1 files changed, 829 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c952f452a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include "o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int
+SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+{
+        static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+        int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+        if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                got_write_lock = 1;
+
+                if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+                        ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+                        0, "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (got_write_lock)
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        else
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+        return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
+
+static void
+ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+{
+        /* Set digest values to defaults */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+        cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+        cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+}
+
+CERT
+*ssl_cert_new(void)
+{
+        CERT *ret;
+
+        ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return (NULL);
+        }
+        memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+        ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+        ret->references = 1;
+        ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+        return (ret);
+}
+
+CERT
+*ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+{
+        CERT *ret;
+        int i;
+
+        ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return (NULL);
+        }
+
+        memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+        ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+        /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+         * if you find that more readable */
+
+        ret->valid = cert->valid;
+        ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+        ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+        ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+        ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+                RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+                ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+        }
+        ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+                ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+                if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
+                        BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+                        if (!b) {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                        ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+                }
+                if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
+                        BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+                        if (!b) {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                        ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+                }
+        }
+        ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
+                ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+                if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        }
+        ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+                if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
+                        ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+                        CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
+                        CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                }
+
+                if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+                        ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+                        CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+                        CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+                        switch (i) {
+                                /* If there was anything special to do for
+                                 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+                                 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+                        case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+                        case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+                                /* We have an RSA key. */
+                                break;
+
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+                                /* We have a DSA key. */
+                                break;
+
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+                        case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+                                /* We have a DH key. */
+                                break;
+
+                        case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+                                /* We have an ECC key */
+                                break;
+
+                        default:
+                                /* Can't happen. */
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+        /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+         * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
+
+        ret->references = 1;
+        /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+         * will be set during handshake.
+         */
+        ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+
+        return (ret);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+                EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+                if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+                if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+        }
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+
+void
+ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        if (c == NULL)
+                return;
+
+        i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0)
+                return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (c->rsa_tmp)
+                RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (c->dh_tmp)
+                DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (c->ecdh_tmp)
+                EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+                if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+                if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#if 0
+                if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+#endif
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+{
+        /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+         * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+         * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+         * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+         * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+         * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+         * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+         * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+         */
+
+        if (o == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return (0);
+        }
+        if (*o == NULL) {
+                if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return (0);
+                }
+        }
+        return (1);
+}
+
+
+SESS_CERT
+*ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+{
+        SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+        ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return NULL;
+        }
+
+        memset(ret, 0 , sizeof *ret);
+        ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+        ret->references = 1;
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        if (sc == NULL)
+                return;
+
+        i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0)
+                return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* i == 0 */
+        if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+                sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+                if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                        X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
+       * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+       * data structure. */
+                if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+                DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+                EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+        OPENSSL_free(sc);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
+{
+        sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+        return (1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+        X509 *x;
+        int i;
+        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+        if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+                return (0);
+
+        x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, sk)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                return (0);
+        }
+#if 0
+        if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+        /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+         * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+         * or vice versa.
+         */
+
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
+        s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+        /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
+         * ctx.
+         */
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+        if (s->verify_callback)
+                X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+        if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+        i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+
+#else
+        i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
+        else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+                i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+                i = 0;
+                ctx.error = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+        }
+
+        s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+        return (i);
+}
+
+static void
+set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+        if (*ca_list != NULL)
+                sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+
+        *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+*SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+{
+        int i;
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+        X509_NAME *name;
+
+        ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+                name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+                if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+                        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+                        return (NULL);
+                }
+        }
+        return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+        set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void
+SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+        set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+*SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+        return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+*SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+        if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+                        { /* we are in the client */
+                if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+                        (s->s3 != NULL))
+                return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+                else
+                        return (NULL);
+        } else {
+                if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+                        return (s->client_CA);
+                else
+                        return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+        }
+}
+
+static int
+add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+        X509_NAME *name;
+
+        if (x == NULL)
+                return (0);
+        if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+                return (0);
+
+        if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+                return (0);
+
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+                X509_NAME_free(name);
+                return (0);
+        }
+        return (1);
+}
+
+int
+SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+        return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int
+SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+        return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int
+xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
+{
+        return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+*SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+{
+        BIO *in;
+        X509 *x = NULL;
+        X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
+
+        sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+        in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+        if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+                goto err;
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+                        break;
+                if (ret == NULL) {
+                        ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+                        if (ret == NULL) {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                }
+                if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+                        /* check for duplicates */
+                xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+                if (xn == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+                        X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                else {
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (0) {
+err:
+                if (ret != NULL)
+                        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+                ret = NULL;
+        }
+        if (sk != NULL)
+                sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+        if (in != NULL)
+                BIO_free(in);
+        if (x != NULL)
+                X509_free(x);
+        if (ret != NULL)
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int
+SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+    const char *file)
+{
+        BIO *in;
+        X509 *x = NULL;
+        X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+        int ret = 1;
+        int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
+
+        oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+
+        in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+        if (in == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+                goto err;
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+                        break;
+                if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+                        xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+                if (xn == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+                        X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                else
+                        sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+        }
+
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+        if (0) {
+err:
+                ret = 0;
+        }
+        if (in != NULL)
+                BIO_free(in);
+        if (x != NULL)
+                X509_free(x);
+
+        (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int
+SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+    const char *dir)
+{
+        DIR *dirp = NULL;
+        char *path = NULL;
+        int ret = 0;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        dirp = opendir(dir);
+        if (dirp) {
+                struct dirent * dp;
+                while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+                        if (asprintf(&path, "%s/%s", dir, dp->d_name) != -1) {
+                                ret = SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack
+                                    (stack,path);
+                                free(path);
+                        }
+                        if (!ret)
+                                break;
+                }
+                (void) closedir(dirp);
+        }
+        if (!ret) {
+                SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, errno);
+                ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir ('", dir, "')");
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+                    ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        }
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+        return ret;
+}