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-rw-r--r--src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c1298
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1298 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3dd0269540..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1298 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.58 2022/03/26 15:05:53 jsing Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <errno.h>
113#include <stdio.h>
114
115#include <openssl/buffer.h>
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117
118#include "bytestring.h"
119#include "dtls_locl.h"
120#include "ssl_locl.h"
121
122static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
123 unsigned int len);
124static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
125
126/*
127 * Force a WANT_READ return for certain error conditions where
128 * we don't want to spin internally.
129 */
130void
131ssl_force_want_read(SSL *s)
132{
133 BIO *bio;
134
135 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
136 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
137 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
138
139 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
140}
141
142/*
143 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
144 * packet by another n bytes.
145 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
146 * by s->internal->packet and s->internal->packet_length.
147 * (If s->internal->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
148 * [plus s->internal->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
149 */
150static int
151ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
152{
153 SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
154 int i, len, left;
155 size_t align;
156 unsigned char *pkt;
157
158 if (n <= 0)
159 return n;
160
161 if (rb->buf == NULL)
162 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
163 return -1;
164
165 left = rb->left;
166 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
167 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
168
169 if (!extend) {
170 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 if (left == 0)
172 rb->offset = align;
173 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
174 /* check if next packet length is large
175 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
176 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
178 (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) {
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
187 rb->offset = align;
188 }
189 }
190 s->internal->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->internal->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
193 }
194
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
198 if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
199 if (left > 0 && n > left)
200 n = left;
201 }
202
203 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
204 if (left >= n) {
205 s->internal->packet_length += n;
206 rb->left = left - n;
207 rb->offset += n;
208 return (n);
209 }
210
211 /* else we need to read more data */
212
213 len = s->internal->packet_length;
214 pkt = rb->buf + align;
215 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
216 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
217 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
218 if (s->internal->packet != pkt) {
219 /* len > 0 */
220 memmove(pkt, s->internal->packet, len + left);
221 s->internal->packet = pkt;
222 rb->offset = len + align;
223 }
224
225 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
226 /* does not happen */
227 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
228 return -1;
229 }
230
231 if (s->internal->read_ahead || SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
232 if (max < n)
233 max = n;
234 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
235 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
236 } else {
237 /* ignore max parameter */
238 max = n;
239 }
240
241 while (left < n) {
242 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
243 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
244 * len+max if possible) */
245
246 errno = 0;
247 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
248 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
249 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
250 } else {
251 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
252 i = -1;
253 }
254
255 if (i <= 0) {
256 rb->left = left;
257 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
258 !SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
259 if (len + left == 0)
260 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
261 }
262 return (i);
263 }
264 left += i;
265
266 /*
267 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
268 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
269 * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
270 */
271 if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
272 if (n > left)
273 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
274 }
275 }
276
277 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
278 rb->offset += n;
279 rb->left = left - n;
280 s->internal->packet_length += n;
281 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
282
283 return (n);
284}
285
286int
287ssl3_packet_read(SSL *s, int plen)
288{
289 int n;
290
291 n = ssl3_read_n(s, plen, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
292 if (n <= 0)
293 return n;
294 if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
295 return s->internal->packet_length;
296
297 return plen;
298}
299
300int
301ssl3_packet_extend(SSL *s, int plen)
302{
303 int rlen, n;
304
305 if (s->internal->packet_length >= plen)
306 return plen;
307 rlen = plen - s->internal->packet_length;
308
309 n = ssl3_read_n(s, rlen, rlen, 1);
310 if (n <= 0)
311 return n;
312 if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
313 return s->internal->packet_length;
314
315 return plen;
316}
317
318/* Call this to get a new input record.
319 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
320 * or non-blocking IO.
