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1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <errno.h>
114#define USE_SOCKETS
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122 unsigned int len);
123static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
125static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
126static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
127
128/* used only by ssl3_get_record */
129static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
130 {
131 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
132 * packet by another n bytes.
133 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
134 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
135 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
136 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 */
138 int i,off,newb;
139
140 if (!extend)
141 {
142 /* start with empty packet ... */
143 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
144 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
145 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
146 s->packet_length = 0;
147 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
148 }
149
150 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
152 {
153 s->packet_length+=n;
154 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
155 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
156 return(n);
157 }
158
159 /* else we need to read more data */
160 if (!s->read_ahead)
161 max=n;
162
163 {
164 /* avoid buffer overflow */
165 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
166 if (max > max_max)
167 max = max_max;
168 }
169 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
170 {
171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
172 return -1;
173 }
174
175 off = s->packet_length;
176 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
177 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
178 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
179 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
180 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
181 {
182 /* off > 0 */
183 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
184 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
185 }
186
187 while (newb < n)
188 {
189 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
190 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
191
192 clear_sys_error();
193 if (s->rbio != NULL)
194 {
195 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
196 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
197 }
198 else
199 {
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
201 i = -1;
202 }
203
204 if (i <= 0)
205 {
206 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
207 return(i);
208 }
209 newb+=i;
210 }
211
212 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
213 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
214 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
215 s->packet_length += n;
216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
217 return(n);
218 }
219
220/* Call this to get a new input record.
221 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
222 * or non-blocking IO.
223 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
224 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
225 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
227 */
228/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
229static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
230 {
231 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
232 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
233 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
234 SSL_SESSION *sess;
235 unsigned char *p;
236 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
237 short version;
238 unsigned int mac_size;
239 int clear=0;
240 size_t extra;
241 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
242 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
243
244 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
245 sess=s->session;
246
247 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
248 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
249 else
250 extra=0;
251 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
252 {
253 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
254 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
256 return -1;
257 }
258
259again:
260 /* check if we have the header */
261 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
262 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
263 {
264 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
265 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
266 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
267
268 p=s->packet;
269
270 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
271 rr->type= *(p++);
272 ssl_major= *(p++);
273 ssl_minor= *(p++);
274 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
275 n2s(p,rr->length);
276
277 /* Lets check version */
278 if (s->first_packet)
279 {
280 s->first_packet=0;
281 }
282 else
283 {
284 if (version != s->version)
285 {
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
287 /* Send back error using their
288 * version number :-) */
289 s->version=version;
290 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
291 goto f_err;
292 }
293 }
294
295 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
296 {
297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
298 goto err;
299 }
300
301 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
302 {
303 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
305 goto f_err;
306 }
307
308 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
309 }
310
311 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
312
313 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
314 {
315 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
316 i=rr->length;
317 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
318 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
319 /* now n == rr->length,
320 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
321 }
322
323 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
324
325 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
326 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
327 */
328 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
329
330 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
331 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
332 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
333 * the decryption or by the decompression
334 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
335 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
336
337 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
338 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
339
340 /* check is not needed I believe */
341 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
342 {
343 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
345 goto f_err;
346 }
347
348 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
349 rr->data=rr->input;
350
351 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
352 if (enc_err <= 0)
353 {
354 if (enc_err == 0)
355 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
356 goto err;
357
358 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
359 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
360 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
361 * the MAC computation anyway. */
362 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
363 }
364
365#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
366printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
367{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
368printf("\n");
369#endif
370
371 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
372 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
373 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
374 (s->read_hash == NULL))
375 clear=1;
376
377 if (!clear)
378 {
379 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
380
381 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
382 {
383#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
384 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
386 goto f_err;
387#else
388 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
389#endif
390 }
391 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
392 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
393 {
394 rr->length -= mac_size;
395 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
396 }
397 else
398 {
399 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
400#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
401 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
403 goto f_err;
404#else
405 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
406 rr->length = 0;
407#endif
408 }
409 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
410 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
411 {
412 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
413 }
414 }
415
416 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
417 {
418 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
419 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
420 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
421 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
422 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
423 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
425 goto f_err;
426 }
427
428 /* r->length is now just compressed */
429 if (s->expand != NULL)
430 {
431 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
432 {
433 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
435 goto f_err;
436 }
437 if (!do_uncompress(s))
438 {
439 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
441 goto f_err;
442 }
443 }
444
445 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
446 {
447 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
449 goto f_err;
450 }
451
452 rr->off=0;
453 /* So at this point the following is true
454 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
455 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
456 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
457 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
458 * after use :-).
