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1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128#include <stdio.h>
129#include "ssl_locl.h"
130#include "kssl_lcl.h"
131#include <openssl/buffer.h>
132#include <openssl/rand.h>
133#include <openssl/objects.h>
134#include <openssl/evp.h>
135#include <openssl/hmac.h>
136#include <openssl/x509.h>
137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138#include <openssl/dh.h>
139#endif
140#include <openssl/bn.h>
141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143#endif
144#include <openssl/md5.h>
145
146static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149#endif
150
151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
294 if (s->hit)
295 {
296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
298 else
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
300 }
301#else
302 if (s->hit)
303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
304#endif
305 else
306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
307 s->init_num=0;
308 break;
309
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
315 {
316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
321 else
322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 skip = 1;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
328 }
329#else
330 }
331 else
332 skip=1;
333
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
335#endif
336 s->init_num=0;
337 break;
338
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
342
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
346#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
347 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
348#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
349 )
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
355 else
356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
357
358
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
361 *
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
367 */
368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
369 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
371 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
375 )
376 )
377 )
378 )
379 {
380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
381 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
382 }
383 else
384 skip=1;
385
386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
387 s->init_num=0;
388 break;
389
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
407 {
408 /* no cert request */
409 skip=1;
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
412 }
413 else
414 {
415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
420#else
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
423#endif
424 s->init_num=0;
425 }
426 break;
427
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->init_num=0;
435 break;
436
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
440 if (num1 > 0)
441 {
442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
446 }
447
448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
449 break;
450
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
455 if (ret <= 0)
456 goto end;
457 if (ret == 2)
458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
459 else {
460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
461 {
462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
463 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
464 }
465 s->init_num=0;
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
467 }
468 break;
469
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
473 if (ret <= 0)
474 goto end;
475 if (ret == 2)
476 {
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
481 */
482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
483 s->init_num = 0;
484 }
485 else
486 {
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
488 s->init_num=0;
489
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
492 */
493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
499 }
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
504
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
510 s->init_num=0;
511 break;
512
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
517 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
518 if (s->hit)
519 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
520#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
523#endif
524 else
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
526 s->init_num=0;
527 break;
528
529#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
535 s->init_num=0;
536 break;
537
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
543 s->init_num=0;
544 break;
545
546#endif
547
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
550
551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
553 { ret= -1; goto end; }
554
555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
557
558 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
560 s->init_num=0;
561
562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
564 {
565 ret= -1;
566 goto end;
567 }
568
569 break;
570
571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
577 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
579 if (s->hit)
580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
581 else
582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
583 s->init_num=0;
584 break;
585
586 case SSL_ST_OK:
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
589
590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
591 s->init_buf=NULL;
592
593 /* remove buffering on output */
594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
595
596 s->init_num=0;
597
598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
599 {
600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
602
603 s->new_session=0;
604
605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
606
607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
608 /* s->server=1; */
609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
610
611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
612 }
613
614 ret = 1;
615 goto end;
616 /* break; */
617
618 default:
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
620 ret= -1;
621 goto end;
622 /* break; */
623 }
624
625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
626 {
627 if (s->debug)
628 {
629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
630 goto end;
631 }
632
633
634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
635 {
636 new_state=s->state;
637 s->state=state;
638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
639 s->state=new_state;
640 }
641 }
642 skip=0;
643 }
644end:
645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
646
647 s->in_handshake--;
648 if (cb != NULL)
649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
650 return(ret);
651 }
652
653int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
654 {
655 unsigned char *p;
656
657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
658 {
659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
661 *(p++)=0;
662 *(p++)=0;
663 *(p++)=0;
664
665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
666 /* number of bytes to write */
667 s->init_num=4;
668 s->init_off=0;
669 }
670
671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
673 }
674
675int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
676 {
677 int ok;
678 long n;
679
680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
681 * so permit appropriate message length */
682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
683 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
685 -1,
686 s->max_cert_list,
687 &ok);
688 if (!ok) return((int)n);
689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
691 {
692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
698 {
699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
701 }
702#endif
703 return 2;
704 }
705 return 1;
706}
707
708int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
709 {
710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
711 unsigned int cookie_len;
712 long n;
713 unsigned long id;
714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
715 SSL_CIPHER *c;
716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
717 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
718#endif
719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
720
721 if (s->new_session
722 && !(s->s3->flags&SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
723 {
724 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
726 goto f_err;
727 }
728
729 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
730 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
731 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
732 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
733 * TLSv1.