321 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
322 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record
323 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data
324 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes
325 */
326/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
327static int
328ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
329{
330 SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
331 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
332 uint8_t alert_desc;
333 uint8_t *out;
334 size_t out_len;
335 int al, n;
336 int ret = -1;
337
338 again:
339 /* check if we have the header */
340 if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
341 (s->internal->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
342 CBS header;
343 uint16_t len, ssl_version;
344 uint8_t type;
345
346 n = ssl3_packet_read(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
347 if (n <= 0)
348 return (n);
349
350 s->internal->mac_packet = 1;
351 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
352
353 if (s->server && s->internal->first_packet) {
354 if ((ret = ssl_server_legacy_first_packet(s)) != 1)
355 return (ret);
356 ret = -1;
357 }
358
359 CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
360
361 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL */
362 if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) ||
363 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) ||
364 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) {
365 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
366 goto err;
367 }
368
369 rr->type = type;
370 rr->length = len;
371
372 /* Lets check version */
373 if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) {
374 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) &&
375 !tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
376 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
377 s->version = ssl_version;
378 }
379 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
380 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
381 goto fatal_err;
382 }
383
384 if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
385 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
386 goto err;
387 }
388
389 if (rr->length > rb->len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
390 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
391 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
392 goto fatal_err;
393 }
394 }
395
396 n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length);
397 if (n <= 0)
398 return (n);
399 if (n != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length)
400 return (n);
401
402 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
403
404 /*
405 * A full record has now been read from the wire, which now needs
406 * to be processed.
407 */
408 tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, s->version);
409
410 if (!tls12_record_layer_open_record(s->internal->rl, s->internal->packet,
411 s->internal->packet_length, &out, &out_len)) {
412 tls12_record_layer_alert(s->internal->rl, &alert_desc);
413
414 if (alert_desc == 0)
415 goto err;
416
417 if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW)
418 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
419 else if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC)
420 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
421
422 al = alert_desc;
423 goto fatal_err;
424 }
425
426 rr->data = out;
427 rr->length = out_len;
428 rr->off = 0;
429
430 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
431 s->internal->packet_length = 0;
432
433 if (rr->length == 0) {
434 /*
435 * Zero-length fragments are only permitted for application
436 * data, as per RFC 5246 section 6.2.1.
437 */
438 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
439 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
440 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
441 goto fatal_err;
442 }
443
444 /*
445 * CBC countermeasures for known IV weaknesses can legitimately
446 * insert a single empty record, so we allow ourselves to read
447 * once past a single empty record without forcing want_read.
448 */
449 if (s->internal->empty_record_count++ > SSL_MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
450 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_BEHAVING_BADLY);
451 return -1;
452 }
453 if (s->internal->empty_record_count > 1) {
454 ssl_force_want_read(s);
455 return -1;
456 }
457 goto again;
458 }
459
460 s->internal->empty_record_count = 0;
461
462 return (1);
463
464 fatal_err:
465 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
466 err:
467 return (ret);
468}
469
470/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
471 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
472 */
473int
474ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
475{
476 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
477 unsigned int tot, n, nw;
478 int i;
479
480 if (len < 0) {
481 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
482 return -1;
483 }
484
485 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
486 tot = s->s3->wnum;
487 s->s3->wnum = 0;
488
489 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
490 i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
491 if (i < 0)
492 return (i);
493 if (i == 0) {
494 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
495 return -1;
496 }
497 }
498
499 if (len < tot)
500 len = tot;
501 n = (len - tot);
502 for (;;) {
503 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
504 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
505 else
506 nw = n;
507
508 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw);
509 if (i <= 0) {
510 s->s3->wnum = tot;
511 return i;
512 }
513
514 if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
515 (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
516 /*
517 * Next chunk of data should get another prepended
518 * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
519 * weakness.
520 */
521 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
522
523 return tot + i;
524 }
525
526 n -= i;
527 tot += i;
528 }
529}
530
531static int
532do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
533{
534 SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
535 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
536 int need_empty_fragment = 0;
537 size_t align, out_len;
538 uint16_t version;
539 CBB cbb;
540 int ret;
541
542 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
543
544 if (wb->buf == NULL)
545 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
546 return -1;
547
548 /*
549 * First check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL still being written
550 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO.
551 */
552 if (wb->left != 0)
553 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
554
555 /* If we have an alert to send, let's send it. */
556 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
557 if ((ret = ssl3_dispatch_alert(s)) <= 0)
558 return (ret);
559 /* If it went, fall through and send more stuff. */
560
561 /* We may have released our buffer, if so get it again. */
562 if (wb->buf == NULL)
563 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
564 return -1;
565 }
566
567 if (len == 0)
568 return 0;
569
570 /*
571 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256
572 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0.
573 */
574 version = s->version;
575 if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B &&
576 !s->internal->renegotiate &&
577 s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version > TLS1_VERSION)
578 version = TLS1_VERSION;
579
580 /*
581 * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
582 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). Note that this
583 * is unnecessary for AEAD.