459 */
460
461 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
462 s->packet_length=0;
463
464 /* just read a 0 length packet */
465 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
466
467 return(1);
468
469f_err:
470 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
471err:
472 return(ret);
473 }
474
475static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
476 {
477 int i;
478 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
479
480 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
481 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
482 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
483 if (i < 0)
484 return(0);
485 else
486 rr->length=i;
487 rr->data=rr->comp;
488
489 return(1);
490 }
491
492static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
493 {
494 int i;
495 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
496
497 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
498 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
499 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
500 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
501 if (i < 0)
502 return(0);
503 else
504 wr->length=i;
505
506 wr->input=wr->data;
507 return(1);
508 }
509
510/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
511 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
512 */
513int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
514 {
515 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
516 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
517 int i;
518
519 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
520 tot=s->s3->wnum;
521 s->s3->wnum=0;
522
523 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
524 {
525 i=s->handshake_func(s);
526 if (i < 0) return(i);
527 if (i == 0)
528 {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
530 return -1;
531 }
532 }
533
534 n=(len-tot);
535 for (;;)
536 {
537 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
538 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
539 else
540 nw=n;
541
542 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
543 if (i <= 0)
544 {
545 s->s3->wnum=tot;
546 return i;
547 }
548
549 if ((i == (int)n) ||
550 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
551 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
552 {
553 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
554 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
555 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
556
557 return tot+i;
558 }
559
560 n-=i;
561 tot+=i;
562 }
563 }
564
565static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
566 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
567 {
568 unsigned char *p,*plen;
569 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
570 int prefix_len = 0;
571 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
572 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
573 SSL_SESSION *sess;
574
575 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
576 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
577 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
578 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
579
580 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
581 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
582 {
583 i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
584 if (i <= 0)
585 return(i);
586 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
587 }
588
589 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
590 return 0;
591
592 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
593 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
594 sess=s->session;
595
596 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
597 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
598 (s->write_hash == NULL))
599 clear=1;
600
601 if (clear)
602 mac_size=0;
603 else
604 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
605
606 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
607 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
608 {
609 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
610 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
611
612 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
613 {
614 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
615 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
616 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
617 * together with the actual payload) */
618 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
619 if (prefix_len <= 0)
620 goto err;
621
622 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
623 {
624 /* insufficient space */
625 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 goto err;
627 }
628 }
629
630 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
631 }
632
633 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
634
635 /* write the header */
636
637 *(p++)=type&0xff;
638 wr->type=type;
639
640 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
641 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
642
643 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
644 plen=p;
645 p+=2;
646
647 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
648 wr->data=p;
649 wr->length=(int)len;
650 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
651
652 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
653 * wr->data */
654
655 /* first we compress */
656 if (s->compress != NULL)
657 {
658 if (!do_compress(s))
659 {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
661 goto err;
662 }
663 }
664 else
665 {
666 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
667 wr->input=wr->data;
668 }
669
670 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
671 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
672 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
673
674 if (mac_size != 0)
675 {
676 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
677 wr->length+=mac_size;
678 wr->input=p;
679 wr->data=p;
680 }
681
682 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
683 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
684
685 /* record length after mac and block padding */
686 s2n(wr->length,plen);
687
688 /* we should now have
689 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
690 * wr->length long */
691 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
692 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
693
694 if (create_empty_fragment)
695 {
696 /* we are in a recursive call;
697 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
698 */
699 return wr->length;
700 }
701
702 /* now let's set up wb */
703 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
704 wb->offset = 0;
705
706 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
707 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
708 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
709 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
710 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
711
712 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
713 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
714err:
715 return -1;
716 }
717
718/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
719static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
720 unsigned int len)
721 {
722 int i;
723
724/* XXXX */
725 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
726 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
727 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
728 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
729 {
730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
731 return(-1);
732 }
733
734 for (;;)
735 {
736 clear_sys_error();
737 if (s->wbio != NULL)
738 {
739 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
740 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
741 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
742 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
743 }
744 else
745 {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
747 i= -1;
748 }
749 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
750 {
751 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
752 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
753 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
754 }
755 else if (i <= 0)
756 return(i);
757 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
758 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
759 }
760 }
761
762/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
763 * 'type' is one of the following:
764 *
765 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
766 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
767 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