734 */
735 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
736 {
737 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
738 }
739 s->first_packet=1;
740 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
741 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
742 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
743 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
744 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
745 &ok);
746
747 if (!ok) return((int)n);
748 s->first_packet=0;
749 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
750
751 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
752 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
753 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
754 p+=2;
755
756 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
757 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
758 {
759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
760 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
761 {
762 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
763 s->version = s->client_version;
764 }
765 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
766 goto f_err;
767 }
768
769 /* load the client random */
770 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
771 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
772
773 /* get the session-id */
774 j= *(p++);
775
776 s->hit=0;
777 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
778 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
779 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
780 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
781 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
782 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
783 * an earlier library version)
784 */
785 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
786 {
787 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
788 goto err;
789 }
790 else
791 {
792 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
793 if (i == 1)
794 { /* previous session */
795 s->hit=1;
796 }
797 else if (i == -1)
798 goto err;
799 else /* i == 0 */
800 {
801 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
802 goto err;
803 }
804 }
805
806 p+=j;
807
808 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
809 {
810 /* cookie stuff */
811 cookie_len = *(p++);
812
813 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
814 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
815 {
816 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
817 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
818 {
819 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
821 goto f_err;
822 }
823 }
824
825 /*
826 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
827 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
828 * does not cause an overflow.
829 */
830 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
831 {
832 /* too much data */
833 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
835 goto f_err;
836 }
837
838 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
839 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
840 cookie_len > 0)
841 {
842 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
843
844 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
845 {
846 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
847 cookie_len) == 0)
848 {
849 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
851 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
852 goto f_err;
853 }
854 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
855 }
856 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
857 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
858 {
859 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
861 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
862 goto f_err;
863 }
864 }
865
866 p += cookie_len;
867 }
868
869 n2s(p,i);
870 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
871 {
872 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
873 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
875 goto f_err;
876 }
877 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
878 {
879 /* not enough data */
880 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
882 goto f_err;
883 }
884 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
885 == NULL))
886 {
887 goto err;
888 }
889 p+=i;
890
891 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
892 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
893 {
894 j=0;
895 id=s->session->cipher->id;
896
897#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
898 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
899#endif
900 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
901 {
902 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
903#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
904 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
905 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
906#endif
907 if (c->id == id)
908 {
909 j=1;
910 break;
911 }
912 }
913 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
914 {
915 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
916 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
917 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
918 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
919 * enabled, though. */
920 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
921 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
922 {
923 s->session->cipher = c;
924 j = 1;
925 }
926 }
927 if (j == 0)
928 {
929 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
930 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
931 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
933 goto f_err;
934 }
935 }
936
937 /* compression */
938 i= *(p++);
939 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
940 {
941 /* not enough data */
942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
944 goto f_err;
945 }
946 q=p;
947 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
948 {
949 if (p[j] == 0) break;
950 }
951
952 p+=i;
953 if (j >= i)
954 {
955 /* no compress */
956 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
958 goto f_err;
959 }
960
961#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
962 /* TLS extensions*/
963 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
964 {
965 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
966 {
967 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
969 goto f_err;
970 }
971 }
972 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
974 goto err;
975 }
976#endif
977 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
978 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
979 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
980 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
981#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
982 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
983 { /* See if we have a match */
984 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
985
986 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
987 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
988 {
989 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
990 v=comp->id;
991 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
992 {
993 if (v == q[o])
994 {
995 done=1;
996 break;
997 }
998 }
999 if (done) break;
1000 }
1001 if (done)
1002 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1003 else
1004 comp=NULL;
1005 }
1006#endif
1007
1008 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1009#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1010 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1011 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1012 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1013 {
1014 if (p < (d+n))
1015 {
1016 /* wrong number of bytes,
1017 * there could be more to follow */
1018 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1020 goto f_err;
1021 }
1022 }
1023#endif
1024
1025 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1026 * pick a cipher */
1027
1028 if (!s->hit)
1029 {
1030#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1031 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1032#else
1033 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1034#endif
1035 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1036 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1037 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1038 if (ciphers == NULL)
1039 {
1040 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1042 goto f_err;
1043 }
1044 ciphers=NULL;
1045 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1046 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1047
1048 if (c == NULL)
1049 {
1050 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1052 goto f_err;
1053 }
1054 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1055 }
1056 else
1057 {
1058 /* Session-id reuse */
1059#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1060 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1061 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1062 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1063
1064 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1065 {
1066 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1067 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1068 {
1069 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1070 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1071 nc=c;
1072 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1073 ec=c;
1074 }
1075 if (nc != NULL)
1076 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1077 else if (ec != NULL)
1078 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1079 else
1080 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1081 }
1082 else
1083#endif
1084 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1085 }
1086
1087 /* we now have the following setup.