584 */
585 if (sess != NULL && tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
586 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments &&
587 !s->s3->empty_fragment_done &&
588 type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
589 need_empty_fragment = 1;
590 }
591
592 /*
593 * An extra fragment would be a couple of cipher blocks, which would
594 * be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
595 * payload, then we can just simply pretend we have two headers.
596 */
597 align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
598 if (need_empty_fragment)
599 align += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
600 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
601 wb->offset = align;
602
603 if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, wb->buf + align, wb->len - align))
604 goto err;
605
606 tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, version);
607
608 if (need_empty_fragment) {
609 if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type,
610 buf, 0, &cbb))
611 goto err;
612 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
613 }
614
615 if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type, buf, len, &cbb))
616 goto err;
617
618 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &out_len))
619 goto err;
620
621 wb->left = out_len;
622
623 /*
624 * Memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
625 * bad write retries later.
626 */
627 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
628 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
629 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
630 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
631
632 /* We now just need to write the buffer. */
633 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
634
635 err:
636 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
637
638 return -1;
639}
640
641/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
642int
643ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
644{
645 int i;
646 SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
647
648 /* XXXX */
649 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
650 !(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
651 (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
652 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
653 return (-1);
654 }
655
656 for (;;) {
657 errno = 0;
658 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
659 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
660 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
661 (unsigned int)wb->left);
662 } else {
663 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
664 i = -1;
665 }
666 if (i == wb->left) {
667 wb->left = 0;
668 wb->offset += i;
669 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
670 !SSL_is_dtls(s))
671 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
672 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
673 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
674 } else if (i <= 0) {
675 /*
676 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
677 * whole point in using a datagram service.
678 */
679 if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
680 wb->left = 0;
681 return (i);
682 }
683 wb->offset += i;
684 wb->left -= i;
685 }
686}
687
688int
689ssl3_read_alert(SSL *s)
690{
691 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
692 uint8_t alert_level, alert_descr;
693
694 /*
695 * TLSv1.2 permits an alert to be fragmented across multiple records or
696 * for multiple alerts to be be coalesced into a single alert record.
697 * In the case of DTLS, there is no way to reassemble an alert
698 * fragmented across multiple records, hence a full alert must be
699 * available in the record.
700 */
701 while (rr->length > 0 &&
702 s->s3->alert_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment)) {
703 s->s3->alert_fragment[s->s3->alert_fragment_len++] =
704 rr->data[rr->off++];
705 rr->length--;
706 }
707 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment)) {
708 if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
709 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
710 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
711 return -1;
712 }
713 return 1;
714 }
715
716 ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2);
717
718 alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
719 alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
720 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
721
722 ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT,
723 (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr);
724
725 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
726 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
727 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
728 s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
729 return 0;
730 }
731 /* We requested renegotiation and the peer rejected it. */
732 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
733 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
734 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
735 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
736 return -1;
737 }
738 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
739 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
740 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
741 SSLerror(s, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
742 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
743 s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
744 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
745 return 0;
746 } else {
747 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
748 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
749 return -1;
750 }
751
752 return 1;
753}
754
755int
756ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
757{
758 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
759
760 /*
761 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what
762 * the record payload has to look like.
763 */
764 if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0) {
765 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
766 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
767 return -1;
768 }
769 if (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
770 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
771 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
772 return -1;
773 }
774
775 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
776
777 ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1);
778
779 /* Check that we have a cipher to change to. */
780 if (s->s3->hs.cipher == NULL) {
781 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
782 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
783 return -1;
784 }
785
786 /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
787 if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
788 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
789 /*
790 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous
791 * handshake messages are still missing, so just
792 * drop it.
793 */
794 rr->length = 0;
795 return 1;
796 }
797 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
798 } else {
799 if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK) == 0) {
800 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
801 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
802 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
803 return -1;
804 }
805 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
806 }
807
808 rr->length = 0;
809
810 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
811 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
812 return -1;
813
814 return 1;
815}
816
817static int
818ssl3_read_handshake_unexpected(SSL *s)
819{
820 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
821 uint32_t hs_msg_length;
822 uint8_t hs_msg_type;
823 CBS cbs;
824 int ret;
825
826 /*
827 * We need four bytes of handshake data so we have a handshake message
828 * header - this may be in the same record or fragmented across multiple
829 * records.