768 *
769 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
770 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
771 *
772 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
773 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
774 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
775 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
776 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
777 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
778 * Change cipher spec protocol
779 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
780 * Alert protocol
781 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
782 * Handshake protocol
783 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
784 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
785 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
786 * Application data protocol
787 * none of our business
788 */
789int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
790 {
791 int al,i,j,ret;
792 unsigned int n;
793 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
794 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
795
796 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
797 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
798 return(-1);
799
800 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
801 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
802 {
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
804 return -1;
805 }
806
807 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
808 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
809 {
810 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
811 unsigned char *dst = buf;
812 unsigned int k;
813
814 /* peek == 0 */
815 n = 0;
816 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
817 {
818 *dst++ = *src++;
819 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
820 n++;
821 }
822 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
823 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
824 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
825 return n;
826 }
827
828 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
829
830 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
831 {
832 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
833 i=s->handshake_func(s);
834 if (i < 0) return(i);
835 if (i == 0)
836 {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
838 return(-1);
839 }
840 }
841start:
842 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
843
844 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
845 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
846 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
847 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
848 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
849
850 /* get new packet if necessary */
851 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
852 {
853 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
854 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
855 }
856
857 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
858
859 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
860 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
861 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
862 {
863 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
865 goto f_err;
866 }
867
868 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
869 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
870 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
871 {
872 rr->length=0;
873 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
874 return(0);
875 }
876
877
878 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
879 {
880 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
881 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
882 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
883 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
884 {
885 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
887 goto f_err;
888 }
889
890 if (len <= 0) return(len);
891
892 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
893 n = rr->length;
894 else
895 n = (unsigned int)len;
896
897 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
898 if (!peek)
899 {
900 rr->length-=n;
901 rr->off+=n;
902 if (rr->length == 0)
903 {
904 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
905 rr->off=0;
906 }
907 }
908 return(n);
909 }
910
911
912 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
913 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
914
915 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
916 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
917 */
918 {
919 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
920 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
921 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
922
923 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
924 {
925 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
926 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
927 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
928 }
929 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
930 {
931 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
932 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
933 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
934 }
935
936 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
937 {
938 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
939 if (rr->length < n)
940 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
941
942 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
943 while (n-- > 0)
944 {
945 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
946 rr->length--;
947 }
948
949 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
950 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
951 }
952 }
953
954 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
955 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
956 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
957
958 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
959 if ((!s->server) &&
960 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
961 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
962 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
963 {
964 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
965
966 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
967 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
968 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
969 {
970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
972 goto f_err;
973 }
974
975 if (s->msg_callback)
976 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
977
978 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
979 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
980 !s->s3->renegotiate)
981 {
982 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
983 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
984 {
985 i=s->handshake_func(s);
986 if (i < 0) return(i);
987 if (i == 0)
988 {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
990 return(-1);
991 }
992
993 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
994 {
995 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
996 {
997 BIO *bio;
998 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
999 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1000 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1001 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1002 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1003 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1004 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1005 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1006 return(-1);
1007 }
1008 }
1009 }
1010 }
1011 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1012 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1013 goto start;
1014 }
1015
1016 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1017 {
1018 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1019 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1020
1021 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1022
1023 if (s->msg_callback)
1024 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1025
1026 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1027 cb=s->info_callback;
1028 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1029 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1030
1031 if (cb != NULL)
1032 {
1033 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1034 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1035 }
1036
1037 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1038 {