1088 * client_random
1089 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1090 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1091 * compression - basically ignored right now
1092 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1093 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1094 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1095 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1096 */
1097
1098 ret=1;
1099 if (0)
1100 {
1101f_err:
1102 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1103 }
1104err:
1105 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1106 return(ret);
1107 }
1108
1109int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1110 {
1111 unsigned char *buf;
1112 unsigned char *p,*d;
1113 int i,sl;
1114 unsigned long l,Time;
1115
1116 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1117 {
1118 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1119 p=s->s3->server_random;
1120 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1121 l2n(Time,p);
1122 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1123 return -1;
1124 /* Do the message type and length last */
1125 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1126
1127 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1128 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1129
1130 /* Random stuff */
1131 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1132 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1133
1134 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1135 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1136 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1137 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1138 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1139 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1140 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1141 *
1142 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1143 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1144 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1145 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1146 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1147 * is unaffected.
1148 */
1149 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1150 && !s->hit)
1151 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1152
1153 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1154 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1155 {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 return -1;
1158 }
1159 *(p++)=sl;
1160 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1161 p+=sl;
1162
1163 /* put the cipher */
1164 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1165 p+=i;
1166
1167 /* put the compression method */
1168#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1169 *(p++)=0;
1170#else
1171 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1172 *(p++)=0;
1173 else
1174 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1175#endif
1176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1177 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1178 {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 return -1;
1181 }
1182#endif
1183 /* do the header */
1184 l=(p-d);
1185 d=buf;
1186 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1187 l2n3(l,d);
1188
1189 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1190 /* number of bytes to write */
1191 s->init_num=p-buf;
1192 s->init_off=0;
1193 }
1194
1195 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1196 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1197 }
1198
1199int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1200 {
1201 unsigned char *p;
1202
1203 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1204 {
1205 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1206
1207 /* do the header */
1208 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1209 *(p++)=0;
1210 *(p++)=0;
1211 *(p++)=0;
1212
1213 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1214 /* number of bytes to write */
1215 s->init_num=4;
1216 s->init_off=0;
1217 }
1218
1219 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1220 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1221 }
1222
1223int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1224 {
1225#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1226 unsigned char *q;
1227 int j,num;
1228 RSA *rsa;
1229 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1230 unsigned int u;
1231#endif
1232#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1233 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1234#endif
1235#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1236 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1237 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1238 int encodedlen = 0;
1239 int curve_id = 0;
1240 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1241#endif
1242 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1243 unsigned char *p,*d;
1244 int al,i;
1245 unsigned long type;
1246 int n;
1247 CERT *cert;
1248 BIGNUM *r[4];
1249 int nr[4],kn;
1250 BUF_MEM *buf;
1251 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1252
1253 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1254 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1255 {
1256 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1257 cert=s->cert;
1258
1259 buf=s->init_buf;
1260
1261 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1262 n=0;
1263#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1264 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1265 {
1266 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1267 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1268 {
1269 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1270 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1271 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1272 if(rsa == NULL)
1273 {
1274 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1276 goto f_err;
1277 }
1278 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1279 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1280 }
1281 if (rsa == NULL)
1282 {
1283 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1285 goto f_err;
1286 }
1287 r[0]=rsa->n;
1288 r[1]=rsa->e;
1289 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1290 }
1291 else
1292#endif
1293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1294 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1295 {
1296 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1297 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1298 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1299 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1300 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1301 if (dhp == NULL)
1302 {
1303 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1305 goto f_err;
1306 }
1307
1308 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1309 {
1310 DH_free(dh);
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 goto err;
1313 }
1314
1315 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1316 {
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1318 goto err;
1319 }
1320
1321 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1322 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1323 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1324 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1325 {
1326 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1327 {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1329 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1330 goto err;
