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1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <errno.h>
114#define USE_SOCKETS
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,off,newb;
133
134 if (!extend)
135 {
136 /* start with empty packet ... */
137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
140 s->packet_length = 0;
141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
142 }
143
144 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
145 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
146 extend)
147 {
148 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
149 n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
150 }
151
152 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
153 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
154 {
155 s->packet_length+=n;
156 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
157 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
158 return(n);
159 }
160
161 /* else we need to read more data */
162 if (!s->read_ahead)
163 max=n;
164
165 {
166 /* avoid buffer overflow */
167 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
168 if (max > max_max)
169 max = max_max;
170 }
171 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
172 {
173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
174 return -1;
175 }
176
177 off = s->packet_length;
178 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
179 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
180 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
181 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
182 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
183 {
184 /* off > 0 */
185 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
186 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
187 }
188
189 while (newb < n)
190 {
191 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
192 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
193
194 clear_sys_error();
195 if (s->rbio != NULL)
196 {
197 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
198 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
199 }
200 else
201 {
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
203 i = -1;
204 }
205
206 if (i <= 0)
207 {
208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
209 return(i);
210 }
211 newb+=i;
212 }
213
214 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
215 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
216 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
217 s->packet_length += n;
218 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
219 return(n);
220 }
221
222/* Call this to get a new input record.
223 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
224 * or non-blocking IO.
225 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
227 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
228 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
229 */
230/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
231static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
232 {
233 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
234 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
235 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
236 SSL_SESSION *sess;
237 unsigned char *p;
238 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
239 short version;
240 unsigned int mac_size;
241 int clear=0;
242 size_t extra;
243 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
244 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
245
246 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
247 sess=s->session;
248
249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
250 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
251 else
252 extra=0;
253 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
254 {
255 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
256 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 return -1;
259 }
260
261again:
262 /* check if we have the header */
263 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
264 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
265 {
266 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
267 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
268 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
269
270 p=s->packet;
271
272 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
273 rr->type= *(p++);
274 ssl_major= *(p++);
275 ssl_minor= *(p++);
276 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
277 n2s(p,rr->length);
278
279 /* Lets check version */
280 if (!s->first_packet)
281 {
282 if (version != s->version)
283 {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
285 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
286 /* Send back error using their
287 * minor version number :-) */
288 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
289 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
290 goto f_err;
291 }
292 }
293
294 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
295 {
296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
297 goto err;
298 }
299
300 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
301 {
302 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
304 goto f_err;
305 }
306
307 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
308 }
309
310 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
311
312 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
313 {
314 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
315 i=rr->length;
316 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
317 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
318 /* now n == rr->length,
319 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
320 }
321
322 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
323
324 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
325 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
326 */
327 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
328
329 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
330 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
331 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
332 * the decryption or by the decompression
333 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
334 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
335
336 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
337 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
338
339 /* check is not needed I believe */
340 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
341 {
342 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
344 goto f_err;
345 }
346
347 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
348 rr->data=rr->input;
349
350 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
351 if (enc_err <= 0)
352 {
353 if (enc_err == 0)
354 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
355 goto err;
356
357 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
358 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
359 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
360 * the MAC computation anyway. */
361 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
362 }
363
364#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
365printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
366{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
367printf("\n");
368#endif
369
370 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
371 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
372 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
373 (s->read_hash == NULL))
374 clear=1;
375
376 if (!clear)
377 {
378 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
379
380 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
381 {
382#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
383 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
385 goto f_err;
386#else
387 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
388#endif
389 }
390 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
391 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
392 {
393 rr->length -= mac_size;
394 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
395 }
396 else
397 {
398 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
399#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
400 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
402 goto f_err;
403#else
404 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
405 rr->length = 0;
406#endif
407 }
408 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
409 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
410 {
411 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
412 }
413 }
414
415 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
416 {
417 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
418 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
419 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
420 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
421 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
422 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
424 goto f_err;
425 }
426
427 /* r->length is now just compressed */
428 if (s->expand != NULL)
429 {
430 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
431 {
432 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
434 goto f_err;
435 }
436 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
437 {
438 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
440 goto f_err;
441 }
442 }
443
444 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
445 {
446 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
448 goto f_err;
449 }
450
451 rr->off=0;
452 /* So at this point the following is true
453 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
454 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
455 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
456 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
457 * after use :-).