1039 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1040 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1041 {
1042 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1043 return(0);
1044 }
1045 }
1046 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1047 {
1048 char tmp[16];
1049
1050 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1051 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1053 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1054 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1055 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1056 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1057 return(0);
1058 }
1059 else
1060 {
1061 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1063 goto f_err;
1064 }
1065
1066 goto start;
1067 }
1068
1069 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1070 {
1071 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1072 rr->length=0;
1073 return(0);
1074 }
1075
1076 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1077 {
1078 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1079 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1080 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1081 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1082 {
1083 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1085 goto f_err;
1086 }
1087
1088 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1089 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1090 {
1091 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1093 goto f_err;
1094 }
1095
1096 rr->length=0;
1097
1098 if (s->msg_callback)
1099 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1100
1101 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1102 if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1103 goto err;
1104 else
1105 goto start;
1106 }
1107
1108 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1109 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1110 {
1111 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1112 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1113 {
1114#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1115 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1116 * protocol violations): */
1117 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1118 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1119 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1120#else
1121 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1122#endif
1123 s->new_session=1;
1124 }
1125 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1126 if (i < 0) return(i);
1127 if (i == 0)
1128 {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1130 return(-1);
1131 }
1132
1133 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1134 {
1135 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1136 {
1137 BIO *bio;
1138 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1139 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1140 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1141 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1142 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1143 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1144 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1145 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1146 return(-1);
1147 }
1148 }
1149 goto start;
1150 }
1151
1152 switch (rr->type)
1153 {
1154 default:
1155#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1156 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1157 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1158 {
1159 rr->length = 0;
1160 goto start;
1161 }
1162#endif
1163 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1165 goto f_err;
1166 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1167 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1168 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1169 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1170 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1171 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1172 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 goto f_err;
1175 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1176 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1177 * but have application data. If the library was
1178 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1179 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1180 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1181 * we will indulge it.
1182 */
1183 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1184 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1185 ((
1186 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1187 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1188 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1189 ) || (
1190 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1191 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1192 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1193 )
1194 ))
1195 {
1196 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1197 return(-1);
1198 }
1199 else
1200 {
1201 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1203 goto f_err;
1204 }
1205 }
1206 /* not reached */
1207
1208f_err:
1209 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1210err:
1211 return(-1);
1212 }
1213
1214static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1215 {
1216 int i;
1217 const char *sender;
1218 int slen;
1219
1220 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1221 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1222 else
1223 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1224
1225 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1226 {
1227 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1228 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1229 }
1230
1231 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1232 return(0);
1233
1234 /* we have to record the message digest at
1235 * this point so we can get it before we read
1236 * the finished message */
1237 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1238 {
1239 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1240 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1241 }
1242 else
1243 {
1244 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1245 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1246 }
1247
1248 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1249 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1250 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1251 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1252
1253 return(1);
1254 }
1255
1256void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1257 {
1258 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1259 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1260 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1261 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1262 if (desc < 0) return;
1263 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1264 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1265 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1266
1267 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1268 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1269 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1270 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1271 ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
1272 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1273 * some time in the future */
1274 }
1275
1276int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1277 {
1278 int i,j;
1279 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1280
1281 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1282 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1283 if (i <= 0)
1284 {
1285 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1286 }
1287 else
1288 {
1289 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1290 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1291 * we will not worry too much. */
1292 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1293 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1294
1295 if (s->msg_callback)
1296 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1297
1298 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1299 cb=s->info_callback;
1300 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1301 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1302
1303 if (cb != NULL)
1304 {
1305 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1306 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1307 }
1308 }
1309 return(i);
1310 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-10-24 10:10:28 +0000