1331 }
1332 }
1333 else
1334 {
1335 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1336 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1337 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1338 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1339 {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1341 goto err;
1342 }
1343 }
1344 r[0]=dh->p;
1345 r[1]=dh->g;
1346 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1347 }
1348 else
1349#endif
1350#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1351 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1352 {
1353 const EC_GROUP *group;
1354
1355 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1356 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1357 {
1358 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1359 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1360 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1361 }
1362 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1363 {
1364 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1366 goto f_err;
1367 }
1368
1369 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1370 {
1371 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 goto err;
1374 }
1375
1376 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1377 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1378 {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1380 goto err;
1381 }
1382 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1383 {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1385 goto err;
1386 }
1387 ecdh = ecdhp;
1388
1389 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1390 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1391 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1392 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1393 {
1394 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1395 {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1397 goto err;
1398 }
1399 }
1400
1401 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1402 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1403 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1404 {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1406 goto err;
1407 }
1408
1409 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1410 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1411 {
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1413 goto err;
1414 }
1415
1416 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1417 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1418 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1419 */
1420 if ((curve_id =
1421 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1422 == 0)
1423 {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1425 goto err;
1426 }
1427
1428 /* Encode the public key.
1429 * First check the size of encoding and
1430 * allocate memory accordingly.
1431 */
1432 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1433 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1434 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1435 NULL, 0, NULL);
1436
1437 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1438 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1439 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1440 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1441 {
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1443 goto err;
1444 }
1445
1446
1447 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1448 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1449 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1450 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1451
1452 if (encodedlen == 0)
1453 {
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1455 goto err;
1456 }
1457
1458 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1459
1460 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1461 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1462 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1463 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1464 * structure.
1465 */
1466 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1467
1468 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1469 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1470 */
1471 r[0]=NULL;
1472 r[1]=NULL;
1473 r[2]=NULL;
1474 r[3]=NULL;
1475 }
1476 else
1477#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1478 {
1479 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1481 goto f_err;
1482 }
1483 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1484 {
1485 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1486 n+=2+nr[i];
1487 }
1488
1489 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1490 {
1491 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1492 == NULL)
1493 {
1494 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1495 goto f_err;
1496 }
1497 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1498 }
1499 else
1500 {
1501 pkey=NULL;
1502 kn=0;
1503 }
1504
1505 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1506 {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1508 goto err;
1509 }
1510 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1511 p= &(d[4]);
1512
1513 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1514 {
1515 s2n(nr[i],p);
1516 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1517 p+=nr[i];
1518 }
1519
1520#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1521 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1522 {
1523 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1524 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1525 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1526 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1527 * the actual encoded point itself
1528 */
1529 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1530 p += 1;
1531 *p = 0;
1532 p += 1;
1533 *p = curve_id;
1534 p += 1;
1535 *p = encodedlen;
1536 p += 1;
1537 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1538 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1539 encodedlen);
1540 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1541 p += encodedlen;
1542 }
1543#endif
1544
1545 /* not anonymous */
1546 if (pkey != NULL)
1547 {
1548 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1549 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1550#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1551 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1552 {
1553 q=md_buf;
1554 j=0;
1555 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1556 {
1557 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1558 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1559 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1560 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1561 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1562 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1563 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1564 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1565 (unsigned int *)&i);
1566 q+=i;
1567 j+=i;
1568 }
1569 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1570 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1571 {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1573 goto err;
1574 }
1575 s2n(u,p);
1576 n+=u+2;
1577 }
1578 else
1579#endif
1580#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1581 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1582 {
1583 /* lets do DSS */
