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1/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.1 2017/01/26 05:51:54 jsing Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <errno.h>
113#include <stdio.h>
114
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118#include <openssl/evp.h>
119
120#include "bytestring.h"
121
122static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
123 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
124static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
125
126/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->internal->packet and s->internal->packet_length.
130 * (If s->internal->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->internal->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133static int
134ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
135{
136 int i, len, left;
137 size_t align;
138 unsigned char *pkt;
139 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
140
141 if (n <= 0)
142 return n;
143
144 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
145 if (rb->buf == NULL)
146 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
147 return -1;
148
149 left = rb->left;
150 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
151 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
152
153 if (!extend) {
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
155 if (left == 0)
156 rb->offset = align;
157 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
162 (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->internal->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->internal->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
183 if (left > 0 && n > left)
184 n = left;
185 }
186
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
188 if (left >= n) {
189 s->internal->packet_length += n;
190 rb->left = left - n;
191 rb->offset += n;
192 return (n);
193 }
194
195 /* else we need to read more data */
196
197 len = s->internal->packet_length;
198 pkt = rb->buf + align;
199 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
200 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
201 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
202 if (s->internal->packet != pkt) {
203 /* len > 0 */
204 memmove(pkt, s->internal->packet, len + left);
205 s->internal->packet = pkt;
206 rb->offset = len + align;
207 }
208
209 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
210 /* does not happen */
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
212 return -1;
213 }
214
215 if (!s->internal->read_ahead) {
216 /* ignore max parameter */
217 max = n;
218 } else {
219 if (max < n)
220 max = n;
221 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
222 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
223 }
224
225 while (left < n) {
226 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
227 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
228 * len+max if possible) */
229
230 errno = 0;
231 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
232 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
233 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
234 } else {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
236 i = -1;
237 }
238
239 if (i <= 0) {
240 rb->left = left;
241 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
242 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
243 if (len + left == 0)
244 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
245 }
246 return (i);
247 }
248 left += i;
249
250 /*
251 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
252 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
253 * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
254 */
255 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
256 if (n > left)
257 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
258 }
259 }
260
261 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
262 rb->offset += n;
263 rb->left = left - n;
264 s->internal->packet_length += n;
265 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
266
267 return (n);
268}
269
270int
271ssl3_packet_read(SSL *s, int plen)
272{
273 int n;
274
275 n = ssl3_read_n(s, plen, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
276 if (n <= 0)
277 return n;
278 if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
279 return s->internal->packet_length;
280
281 return plen;
282}
283
284int
285ssl3_packet_extend(SSL *s, int plen)
286{
287 int rlen, n;
288
289 if (s->internal->packet_length >= plen)
290 return plen;
291 rlen = plen - s->internal->packet_length;
292
293 n = ssl3_read_n(s, rlen, rlen, 1);
294 if (n <= 0)
295 return n;
296 if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
297 return s->internal->packet_length;
298
299 return plen;
300}
301
302/* Call this to get a new input record.
303 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
304 * or non-blocking IO.
