1 files changed, 13 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
index 481cf37bef..120f92a9d3 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -591,13 +591,13 @@ ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                         s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #endif
                                 s->init_num = 0;
-                        } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+                        } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                                 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
                                 s->init_num = 0;
                                 if (!s->session->peer)
                                         break;
                                 /*
-                                 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
+                                 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
                                  * at this point and digest cached records.
                                  */
                                 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
          * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
          * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
          * ignore resumption requests with flag
-         * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
+         * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
          * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
          * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
          * library versions).
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
         p += j;
 
-        if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
                 /* cookie stuff */
                 cookie_len = *(p++);
 
@@ -1331,8 +1331,7 @@ ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
         }
 
-        if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION ||
-            !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+        if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
                 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
                         al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                         goto f_err;
@@ -1819,8 +1818,7 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                          * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
                          * and p points to the space at the end.
                          */
-                        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
-                                && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+                        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                                 q = md_buf;
                                 j = 0;
                                 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
@@ -1850,13 +1848,9 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                 }
                                 s2n(u, p);
                                 n += u + 2;
-                        } else
-                        if (md) {
-                                /*
-                                 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature
-                                 * algorithm
-                                 */
-                                if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+                        } else if (md) {
+                                /* Send signature algorithm. */
+                                if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                                         if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
                                                 /* Should never happen */
                                                 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -1884,7 +1878,7 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                 }
                                 s2n(i, p);
                                 n += i + 2;
-                                if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                                if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                                         n += 2;
                         } else {
                                 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
@@ -1937,7 +1931,7 @@ ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                 p += n;
                 n++;
 
-                if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+                if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                         nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
                         s2n(nl, p);
                         p += nl + 2;
@@ -2592,7 +2586,7 @@ ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
             pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
                 i = 64;
         } else {
-                if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+                if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                         int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
                         /* Should never happen */
                         if (sigalg == -1) {
@@ -2635,7 +2629,7 @@ ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
                 goto f_err;
         }
 
-        if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
                 long hdatalen = 0;
                 void *hdata;
                 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);