
1352 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1353 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1354 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1355 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1356 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1357
1358 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1359 * some time in the future */
1360 return -1;
1361}
1362
1363int
1364ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1365{
1366 int i, j;
1367 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1368
1369 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1370 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1371 if (i <= 0) {
1372 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1373 } else {
1374 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1375 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1376 * we will not worry too much. */
1377 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1378 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1379
1380 if (s->msg_callback)
1381 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1382 s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1383
1384 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1385 cb = s->info_callback;
1386 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1387 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1388
1389 if (cb != NULL) {
1390 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1391 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1392 }
1393 }
1394 return (i);
1395}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-11-23 08:12:10 +0000