458 */
459
460 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
461 s->packet_length=0;
462
463 /* just read a 0 length packet */
464 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
465
466 return(1);
467
468f_err:
469 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
470err:
471 return(ret);
472 }
473
474int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
475 {
476#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
477 int i;
478 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
479
480 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
481 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
482 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
483 if (i < 0)
484 return(0);
485 else
486 rr->length=i;
487 rr->data=rr->comp;
488#endif
489 return(1);
490 }
491
492int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
493 {
494#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
495 int i;
496 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
497
498 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
499 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
500 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
501 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
502 if (i < 0)
503 return(0);
504 else
505 wr->length=i;
506
507 wr->input=wr->data;
508#endif
509 return(1);
510 }
511
512/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
513 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
514 */
515int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
516 {
517 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
518 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
519 int i;
520
521 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
522 tot=s->s3->wnum;
523 s->s3->wnum=0;
524
525 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
526 {
527 i=s->handshake_func(s);
528 if (i < 0) return(i);
529 if (i == 0)
530 {
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
532 return -1;
533 }
534 }
535
536 n=(len-tot);
537 for (;;)
538 {
539 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
540 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
541 else
542 nw=n;
543
544 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
545 if (i <= 0)
546 {
547 s->s3->wnum=tot;
548 return i;
549 }
550
551 if ((i == (int)n) ||
552 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
553 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
554 {
555 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
556 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
557 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
558
559 return tot+i;
560 }
561
562 n-=i;
563 tot+=i;
564 }
565 }
566
567static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
568 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
569 {
570 unsigned char *p,*plen;
571 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
572 int prefix_len = 0;
573 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
574 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
575 SSL_SESSION *sess;
576
577 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
578 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
579 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
580 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
581
582 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
583 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
584 {
585 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
586 if (i <= 0)
587 return(i);
588 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
589 }
590
591 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
592 return 0;
593
594 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
595 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
596 sess=s->session;
597
598 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
599 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
600 (s->write_hash == NULL))
601 clear=1;
602
603 if (clear)
604 mac_size=0;
605 else
606 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
607
608 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
609 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
610 {
611 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
612 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
613
614 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
615 {
616 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
617 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
618 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
619 * together with the actual payload) */
620 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
621 if (prefix_len <= 0)
622 goto err;
623
624 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
625 {
626 /* insufficient space */
627 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
628 goto err;
629 }
630 }
631
632 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
633 }
634
635 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
636
637 /* write the header */
638
639 *(p++)=type&0xff;
640 wr->type=type;
641
642 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
643 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
644
645 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
646 plen=p;
647 p+=2;
648
649 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
650 wr->data=p;
651 wr->length=(int)len;
652 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
653
654 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
655 * wr->data */
656
657 /* first we compress */
658 if (s->compress != NULL)
659 {
660 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
661 {
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
663 goto err;
664 }
665 }
666 else
667 {
668 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
669 wr->input=wr->data;
670 }
671
672 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
673 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
674 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
675
676 if (mac_size != 0)
677 {
678 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
679 wr->length+=mac_size;
680 wr->input=p;
681 wr->data=p;
682 }
683
684 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
685 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
686
687 /* record length after mac and block padding */
688 s2n(wr->length,plen);
689
690 /* we should now have
691 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
692 * wr->length long */
693 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
694 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
695
696 if (create_empty_fragment)
697 {
698 /* we are in a recursive call;
699 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
700 */
701 return wr->length;
702 }
703
704 /* now let's set up wb */
705 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
706 wb->offset = 0;
707
708 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
709 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
710 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
711 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
712 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
713
714 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
715 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
716err:
717 return -1;
718 }
719
720/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
721int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
722 unsigned int len)
723 {
724 int i;
725
726/* XXXX */
727 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
728 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
729 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
730 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
731 {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
733 return(-1);
734 }
735
736 for (;;)
737 {
738 clear_sys_error();
739 if (s->wbio != NULL)
740 {
741 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
742 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
743 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
744 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
745 }
746 else
747 {
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
749 i= -1;
750 }
751 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
752 {
753 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
754 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
755 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
756 }
757 else if (i <= 0) {
758 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
759 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
760 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
761 point in using a datagram service */
762 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0;
763 }
764 return(i);
765 }
766 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
767 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
768 }
769 }
770
771/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