1584 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1585 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1586 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1587 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1588 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1589 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1590 {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1592 goto err;
1593 }
1594 s2n(i,p);
1595 n+=i+2;
1596 }
1597 else
1598#endif
1599#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1600 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1601 {
1602 /* let's do ECDSA */
1603 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1604 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1605 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1606 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1607 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1608 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1609 {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1611 goto err;
1612 }
1613 s2n(i,p);
1614 n+=i+2;
1615 }
1616 else
1617#endif
1618 {
1619 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1620 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1622 goto f_err;
1623 }
1624 }
1625
1626 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1627 l2n3(n,d);
1628
1629 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1630 * it off */
1631 s->init_num=n+4;
1632 s->init_off=0;
1633 }
1634
1635 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1636 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1637 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1638f_err:
1639 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1640err:
1641#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1642 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1643 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1644#endif
1645 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1646 return(-1);
1647 }
1648
1649int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1650 {
1651 unsigned char *p,*d;
1652 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1653 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1654 X509_NAME *name;
1655 BUF_MEM *buf;
1656
1657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1658 {
1659 buf=s->init_buf;
1660
1661 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1662
1663 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1664 p++;
1665 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1666 d[0]=n;
1667 p+=n;
1668 n++;
1669
1670 off=n;
1671 p+=2;
1672 n+=2;
1673
1674 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1675 nl=0;
1676 if (sk != NULL)
1677 {
1678 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1679 {
1680 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1681 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1682 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1683 {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1685 goto err;
1686 }
1687 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1688 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1689 {
1690 s2n(j,p);
1691 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1692 n+=2+j;
1693 nl+=2+j;
1694 }
1695 else
1696 {
1697 d=p;
1698 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1699 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1700 n+=j;
1701 nl+=j;
1702 }
1703 }
1704 }
1705 /* else no CA names */
1706 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1707 s2n(nl,p);
1708
1709 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1710 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1711 l2n3(n,d);
1712
1713 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1714 * it off */
1715
1716 s->init_num=n+4;
1717 s->init_off=0;
1718#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1719 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1720
1721 /* do the header */
1722 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1723 *(p++)=0;
1724 *(p++)=0;
1725 *(p++)=0;
1726 s->init_num += 4;
1727#endif
1728
1729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1730 }
1731
1732 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1733 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1734err:
1735 return(-1);
1736 }
1737
1738int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1739 {
1740 int i,al,ok;
1741 long n;
1742 unsigned long l;
1743 unsigned char *p;
1744#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1745 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1746 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1747#endif
1748#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1749 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1750 DH *dh_srvr;
1751#endif
1752#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1753 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1754#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1755
1756#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1758 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1759 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1760 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1761#endif
1762
1763 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1764 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1765 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1766 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1767 2048, /* ??? */
1768 &ok);
1769
1770 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1771 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1772
1773 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1774
1775#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1776 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1777 {
1778 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1779 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1780 {
1781 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1782 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1783 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1784 * be sent already */
1785 if (rsa == NULL)
1786 {
1787 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1789 goto f_err;
1790
1791 }
1792 }
1793 else
1794 {
1795 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1796 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1797 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1798 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1799 {
1800 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1802 goto f_err;
1803 }
1804 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1805 }
1806
1807 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1808 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1809 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1810 {
1811 n2s(p,i);
1812 if (n != i+2)
1813 {
1814 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1815 {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1817 goto err;
1818 }
1819 else
1820 p-=2;
1821 }
1822 else
1823 n=i;
1824 }
1825
1826 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1827
1828 al = -1;
1829
1830 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1831 {
1832 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1834 }
1835
1836 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1837 {
1838 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1839 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1840 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1841 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1842 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1843 * protocol version.
