1 files changed, 29 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
index 20d716fb1b..58cf774967 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -152,11 +152,18 @@ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
 
         if (init)
                 {
-                memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
-                        sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
-                SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
-                SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
-                init=0;
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
+
+                if (init)
+                        {
+                        memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
+                                sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+                        SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
+                        SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
+                        init=0;
+                        }
+                        
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
                 }
         return(&SSLv3_server_data);
         }
@@ -1171,7 +1178,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                         kn=0;
                         }
 
-                if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
+                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
                         goto err;
@@ -1298,7 +1305,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                                 {
                                 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
                                 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
-                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
+                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
                                         {
                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                                         goto err;
@@ -1440,7 +1447,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
                         {
                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+                        /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
                         }
 
                 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
@@ -1456,37 +1463,35 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
                                 {
                                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                                goto f_err;
+                                /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+                                /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+                                 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+                                 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+                                 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+                                 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+                                 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
+                                 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
                                 }
                         }
 
                 if (al != -1)
                         {
-#if 0
-                        goto f_err;
-#else
                         /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
                          * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
-                         * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
-                         * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
-                         * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
-                         * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
-                         * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
-                         */
+                         * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
                         ERR_clear_error();
                         i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
                         p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
                         p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
                         RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-#endif
                         }
         
                 s->session->master_key_length=
                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                 s->session->master_key,
                                 p,i);
-                memset(p,0,i);
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                 }
         else
 #endif
@@ -1549,7 +1554,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 s->session->master_key_length=
                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                 s->session->master_key,p,i);
-                memset(p,0,i);
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                 }
         else
 #endif
@@ -1652,7 +1657,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 if (enc == NULL)
                     goto err;
 
-                memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);       /* per RFC 1510 */
+                memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);       /* per RFC 1510 */
 
                 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
                         {
@@ -1740,7 +1745,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
                 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
                 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
                 -1,
-                512, /* 512? */
+                514, /* 514? */
                 &ok);
 
         if (!ok) return((int)n);