305 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
306 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record
307 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data
308 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes
309 */
310/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
311static int
312ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
313{
314 int al;
315 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
316 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
317 SSL_SESSION *sess;
318 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
319 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
320
321 rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec);
322 sess = s->session;
323
324again:
325 /* check if we have the header */
326 if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
327 (s->internal->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
328 CBS header;
329 uint16_t len, ssl_version;
330 uint8_t type;
331
332 n = ssl3_packet_read(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
333 if (n <= 0)
334 return (n);
335
336 s->internal->mac_packet = 1;
337 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
338
339 if (s->server && s->internal->first_packet) {
340 if ((ret = ssl_server_legacy_first_packet(s)) != 1)
341 return (ret);
342 ret = -1;
343 }
344
345 CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
346
347 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
348 if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) ||
349 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) ||
350 !CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) {
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
352 SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
353 goto err;
354 }
355
356 rr->type = type;
357 rr->length = len;
358
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
362 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
363 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) &&
364 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash)
365 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
366 s->version = ssl_version;
367 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
368 goto f_err;
369 }
370
371 if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
373 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
374 goto err;
375 }
376
377 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
378 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
380 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
381 goto f_err;
382 }
383
384 /* now s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
385 }
386
387 /* s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
388
389 n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length);
390 if (n <= 0)
391 return (n);
392 if (n != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length)
393 return (n);
394
395 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
396
397 /* At this point, s->internal->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
398 * and we have that many bytes in s->internal->packet
399 */
400 rr->input = &(s->internal->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
401
402 /* ok, we can now read from 's->internal->packet' data into 'rr'
403 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
404 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
405 * the decryption or by the decompression
406 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
407 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
408
409 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
410 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
411
412 /* check is not needed I believe */
413 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
414 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
416 goto f_err;
417 }
418
419 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
420 rr->data = rr->input;
421
422 enc_err = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
423 /* enc_err is:
424 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
425 * 1: if the padding is valid
426 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
427 if (enc_err == 0) {
428 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
430 goto f_err;
431 }
432
433
434 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
435 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
436 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
437 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
438 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
439 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
440
441 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
442 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
443
444 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
445 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
446
447 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
448 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
449 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
450 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
451 */
452 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
453 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
454 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
455 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
456 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
458 goto f_err;
459 }
460
461 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
462 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
463 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
464 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
465 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
466 * */
467 mac = mac_tmp;
468 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
469 rr->length -= mac_size;
470 } else {
471 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
472 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
473 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
474 rr->length -= mac_size;
475 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
476 }
477
478 i = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
479 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL ||
480 timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
481 enc_err = -1;
482 if (rr->length >
483 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
484 enc_err = -1;
485 }
486
487 if (enc_err < 0) {
488 /*
489 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with
490 * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a
491 * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext
492 * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error
493 * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker
494 * (e.g. via a logfile)
495 */
496 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
498 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
499 goto f_err;
500 }
501
502 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
503 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
505 goto f_err;
506 }
507
508 rr->off = 0;
509 /*
510 * So at this point the following is true
511 *
512 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type is the type of record
513 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
514 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
515 * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
516 * after use :-).
517 */
518
519 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
520 s->internal->packet_length = 0;
521
522 /* just read a 0 length packet */
523 if (rr->length == 0)
524 goto again;
525
526 return (1);
527
528f_err:
529 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
530err:
531 return (ret);
532}
533
534/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
535 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
536 */
537int
538ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
539{
540 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
541 unsigned int tot, n, nw;
542 int i;
543
544 if (len < 0) {
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
546 return -1;
547 }
548
549 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
550 tot = S3I(s)->wnum;
551 S3I(s)->wnum = 0;
552
553 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
554 i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
555 if (i < 0)
556 return (i);
557 if (i == 0) {
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
559 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
560 return -1;
561 }
562 }
563
564 if (len < tot)
565 len = tot;
566 n = (len - tot);
567 for (;;) {
568 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
569 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
570 else
571 nw = n;
572
573 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
574 if (i <= 0) {
575 S3I(s)->wnum = tot;
576 return i;
577 }
578
579 if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
580 (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
581 /*
582 * Next chunk of data should get another prepended
583 * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
584 * weakness.
585 */
586 S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 0;
587
588 return tot + i;
589 }
590
591 n -= i;
592 tot += i;
593 }
594}
595
596static int
597do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
598 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
599{
600 unsigned char *p, *plen;
601 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
602 int prefix_len = 0;
603 int eivlen;
604 size_t align;
605 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
606 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
607 SSL_SESSION *sess;
608
609 if (wb->buf == NULL)
610 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
611 return -1;
612
613 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
614 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
615 if (wb->left != 0)
616 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
617
618 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
619 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
620 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
621 if (i <= 0)
622 return (i);
623 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
624 /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
625 if (wb->buf == NULL)
626 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
627 return -1;
628 }
629
630 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
631 return 0;
632
633 wr = &(S3I(s)->wrec);
634 sess = s->session;
635
636 if ((sess == NULL) || (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
637 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash) == NULL)) {
638 clear = s->internal->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
639 mac_size = 0;
640 } else {
641 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash);
642 if (mac_size < 0)
643 goto err;
644 }
645
646 /*
647 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls
648 * itself.