772 * 'type' is one of the following:
773 *
774 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
775 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
776 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
777 *
778 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
779 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
780 *
781 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
782 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
783 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
784 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
785 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
786 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
787 * Change cipher spec protocol
788 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
789 * Alert protocol
790 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
791 * Handshake protocol
792 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
793 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
794 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
795 * Application data protocol
796 * none of our business
797 */
798int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
799 {
800 int al,i,j,ret;
801 unsigned int n;
802 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
803 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
804
805 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
806 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
807 return(-1);
808
809 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
810 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
811 {
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 return -1;
814 }
815
816 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
817 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
818 {
819 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
820 unsigned char *dst = buf;
821 unsigned int k;
822
823 /* peek == 0 */
824 n = 0;
825 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
826 {
827 *dst++ = *src++;
828 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
829 n++;
830 }
831 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
832 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
833 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
834 return n;
835 }
836
837 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
838
839 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
840 {
841 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
842 i=s->handshake_func(s);
843 if (i < 0) return(i);
844 if (i == 0)
845 {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
847 return(-1);
848 }
849 }
850start:
851 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
852
853 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
854 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
855 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
856 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
857 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
858
859 /* get new packet if necessary */
860 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
861 {
862 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
863 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
864 }
865
866 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
867
868 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
869 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
870 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
871 {
872 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
874 goto f_err;
875 }
876
877 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
878 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
879 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
880 {
881 rr->length=0;
882 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
883 return(0);
884 }
885
886
887 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
888 {
889 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
890 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
891 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
892 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
893 {
894 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
896 goto f_err;
897 }
898
899 if (len <= 0) return(len);
900
901 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
902 n = rr->length;
903 else
904 n = (unsigned int)len;
905
906 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
907 if (!peek)
908 {
909 rr->length-=n;
910 rr->off+=n;
911 if (rr->length == 0)
912 {
913 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
914 rr->off=0;
915 }
916 }
917 return(n);
918 }
919
920
921 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
922 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
923
924 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
925 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
926 */
927 {
928 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
929 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
930 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
931
932 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
933 {
934 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
935 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
936 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
937 }
938 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
939 {
940 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
941 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
942 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
943 }
944
945 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
946 {
947 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
948 if (rr->length < n)
949 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
950
951 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
952 while (n-- > 0)
953 {
954 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
955 rr->length--;
956 }
957
958 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
959 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
960 }
961 }
962
963 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
964 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
965 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
966
967 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
968 if ((!s->server) &&
969 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
970 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
971 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
972 {
973 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
974
975 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
976 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
977 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
978 {
979 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
981 goto f_err;
982 }
983
984 if (s->msg_callback)
985 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
986
987 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
988 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
989 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) &&
990 !s->s3->renegotiate)
991 {
992 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
993 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
994 {
995 i=s->handshake_func(s);
996 if (i < 0) return(i);
997 if (i == 0)
998 {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1000 return(-1);
1001 }
1002
1003 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1004 {
1005 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1006 {
1007 BIO *bio;
1008 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1009 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1010 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1011 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1012 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1013 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1014 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1015 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1016 return(-1);
1017 }
1018 }
1019 }
1020 }
1021 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1022 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1023 goto start;
1024 }
1025
1026 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1027 {
1028 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1029 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1030
1031 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1032
1033 if (s->msg_callback)
1034 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1035
1036 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1037 cb=s->info_callback;
1038 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1039 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1040
1041 if (cb != NULL)
1042 {
1043 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1044 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1045 }
1046
1047 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1048 {