830 */
831 while (rr->length > 0 &&
832 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment)) {
833 s->s3->handshake_fragment[s->s3->handshake_fragment_len++] =
834 rr->data[rr->off++];
835 rr->length--;
836 }
837
838 if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment))
839 return 1;
840
841 if (s->internal->in_handshake) {
842 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
843 return -1;
844 }
845
846 /*
847 * This code currently deals with HelloRequest and ClientHello messages -
848 * anything else is pushed to the handshake_func. Almost all of this
849 * belongs in the client/server handshake code.
850 */
851
852 /* Parse handshake message header. */
853 CBS_init(&cbs, s->s3->handshake_fragment, s->s3->handshake_fragment_len);
854 if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &hs_msg_type))
855 return -1;
856 if (!CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &hs_msg_length))
857 return -1;
858
859 if (hs_msg_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
860 /*
861 * Incoming HelloRequest messages should only be received by a
862 * client. A server may send these at any time - a client should
863 * ignore the message if received in the middle of a handshake.
864 * See RFC 5246 sections 7.4 and 7.4.1.1.
865 */
866 if (s->server) {
867 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
868 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
869 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
870 return -1;
871 }
872
873 if (hs_msg_length != 0) {
874 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
875 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
876 return -1;
877 }
878
879 ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
880 s->s3->handshake_fragment, s->s3->handshake_fragment_len);
881
882 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
883
884 /*
885 * It should be impossible to hit this, but keep the safety
886 * harness for now...
887 */
888 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL)
889 return 1;
890
891 /*
892 * Ignore this message if we're currently handshaking,
893 * renegotiation is already pending or renegotiation is disabled
894 * via flags.
895 */
896 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || s->s3->renegotiate ||
897 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0)
898 return 1;
899
900 if (!ssl3_renegotiate(s))
901 return 1;
902 if (!ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
903 return 1;
904
905 } else if (hs_msg_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
906 /*
907 * Incoming ClientHello messages should only be received by a
908 * server. A client may send these in response to server
909 * initiated renegotiation (HelloRequest) or in order to
910 * initiate renegotiation by the client. See RFC 5246 section
911 * 7.4.1.2.
912 */
913 if (!s->server) {
914 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
915 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
916 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
917 return -1;
918 }
919
920 /*
921 * A client should not be sending a ClientHello unless we're not
922 * currently handshaking.
923 */
924 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
925 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
926 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
927 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
928 return -1;
929 }
930
931 if ((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0) {
932 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
933 SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
934 return -1;
935 }
936
937 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL) {
938 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
939 return -1;
940 }
941
942 /* Client requested renegotiation but it is not permitted. */
943 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding ||
944 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0) {
945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
946 SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
947 return 1;
948 }
949
950 s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
951 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
952 s->internal->new_session = 1;
953
954 } else {
955 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
956 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
957 return -1;
958 }
959
960 if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
961 return ret;
962 if (ret == 0) {
963 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
964 return -1;
965 }
966
967 if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
968 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
969 ssl_force_want_read(s);
970 return -1;
971 }
972 }
973
974 /*
975 * We either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try again
976 * to obtain the (application) data we were asked for.
977 */
978 return 1;
979}
980
981/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
982 * 'type' is one of the following:
983 *
984 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
985 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
986 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
987 *
988 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
989 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
990 *
991 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
992 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
993 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
994 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
995 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
996 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
997 * Change cipher spec protocol
998 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
999 * Alert protocol
1000 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1001 * Handshake protocol
1002 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1003 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1004 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1005 * Application data protocol
1006 * none of our business
1007 */
1008int
1009ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1010{
1011 SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
1012 int rrcount = 0;
1013 unsigned int n;
1014 int ret;
1015
1016 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
1017 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1018 return -1;
1019 }
1020
1021 if (len < 0) {
1022 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 return -1;
1024 }
1025
1026 if (type != 0 && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1027 type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1028 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1029 return -1;
1030 }
1031 if (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1032 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1033 return -1;
1034 }
1035
1036 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1037 /* Partially satisfy request from fragment storage. */
1038 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1039 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1040 unsigned int k;
1041
1042 /* peek == 0 */
1043 n = 0;
1044 while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1045 *dst++ = *src++;
1046 len--;
1047 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1048 n++;
1049 }
1050 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1051 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1052 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1053 return n;
1054 }
1055
1056 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
1057 if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
1058 return ret;
1059 if (ret == 0) {
1060 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1061 return -1;
1062 }
1063 }
1064
1065 start:
1066 /*
1067 * Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the
1068 * peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an
1069 * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further
1070 * processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and
1071 * non-application data records per connection should probably also be
1072 * limited...