649 */
650 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done) {
651 /*
652 * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
653 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
654 */
655 if (S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments &&
656 type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
657 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
658 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
659 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
660 * together with the actual payload) */
661 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
662 if (prefix_len <= 0)
663 goto err;
664
665 if (prefix_len >
666 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
667 /* insufficient space */
668 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
670 goto err;
671 }
672 }
673
674 S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 1;
675 }
676
677 if (create_empty_fragment) {
678 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
679 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
680 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
681 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
682 align = (size_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
683 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
684
685 p = wb->buf + align;
686 wb->offset = align;
687 } else if (prefix_len) {
688 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
689 } else {
690 align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
691 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
692
693 p = wb->buf + align;
694 wb->offset = align;
695 }
696
697 /* write the header */
698
699 *(p++) = type&0xff;
700 wr->type = type;
701
702 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
703 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
704 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
705 */
706 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->internal->renegotiate &&
707 TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
708 *(p++) = 0x1;
709 else
710 *(p++) = s->version&0xff;
711
712 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
713 plen = p;
714 p += 2;
715
716 /* Explicit IV length. */
717 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
718 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_write_ctx);
719 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
720 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->internal->enc_write_ctx);
721 if (eivlen <= 1)
722 eivlen = 0;
723 }
724 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
725 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
726 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
727 else
728 eivlen = 0;
729 } else if (s->internal->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
730 s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) {
731 eivlen = s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
732 } else
733 eivlen = 0;
734
735 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
736 wr->data = p + eivlen;
737 wr->length = (int)len;
738 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
739
740 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
741
742 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
743 wr->input = wr->data;
744
745 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
746 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
747 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
748
749 if (mac_size != 0) {
750 if (s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
751 &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
752 goto err;
753 wr->length += mac_size;
754 }
755
756 wr->input = p;
757 wr->data = p;
758
759 if (eivlen) {
760 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
761 goto err;
762 */
763 wr->length += eivlen;
764 }
765
766 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
767 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
768
769 /* record length after mac and block padding */
770 s2n(wr->length, plen);
771
772 /* we should now have
773 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
774 * wr->length long */
775 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
776 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
777
778 if (create_empty_fragment) {
779 /* we are in a recursive call;
780 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
781 */
782 return wr->length;
783 }
784
785 /* now let's set up wb */
786 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
787
788 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
789 * bad write retries later */
790 S3I(s)->wpend_tot = len;
791 S3I(s)->wpend_buf = buf;
792 S3I(s)->wpend_type = type;
793 S3I(s)->wpend_ret = len;
794
795 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
796 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
797err:
798 return -1;
799}
800
801/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
802int
803ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
804{
805 int i;
806 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
807
808 /* XXXX */
809 if ((S3I(s)->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((S3I(s)->wpend_buf != buf) &&
810 !(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
811 (S3I(s)->wpend_type != type)) {
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
813 return (-1);
814 }
815
816 for (;;) {
817 errno = 0;
818 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
819 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
820 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
821 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
822 (unsigned int)wb->left);
823 } else {
824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
825 i = -1;
826 }
827 if (i == wb->left) {
828 wb->left = 0;
829 wb->offset += i;
830 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
831 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
832 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
833 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
834 return (S3I(s)->wpend_ret);
835 } else if (i <= 0) {
836 /*
837 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
838 * whole point in using a datagram service.
839 */
840 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
841 wb->left = 0;
842 return (i);
843 }
844 wb->offset += i;
845 wb->left -= i;
846 }
847}
848
849/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
850 * 'type' is one of the following:
851 *
852 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
853 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
854 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
855 *
856 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
857 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
858 *
859 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
860 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
861 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
862 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
863 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
864 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
865 * Change cipher spec protocol
866 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
867 * Alert protocol
868 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
869 * Handshake protocol
870 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
871 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
872 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
873 * Application data protocol
874 * none of our business
875 */
876int
877ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
878{
879 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
880 int al, i, j, ret, rrcount = 0;
881 unsigned int n;
882 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
883 BIO *bio;
884
885 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
886 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
887 return (-1);
888
889 if (len < 0) {
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
891 return -1;
892 }
893
894 if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
895 type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
896 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 return -1;
899 }
900
901 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
902 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
903 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
904 unsigned char *src = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment;
905 unsigned char *dst = buf;
906 unsigned int k;
907
908 /* peek == 0 */
909 n = 0;
910 while ((len > 0) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
911 *dst++ = *src++;
912 len--;
913 S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len--;
914 n++;
915 }
916 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
917 for (k = 0; k < S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
918 S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
919 return n;
920 }
921
922 /*
923 * Now S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
924 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
925 */
926 if (!s->internal->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
927 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
928 i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
929 if (i < 0)
930 return (i);
931 if (i == 0) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
933 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
934 return (-1);
935 }
936 }
937
938start:
939 /*
940 * Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the
941 * peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an
942 * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further
943 * processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and
944 * non-application data records per connection should probably also be
945 * limited...