1844 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1845 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1846 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1847 {
1848 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1850
1851 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1852 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1853 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1854 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1855 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1856 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1857 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1858 }
1859 }
1860
1861 if (al != -1)
1862 {
1863 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1864 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1865 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1866 ERR_clear_error();
1867 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1868 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1869 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1870 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1871 goto err;
1872 }
1873
1874 s->session->master_key_length=
1875 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1876 s->session->master_key,
1877 p,i);
1878 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1879 }
1880 else
1881#endif
1882#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1883 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1884 {
1885 n2s(p,i);
1886 if (n != i+2)
1887 {
1888 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1889 {
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1891 goto err;
1892 }
1893 else
1894 {
1895 p-=2;
1896 i=(int)n;
1897 }
1898 }
1899
1900 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1901 {
1902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1904 goto f_err;
1905 }
1906 else
1907 {
1908 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1909 {
1910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1912 goto f_err;
1913 }
1914 else
1915 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1916 }
1917
1918 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1919 if (pub == NULL)
1920 {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1922 goto err;
1923 }
1924
1925 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1926
1927 if (i <= 0)
1928 {
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1930 goto err;
1931 }
1932
1933 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1934 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1935
1936 BN_clear_free(pub);
1937 pub=NULL;
1938 s->session->master_key_length=
1939 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1940 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1941 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1942 }
1943 else
1944#endif
1945#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1946 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1947 {
1948 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1949 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1950 krb5_data authenticator;
1951 krb5_data enc_pms;
1952 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1953 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1954 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1955 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1956 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1957 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1958 int padl, outl;
1959 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1960 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1961
1962 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1963
1964 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1965
1966 n2s(p,i);
1967 enc_ticket.length = i;
1968
1969 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1970 {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1973 goto err;
1974 }
1975
1976 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1977 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1978
1979 n2s(p,i);
1980 authenticator.length = i;
1981
1982 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1983 {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1985 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988
1989 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1990 p+=authenticator.length;
1991
1992 n2s(p,i);
1993 enc_pms.length = i;
1994 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1995 p+=enc_pms.length;
1996
1997 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1998 ** after decryption
1999 */
2000 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2001 {
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2004 goto err;
2005 }
2006
2007 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2008 enc_pms.length + 6))
2009 {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2012 goto err;
2013 }
2014
2015 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2016 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2017 {
2018#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2019 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2020 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2021 if (kssl_err.text)
2022 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2023#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2025 kssl_err.reason);
2026 goto err;
2027 }
2028
2029 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2030 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2031 */
2032 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2033 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2034 {
2035#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2036 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2037 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2038 if (kssl_err.text)
2039 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2040#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2042 kssl_err.reason);
2043 goto err;
2044 }
2045
2046 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2047 {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2049 goto err;
2050 }
2051
2052#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2053 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2054#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2055
2056 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2057 if (enc == NULL)
2058 goto err;
2059
2060 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2061
2062 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2063 {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2065 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2066 goto err;
2067 }
2068 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2069 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2070 {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2072 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2073 goto err;
2074 }
2075 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2076 {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2078 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2079 goto err;
2080 }
2081 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2082 {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2084 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2085 goto err;
2086 }
2087 outl += padl;
2088 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2089 {
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2091 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2092 goto err;
2093 }
2094 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2095 {
2096 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2097 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2098 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2099 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2100 * the protocol version.
2101 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2102 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2103 */
2104 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2105 {
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2108 goto err;
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2113
2114 s->session->master_key_length=
2115 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2116 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2117
2118 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2119 {
2120 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2121 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2122 {
2123 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2124 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2125 }
2126 }
2127
2128
2129 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2130 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2131 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2132 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2133 */
2134 }
2135 else
2136#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2137
2138#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2139 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2140 {
2141 int ret = 1;
2142 int field_size = 0;
2143 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2144 const EC_GROUP *group;
2145 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2146
2147 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2148 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2149 {
2150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2151 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2152 goto err;
2153 }
2154
2155 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2156 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2157 {
2158 /* use the certificate */
2159 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2160 }
2161 else
2162 {
2163 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2164 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2165 */
2166 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2167 }
2168
2169 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2170 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2171
2172 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2173 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2174 {
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2177 goto err;
2178 }
2179
2180 /* Let's get client's public key */
2181 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2182 {
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2185 goto err;
2186 }
2187
2188 if (n == 0L)
2189 {
2190 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2191
2192 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2193 {
2194 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2196 goto f_err;
2197 }
2198 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2199 == NULL) ||
2200 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2201 {
2202 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2203 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2204 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2205 * never executed. When that support is
2206 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2207 * received in the certificate is
2208 * authorized for key agreement.
2209 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2210 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2211 * group.