1049 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1050 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1051 {
1052 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1053 return(0);
1054 }
1055 }
1056 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1057 {
1058 char tmp[16];
1059
1060 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1061 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1063 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1064 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1065 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1066 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1067 return(0);
1068 }
1069 else
1070 {
1071 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1073 goto f_err;
1074 }
1075
1076 goto start;
1077 }
1078
1079 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1080 {
1081 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1082 rr->length=0;
1083 return(0);
1084 }
1085
1086 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1087 {
1088 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1089 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1090 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1091 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1092 {
1093 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1095 goto f_err;
1096 }
1097
1098 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1099 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1100 {
1101 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1103 goto f_err;
1104 }
1105
1106 rr->length=0;
1107
1108 if (s->msg_callback)
1109 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1110
1111 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1112 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1113 goto err;
1114 else
1115 goto start;
1116 }
1117
1118 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1119 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1120 {
1121 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1122 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1123 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1124 {
1125#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1126 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1127 * protocol violations): */
1128 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1129 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1130 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1131#else
1132 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1133#endif
1134 s->new_session=1;
1135 }
1136 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1137 if (i < 0) return(i);
1138 if (i == 0)
1139 {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1141 return(-1);
1142 }
1143
1144 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1145 {
1146 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1147 {
1148 BIO *bio;
1149 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1150 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1151 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1152 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1153 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1154 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1155 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1156 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1157 return(-1);
1158 }
1159 }
1160 goto start;
1161 }
1162
1163 switch (rr->type)
1164 {
1165 default:
1166#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1167 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1168 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1169 {
1170 rr->length = 0;
1171 goto start;
1172 }
1173#endif
1174 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1176 goto f_err;
1177 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1178 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1179 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1180 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1181 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1182 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1183 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 goto f_err;
1186 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1187 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1188 * but have application data. If the library was
1189 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1190 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1191 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1192 * we will indulge it.
1193 */
1194 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1195 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1196 ((
1197 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1198 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1199 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1200 ) || (
1201 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1202 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1203 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1204 )
1205 ))
1206 {
1207 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1208 return(-1);
1209 }
1210 else
1211 {
1212 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1214 goto f_err;
1215 }
1216 }
1217 /* not reached */
1218
1219f_err:
1220 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1221err:
1222 return(-1);
1223 }
1224
1225int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1226 {
1227 int i;
1228 const char *sender;
1229 int slen;
1230
1231 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1232 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1233 else
1234 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1235
1236 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1237 {
1238 if (s->session == NULL)
1239 {
1240 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1242 return (0);
1243 }
1244
1245 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1246 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1247 }
1248
1249 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1250 return(0);
1251
1252 /* we have to record the message digest at
1253 * this point so we can get it before we read
1254 * the finished message */
1255 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1256 {
1257 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1258 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1259 }
1260 else
1261 {
1262 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1263 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1264 }
1265
1266 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1267 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1268 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1269 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1270
1271 return(1);
1272 }
1273
1274void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1275 {
1276 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1277 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1278 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1279 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1280 if (desc < 0) return;
1281 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1282 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1283 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1284
1285 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1286 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1287 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1288 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1289 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1290 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1291 * some time in the future */
1292 }
1293
1294int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1295 {
1296 int i,j;
1297 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1298
1299 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1300 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1301 if (i <= 0)
1302 {
1303 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1304 }
1305 else
1306 {
1307 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1308 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1309 * we will not worry too much. */
1310 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1311 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1312
1313 if (s->msg_callback)
1314 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1315
1316 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1317 cb=s->info_callback;
1318 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1319 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1320
1321 if (cb != NULL)
1322 {
1323 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1324 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1325 }
1326 }
1327 return(i);
1328 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-27 05:38:38 +0000