946 */
947 if (rrcount++ >= 3) {
948 if ((bio = SSL_get_rbio(s)) == NULL) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 return -1;
951 }
952 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
953 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
954 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
955 return -1;
956 }
957
958 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
959
960 /*
961 * S3I(s)->rrec.type - is the type of record
962 * S3I(s)->rrec.data, - data
963 * S3I(s)->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
964 * S3I(s)->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
965 */
966 rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec);
967
968 /* get new packet if necessary */
969 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
970 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
971 if (ret <= 0)
972 return (ret);
973 }
974
975 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
976
977 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
978 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
979 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
980 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
982 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
983 goto f_err;
984 }
985
986 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
987 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
988 if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
989 rr->length = 0;
990 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
991 return (0);
992 }
993
994
995 /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
996 if (type == rr->type) {
997 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
998 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
999 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1000 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1001 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1003 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1004 goto f_err;
1005 }
1006
1007 if (len <= 0)
1008 return (len);
1009
1010 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1011 n = rr->length;
1012 else
1013 n = (unsigned int)len;
1014
1015 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1016 if (!peek) {
1017 memset(&(rr->data[rr->off]), 0, n);
1018 rr->length -= n;
1019 rr->off += n;
1020 if (rr->length == 0) {
1021 s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1022 rr->off = 0;
1023 if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
1024 s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1025 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1026 }
1027 }
1028 return (n);
1029 }
1030
1031
1032 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1033 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1034
1035 {
1036 /*
1037 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment'
1038 * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data
1039 * at a fixed place.
1040 */
1041 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1042 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1043 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1044
1045 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1046 dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->handshake_fragment;
1047 dest = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment;
1048 dest_len = &S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len;
1049 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1050 dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->alert_fragment;
1051 dest = S3I(s)->alert_fragment;
1052 dest_len = &S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len;
1053 }
1054 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1055 /* available space in 'dest' */
1056 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len;
1057 if (rr->length < n)
1058 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1059
1060 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1061 while (n-- > 0) {
1062 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1063 rr->length--;
1064 }
1065
1066 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1067 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1068 }
1069 }
1070
1071 /* S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1072 * S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1073 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1074
1075 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1076 if ((!s->server) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1077 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1078 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1079 S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1080
1081 if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1082 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1083 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1086 goto f_err;
1087 }
1088
1089 if (s->internal->msg_callback)
1090 s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1091 S3I(s)->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1092 s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
1093
1094 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1095 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1096 !S3I(s)->renegotiate) {
1097 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1098 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1099 i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
1100 if (i < 0)
1101 return (i);
1102 if (i == 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1104 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1105 return (-1);
1106 }
1107
1108 if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1109 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
1110 /* no read-ahead left? */
1111 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1112 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1113 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1114 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1115 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1116 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1117 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1118 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1119 return (-1);
1120 }
1121 }
1122 }
1123 }
1124 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1125 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1126 goto start;
1127 }
1128 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1129 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1130 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1131 */
1132 if (s->server &&
1133 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1134 !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding &&
1135 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1136 (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1137 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1138 /*S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1139 rr->length = 0;
1140 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1141 goto start;
1142 }
1143 if (S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1144 int alert_level = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[0];
1145 int alert_descr = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[1];
1146
1147 S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1148
1149 if (s->internal->msg_callback)
1150 s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1151 S3I(s)->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
1152
1153 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
1154 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
1155 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
1156 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
1157
1158 if (cb != NULL) {
1159 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1160 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1161 }
1162
1163 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1164 S3I(s)->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1165 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1166 s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1167 return (0);
1168 }
1169 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1170 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1171 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1172 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1173 * expects it to succeed.