2212 */
2213 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2216 goto f_err;
2217 }
2218
2219 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2220 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2221 {
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2223 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2224 goto err;
2225 }
2226 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2227 }
2228 else
2229 {
2230 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2231 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2232 */
2233 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2234 {
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2236 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2237 goto err;
2238 }
2239
2240 /* Get encoded point length */
2241 i = *p;
2242 p += 1;
2243 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2244 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2245 {
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2248 goto err;
2249 }
2250 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2251 * currently, so set it to the start
2252 */
2253 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2254 }
2255
2256 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2257 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2258 if (field_size <= 0)
2259 {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2261 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2262 goto err;
2263 }
2264 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2265 if (i <= 0)
2266 {
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271
2272 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2273 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2274 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2275 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2276 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2277
2278 /* Compute the master secret */
2279 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2280 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2281
2282 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2283 return (ret);
2284 }
2285 else
2286#endif
2287 {
2288 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2291 goto f_err;
2292 }
2293
2294 return(1);
2295f_err:
2296 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2297#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2298err:
2299#endif
2300#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2301 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2302 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2303 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2304 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2305 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2306#endif
2307 return(-1);
2308 }
2309
2310int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2311 {
2312 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2313 unsigned char *p;
2314 int al,ok,ret=0;
2315 long n;
2316 int type=0,i,j;
2317 X509 *peer;
2318
2319 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2320 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2321 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2322 -1,
2323 514, /* 514? */
2324 &ok);
2325
2326 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2327
2328 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2329 {
2330 peer=s->session->peer;
2331 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2332 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2333 }
2334 else
2335 {
2336 peer=NULL;
2337 pkey=NULL;
2338 }
2339
2340 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2341 {
2342 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2343 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2344 {
2345 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2347 goto f_err;
2348 }
2349 ret=1;
2350 goto end;
2351 }
2352
2353 if (peer == NULL)
2354 {
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2356 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2357 goto f_err;
2358 }
2359
2360 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2361 {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2363 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2364 goto f_err;
2365 }
2366
2367 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2368 {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2370 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2371 goto f_err;
2372 }
2373
2374 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2375 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2376 n2s(p,i);
2377 n-=2;
2378 if (i > n)
2379 {
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2381 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 goto f_err;
2383 }
2384
2385 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2386 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2387 {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2389 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 goto f_err;
2391 }
2392
2393#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2394 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2395 {
2396 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2397 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2398 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2399 if (i < 0)
2400 {
2401 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2403 goto f_err;
2404 }
2405 if (i == 0)
2406 {
2407 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2409 goto f_err;
2410 }
2411 }
2412 else
2413#endif
2414#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2415 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2416 {
2417 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2418 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2419 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2420 if (j <= 0)
2421 {
2422 /* bad signature */
2423 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2425 goto f_err;
2426 }
2427 }
2428 else
2429#endif
2430#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2431 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2432 {
2433 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2434 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2435 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2436 if (j <= 0)
2437 {
2438 /* bad signature */
2439 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2441 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2442 goto f_err;
2443 }
2444 }
2445 else
2446#endif
2447 {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2449 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2450 goto f_err;
2451 }
2452
2453
2454 ret=1;
2455 if (0)
2456 {
2457f_err:
2458 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2459 }
2460end:
2461 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2462 return(ret);
2463 }
2464
2465int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2466 {
2467 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2468 X509 *x=NULL;
2469 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2470 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2471 unsigned char *d;
2472 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2473
2474 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2475 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2476 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2477 -1,
2478 s->max_cert_list,
2479 &ok);
2480
2481 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2482
2483 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2484 {
2485 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2486 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2487 {
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2489 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2490 goto f_err;
2491 }
2492 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2493 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2494 {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2496 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2497 goto f_err;
2498 }
2499 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2500 return(1);
2501 }
2502
2503 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2504 {
2505 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2507 goto f_err;
2508 }
2509 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2510
2511 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2512 {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2514 goto err;
2515 }
2516
2517 n2l3(p,llen);
2518 if (llen+3 != n)
2519 {
2520 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2522 goto f_err;
2523 }
2524 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2525 {
2526 n2l3(p,l);
2527 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2528 {
2529 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2531 goto f_err;
2532 }
2533
2534 q=p;
2535 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2536 if (x == NULL)
2537 {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2539 goto err;
2540 }
2541 if (p != (q+l))
2542 {
2543 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2545 goto f_err;
2546 }
2547 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2548 {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2550 goto err;
2551 }
2552 x=NULL;
2553 nc+=l+3;
2554 }
2555
2556 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2557 {
2558 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2559 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2560 {
2561 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2563 goto f_err;
2564 }
2565 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2566 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2567 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2568 {