1073 */
1074 if (rrcount++ >= 3) {
1075 ssl_force_want_read(s);
1076 return -1;
1077 }
1078
1079 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1080
1081 rr = &s->s3->rrec;
1082
1083 if (rr->length == 0 || s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) {
1084 if ((ret = ssl3_get_record(s)) <= 0)
1085 return ret;
1086 }
1087
1088 /* We now have a packet which can be read and processed. */
1089
1090 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1091 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1093 return -1;
1094 }
1095
1096 /*
1097 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1098 * 'peek' mode).
1099 */
1100 if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1101 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1102 rr->length = 0;
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105
1106 /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1107 if (type == rr->type) {
1108 /*
1109 * Make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1110 * are doing a handshake for the first time.
1111 */
1112 if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1113 !tls12_record_layer_read_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
1114 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1115 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
1116 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1117 return -1;
1118 }
1119
1120 if (len <= 0)
1121 return len;
1122
1123 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1124 n = rr->length;
1125 else
1126 n = (unsigned int)len;
1127
1128 memcpy(buf, &rr->data[rr->off], n);
1129 if (!peek) {
1130 memset(&rr->data[rr->off], 0, n);
1131 rr->length -= n;
1132 rr->off += n;
1133 if (rr->length == 0) {
1134 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1135 rr->off = 0;
1136 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
1137 s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1138 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1139 }
1140 }
1141
1142 return n;
1143 }
1144
1145 /*
1146 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1147 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1148 */
1149
1150 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1151 if ((ret = ssl3_read_alert(s)) <= 0)
1152 return ret;
1153 goto start;
1154 }
1155
1156 if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
1157 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1158 rr->length = 0;
1159 return 0;
1160 }
1161
1162 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1163 /*
1164 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1165 * application data. If the library was running inside
1166 * ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes
1167 * sense to read application data at this point (session
1168 * renegotiation not yet started), we will indulge it.
1169 */
1170 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data != 0 &&
1171 s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0 &&
1172 (((s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1173 (s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1174 (s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
1175 (s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1176 (s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1177 (s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1178 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1179 return -1;
1180 } else {
1181 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1182 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
1183 SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1184 return -1;
1185 }
1186 }
1187
1188 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1189 if ((ret = ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(s)) <= 0)
1190 return ret;
1191 goto start;
1192 }
1193
1194 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1195 if ((ret = ssl3_read_handshake_unexpected(s)) <= 0)
1196 return ret;
1197 goto start;
1198 }
1199
1200 /*
1201 * Unknown record type - TLSv1.2 sends an unexpected message alert while
1202 * earlier versions silently ignore the record.
1203 */
1204 if (ssl_effective_tls_version(s) <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1205 rr->length = 0;
1206 goto start;
1207 }
1208 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1210 return -1;
1211}
1212
1213int
1214ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1215{
1216 if (s->s3->hs.tls12.key_block == NULL) {
1217 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1218 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1219 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1220 return (0);
1221 }
1222
1223 s->session->cipher = s->s3->hs.cipher;
1224 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s))
1225 return (0);
1226 }
1227
1228 if (!tls1_change_read_cipher_state(s))
1229 return (0);
1230
1231 /*
1232 * We have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1233 * before we read the finished message.
1234 */
1235 if (!tls12_derive_peer_finished(s))
1236 return (0);
1237
1238 return (1);
1239}
1240
1241static int
1242ssl3_write_alert(SSL *s)
1243{
1244 if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
1245 return do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1246 sizeof(s->s3->send_alert));
1247
1248 return do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1249 sizeof(s->s3->send_alert));
1250}
1251
1252int
1253ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1254{
1255 /* If alert is fatal, remove session from cache. */
1256 if (level == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1257 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1258
1259 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1260 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1261 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1262
1263 /*
1264 * If data is still being written out, the alert will be dispatched at
1265 * some point in the future.
1266 */
1267 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1268 return -1;
1269
1270 return ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
1271}
1272
1273int
1274ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1275{
1276 int ret;
1277
1278 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1279 if ((ret = ssl3_write_alert(s)) <= 0) {
1280 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1281 return ret;
1282 }
1283
1284 /*
1285 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1286 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1287 * we will not worry too much.
1288 */
1289 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1290 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1291
1292 ssl_msg_callback(s, 1, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2);
1293
1294 ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,
1295 (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]);
1296
1297 return ret;
1298}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2026-02-14 03:01:53 +0000