1174 *
1175 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1176 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1177 */
1178 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1179 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1181 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1182 goto f_err;
1183 }
1184 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1185 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1186 S3I(s)->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1188 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1189 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
1190 alert_descr);
1191 s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1192 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1193 return (0);
1194 } else {
1195 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1197 goto f_err;
1198 }
1199
1200 goto start;
1201 }
1202
1203 if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
1204 /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1205 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1206 rr->length = 0;
1207 return (0);
1208 }
1209
1210 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1211 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1212 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1213 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1214 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1215 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1217 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1218 goto f_err;
1219 }
1220
1221 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1222 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1223 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1225 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1226 goto f_err;
1227 }
1228
1229 /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
1230 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1233 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1234 goto f_err;
1235 }
1236 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1237
1238 rr->length = 0;
1239
1240 if (s->internal->msg_callback) {
1241 s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version,
1242 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s,
1243 s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
1244 }
1245
1246 S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1247 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1248 goto err;
1249 else
1250 goto start;
1251 }
1252
1253 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1254 if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
1255 if (((s->internal->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1256 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1257 s->internal->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1258 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
1259 s->internal->new_session = 1;
1260 }
1261 i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
1262 if (i < 0)
1263 return (i);
1264 if (i == 0) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1266 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1267 return (-1);
1268 }
1269
1270 if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1271 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1272 BIO *bio;
1273 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1274 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1275 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1276 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1277 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1278 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1279 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1280 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1281 return (-1);
1282 }
1283 }
1284 goto start;
1285 }
1286
1287 switch (rr->type) {
1288 default:
1289 /*
1290 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1291 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1292 */
1293 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
1294 s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1295 rr->length = 0;
1296 goto start;
1297 }
1298 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1300 goto f_err;
1301 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1302 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1303 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1304 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1305 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->internal->in_handshake is set, but that
1306 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1307 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1309 goto f_err;
1310 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1311 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1312 * but have application data. If the library was
1313 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1314 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1315 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1316 * we will indulge it.
1317 */
1318 if (S3I(s)->in_read_app_data &&
1319 (S3I(s)->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1320 (((s->internal->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1321 (s->internal->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1322 (s->internal->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) ||
1323 ((s->internal->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1324 (s->internal->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1325 (s->internal->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1326 S3I(s)->in_read_app_data = 2;
1327 return (-1);
1328 } else {
1329 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1331 goto f_err;
1332 }
1333 }
1334 /* not reached */
1335
1336f_err:
1337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1338err:
1339 return (-1);
1340}
1341
1342int
1343ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1344{
1345 int i;
1346 const char *sender;
1347 int slen;
1348
1349 if (s->internal->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1350 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1351 else
1352 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1353
1354 if (S3I(s)->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1355 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1356 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1358 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1359 return (0);
1360 }
1361
1362 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher;
1363 if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1364 return (0);
1365 }
1366
1367 if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1368 return (0);
1369
1370 /* we have to record the message digest at
1371 * this point so we can get it before we read
1372 * the finished message */
1373 if (s->internal->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1374 sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1375 slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1376 } else {
1377 sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1378 slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1379 }
1380
1381 i = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
1382 S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1383 if (i == 0) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387 S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1388
1389 return (1);
1390}
1391
1392int
1393ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1394{
1395 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1396 desc = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1397 if (desc < 0)
1398 return -1;
1399 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1400 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1401 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1402
1403 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1404 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1405 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1406 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1407 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1408
1409 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1410 * some time in the future */
1411 return -1;
1412}
1413
1414int
1415ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1416{
1417 int i, j;
1418 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1419
1420 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1421 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1422 if (i <= 0) {
1423 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1424 } else {
1425 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1426 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1427 * we will not worry too much. */
1428 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1429 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1430
1431 if (s->internal->msg_callback)
1432 s->internal->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1433 s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
1434
1435 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
1436 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
1437 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
1438 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
1439
1440 if (cb != NULL) {
1441 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1442 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1443 }
1444 }
1445 return (i);
1446}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-26 19:44:33 +0000