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2570 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2571 goto f_err;
2572 }
2573 }
2574 else
2575 {
2576 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2577 if (i <= 0)
2578 {
2579 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2581 goto f_err;
2582 }
2583 }
2584
2585 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2586 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2587 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2588 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2589
2590 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2591 * when we arrive here. */
2592 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2593 {
2594 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2595 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2596 {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2598 goto err;
2599 }
2600 }
2601 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2602 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2603 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2604 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2605 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2606
2607 sk=NULL;
2608
2609 ret=1;
2610 if (0)
2611 {
2612f_err:
2613 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2614 }
2615err:
2616 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2617 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2618 return(ret);
2619 }
2620
2621int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2622 {
2623 unsigned long l;
2624 X509 *x;
2625
2626 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2627 {
2628 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2629 if (x == NULL &&
2630 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2631 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2632 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2633 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2634 {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2636 return(0);
2637 }
2638
2639 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2641 s->init_num=(int)l;
2642 s->init_off=0;
2643 }
2644
2645 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2646 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2647 }
2648
2649
2650#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2651/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2652static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2653{
2654 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2655 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2656 switch (nid) {
2657 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2658 return 1;
2659 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2660 return 2;
2661 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2662 return 3;
2663 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2664 return 4;
2665 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2666 return 5;
2667 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2668 return 6;
2669 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2670 return 7;
2671 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2672 return 8;
2673 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2674 return 9;
2675 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2676 return 10;
2677 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2678 return 11;
2679 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2680 return 12;
2681 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2682 return 13;
2683 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2684 return 14;
2685 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2686 return 15;
2687 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2688 return 16;
2689 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2690 return 17;
2691 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2692 return 18;
2693 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2694 return 19;
2695 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2696 return 20;
2697 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2698 return 21;
2699 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2700 return 22;
2701 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2702 return 23;
2703 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2704 return 24;
2705 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2706 return 25;
2707 default:
2708 return 0;
2709 }
2710}
2711#endif
2712#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2713int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2714 {
2715 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2716 {
2717 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2718 int len, slen;
2719 unsigned int hlen;
2720 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2721 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2722 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2723 unsigned char key_name[16];
2724
2725 /* get session encoding length */
2726 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2727 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2728 * too long
2729 */
2730 if (slen > 0xFF00)
2731 return -1;
2732 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2733 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2734 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2735 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2736 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2737 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2738 */
2739 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2740 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2741 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2742 return -1;
2743 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2744 if (!senc)
2745 return -1;
2746 p = senc;
2747 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2748
2749 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2750 /* do the header */
2751 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2752 /* Skip message length for now */
2753 p += 3;
2754 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2755 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2756 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2757 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2758 * from parent ctx.
2759 */
2760 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2761 {
2762 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2763 &hctx, 1) < 0)
2764 {
2765 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2766 return -1;
2767 }
2768 }
2769 else
2770 {
2771 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2772 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2773 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2774 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2775 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2776 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2777 }
2778 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2779 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2780 p += 2;
2781 /* Output key name */
2782 macstart = p;
2783 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2784 p += 16;
2785 /* output IV */
2786 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2787 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2788 /* Encrypt session data */
2789 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2790 p += len;
2791 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2792 p += len;
2793 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2794
2795 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2796 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2797 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2798
2799 p += hlen;
2800 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2801 /* Total length */
2802 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2803 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2804 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2805 p += 4;
2806 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2807
2808 /* number of bytes to write */
2809 s->init_num= len;
2810 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2811 s->init_off=0;
2812 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2813 }
2814
2815 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2816 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2817 }
2818
2819int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2820 {
2821 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2822 {
2823 unsigned char *p;
2824 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2825 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2826 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2827 * + (ocsp response)
2828 */
2829 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2830 return -1;
2831
2832 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2833
2834 /* do the header */
2835 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2836 /* message length */
2837 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2838 /* status type */
2839 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2840 /* length of OCSP response */
2841 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2842 /* actual response */
2843 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2844 /* number of bytes to write */
2845 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2846 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2847 s->init_off = 0;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2851 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2852 }
2853#endif
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