1 files changed, 860 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da90078a37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
+#include <dirent.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NeXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#define dirent direct
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+        {
+        static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+
+        if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+                {
+                /* any write lock will do; usually this branch
+                 * will only be taken once anyway */
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                
+                if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+                        {
+                        ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+                                0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+                        }
+                
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                }
+        return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+        }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+        {
+        CERT *ret;
+
+        ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+        if (ret == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
+
+        ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+        ret->references=1;
+
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+        {
+        CERT *ret;
+        int i;
+
+        ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+        if (ret == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+
+        memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+        ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+        /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+         * if you find that more readable */
+
+        ret->valid = cert->valid;
+        ret->mask = cert->mask;
+        ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                {
+                RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+                ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+                }
+        ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                {
+                /* DH parameters don't have a reference count */
+                ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+                if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
+                        {
+                        BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+                        if (!b)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+                        }
+                if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
+                        {
+                        BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+                        if (!b)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+                        }
+                }
+        ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+                {
+                if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        {
+                        ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+                        CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
+                                CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                        }
+                
+                if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        {
+                        ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+                        CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+                                CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+                        switch(i) 
+                                {
+                                /* If there was anything special to do for
+                                 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+                                 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+                        case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+                        case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+                                /* We have an RSA key. */
+                                break;
+                                
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+                                /* We have a DSA key. */
+                                break;
+                                
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+                                /* We have a DH key. */
+                                break;
+                                
+                        default:
+                                /* Can't happen. */
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+        
+        /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+         * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
+
+        ret->references=1;
+
+        return(ret);
+        
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* avoid 'unreferenced label' warning if OPENSSL_NO_DH is defined */
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+                {
+                if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+                if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+                }
+
+        return NULL;
+        }
+
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        if(c == NULL)
+            return;
+
+        i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0)
+                {
+                fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+                }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+                {
+                if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+                if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#if 0
+                if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+#endif
+                }
+        OPENSSL_free(c);
+        }
+
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+        {
+        /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+         * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+         * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+         * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+         * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+         * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+         * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+         * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+         */
+        
+        if (o == NULL) 
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if (*o == NULL)
+                {
+                if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                }
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+        {
+        SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+        ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return NULL;
+                }
+
+        memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
+        ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+        ret->references = 1;
+
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        if (sc == NULL)
+                return;
+
+        i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0)
+                return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0)
+                {
+                fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+                }
+#endif
+
+        /* i == 0 */
+        if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+                sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+                {
+                if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
+           * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+           * data structure. */
+                if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+                }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+                DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        OPENSSL_free(sc);
+        }
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
+        {
+        sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+        {
+        X509 *x;
+        int i;
+        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+        if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+                return(0);
+
+        x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+        if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
+
+        /* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by
+         * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+         * or vice versa.
+         */
+        if (s->server)
+                i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT;
+        else
+                i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER;
+
+        X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust);
+
+        if (s->verify_callback)
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+        if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+                i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); 
+#else
+                i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
+        else
+                {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+                i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+                i=0;
+                ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+                }
+
+        s->verify_result=ctx.error;
+        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+        return(i);
+        }
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+        {
+        if (*ca_list != NULL)
+                sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+
+        *ca_list=list;
+        }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+        {
+        int i;
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+        X509_NAME *name;
+
+        ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+        for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+                {
+                name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
+                if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
+                        {
+                        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+                        return(NULL);
+                        }
+                }
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+        {
+        set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list);
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+        {
+        set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list);
+        }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return(ctx->client_CA);
+        }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+                { /* we are in the client */
+                if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+                        (s->s3 != NULL))
+                        return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+                else
+                        return(NULL);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+                        return(s->client_CA);
+                else
+                        return(s->ctx->client_CA);
+                }
+        }
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
+        {
+        X509_NAME *name;
+
+        if (x == NULL) return(0);
+        if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+                return(0);
+                
+        if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+                return(0);
+
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
+                {
+                X509_NAME_free(name);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
+        {
+        return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
+        {
+        return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
+        }
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
+        {
+        return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+        {
+        BIO *in;
+        X509 *x=NULL;
+        X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk;
+
+        ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+        sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+        in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+        if ((ret == NULL) || (sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        
+        if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+                goto err;
+
+        for (;;)
+                {
+                if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+                        break;
+                if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+                /* check for duplicates */
+                xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+                if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+                if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
+                        X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                else
+                        {
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (0)
+                {
+err:
+                if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+                ret=NULL;
+                }
+        if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+        if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+        if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                        const char *file)
+        {
+        BIO *in;
+        X509 *x=NULL;
+        X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+        int ret=1;
+        int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
+        
+        oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
+        
+        in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+        
+        if (in == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        
+        if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+                goto err;
+        
+        for (;;)
+                {
+                if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+                        break;
+                if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+                xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+                if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+                if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
+                        X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                else
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
+                }
+
+        if (0)
+                {
+err:
+                ret=0;
+                }
+        if(in != NULL)
+                BIO_free(in);
+        if(x != NULL)
+                X509_free(x);
+        
+        sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS         /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                       const char *dir)
+        {
+        DIR *d;
+        struct dirent *dstruct;
+        int ret = 0;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        d = opendir(dir);
+
+        /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+        if(!d)
+                {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+                ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        
+        while((dstruct=readdir(d)))
+                {
+                char buf[1024];
+                int r;
+                
+                if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                
+                r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
+                if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+                        goto err;
+                if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        ret = 1;
+
+err:    
+        if (d) closedir(d);
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                       const char *dir)
+        {
+        WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData;
+        HANDLE hFind;
+        int ret = 0;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+        WCHAR* wdir = NULL;
+#endif
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+        /* convert strings to UNICODE */
+        {
+                BOOL result = FALSE;
+                int i;
+                wdir = malloc((strlen(dir)+1)*2);
+                if (wdir == NULL)
+                        goto err_noclose;
+                for (i=0; i<(int)strlen(dir)+1; i++)
+                        wdir[i] = (short)dir[i];
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+        hFind = FindFirstFile(wdir, &FindFileData);
+#else
+        hFind = FindFirstFile(dir, &FindFileData);
+#endif
+        /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+        if(hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+                {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+                ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+                goto err_noclose;
+                }
+        
+        do 
+                {
+                char buf[1024];
+                int r;
+                
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+                if(strlen(dir)+_tcslen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
+#else
+                if(strlen(dir)+strlen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
+#endif
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                
+                r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,FindFileData.cFileName);
+                if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+                        goto err;
+                if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        while (FindNextFile(hFind, &FindFileData) != FALSE);
+        ret = 1;
+
+err:    
+        FindClose(hFind);
+err_noclose:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+        if (wdir != NULL)
+                free(wdir);
+#endif
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+#endif